Assurance about the offering
Assessment evidence, certification boundary, provider responsibilities, secure configuration guidance, findings, and ongoing service evidence.
Proposal & working paper · 26 October 2026
A signed CSA for the cloud service. A separate ATO for the agency system.
This report reviews a proposed agency workflow and turns it into an eight-step workbook. It is an independent analysis, not official FedRAMP guidance or an authorization.
The proposal is a new FedRAMP-specific Cloud Service Authorization (CSA) process that agencies would follow for cloud services used by their federal information systems. Each CSA would be a distinct signed agency decision, referenced from SA-9, SA-4, and other applicable controls. The agency would separately authorize its federal information system through the FISMA ATO process.
The FedRAMP Act’s process and reuse authorities, M-24-15, and NIST’s external-service model provide a basis for evaluating this design. The CSA would operate within the agency system’s lifecycle, with its own decision scope and signed record. Agency monitoring would connect service evidence and CSA conditions to the system’s continued authorization.
What would be new: a FedRAMP-defined agency CSA procedure and signed decision, separate from the agency system ATO and from the provider’s FedRAMP authorization or certification. SA-9, SA-4, and other control records would reference the CSA. The CSA would have its own signing authority, decision criteria, and lifecycle under that new process.
Published FedRAMP guidance supports reuse and agency system authorization. The cited guidance does not establish the distinct CSA proposed here. The report separates that proposed process from existing requirements and identifies what FedRAMP would need to define.
Agencies use FedRAMP Certifications as reusable security evidence, but each agency still authorizes its own federal information systems. FedRAMP certifies the cloud service offering; the agency authorizing official accepts risk for the agency’s specific use of that service, including the information processed, the configuration selected, the integrations enabled, and the controls the agency is responsible for operating.
Assessment evidence, certification boundary, provider responsibilities, secure configuration guidance, findings, and ongoing service evidence.
Under the proposal: a signed CSA for each cloud service and a separate system ATO, covering information, mission, customer controls, integrations, agreements, and continued use or exit.
This is a responsibility map, not a legal boundary excluding the provider from applicable requirements. See SA-9 in steps 3 and 8, and M-24-15 in steps 7 and 8.
Step 4 below reflects the clarified proposal: agencies perform a separate, signed CSA under a new FedRAMP process. Step 5 remains the agency system’s FISMA ATO. The expanded workbook adds preparation, agreements, control references, and connected monitoring.
Aligned. Add ownership, information flows, non-security obligations, and a FedRAMP scope determination. See workbook step
Aligned. Derive the category from information and mission harm; define a real boundary and allocate responsibilities. See workbook step
Aligned with conditions. Presume provider assessment adequate; document fit and customer work without repeating the assessment. See workbook step
Proposed new procedure. Agencies would issue a distinct signed CSA for cloud services used by their agency information system, document the applicable requirements, and reference the CSA from SA-9, SA-4, and other controls. The system ATO remains separate. See workbook step
Aligned. Complete the system’s FISMA assessment and ATO, using signed CSAs as supporting decisions and assessing agency implementation and integrations. See workbook step
Aligned if connected. Feed FedRAMP evidence into agency monitoring, ongoing risk acceptance, and change/exit decisions. See workbook step
Use one worksheet per agency use and service; link related records when a system uses several services. Work through the eight records below. Steps 2–5 are iterative: evidence or design changes can send you back. The proposed CSA and the agency system ATO have separate scopes. For a new system, operational use waits for its ATO. Within an existing ATO lifecycle, a new CSA also requires review of whether the system authorization still covers the changed use.
Use references to agency records. This page is a working aid, not the official repository. Answers stay in this browser session unless you choose browser storage or export them. Nothing entered here is sent to a server.
Session only. Export a copy before closing this page.
JSON import replaces this worksheet after validation. Browser storage is specific to this site and browser. Exported files are your responsibility to store appropriately. Field completion does not mean approval.
