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SP 800-37 Rev. 2: Security and Privacy RMF

Selected pages that mention A-130. Other pages are omitted.

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NIST SP 800-37, REVISION 2 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy ________________________________________________________________________________________________ PAGE i This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r2

Authority This publication has been developed by NIST to further its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of the appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.

Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, OMB Director, or any other federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-37, Revision 2 Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-37, Rev. 2, 183 pages (December 2018)

CODEN: NSPUE2

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r2

Comments on this publication may be submitted to: National Institute of Standards and Technology Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory

100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

Email: sec-cert@nist.gov All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [FOIA96]. Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts, practices, and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST.

Organizations are encouraged to review draft publications during the designated public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications.

NIST SP 800-37, REVISION 2 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy ________________________________________________________________________________________________ PAGE vi This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r2

reputational, political, and a broad range of operational risks such as information security, human capital, business continuity, and related risks…” “… Effective management of cybersecurity risk requires that agencies align information security management processes with strategic, operational, and budgetary planning processes…” OMB Circular A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic Resource [OMB A-130], addresses responsibilities for protecting federal information resources and for managing personally identifiable information (PII). Circular A-130 requires agencies to implement the RMF that is described in this guideline and requires agencies to integrate privacy into the RMF process. In establishing requirements for information security programs and privacy programs, the OMB circular emphasizes the need for both programs to collaborate on shared objectives: “While security and privacy are independent and separate disciplines, they are closely related, and it is essential for agencies to take a coordinated approach to identifying and managing security and privacy risks and complying with applicable requirements….”

This update to NIST Special Publication 800-37 (Revision 2) responds to the call by the Defense Science Board, the Executive Order, and the OMB policy memorandum to develop the next- generation Risk Management Framework (RMF) for information systems, organizations, and individuals.

There are seven major objectives for this update:

• To provide closer linkage and communication between the risk management processes and activities at the C-suite or governance level of the organization and the individuals, processes, and activities at the system and operational level of the organization;

• To institutionalize critical risk management preparatory activities at all risk management levels to facilitate a more effective, efficient, and cost-effective execution of the RMF;

• To demonstrate how the NIST Cybersecurity Framework [NIST CSF] can be aligned with the RMF and implemented using established NIST risk management processes;

• To integrate privacy risk management processes into the RMF to better support the privacy protection needs for which privacy programs are responsible;

• To promote the development of trustworthy secure software and systems by aligning life cycle-based systems engineering processes in NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume 1 [SP 800-160 v1], with the relevant tasks in the RMF;

• To integrate security-related, supply chain risk management (SCRM) concepts into the RMF to address untrustworthy suppliers, insertion of counterfeits, tampering, unauthorized production, theft, insertion of malicious code, and poor manufacturing and development practices throughout the SDLC; and

• To allow for an organization-generated control selection approach to complement the traditional baseline control selection approach and support the use of the consolidated control catalog in NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5. The addition of the Prepare step is one of the key changes to the RMF—incorporated to achieve more effective, efficient, and cost-effective security and privacy risk management processes.

The primary objectives for institutionalizing organization-level and system-level preparation are:

NIST SP 800-37, REVISION 2 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy ________________________________________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER ONE PAGE 1

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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION THE NEED TO MANAGE SECURITY AND PRIVACY RISK

rganizations depend on information systems1 to carry out their missions and business functions. The success of the missions and business functions depends on protecting the confidentiality, integrity, availability of information processed, stored, and transmitted by those systems and the privacy of individuals. The threats to information systems include equipment failure, environmental disruptions, human or machine errors, and purposeful attacks that are often sophisticated, disciplined, well-organized, and well-funded.2 When successful, attacks on information systems can result in serious or catastrophic damage to organizational operations3 and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.4 Therefore, it is imperative that organizations remain vigilant and that senior executives, leaders, and managers throughout the organization understand their responsibilities and are accountable for protecting organizational assets and for managing risk.5 In addition to the responsibility to protect organizational assets from the threats that exist in today’s environment, organizations have a responsibility to consider and manage the risks to individuals when information systems process personally identifiable information (PII).6 7 The information security and privacy programs implemented by organizations have complementary objectives with respect to managing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII. While many privacy risks arise from unauthorized activities that lead to the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of PII, other privacy risks result from authorized activities involving the creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, or disposal of PII that enables an organization to meet its mission or business objectives. For example, organizations could fail to provide appropriate notice of PII processing depriving an individual of knowledge of such processing or an individual could be embarrassed or stigmatized

1 An information system is a discrete set of information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information [44 USC 3502]. The term information system includes, for example, general-purpose computing systems; industrial/process control systems; cyber-physical systems; weapons systems; super computers; command, control, and communications systems; devices such as smart phones and tablets; environmental control systems; embedded devices/sensors; and paper-based systems.

2 Defense Science Board Task Force Report, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat [DSB 2013]. 3 Organizational operations include mission, functions, image, and reputation. 4 Adverse impacts include, for example, compromises to systems supporting critical infrastructure applications or that are paramount to government continuity of operations as defined by the Department of Homeland Security.

5 Risk is a measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event. Risk is also a function of the adverse impacts that arise if the circumstance or event occurs, and the likelihood of occurrence. Types of risk include program risk; compliance/regulatory risk; financial risk; legal risk; mission/business risk; political risk; security and privacy risk (including supply chain risk); project risk; reputational risk; safety risk; strategic planning risk.

6 [OMB A-130] defines PII as “information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual.” 7 Organizations may also choose to consider risks to individuals that may arise from interactions with information systems, where the processing of PII may be less impactful than the effect the system has on individuals’ behavior or activities. Such effects would constitute risks to individual autonomy and organizations may need to take steps to manage those risks in addition to information security and privacy risks.

O

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CHAPTER ONE PAGE 2

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by the authorized disclosure of PII. While managing privacy risk requires close coordination between information security and privacy programs due to the complementary nature of the programs’ objectives around the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII, privacy risks also raise distinct concerns that require specialized expertise and approaches. Therefore, it is critical that organizations also establish and maintain robust privacy programs to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to manage the risk to individuals associated with the processing of PII.

Closely related to, and a part of security and privacy risks, supply chain risk8 is also of growing concern to organizations. Because of the increased reliance on third-party or external providers and commercial-off-the-shelf products, systems, and services, attacks or disruptions in the supply chain which impact an organization’s systems are increasing. Such attacks can be difficult to trace or manage and can result in serious, severe, or catastrophic consequences for an organization’s systems. Supply chain risk management (SCRM) overlaps and works in harmony with security and privacy risk management. This publication integrates security and privacy risk management practices associated with SCRM into the RMF to help promote a comprehensive approach to managing security and privacy risk. While the publication is principally focused on managing information security and privacy risk, SCRM concepts that support security and privacy risk management are specifically called out in several areas to add emphasis and to clarify how they can be addressed using the RMF.

1.1 BACKGROUND

NIST in its partnership with the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Committee on National Security Systems, developed a Risk Management Framework (RMF) to improve information security, strengthen risk management processes, and encourage reciprocity9 among organizations. In July 2016, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) revised Circular A-130 to include responsibilities for privacy programs under the RMF.

The RMF emphasizes risk management by promoting the development of security and privacy capabilities into information systems throughout the system development life cycle (SDLC);10 by maintaining situational awareness of the security and privacy posture of those systems on an ongoing basis through continuous monitoring processes; and by providing information to senior leaders and executives to facilitate decisions regarding the acceptance of risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation arising from the use and operation of their systems. The RMF:

• Provides a repeatable process designed to promote the protection of information and information systems commensurate with risk;

• Emphasizes organization-wide preparation necessary to manage security and privacy risks;

8 SCRM requirements are promulgated in [OMB A-130], [DODI 5200.44], and for national security systems in [CNSSD 505]. SCRM requirements have also been addressed by the Federal SCRM Policy Coordinating Committee. 9 Reciprocity is an agreement between organizations to accept one another’s security assessment results in order to reuse system resources or to accept each other’s assessed security posture in order to share information.

10 [SP 800-64] and [SP 800-160 v1] provide guidance on security considerations in the SDLC.

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• Facilitates the categorization of information and systems, the selection, implementation, assessment, and monitoring of controls, and the authorization of information systems and common controls;11

• Promotes the use of automation for near real-time risk management and ongoing system and control authorization through the implementation of continuous monitoring processes;

• Encourages the use of correct and timely metrics to provide senior leaders and managers with the necessary information to make cost-effective, risk-based decisions for information systems supporting their missions and business functions;

• Facilitates the integration of security and privacy requirements12 and controls into enterprise architecture,13 SDLC, acquisition processes, and systems engineering processes;

• Connects risk management processes at the organization and mission/business process levels to risk management processes at the information system level through a senior accountable official for risk management and risk executive (function);14 and

• Establishes responsibility and accountability for controls implemented within information systems and inherited by those systems. The RMF provides a dynamic and flexible approach to effectively manage security and privacy risks in diverse environments with complex and sophisticated threats, evolving missions and business functions, and changing system and organizational vulnerabilities. The framework is policy and technology neutral, which facilitates ongoing upgrades to IT resources15 and to IT modernization efforts—to support and help ensure essential missions and services are provided during such transition periods.

1.2 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY

This publication describes the RMF and provides guidelines for managing security and privacy risks and applying the RMF to information systems and organizations. The guidelines have been developed:

• To ensure that managing system-related security and privacy risk is consistent with the mission and business objectives of the organization and risk management strategy established by the senior leadership through the risk executive (function);

• To achieve privacy protections for individuals and security protections for information and information systems through the implementation of appropriate risk response strategies;

• To support consistent, informed, and ongoing authorization decisions,16 reciprocity, and the transparency and traceability of security and privacy information;

11 Chapter 3 describes the seven steps and associated tasks in the RMF. 12 Section 2.6 describes the relationship between requirements and controls with respect to RMF execution.

13 [OMB FEA] provides guidance on the Federal Enterprise Architecture.

14 [OMB M-17-25] provides guidance on risk management roles and responsibilities. 15 IT resources refer to the information technology component of information resources defined in [OMB A-130]. 16 [SP 800-137] provides guidance on information security continuous monitoring supporting ongoing authorization.

Future publications will address privacy continuous monitoring.

NIST SP 800-37, REVISION 2 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy ________________________________________________________________________________________________

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2.3 INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN THE RMF

Executing the RMF requires close collaboration between information security programs and privacy programs. While information security programs and privacy programs have different objectives, those objectives are overlapping and complementary. Information security programs are responsible for protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction (i.e., unauthorized system activity or behavior) in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Privacy programs are responsible for ensuring compliance with applicable privacy requirements and for managing the risks to individuals associated with the creation, collection, use, processing, dissemination, storage, maintenance, disclosure, or disposal (collectively referred to as “processing”) of PII.30 When preparing to execute the steps of the RMF, organizations consider how to best promote and institutionalize collaboration between the two programs to ensure that the objectives of both disciplines are met at every step of the process.

30 Privacy programs may also choose to consider the risks to individuals that may arise from their interactions with information systems, where the processing of PII may be less impactful than the effect the system has on individuals’ behavior or activities. Such effects would constitute risks to individual autonomy and organizations may need to take steps to manage those risks in addition to information security and privacy risks.

OMB CIRCULAR A-130: INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY In 2016, OMB revised Circular A-130, the circular establishing general policy for the planning, budgeting, governance, acquisition, and management of federal information, personnel, equipment, funds, information technology resources, and supporting infrastructure and services. The circular addresses responsibilities for protecting federal information resources and managing personally identifiable information (PII). In establishing requirements for information security programs and privacy programs, the circular emphasizes the need for both programs to collaborate on shared objectives: While security and privacy are independent and separate disciplines, they are closely related, and it is essential for agencies to take a coo rdinated approach to identifying and managing security and privacy risks and complying with applicable requirements.

[OMB A-130] requires organizations to implement the RMF that is described in this guideline. With the 2016 revision to the circular, OMB also requires organizations to integrate privacy into the RMF process: The RMF provides a disciplined and structured process that integrates information security, privacy, and risk management activities into the SDLC. This Circular requires organizations to use the RMF to manage privacy risks beyond those that are typically included under the “confidentiality” objective of the term “information security.” While many privacy risks relate to the unauthorized access or disclos ure of PII, privacy risks may also result from other activities, including the creation, collection, use, and retention of PII; the inadequate quality or integrity of PII; and the lack of appropriate notice, transparency, or participation.

This section of the guideline describes the relationship between information security programs and privacy programs under the RMF. However, subject to OMB policy, organizations retain the flexibility to undertake the integration of privacy into the RMF in the most effect ive manner, considering the organization’s mission and circumstances.

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When an information system processes PII, the organization’s information security program and privacy program have a shared responsibility for managing the risks to individuals that may arise from unauthorized system activity or behavior. This requires the two programs to collaborate when selecting, implementing, assessing, and monitoring security controls.31 However, while information security programs and privacy programs have complementary objectives with respect to managing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII, protecting individuals’ privacy cannot be achieved solely by securing PII.

Not all privacy risks arise from unauthorized system activity or behavior, such as unauthorized access or disclosure of PII. Some privacy risks may result from authorized activity that is beyond the scope of information security. For example, privacy programs are responsible for managing the risks to individuals that may result from the creation, collection, use, and retention of PII; the inadequate quality or integrity of PII; and the lack of appropriate notice, transparency, or participation. Therefore, to help ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to manage privacy risks from authorized and unauthorized processing of PII, organizations’ privacy programs also select, implement, assess, and monitor privacy controls.32

[OMB A-130] defines a privacy control as an administrative, technical, or physical safeguard employed within an agency to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to manage privacy risks. A privacy control is different from a security control, which the Circular defines as a safeguard or countermeasure prescribed for an information system or an organization to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information. Due to the shared responsibility that organizations’ information security programs and privacy programs have to manage the risks to individuals arising from unauthorized system activity or behavior, controls that achieve both security and privacy objectives are both privacy and security controls. This guideline refers to such controls that achieve both sets of objectives simply as “controls.” When this guideline uses the descriptors “privacy” and “security” with the term control, it is referring to those controls in circumstances where the controls are selected, implemented, and assessed for particular objectives.

The risk management processes described in this publication are equally applicable to security and privacy programs. However, the risks that security and privacy programs are required to manage are overlapping in some areas, but not in others. Consequently, it is important that organizations understand the interplay between privacy and security to promote effective collaboration between privacy and security officials at every level of the organization.

31 For example, in Task C-2 of the Categorize step, privacy and security programs work together to consider potential adverse impacts to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of PII in order to determine the impact level for the information system. The resulting impact level drives the selection of a security control baseline in Task S-1 of the Select step.

32 Different controls may need to be selected to mitigate the privacy risks associated with authorized processing of PII. For example, there may be a risk that individuals would be embarrassed or stigmatized if certain information is disclosed about them. While encryption could prevent unauthorized disclosure of PII, it would not address any privacy risks related to disclosures to parties that are authorized to decrypt and access the PII. To mitigate this privacy risk, organizations would need to assess the risk of allowing authorized parties to decrypt the information and potentially select controls that would mitigate that risk. In such an example, an organization might select controls to enable individuals to understand the organization’s disclosure practices and exercise choices about this access or use differential privacy or privacy-enhancing cryptographic techniques to disassociate the information from an individual.

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requirements, and the costs to the organization. Appendix G provides additional information and considerations for determining authorization boundaries, including boundaries for complex systems and software applications.

2.6 REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLS

Before executing the RMF, it is important to understand the concept of security and privacy requirements and the relationship between requirements and controls. The term requirements can be used in different contexts. In the context of federal information security and privacy policies, the term is generally used to refer to information security and privacy obligations imposed on organizations. For example, OMB Circular A-130 imposes a series of information security and privacy requirements with which federal agencies must comply when managing information resources. In addition to the use of the term requirements in the context of federal policy, the term requirements is used in this guideline in a broader sense to refer to an expression of the set of stakeholder protection needs for a particular system or organization.

Stakeholder protection needs and corresponding security and privacy requirements may be derived from many sources (e.g., laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, mission and business needs, or risk assessments). The term requirements, as used in this guideline, includes both legal and policy requirements, as well as an expression of the broader set of stakeholder protection needs that may be derived from other sources. All of these requirements, when applied to a system, help determine the required characteristics of the system—encompassing security, privacy, and assurance.

Organizations may choose to divide security and privacy requirements into more granular categories depending on where the requirements are employed in the SDLC and for what purpose. Organizations may use the term capability requirement to describe a capability that the system or organization must provide to satisfy a stakeholder protection need. In addition, organizations may refer to system requirements that pertain to particular hardware, software, and firmware components of a system as specification requirements—that is, capabilities that implement all or part of a control and that may be assessed (i.e., as part of the verification, validation, testing, and evaluation processes). Finally, organizations may use the term statement of work requirements to refer to actions that must be performed operationally or during system development.

Controls can be viewed as descriptions of the safeguards and protection capabilities appropriate for achieving the particular security and privacy objectives of the organization and reflecting the

EFFECTIVE AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARIES

Establishing meaningful authorization boundaries for systems and common controls is one of the most important risk management activities carried out by an organization. The authorization boundary defines the specific scope of an authorizing official’s responsibility and accountability for protecting information resources and individuals’ privacy —including the use of systems, components, and services from external providers. Establishment of meaningful authorization boundaries is a foundation for assuring mission and business success for the organization.

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individuals, other organizations, or the Nation are acceptable based on the organization’s risk management strategy and organizational risk tolerance.45

2.8 SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT

Organizations are becoming increasingly reliant on products, systems, and services provided by external providers to carry out missions and business functions. Organizations are responsible and accountable for the risk incurred when using such component products, systems, and services.46 Relationships with external providers can be established in a variety of ways, for example, through joint ventures, business partnerships, various types of formal agreements (e.g., contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements), or outsourcing arrangements.

The growing dependence on products, systems, and services from external providers, along with the nature of the relationships with those providers, present an increasing amount of risk to an organization. Risk may increase based on the likelihood of occurrence and adverse impact from threat events such as the insertion of counterfeits, unauthorized production, tampering, theft, insertion of malicious software and hardware, as well as poor manufacturing and development practices in the supply chain, including the failure to build in security or privacy capabilities that enable an organization to better manage risk in its environment.

Supply chain risks can be endemic or systemic within a system element, system, organization, sector, or nation. While the singular use of a system element or service within a system may present an acceptable risk to an organization, its common or extended use throughout a system, organization, sector or nation can raise the risk to an unacceptable level. These risks are often associated with the global and distributed nature of product and service supply chains and an organization’s decreased visibility into, and understanding of, how the technology that they acquire is developed, integrated, and deployed. This includes the processes, procedures, and practices used to assure the integrity, security, resilience, privacy capabilities, and quality of the acquired products, systems, and services.