The authorizing official should be able to trace the decision from the agency’s information and mission to the selected service, evidence, customer responsibilities, assessment results, conditions, and ongoing monitoring. The completed package should identify two separate signed decisions: the service CSA under the proposed FedRAMP procedure and the agency system ATO. This worksheet helps assemble and cross-reference them; exporting it does not sign either decision.
Quoted passages retain the source wording. PDF line wrapping and line-end hyphenation are normalized; paragraph breaks are added for readability. Locators identify the printed section and original PDF page. The analysis and workbook prompts are this report’s interpretation and proposal.
Currency: reviewed October 26, 2026. The statutory quotations come from the 2014 and 2022 enacted laws, checked against the site’s retained current-law collection (OLRC release 119-118, through September 30, 2026). This is not a claim to have audited every later enactment. A-130 is the 2016 revision; M-24-15 is July 25, 2024. SP 800-37 Rev. 2 is December 2018. The SP 800-53 Rev. 5 quotes use the December 2020 update; NIST’s August 2025 Release 5.2.0 changes do not alter SA-9 or the SA-4 control statement quoted here. Current baselines are in SP 800-53B and its applicable updates.
Program guidance: the five current FedRAMP pages were captured October 26, 2026. The Agency Use page labels its rules required, with July 4, 2026 applicability dates. The local FedRAMP MCP snapshot was older and marked some rules as placeholders; the published page is the basis for the program-status descriptions here. See the current scope guidance for detailed exclusions and examples. National-security and classified systems are outside this workbook’s scope.
See the information and systems history for the earlier law, comments, and changes. This page concentrates on the proposed implementation. Download quotations · Download source metadata
Official source · Retained original
Historical edition
SHA-256
107a9b9cdc8eccf37386aec28bbaf2dfaef5cfece17151ceabc3960423243a57Official source · Retained original
Historical edition
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96ab24c78d410963ebb0bcd519dbe4b95ee800400c49ea4448e6d3f39c3eb917Official source · Retained original
2016 revision; later laws and memoranda also apply.
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f1a2e73a1063eab7d83da2a3bfa810f3aaebc9a6ef8e9d264ffc57ccd02152e6Official source · Retained original
Historical edition
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4f75e1136bb905a654f1bcd9eefefb4108f47597276ee5eec0688f6d96f6a01dOfficial source · Retained original
Current applicability not assessed
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07aabe7fd0baa34e3c77b7c9537204c6ac1caff473e04af8dc7e40743c30250aOfficial source · Retained original
Historical edition
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9e5d37dfa7d1282073c16f3dde21978078f62f58f9db36f4828e270e02de933fOfficial source · Retained original
Official published page captured October 26, 2026. The accompanying text file is extracted from its article body.
SHA-256
669bec2cf3b9a5a4441e495719997de1a98882fe9413f879dc593036b27c4317Official source · Retained original
Official published page captured October 26, 2026. The accompanying text file is extracted from its article body.
SHA-256
dd12a4780b6731ac2e4c0fe5f8e96f9ceae6768f06b6f1fdbfebb12a51bbd69cOfficial source · Retained original
Official published page captured October 26, 2026. The accompanying text file is extracted from its article body.
SHA-256
f18d1c5a206729b43ba95820eb2a2b3380071e056f469e37d9cb484944ff3f49Official source · Retained original
Official published page captured October 26, 2026. The accompanying text file is extracted from its article body.
SHA-256
0cb9ab020cfedd30ae45c3b757f4c74ffaba7d4c8e7d95298b8ac149ac97ff93Official source · Retained original
Official published page captured October 26, 2026. The accompanying text file is extracted from its article body.
SHA-256
006a89ab84e612853f6c998fff7d89e817133010b767837e5da74fc3cb450cdbOfficial source · Retained original
Historical edition
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73d19f05f71e30f378050f178aa3943c38790bbae56c07f2b5708c5a1a90242fOfficial source · Retained original
Historical edition
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fc63bcd61715d0181dd8e85998b1e6201ae3515fc6626102101cab1841e11ec6Official source · Retained original
Historical edition
SHA-256
8a9dae903c2e4924d7b67c246faa32757d15f9731abb85922fad63f9ea0e02fa