To address supply chain risks, organizations develop an SCRM policy, which is an important vehicle for directing SCRM activities. Guided and informed by applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, and regulations, the SCRM policy supports applicable organizational policies (e.g., acquisition and procurement, information security and privacy, logistics, quality, and supply chain). The policy addresses the goals and objectives in the organization’s strategic plan, missions and business functions, and the internal and external customer requirements. It also defines the integration points for SCRM with the risk management and the SDLC processes for the organization. Finally, the SCRM policy defines the SCRM roles and responsibilities within the organization, any dependencies among those roles, and the interaction among the roles. SCRM roles specify the responsibilities for procurement, conducting risk assessments, collecting supply chain threat intelligence, identifying and implementing risk-based mitigations, and performing monitoring functions.

45 See RMF Prepare-Organization Level step, Task P-2.

46 [OMB A-130] defines supply chain risk and requires federal agencies to consider supply chain security issues for all resource planning and management activities throughout the SDLC so that risks are appropriately managed.

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[FISMA] and [OMB A-130] require external providers handling federal information or operating systems on behalf of the federal government to meet the same security and privacy requirements as federal agencies. Security and privacy requirements for external providers including the controls for systems processing, storing, or transmitting federal information are expressed in contracts or other formal agreements. The RMF can be effectively used to manage supply chain risk.47 The conceptual view of the system in Figure 5 can guide and inform security, privacy, and risk management activities for all elements of the supply chain. Every step in the RMF can be executed by nonfederal external providers except for the Authorize step—that is, the acceptance of risk is an inherent federal responsibility for which senior executives are held responsible and accountable. The authorization decision is directly linked to the management of risk related to the acquisition and use of component products, systems, and services from external providers.48 [OMB A-130] also requires organizations to develop and implement SCRM plans.49 Managing supply chain risk is a complex, multifaceted undertaking requiring a coordinated effort across an organization—building trust relationships and communicating with both internal and external stakeholders. SCRM activities involve identifying and assessing applicable risks, determining appropriate mitigating actions, developing appropriate SCRM plans to document selected mitigating actions, and monitoring performance against SCRM plans. Because supply chains differ across and within organizations, SCRM plans are tailored to the individual program, organizational, and operational contexts. Tailored plans provide the basis for determining whether a system is “fit for purpose” and as such, the controls need to be tailored accordingly.

Tailored SCRM plans help organizations to focus their resources on the most critical missions and business functions based on mission and business requirements and their risk environment. The determination that the risk from acquiring products, systems, or services from external providers is acceptable depends on the level of assurance50 that the organization can gain from the providers. The level of assurance is based on the degree of control the organization can exert on the external provider regarding the controls needed for the protection of the product, system, or service and the evidence brought forth by the provider as to the effectiveness of those controls.

The degree of control is established by the specific terms and conditions of the contract or service-level agreement. Some organizations have extensive control through contract vehicles or other agreements that specify the security and privacy requirements for the external provider.

Other organizations, in contrast, have limited control because they are purchasing commodity

47 Supply chain risk means risks that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or information systems and reflect the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation [OMB A-130].

When system elements process PII, SCRM practices address both information security and privacy risk. 48 While authorization (i.e., the acceptance of risk) of federal information systems is an inherent federal responsibility, it is a foundational concept that can be used by senior executives in nonfederal organizations at all levels in the supply chain to manage security and privacy risk.

49 [SP 800-161] provides guidance on SCRM plans. 50 The level of assurance provided by an external provider can vary, ranging from those who provide high assurance (e.g., business partners in a joint venture that share a common business model and goals) to those who provide less assurance and represent greater sources of risk (e.g., business partners in one endeavor who are also competitors in another market sector).

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processes that are not defined in the CUI Registry or in [SP 800-60 v2]. Identified information types are confirmed by the information owners or stewards and documented in the system security and privacy plans. References: [OMB A-130]; [NARA CUI]; [SP 800-39] (System Level); [SP 800-60 v1]; [SP 800-60 v2]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

INFORMATION LIFE CYCLE

TASK P-13 Identify and understand all stages of the information life cycle for each information type processed, stored, or transmitted by the system. Potential Inputs: Missions, business functions, and mission/business processes the system will support; system stakeholder information; authorization boundary information; information about other systems that interact with the system (e.g., information exchange/connection agreements); system design documentation; system element information; list of system information types.

Expected Outputs: Documentation of the stages through which information passes in the system, such as a data map or model illustrating how information is structured or is processed by the system throughout its life cycle. Such documentation includes, for example, data flow diagrams, entity relationship diagrams, database schemas, and data dictionaries.

Primary Responsibility: Senior Agency Official for Privacy; System Owner; Information Owner or Steward. Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Mission or Business Owner; Security Architect; Privacy Architect; Enterprise Architect; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer.

System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition). Existing – Operations/Maintenance. Discussion: The information life cycle describes the stages through which information passes, typically characterized as creation or collection, processing, dissemination, use, stora ge, and disposition, to include destruction and deletion [OMB A-130]. Identifying and understanding how each information type is processed during all stages of the life cycle helps organizations identify considerations for protecting the information, informs the organization’s security and privacy risk assessments, and informs the selection and implementation of controls. Identification and understanding of the information life cycle facilitates the employment of practices to help ensure, for example, that organizations have the authority to collect or create information, develop rules related to the processing of information in accordance with its impact level, create agreements for information sharing, and follow retention schedules for the storage and disposition of information.

Using tools such as a data map enables organizations to understand how information is being processed so that organizations can better assess where security and privacy risks could arise and where controls could be applied most effectively. It is important for organizations to consider the appropriate delineation of the authorization boundary and the information system’s interaction with other systems because the way information enters and leaves the system can affect the security and privacy risk assessments. The elements of the system are identified with sufficient granularity to support such risk assessments.

Identifying and understanding the information life cycle is particularly relevant for the assessment of security and privacy risks since information may be processed by a system in any of the SDLC phases. For example, in the testing and integration phase of the SDLC, processing actual (i.e., live) data would likely raise security and privacy risks, but using substitute (i.e., synthetic) data may allow an equivalent benefit in terms of system testing while reducing risk.

References: [OMB A-130]; [OMB M-13-13]; [NARA RECM]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]); [IR 8062].

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Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer. System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition). Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

Discussion: For information systems that process PII, the senior agency official for privacy reviews and approves the security categorization results and decision prior to the authorizing official’s review. 76 Security categorization results and decisions are reviewed by the authorizing official or a designat ed representative to ensure that the security category selected for the information system is consistent with the mission and business functions of the organization and the need to adequately protect those missions and functions. The authorizing official or designated representative reviews the categorization results and decision from an organization-wide perspective, including how the decision aligns with the categorization decisions for all other organizational systems. The authorizing official collaborates with the senior accountable official for risk management or the risk executive (function) to ensure that the categorization decision for the system is consistent with the organizational risk management strategy and satisfies requirements for high value assets. As part of the approval process, the authorizing official can provide specific guidance to the system owner with respect to any limitations on baseline tailoring activities for the system that occur at the RMF Select step (see Task S-2). If the security categorization decision is not approved, the system owner initiates steps to repeat the categorization process and resubmits the adjusted results to the authorizing official or designated representative. System registration information is subsequently updated with the approved security categorization information (see Task P-18).

References: [FIPS 199]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-39] (Organization Level); [SP 800-160 v1] (Stakeholder Needs and Requirements Definition Process); [CNSSI 1253]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

76 The responsibilities of the senior agency official for privacy are detailed in [OMB A-130].

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ASSESSOR SELECTION

TASK A-1 Select the appropriate assessor or assessment team for the type of control assessment to be conducted. Potential Inputs: Security, privacy, and SCRM plans; program management control information; common control documentation; organizational security and privacy program plans; SCRM strategy; system design documentation; enterprise, security, and privacy architecture information; security, privacy, and SCRM policies and procedures applicable to the system.

Expected Outputs: Selection of assessor or assessment team responsible for conducting the control assessment. Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative. Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.

System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment. Existing – Operations/Maintenance. Discussion: Organizations consider both the technical expertise and level of independence 87 required in selecting control assessors.88 Organizations ensure that control assessors possess the required skills and technical expertise to develop effective assessment plans and to conduct assessments of program management, system-specific, hybrid, and common controls, as appropriate. This includes general knowledge of risk management concepts and approaches as well as comprehensive knowledge of and experience with the hardware, software, and firmware components implemented. In organizations where the assessment capability is centrally managed, the senior agency information security officer may have the responsibility of selecting and managing the security control assessors or assessment teams for organizational systems. As controls may be implemented to achieve security and privacy objectives, organizations consider the degree of collaboration between security control and privacy control assessors that is necessary.

Organizations can conduct self-assessments of controls or obtain the services of an independent control assessor. An independent assessor is an individual or group that can conduct an impartial assessment. Impartiality means that assessors are free from perceived or actual conflicts of interest with respect to the determination of control effectiveness or the development, operation, or management of the system, common controls, or program management controls. The authorizing official determines the level of assessor independence based on applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, or standards. The authorizing official consults with the Office of the Inspector General, chief information officer, senior agency official for privacy, and senior agency information security officer to help guide and inform decisions regarding assessor independence.

The system privacy officer is responsible for identifying assessment methodologies and metrics to determine if privacy controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and sufficient to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks. The senior agency official for privacy is responsible for conducting assessments of privacy controls and documenting the results of the assessments. At the discretion of the organization, privacy controls may be assessed by an independent assessor. However, in all cases, the senior agency official for privacy is responsible and accountable for

87 In accordance with [OMB A-130], an independent evaluation of privacy program and practices is not required. However, an organization may choose to employ independent privacy assessments at the organization’s discretion. 88 Some organizations may select control assessors prior to the RMF Assess step to support control assessments at the earliest opportunity during the system life cycle. Early identification and selection of assessors allows organizations to plan for the assessment activities, including agreeing on the scope of the assessment. Organizations implementing a systems security engineering approach may also benefit from early selection of assessors to support verification and validation activities that occur throughout the system life cycle.

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Common controls (i.e., controls that are inherited by the system) are assessed separately (by assessors chosen by common control providers or the organization) and need not be assessed as part of a system - level assessment. Organizations ensure that assessors have access to the information system and environment of operation where the controls are implemented and to the documentation, records, artifacts, test results, and other materials needed to assess the controls. This includes the controls implemented by external providers through contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, or supply chain arrangements. Assessors have the required degree of independence as determined by the authorizing official.91 Assessor independence during the continuous monitoring process facilitates reuse of assessment results to support ongoing authorization and reauthorizat ion.

To make the risk management process more efficient and cost-effective, organizations may choose to establish reasonable and appropriate criteria for reusing assessment results as part of organization -wide assessment policy or in the security and privacy program plans. For example, a recent audit of a system may have produced information about the effectiveness of selected controls. Another opportunity to reuse previous assessment results may come from external programs that test and evaluate security a nd privacy features of commercial information technology products (e.g., Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Program and NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program,). If prior assessment results from the system developer or vendor are available, the control assessor, under appropriate circumstances, may incorporate those results into the assessment. In addition, if a control implementation was assessed during other forms of assessment at previous stages of the SDLC (e.g., unit testing, functional testing, acceptance testing), organizations may consider potential reuse of those results to reduce duplication of efforts. And finally, assessment results can be reused to support reciprocity, for example, assessment results supporting an authorization to use (see Appendix F). Additional information on assessment result reuse is available in [SP 800-53A].

References: [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Verification and Validation Processes); [IR 8011 v1].

ASSESSMENT REPORTS

TASK A-4 Prepare the assessment reports documenting the findings and recommendations from the control assessments. Potential Inputs: Completed control assessments and associated assessment evidence. Expected Outputs: Completed security and privacy assessment reports detailing the assessor findings and recommendations.

Primary Responsibility: Control Assessor. Supporting Roles: System Owner; Common Control Provider; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer. System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment. Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

Discussion: The results of the security and privacy control assessments, including recommendations f or correcting deficiencies in the implemented controls, are documented in the assessment reports 92 by control assessors. Organizations may develop a single, integrated security and privacy assessment report.

Assessment reports are key documents in the system or common control au thorization package that is developed for authorizing officials. The assessment reports include information based on assessor

91 In accordance with [OMB A-130], an independent evaluation of privacy program and practices is not required. However, an organization may choose to employ independent privacy assessments at the organization’s discretion. 92 If a comparable report meets the requirements of what is to be included in an assessment report, then the comparable report would itself constitute the assessment report.

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References: [OMB A-130]; [SP 800-18]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Risk Management Process); [SP 800-161] (SCRM Plans).

RISK ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

TASK R-2 Analyze and determine the risk from the operation or use of the system or the provision of common controls. Potential Inputs: Authorization package; supporting assessment evidence or other documentation as required; information provided by the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function); organizational risk management strategy and risk tolerance; organization - and system-level risk assessment results.

Expected Outputs: Risk determination. Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative. Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.

System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Implementation/Assessment. Existing – Operations/Maintenance. Discussion: The authorizing official or designated representative, in collaboration with the senior agency information security officer and the senior agency official for privacy (for information systems processing PII), analyzes the information in the authorization package provided by the control assessor, system owner, or common control provider, and finalizes the determination of risk. Further discussion with the control assessor, system owner, or common control provider may be necessary to help ensure a thorough understanding of risk by the authorizing official.

Risk assessments are employed to provide information99 that may influence the risk analysis and determination. The senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function) may provide additional information to the authorizing official that is considered in the final determination of risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from either the operation or use of the system or the provision of common controls. The additional information may include, for example, organizational risk tolerance, dependencies among systems and controls, mission and business requirements, the criticality of the missions or business functions supported by the system, or the risk management strategy.

The authorizing official analyzes the information provided by the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function) and information provided by the system owner or common control provider in the authorization package when making a risk determination. Any additional information provided by the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function) is documented and included, to the extent it is relevant, as part of the authori zation decision (see Task R-4).

The authorizing official may also use an automated security/privacy management and reporting tool to annotate senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function) input. When the system is operating under an ongoing authorization, the risk determination task is effectively unchanged. The authorizing official analyzes the relevant security and privacy information provided by the automated security/privacy management and reporting tool to determine the current security and privacy posture of the system.

References: [OMB A-130]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-39] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP 800-137]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Risk Management Process); [IR 8062].

99 [SP 800-30] provides guidance on conducting security risk assessments. [IR 8062] provides information about privacy risk assessments and associated risk factors.

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AUTHORIZATION DECISION

TASK R-4 Determine if the risk from the operation or use of the information system or the provision or use of common controls is acceptable. Potential Inputs: Risk responses for determined risks. Expected Outputs: Authorization to operate, authorization to use, common control authorization; denial of authorization to operate, denial of authorization to use, denial of common control authorization.

Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official. Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Authorizing Official Designated Representative.

System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Implementation/Assessment. Existing – Operations/Maintenance. Discussion: The explicit acceptance of risk is the responsibility of the authorizing official and cannot be delegated to other officials within the organization. The authorizing official considers many factors when deciding if the risk to the organization’s operations (including mission, functions, image, and reputation) and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation, is acceptable. Balancing security and privacy considerations with mission and business needs is paramount to achieving an acceptable risk -based authorization decision.102 The authorizing official issues an authorization decision for the system or for organization-designated common controls after reviewing the information in the authorization package, input from other organizational officials (see Task R-2), and other relevant information that may affect the authorization decision. The authorization package provides the most current information on the security and privacy posture of the system or the common controls.

The authorizing official consults with the Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or the Risk Executive (Function) prior to making the final authorization decision for the information system or the common controls. Because there are potentially significant dependencies among organizational systems and with external systems, the authorization decisions for individual systems consider the current residual risk, organizational plans of action and milestones, and the risk tolerance of the organization.

The authorization decision is conveyed by the authorizing official to the system owner or common control provider, and other organizational officials, as appropriate. 103 The authorization decision also conveys the terms and conditions for the authorization to operate; the authorization termination date or time-driven authorization frequency; input from the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function), if provided; and for common control authorizations, the system impact level suppor ted by the common controls.

For systems, the authorization decision indicates to the system owner whether the system is authorized to operate or authorized to use, or not authorized to operate or not authorized to use. For common controls, the authorization decision indicates to the common control provider and to the system owners of inheriting systems, whether the common controls are authorized to be provided or not authorized to

102 While balancing security and privacy considerations with mission and business needs is paramount to achieving an acceptable risk-based authorization decision, there may be instances when the authorizing official and senior agency official for privacy cannot reach a final resolution regarding the appropriate protection for PII and the information systems that process PII. [OMB A-130] provides guidance on how to resolve such instances.

103 Organizations are encouraged to employ automated security/privacy management and reporting tools whenever feasible, to develop the authorization packages for systems and common controls and to maintain those packages during ongoing authorization. Automated tools can significantly reduce documentation costs, provide increased speed and efficiency in generating important information for decision makers, and provide more effective means for updating critical risk management information. It is recognized that certain controls are not conducive to the use of automated tools and therefore, manual methods are acceptable in those situations.

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be provided. The terms and conditions for the common control authorization pr ovide a description of any specific limitations or restrictions placed on the operation of the system or the controls that must be followed by the system owner or common control provider.

The authorization termination date is established by the authorizing official and indicates when the authorization expires. Organizations may eliminate the authorization termination date if the system is operating under an ongoing authorization—that is, the continuous monitoring program is sufficiently robust and mature to provide the authorizing official with the needed information to conduct ongoing risk determination and risk acceptance activities regarding the security and privacy posture of the system and the ongoing effectiveness of the controls employed within and inherited by the system.

The authorization decision is included with the authorization package and is transmitted to the system owner or common control provider. Upon receipt of the authorization decision and the authorization package, the system owner or common control provider acknowledges and implements the terms and conditions of the authorization. The organization ensures that the authorization package, including the authorization decision for systems and common controls, is made available to organizational officials (e.g., system owners inheriting common controls; chief information officers; senior accountable officials for risk management or risk executive [function]; senior agency information security officers; senior agency officials for privacy; and system security and privacy officers). The authorizing official verifies on an ongoing basis as part of continuous monitoring (see Task M-2) that the established terms and conditions for authorization are being followed by the system owner or common control provider.

When the system is operating under ongoing authorization, the authorizing official continues to be responsible and accountable for explicitly understanding and accepting the risk of continuing to operate or use the system or continuing to provide common controls for inheritance. For ongoing authorization, the authorization frequency is specified in lieu of an authorization termination date. The authorizing official reviews the information with the specific time-driven authorization frequency defined by the organization as part of the continuous monitoring strategy and determines if the risk of continued system operation or the provision of common controls remains acceptable. I f the risk remains acceptable, the authorizing official acknowledges the acceptance in accordance with organizational processes. If not, the authorizing official indicates that the risk is no longer acceptable and requires further risk response or a full denial of the authorization.

The organization determines the level of formality for the process of communicating and acknowledging continued risk acceptance by the authorizing official. The authorizing official may continue to establish and convey the specific terms and conditions to be followed by the system owner or common control provider for continued authorization to operate, continued common control authorization, or continued authorization to use. The terms and conditions of the authorization may be conveyed through an automated management and reporting tool as part of an automated authorization decision.

If control assessments are conducted by qualified assessors with the level of independence 104 required, the assessment results support ongoing authorization and may be applied to a reauthorization. Organizational policies regarding ongoing authorization and reauthorization are consistent with laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, and policies.

Appendix F provides additional guidance on authorization decisions, the types of authorizations, and the preparation of the authorization packages. References: [SP 800-39] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP 800-160 v1] (Risk Management Process).

104 In accordance with [OMB A-130], an independent evaluation of privacy program and practices is not required. However, an organization may choose to employ independent privacy assessments at the organization’s discretion.

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ONGOING ASSESSMENTS

Task M-2 Assess the controls implemented within and inherited by the system in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy. Potential Inputs: Organizational continuous monitoring strategy and system level continuous monitoring strategy (if applicable); security and privacy plans; security and privacy assessment plans; security and privacy assessment reports; plans of action and milestones; information from automated and manual monitoring tools; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; external assessment or audit results (if applicable).

Expected Outputs: Updated security and privacy assessment reports. Primary Responsibility: Control Assessor. Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; System Owner or Common Control Provider; Information Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.

System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Operations/Maintenance. Existing – Operations/Maintenance. Discussion: After an initial system or common control authorization, the organization assesses all controls on an ongoing basis. Ongoing assessment of the control effectiveness is part of the continuous monitoring activities of the organization. The monitoring frequency for each control is based on the organizational continuous monitoring strategy (see Task P-7) and can be supplemented by the system-level continuous monitoring strategy (see Task S-5). Adherence to the terms and conditions specified by the authorizing official as part of the authorization decision are also monitored (see Task M-1). Ongoing control assessment continues as the information generated as part of continuous monitoring is correlated, analyzed, and reported to senior leaders.

For ongoing control assessments, assessors have the required degree of independence as determined by the authorizing official.107 Assessor independence during continuous monitoring introduces efficiencies into the process and may allow for reuse of assessment results in support of ongoing authorization and when reauthorization is required.

To satisfy the annual FISMA security assessment requirement, organizations can use assessment results from control assessments that occurred during authorization, ongoing authorization, or reauthorization; during continuous monitoring; or the during testing and evaluation of systems as part of the SDLC or an audit (provided the assessment results are current, relevant to the determination of control effectiveness, and obtained by assessors with the required degree of independence). Existing assessment results are reused consistent with the reuse policy established by the organization and are supplemented with additional assessments as needed. The reuse of assessment results is helpful in achieving a cost-effective, security program capable of producing the evidence necessary to determine the security posture of information systems and the organization. Finally, the use of automation to support control assessments facilitates a greater frequency, volume, and coverage of assessments.

References: [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-137]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Verification, Validation, Operation, and Maintenance Processes); [IR 8011 v1].

ONGOING RISK RESPONSE

Task M-3 Respond to risk based on the results of ongoing monitoring activities, risk assessments, and outstanding items in plans of action and milestones.

107 In accordance with [OMB A-130], an independent evaluation of privacy programs and practices is not required. However, an organization may choose to employ independent privacy assessments at the organization’s discretion.

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POLICIES, REGULATIONS, DIRECTIVES, AND INSTRUCTIONS

[OMB A-123] Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123, Management's Responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control, July

2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2016/ m-16-17.pdf [OMB A-130] Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic Resource, July 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A130/a13 0revised.pdf [OMB M-13-13] Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-13-13, Open Data Policy-Managing Information as an Asset, May 2013.

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013 /m-13-13.pdf [OMB M-17-25] Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-17-25, Reporting Guidance for Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, May 2017.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/ M-17-25.pdf [OMB M-19-03] Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-19-03, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Agencies by enhancing the High Value Asset Program, December 2018.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/M-19-03.pdf [CNSSI 1253] Committee on National Security Systems Instruction 1253, Security Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems, March

2014. https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm [CNSSI 4009] Committee on National Security Systems Instruction 4009, Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Glossary, April 2015. https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm [CNSSD 505] Committee on National Security Systems Directive 505, Supply Chain Risk Management, August 2017.

https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Directives.cfm [OCIO HVA] Office of the Federal Chief Information Officer, The Agency HVA Process. https://policy.cio.gov/hva/process [DODI 5200.44] Department of Defense Instruction 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN), July 2017.

http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/520044p.pdf

STANDARDS, GUIDELINES, AND REPORTS

[IEEE 610.12] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std. 610.12-1990, IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology, December 1990. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel1/2238/4148/00159342.pdf

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APPENDIX B GLOSSARY COMMON TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

ppendix B provides definitions for terminology used within Special Publication 800-37. Sources for terms used in this publication are cited as applicable. Where no citation is noted, the source of the definition is Special Publication 800-37. adequate security [OMB A-130] Security protections commensurate with the risk resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information. This includes ensuring that information hosted on behalf of an agency and information systems and applications used by the agency operate effectively and provide appropriate confidentiality, integrity, and availability protections through the application of cost-effective security controls.

agency [OMB A-130] Any executive agency or department, military department, Federal Government corporation, Federal Government- controlled corporation, or other establishment in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, or any independent regulatory agency.

allocation The process an organization employs to assign security or privacy requirements to an information system or its environment of operation; or to assign controls to specific system elements responsible for providing a security or privacy capability (e.g., router, server, remote sensor).

application A software program hosted by an information system. assessment See control assessment or risk assessment. assessment plan The objectives for the control assessments and a detailed roadmap of how to conduct such assessments. assessor The individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting a security or privacy assessment.

assignment statement A control parameter that allows an organization to assign a specific, organization-defined value to the control or control enhancement (e.g., assigning a list of roles to be notified or a value for the frequency of testing). See organization-defined control parameters and selection statement.

A

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assurance [ISO 15026, Adapted] Grounds for justified confidence that a [security or privacy] claim has been or will be achieved. Note 1: Assurance is typically obtained relative to a set of specific claims. The scope and focus of such claims may vary (e.g., security claims, safety claims) and the claims themselves may be interrelated.

Note 2: Assurance is obtained through techniques and methods that generate credible evidence to substantiate claims. audit log [CNSSI 4009] A chronological record of system activities, including records of system accesses and operations performed in a given period.

audit trail

A chronological record that reconstructs and examines the sequence of activities surrounding or leading to a specific operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction from inception to result. authentication [FIPS 200] Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a prerequisite to allowing access to resources in a system.

authenticity The property of being genuine and being able to be verified and trusted; confidence in the validity of a transmission, a message, or message originator. See authentication. authorization boundary [OMB A-130] All components of an information system to be authorized for operation by an authorizing official. This excludes separately authorized systems to which the information system is connected.

authorization package [OMB A-130] The essential information that an authorizing official uses to determine whether to authorize the operation of an information system or the provision of a designated set of common controls. At a minimum, the authorization package includes an executive summary, system security plan, privacy plan, security control assessment, privacy control assessment, and any relevant plans of action and milestones.

authorization to operate [OMB A-130] The official management decision given by a senior Federal official or officials to authorize operation of an information system and to explicitly accept the risk to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the implementation of an agreed-upon set of security and privacy controls. Authorization also applies to common controls inherited by agency information systems.

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authorization to use The official management decision given by an authorizing official to authorize the use of an information system, service, or application based on the information in an existing authorization package generated by another organization, and to explicitly accept the risk to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the implementation of an agreed-upon set of controls in the system, service, or application.

Note: An authorization to use typically applies to cloud and shared systems, services, and applications and is employed when an organization (referred to as the customer organization) chooses to accept the information in an existing authorization package generated by another organization (referred to as the provider organization).

authorizing official [OMB A-130] A senior Federal official or executive with the authority to authorize (i.e., assume responsibility for) the operation of an information system or the use of a designated set of common controls at an acceptable level of risk to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

authorizing official designated representative An organizational official acting on behalf of an authorizing official in carrying out and coordinating the required activities associated with the authorization process. availability [44 USC 3552] Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.

baseline See control baseline. baseline configuration [SP 800-128, Adapted] A documented set of specifications for a system, or a configuration item within a system, that has been formally reviewed and agreed on at a given point in time, and which can be changed only through change control procedures.

capability A combination of mutually reinforcing controls implemented by technical means, physical means, and procedural means. Such controls are typically selected to achieve a common information security or privacy purpose. capability requirement A type of requirement describing the capability that the organization or system must provide to satisfy a stakeholder need.

Note: Capability requirements related to information security and privacy are derived from stakeholder protection needs and the corresponding security and privacy requirements. chain of trust (supply chain) A certain level of trust in supply chain interactions such that each participant in the consumer-provider relationship provides adequate protection for its component products, systems, and services.

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chief information officer [OMB A-130] The senior official that provides advice and other assistance to the head of the agency and other senior management personnel of the agency to ensure that IT is acquired and information resources are managed for the agency in a manner that achieves the agency’s strategic goals and information resources management goals; and is responsible for ensuring agency compliance with, and prompt, efficient, and effective implementation of, the information policies and information resources management responsibilities, including the reduction of information collection burdens on the public.

chief information security officer See Senior Agency Information Security Officer. classified information See classified national security information. classified national security information [CNSSI 4009] Information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form.

commodity service A system service provided by a commercial service provider to a large and diverse set of consumers. The organization acquiring or receiving the commodity service possesses limited visibility into the management structure and operations of the provider, and while the organization may be able to negotiate service-level agreements, the organization is typically not able to require that the provider implement specific controls.

common control [OMB A-130] A security or privacy control that is inherited by multiple information systems or programs. common control provider

An organizational official responsible for the development, implementation, assessment, and monitoring of common controls (i.e., controls inheritable by organizational systems). common criteria [CNSSI 4009] Governing document that provides a comprehensive, rigorous method for specifying security function and assurance requirements for products and systems.

compensating controls The security and privacy controls implemented in lieu of the controls in the baselines described in NIST Special Publication 800-53 that provide equivalent or comparable protection for a system or organization. component See system component.

confidentiality [44 USC 3552] Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information.

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control inheritance A situation in which a system or application receives protection from controls (or portions of controls) that are developed, implemented, assessed, authorized, and monitored by entities other than those responsible for the system or application; entities either internal or external to the organization where the system or application resides. See common control.

control parameter See organization-defined control parameter. controlled unclassified information [32 CFR 2002.4]

Information that the Government creates or possesses, or that an entity creates or possesses for or on behalf of the Government, that a law, regulation, or Government-wide policy requires or permits an agency to handle using safeguarding or dissemination controls. However, CUI does not include classified information or information a non-executive branch entity possesses and maintains in its own systems that did not come from, or was not created or possessed by or for, an executive branch agency or an entity acting for an agency.

countermeasures [FIPS 200] Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that reduce the vulnerability of a system. Synonymous with security controls and safeguards. cybersecurity [OMB A-130] Prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communications services, wire communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.

cybersecurity framework [NIST CSF] A risk-based approach to reducing cybersecurity risk composed of three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Profile, and the Framework Implementation Tiers. cybersecurity framework category [NIST CSF] The subdivision of a Function into groups of cybersecurity outcomes, closely tied to programmatic needs and particular activities.

cybersecurity framework core [NIST CSF] A set of cybersecurity activities and references that are common across critical infrastructure sectors and are organized around particular outcomes. The Framework Core comprises four types of elements: Functions, Categories, Subcategories, and Informative References.

cybersecurity framework function [NIST CSF] One of the main components of the Framework. Functions provide the highest level of structure for organizing basic cybersecurity activities into Categories and Subcategories. The five functions are Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.

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cybersecurity framework profile [NIST CSF] A representation of the outcomes that a particular system or organization has selected from the Framework Categories and Subcategories. cybersecurity framework subcategory [NIST CSF] The subdivision of a Category into specific outcomes of technical and/or management activities.

derived requirements [SP 800-160 v1] A requirement that is implied or transformed from a higher-level requirement. Note 1: Implied requirements cannot be assessed since they are not contained in any requirements baseline. The decomposition of requirements throughout the engineering process makes implicit requirements explicit, allowing them to be stated and captured in appropriate baselines and allowing associated assessment criteria to be stated.

Note 2: A derived requirement must trace back to at least one higher-level requirement. detect (CSF function) [NIST CSF] Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event. developer A general term that includes developers or manufacturers of systems, system components, or system services; systems integrators; vendors; and product resellers. Development of systems, components, or services can occur internally within organizations or through external entities.

enterprise [CNSSI 4009] An organization with a defined mission/goal and a defined boundary, using systems to execute that mission, and with responsibility for managing its own risks and performance. An enterprise may consist of all or some of the following business aspects: acquisition, program management, human resources, financial management, security, and systems, information and mission management. See organization.

enterprise architecture [44 USC 3601] A strategic information asset base, which defines the mission; the information necessary to perform the mission; the technologies necessary to perform the mission; and the transitional processes for implementing new technologies in response to changing mission needs; and includes a baseline architecture; a target architecture; and a sequencing plan.

environment of operation [OMB A-130] The physical surroundings in which an information system processes, stores, and transmits information. event [SP 800-61, Adapted] Any observable occurrence in a network or information system. executive agency [OMB A-130] An executive department specified in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 101; a military department specified in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 102; an independent establishment as defined in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 104(1); and a wholly owned Government corporation fully subject to the provisions of

31 U.S.C.

Chapter 91.

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external system (or component) A system or system element that is outside of the authorization boundary established by the organization and for which the organization typically has no direct control over the application of required controls or the assessment of control effectiveness.

external system service A system service that is implemented outside of the authorization boundary of the organizational system (i.e., a service that is used by, but not a part of, the organizational system) and for which the organization typically has no direct control over the application of required controls or the assessment of control effectiveness.

external system service provider A provider of external system services to an organization through a variety of consumer-producer relationships including but not limited to: joint ventures; business partnerships; outsourcing arrangements (i.e., through contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements); licensing agreements; and/or supply chain exchanges.

external network A network not controlled by the organization. federal agency See executive agency. federal enterprise architecture [OMB FEA] A business-based framework for governmentwide improvement developed by the Office of Management and Budget that is intended to facilitate efforts to transform the federal government to one that is citizen-centered, results-oriented, and market-based.

federal information system [40 USC 11331] An information system used or operated by an executive agency, by a contractor of an executive agency, or by another organization on behalf of an executive agency. firmware [CNSSI 4009] Computer programs and data stored in hardware - typically in read-only memory (ROM) or programmable read-only memory

(PROM) - such that the programs and data cannot be dynamically written or modified during execution of the programs. See hardware and software. hardware [CNSSI 4009] The material physical components of a system. See software and firmware. high-impact system [FIPS 200] A system in which at least one security objective (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS Publication 199 potential impact value of high.

hybrid control [OMB A-130] A security or privacy control that is implemented for an information system in part as a common control and in part as a system-specific control. See common control and system-specific control. identify (CSF function) [NIST CSF] Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event.

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impact With respect to security, the effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation (including the national security interests of the United States) of a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or a system. With respect to privacy, the adverse effects that individuals could experience when an information system processes their PII.

impact level See impact value. impact value [FIPS 199] The assessed worst-case potential impact that could result from a compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information expressed as a value of low, moderate or high. incident [44 USC 3552] An occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority, the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or an information system; or constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of law, security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies.

independent verification and validation [CNSSI 4009] A comprehensive review, analysis, and testing, (software and/or hardware) performed by an objective third party to confirm (i.e., verify) that the requirements are correctly defined, and to confirm (i.e., validate) that the system correctly implements the required functionality and security requirements.

industrial control system [SP 800-82] General term that encompasses several types of control systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as programmable logic controllers

(PLC) often found in the industrial sectors and critical infrastructures. An ICS consists of combinations of control components (e.g., electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic) that act together to achieve an industrial objective (e.g., manufacturing, transportation of matter or energy).

information [OMB A-130] Any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts, data, or opinions in any medium or form, including textual, numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, electronic, or audiovisual forms. information life cycle [OMB A-130] The stages through which information passes, typically characterized as creation or collection, processing, dissemination, use, storage, and disposition, to include destruction and deletion.

information owner Official with statutory or operational authority for specified information and responsibility for establishing the controls for its generation, collection, processing, dissemination, and disposal. information resources [44 USC 3502] Information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology.

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information security [44 USC 3552] The protection of information and systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability. information security architecture [OMB A-130] An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that describes the structure and behavior of the enterprise security processes, security systems, personnel and organizational subunits, showing their alignment with the enterprise’s mission and strategic plans. See security architecture.

information security program plan [OMB A-130] Formal document that provides an overview of the security requirements for an organization-wide information security program and describes the program management controls and common controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements.

information security risk [SP 800-30] The risk to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation due to the potential for unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and/or systems.

information steward An agency official with statutory or operational authority for specified information and responsibility for establishing the controls for its generation, collection, processing, dissemination, and disposal. information system [44 USC 3502] A discrete set of information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information.

information system boundary See authorization boundary. information system security officer [CNSSI 4009] Individual with assigned responsibility for maintaining the appropriate operational security posture for an information system or program. information system security plan [OMB A-130] A formal document that provides an overview of the security requirements for an information system and describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements.

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information technology [OMB A-130] Any services, equipment, or interconnected system(s) or subsystem(s) of equipment, that are used in the automatic acquisition, storage, analysis, evaluation, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information by the agency. For purposes of this definition, such services or equipment if used by the agency directly or is used by a contractor under a contract with the agency that requires its use; or to a significant extent, its use in the performance of a service or the furnishing of a product. Information technology includes computers, ancillary equipment (including imaging peripherals, input, output, and storage devices necessary for security and surveillance), peripheral equipment designed to be controlled by the central processing unit of a computer, software, firmware and similar procedures, services (including cloud computing and help-desk services or other professional services which support any point of the life cycle of the equipment or service), and related resources. Information technology does not include any equipment that is acquired by a contractor incidental to a contract which does not require its use.

information technology product See system component. information type [FIPS 199] A specific category of information (e.g., privacy, medical, proprietary, financial, investigative, contractor-sensitive, security management) defined by an organization or in some instances, by a specific law, executive order, directive, policy, or regulation.

interface [CNSSI 4009] Common boundary between independent systems or modules where interactions take place. integrity [44 USC 3552] Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity.

joint authorization Authorization involving multiple authorizing officials. low-impact system [FIPS 200] A system in which all three security objectives (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) are assigned a FIPS Publication 199 potential impact value of low.

media [FIPS 200] Physical devices or writing surfaces including, but not limited to, magnetic tapes, optical disks, magnetic disks, Large-Scale Integration memory chips, and printouts (but excluding display media) onto which information is recorded, stored, or printed within a system.

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organization-defined control parameter The variable part of a control or control enhancement that can be instantiated by an organization during the tailoring process by either assigning an organization-defined value or selecting a value from a pre-defined list provided as part of the control or control enhancement.

overlay [OMB A-130] A specification of security or privacy controls, control enhancements, supplemental guidance, and other supporting information employed during the tailoring process, that is intended to complement (and further refine) security control baselines. The overlay specification may be more stringent or less stringent than the original security control baseline specification and can be applied to multiple information systems.

personally identifiable information [OMB A-130] Information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual. plan of action and milestones

A document that identifies tasks needing to be accomplished. It details resources required to accomplish the elements of the plan, any milestones in meeting the tasks, and scheduled completion dates for the milestones. potential impact [FIPS 199] The loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be expected to have a limited adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199 low); a serious adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199 moderate); or a severe or catastrophic adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199 high) on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

privacy architect Individual, group, or organization responsible for ensuring that the system privacy requirements necessary to protect individuals’ privacy are adequately addressed in all aspects of enterprise architecture including reference models, segment and solution architectures, and information systems processing PII.

privacy architecture An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that describes the structure and behavior for an enterprise’s privacy protection processes, technical measures, personnel and organizational sub-units, showing their alignment with the enterprise’s mission and strategic plans.

privacy control [OMB A-130] The administrative, technical, and physical safeguards employed within an agency to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks. Note: Controls can be selected to achieve multiple objectives; those controls that are selected to achieve both security and privacy objectives require a degree of collaboration between the organization’s information security program and privacy program.

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privacy control assessment [OMB A-130] The assessment of privacy controls to determine whether the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and sufficient to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks. A privacy control assessment is both an assessment and a formal document detailing the process and the outcome of the assessment.

privacy control baseline A collection of controls specifically assembled or brought together by a group, organization, or community of interest to address the privacy protection needs of individuals. privacy impact assessment [OMB A-130] An analysis of how information is handled to ensure handling conforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy; to determine the risks and effects of creating, collecting, using, processing, storing, maintaining, disseminating, disclosing, and disposing of information in identifiable form in an electronic information system; and to examine and evaluate protections and alternate processes for handling information to mitigate potential privacy concerns. A privacy impact assessment is both an analysis and a formal document detailing the process and the outcome of the analysis.

privacy plan [OMB A-130] A formal document that details the privacy controls selected for an information system or environment of operation that are in place or planned for meeting applicable privacy requirements and managing privacy risks, details how the controls have been implemented, and describes the methodologies and metrics that will be used to assess the controls.

privacy posture

The privacy posture represents the status of the information systems and information resources (e.g., personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology) within an organization based on information assurance resources (e.g., people, hardware, software, policies, procedures) and the capabilities in place to comply with applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks and to react as the situation changes.

privacy program plan [OMB A-130] A formal document that provides an overview of an agency’s privacy program, including a description of the structure of the privacy program, the resources dedicated to the privacy program, the role of the Senior Agency Official for Privacy and other privacy officials and staff, the strategic goals and objectives of the privacy program, and the program management controls and common controls in place or planned for meeting applicable privacy requirements and managing privacy risks.

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privacy requirement

A requirement that applies to an information system or an organization that is derived from applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, standards, regulations, procedures, and/or mission/business needs with respect to privacy. Note: The term privacy requirement can be used in a variety of contexts from high-level policy activities to low-level implementation activities in system development and engineering disciplines.

privacy information Information that describes the privacy posture of an information system or organization. protect (CSF function) [NIST CSF] Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical infrastructure services. provenance The chronology of the origin, development, ownership, location, and changes to a system or system component and associated data. It may also include personnel and processes used to interact with or make modifications to the system, component, or associated data.

reciprocity Agreement among participating organizations to accept each other’s security assessments to reuse system resources and/or to accept each other’s assessed security posture to share information. records [44 USC 3301] All recorded information, regardless of form or characteristics, made or received by a Federal agency under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the United States Government or because of the informational value of data in them.

recover (CSF function) [NIST CSF] Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity event. resilience [CNSSI 4009] The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.

respond (CSF function) [NIST CSF] Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action regarding a detected cybersecurity event. risk [OMB A-130] A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically is a function of: (i) the adverse impact, or magnitude of harm, that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence.

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risk assessment [SP 800-30]

The process of identifying risks to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting from the operation of a system. risk executive (function) [SP 800-39] An individual or group within an organization, led by the senior accountable official for risk management, that helps to ensure that security risk considerations for individual systems, to include the authorization decisions for those systems, are viewed from an organization-wide perspective with regard to the overall strategic goals and objectives of the organization in carrying out its missions and business functions; and managing risk from individual systems is consistent across the organization, reflects organizational risk tolerance, and is considered along with other organizational risks affecting mission/business success.

risk management [OMB A-130] The program and supporting processes to manage risk to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation), agency assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, and includes: establishing the context for risk-related activities; assessing risk; responding to risk once determined; and monitoring risk over time.

risk mitigation [CNSSI 4009] Prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate risk- reducing controls/countermeasures recommended from the risk management process. risk response [OMB A-130] Accepting, avoiding, mitigating, sharing, or transferring risk to agency operations, agency assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation.

sanitization [SP 800-88] A process to render access to target data on the media infeasible for a given level of effort. Clear, purge, and destroy are actions that can be taken to sanitize media. scoping considerations A part of tailoring guidance providing organizations with specific considerations on the applicability and implementation of controls in the control baselines. Considerations include policy/regulatory, technology, physical infrastructure, system element allocation, operational/environmental, public access, scalability, common control, and security objective.

security [CNSSI 4009]

A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that enable an organization to perform its mission or critical functions despite risks posed by threats to its use of systems. Protective measures may involve a combination of deterrence, avoidance, prevention, detection, recovery, and correction that should form part of the organization’s risk management approach.

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security architect Individual, group, or organization responsible for ensuring that the information security requirements necessary to protect the organization’s core missions and business processes are adequately addressed in all aspects of enterprise architecture including reference models, segment and solution architectures, and the resulting information systems supporting those missions and business processes.

security architecture [SP 800-39]

[SP 800-160 v1]

An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that describes the structure and behavior for an enterprise’s security processes, information security systems, personnel and organizational sub-units, showing their alignment with the enterprise’s mission and strategic plans. See information security architecture.

A set of physical and logical security-relevant representations (i.e., views) of system architecture that conveys information about how the system is partitioned into security domains and makes use of security-relevant elements to enforce security policies within and between security domains based on how data and information must be protected.

Note: The security architecture reflects security domains, the placement of security-relevant elements within the security domains, the interconnections and trust relationships between the security-relevant elements, and the behavior and interactions between the security-relevant elements. The security architecture, similar to the system architecture, may be expressed at different levels of abstraction and with different scopes.

security categorization The process of determining the security category for information or a system. Security categorization methodologies are described in CNSS Instruction 1253 for national security systems and in FIPS Publication 199 for other than national security systems.

See security category. security category [OMB A-130] The characterization of information or an information system based on an assessment of the potential impact that a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information or information system would have on agency operations, agency assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

security control [OMB A-130] The safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information system or an organization to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information. security control assessment [OMB A-130] The testing or evaluation of security controls to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for an information system or organization.

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security control baseline [OMB A-130] The set of minimum security controls defined for a low-impact, moderate-impact, or high-impact information system. See also control baseline. security objective [FIPS 199] Confidentiality, integrity, or availability. security plan See information system security plan.

security posture [CNSSI 4009] The security status of an enterprise’s networks, information, and systems based on information assurance resources (e.g., people, hardware, software, policies) and capabilities in place to manage the defense of the enterprise and to react as the situation changes. Synonymous with security status.

security requirement [FIPS 200, Adapted] A requirement levied on an information system or an organization that is derived from applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, standards, instructions, regulations, procedures, and/or mission/business needs to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information that is being processed, stored, or transmitted.

Note: Security requirements can be used in a variety of contexts from high- level policy activities to low-level implementation activities in system development and engineering disciplines. security information Information within the system that can potentially impact the operation of security functions or the provision of security services in a manner that could result in failure to enforce the system security policy or maintain isolation of code and data.

selection statement A control parameter that allows an organization to select a value from a list of pre-defined values provided as part of the control or control enhancement (e.g., selecting to either restrict an action or prohibit an action). See assignment statement and organization-defined control parameter.

senior agency information security officer [44 USC 3544] Official responsible for carrying out the Chief Information Officer responsibilities under FISMA and serving as the Chief Information Officer’s primary liaison to the agency’s authorizing officials, information system owners, and information system security officers.

senior agency official for privacy [OMB A-130] The senior official, designated by the head of each agency, who has agency-wide responsibility for privacy, including implementation of privacy protections; compliance with Federal laws, regulations, and policies relating to privacy; management of privacy risks at the agency; and a central policy-making role in the agency’s development and evaluation of legislative, regulatory, and other policy proposals.

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senior accountable official for risk management [OMB M-17-25] The senior official, designated by the head of each agency, who has vision into all areas of the organization and is responsible for alignment of information security management processes with strategic, operational, and budgetary planning processes.

software [CNSSI 4009] Computer programs and associated data that may be dynamically written or modified during execution. specification [IEEE 610.12] A document that specifies, in a complete, precise, verifiable manner, the requirements, design, behavior, or other characteristics of a system or component and often the procedures for determining whether these provisions have been satisfied. See specification requirement.

specification requirement A type of requirement that provides a specification for a specific capability that implements all or part of a control and that may be assessed (i.e., as part of the verification, validation, testing, and evaluation processes). statement of work requirement A type of requirement that represents an action that is performed operationally or during system development.

subsystem A major subdivision or element of an information system consisting of information, information technology, and personnel that performs one or more specific functions. supply chain [OMB A-130] Linked set of resources and processes between multiple tiers of developers that begins with the sourcing of products and services and extends through the design, development, manufacturing, processing, handling, and delivery of products and services to the acquirer.

supply chain risk [OMB A-130] Risks that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or information systems and reflect the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

supply chain risk management [OMB A-130] The process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks associated with the global and distributed nature of information and communications technology product and service supply chains.

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systems privacy engineering Process that captures and refines privacy requirements and ensures their integration into information technology component products and information systems through purposeful privacy design or configuration. systems security engineer Individual assigned responsibility for conducting systems security engineering activities.

systems security engineering Process that captures and refines security requirements and ensures their integration into information technology component products and information systems through purposeful security design or configuration. system security officer Individual with assigned responsibility for maintaining the appropriate operational security posture for an information system or program.

system security plan See information system security plan. system-related privacy risk [OMB A-130] Risk to an individual or individuals associated with the agency’s creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposal of their PII. See risk.

system-related security risk [SP 800-30] Risk that arises through the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or systems and that considers impacts to the organization (including assets, mission, functions, image, or reputation), individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

See risk. system-specific control [OMB A-130] A security or privacy control for an information system that is implemented at the system level and is not inherited by any other information system. tailored control baseline A set of controls resulting from the application of tailoring guidance to a control baseline. See tailoring.

tailoring [OMB A-130] The process by which security control baselines are modified by identifying and designating common controls; applying scoping considerations; selecting compensating controls; assigning specific values to agency-defined control parameters; supplementing baselines with additional controls or control enhancements; and providing additional specification information for control implementation. The tailoring process may also be applied to privacy controls.

threat [SP 800-30] Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through a system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service.

NIST SP 800-37, REVISION 2 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy ________________________________________________________________________________________________

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threat source [FIPS 200] The intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a vulnerability or a situation and method that may accidentally trigger a vulnerability. See threat agent. trustworthiness [CNSSI 4009] The attribute of a person or enterprise that provides confidence to others of the qualifications, capabilities, and reliability of that entity to perform specific tasks and fulfill assigned responsibilities.

trustworthiness (system) The degree to which an information system (including the information technology components that are used to build the system) can be expected to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information being processed, stored, or transmitted by the system across the full range of threats and individuals’ privacy.

trustworthy information system [OMB A-130] An information system that is believed to be capable of operating within defined levels of risk despite the environmental disruptions, human errors, structural failures, and purposeful attacks that are expected to occur in its environment of operation.

system user Individual, or (system) process acting on behalf of an individual, authorized to access a system. vulnerability [CNSSI 4009] Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source.

Note: The term weakness is synonymous for deficiency. Weakness may result in security and/or privacy risks. vulnerability assessment [CNSSI 4009] Systematic examination of an information system or product to determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies, provide data from which to predict the effectiveness of proposed security measures, and confirm the adequacy of such measures after implementation.

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involve co-authorizing officials.116 If so, agreements are established between the co-authorizing officials and documented in the security and privacy plans. Authorizing officials are responsible and accountable for ensuring that authorization activities and functions that are delegated to authorizing official designated representatives are carried out as specified. For federal agencies, the role of authorizing official is an inherent U.S. Government function and is assigned to government personnel only.

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE

The authorizing official designated representative is an organizational official designated by the authorizing official who is empowered to act on behalf of the authorizing official to coordinate and conduct the day-to-day activities associated with managing risk to information systems and organizations. This includes carrying out many of the activities related to the execution of the RMF. The only activity that cannot be delegated by the authorizing official to the designated representative is the authorization decision and signing of the associated authorization decision document (i.e., the acceptance of risk).

CHIEF ACQUISITION OFFICER

The chief acquisition officer is an organizational official designated by the head of an agency to advise and assist the head of agency and other agency officials to ensure that the mission of the agency is achieved through the management of the agency’s acquisition activities. The chief acquisition officer monitors the performance of acquisition activities and programs; establishes clear lines of authority, accountability, and responsibility for acquisition decision making within the agency; manages the direction and implementation of acquisition policy for the agency; and establishes policies, procedures, and practices that promote full and open competition from responsible sources to fulfill best value requirements considering the nature of the property or service procured. The Chief Acquisition Officer coordinates with mission or business owners, authorizing officials, senior accountable official for risk management, system owners, common control providers, senior agency information security officer, senior agency official for privacy, and risk executive (function) to ensure that security and privacy requirements are defined in organizational procurements and acquisitions.

CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

The chief information officer117 is an organizational official responsible for designating a senior agency information security officer; developing and maintaining security policies, procedures, and control techniques to address security requirements; overseeing personnel with significant responsibilities for security and ensuring that the personnel are adequately trained; assisting senior organizational officials concerning their security responsibilities; and reporting to the head of the agency on the effectiveness of the organization’s security program, including progress of remedial actions. The chief information officer, with the support of the senior accountable official for risk management, the risk executive (function), and the senior agency information security officer, works closely with authorizing officials and their designated representatives to help ensure that:

116 [OMB A-130] provides additional information about authorizing officials and co-authorizing officials. 117 When an organization has not designated a formal chief information officer position, [FISMA] requires that the associated responsibilities be handled by a comparable organizational official.

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operation or the provision of common controls is acceptable. Ongoing authorization is fundamentally related to the ongoing understanding and ongoing acceptance of security and privacy risk and is dependent on a robust continuous monitoring program.

• Reauthorization is defined as the static, single point-in-time risk determination and risk acceptance decision that occurs after initial authorization. In general, reauthorization actions may be time-driven or event-driven. However, under ongoing authorization, reauthorization is in most instances, an event-driven action initiated by the authorizing official or directed by the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive

(function) in response to an event that results in security and privacy risk above the level of risk previously accepted by the authorizing official. Reauthorization consists of a review of the system or the common controls similar to the review carried out during the initial authorization. The reauthorization differs from the initial authorization because the authorizing official can choose to initiate a complete zero-based review of the system or of the common controls or to initiate a targeted review based on the type of event that triggered the reauthorization. Reauthorization is a separate activity from the ongoing authorization process. However, security and privacy information generated from the continuous monitoring program may be leveraged to support reauthorization. The reauthorization actions may necessitate a review of and changes to the organization’s information security and privacy continuous monitoring strategies which may in turn affect ongoing authorization.

AUTHORIZATION PACKAGE

The authorization package provides a record of the results of the control assessments and provides the authorizing official with the information needed to make a risk-based decision on whether to authorize the operation of a system or common controls.127 The system owner or common control provider is responsible for the development, compilation, and submission of the authorization package. This includes information available from reports generated by an automated security/privacy management and reporting tool. The system owner or common control provider receives inputs from many sources during the preparation of the authorization package (e.g., senior agency information security officer; senior agency official for privacy, senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive [function]; control assessors; system security or privacy officer; and the continuous monitoring program). The authorization package128 includes the following:

• Executive summary;

• Security and privacy plans;129 130

127 Authorization packages for common controls that are not system-based may not include a security or privacy plan, but do include a record of common control implementation details. 128 The authorizing official determines what additional supporting information, artifacts, or references may be required in the authorization package. The additional documentation may include, for example, risk assessments, contingency plans, or SCRM plans.

129 [SP 800-18] provides guidance on system security plans. Guidance on privacy plans will be addressed in a planned publication specific to privacy plans. 130 In accordance with [OMB A-130], the information system security plan and the privacy plan may be integrated into one consolidated document.

NIST SP 800-37, REVISION 2 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy ________________________________________________________________________________________________

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reviewing the authorization package, the customer organization considers various risk factors such as the time elapsed since the authorization results were produced; the environment of operation (if different from the environment reflected in the authorization package); the impact level of the information to be processed, stored, or transmitted; and the overall risk tolerance of the customer organization. If the customer organization plans to integrate the shared system, application, or service with one or more of its systems, the customer organization considers the risk in doing so.

If the customer organization determines that there is insufficient information in the provider authorization package or inadequate controls in place for establishing an acceptable level of risk, the organization may negotiate with the provider organization and request additional controls or security, privacy, or supply chain information. Requests for additional controls may include for example, supplementing controls for risk reduction; implementing compensating controls; conducting additional or more rigorous assessments; or establishing constraints on the use of the system, application, or service provided. Requests for additional information may include, for example, information the provider organization produced or discovered in the use of the system that is not reflected in the authorization package. When the provider organization does not provide the requested controls, the customer organization may choose to implement additional controls to reduce risk to an acceptable level. The additional controls, along with any other controls for which the customer organization is responsible, are documented, implemented, assessed, authorized, and monitored.

Once the customer organization is satisfied with the security and privacy posture of the shared or cloud system, application, or service (as reflected in the current authorization package) and the risk of using the shared or cloud system, application, or service has been sufficiently mitigated, the customer organization issues an authorization to use in which the customer organization explicitly understands and accepts the security or privacy risk incurred by using the shared system, service, or application.144 Ultimately, the customer organization is responsible and accountable for the risks that may impact the customer organization’s operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation.

The authorization to use does not require a termination date but remains in effect if the customer organization continues to accept the security and privacy risk of using the shared or cloud system, application, or service and the authorization to operate issued by the provider organization meets the requirements established by federal and organizational policies. It is incumbent on the customer organization to ensure that information from the monitoring activities conducted by the provider organization is shared on an ongoing basis and that the provider organization notifies the customer organization when there are significant changes to the system, application, or service that may affect the security and privacy posture of the provider. If desired, the authorization to use decision may specify time- or even-driven triggers for review of the security and privacy posture of the provider organization system, service, or application being used by the customer organization. The provider organization to notifies the

144 In accordance with [FISMA], the head of each agency is responsible for providing information security protections commensurate with the risk resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information collected or maintained by or on behalf of the agency; and information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency. [OMB A-130] describes organizational responsibilities for accepting security and privacy risk.