[PDF page 1] FIPS PUB 140-2 CHANGE NOTICES (12-03-2002) FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION (Supercedes FIPS PUB 140-1, 1994 January 11) SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES CATEGORY: COMPUTER SECURITY SUBCATEGORY: CRYPTOGRAPHY Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900 Issued May 25, 2001 U.S. Department of Commerce Donald L. Evans, Secretary Technology Administration Phillip J. Bond, Under Secretary for Technology National Institute of Standards and Technology Arden L. Bement, Jr., Director i [PDF page 2] Foreword The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Series of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is the official series of publications relati ng to stan dards and guidelines adopted and promulgated under the provisions of Sectio n 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-106) and the Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235). These m andates have given th e Secretary of Com merce and NIST im portant responsibilities for improving the utilization and management of computer and related telecommunications systems in the Federal government. The NIST, through its Information Technolog y Laboratory, provides leadership, technical guidance, and coordination of government efforts in the development of standards and guidelines in these areas. Comments concerning Feder al I nformation Pr ocessing Standard s Publications are welc omed an d should be addressed to the Director, Information Technology Laboratory, National Institut e of Standards an d Technology, 100 Bureau Driv e, Stop 8900 , Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900. W illiam Mehuron, Director Information Technology Laboratory Abstract The sel ective application of t echnological and related procedu ral saf eguards i s an important responsibilit y of every Federal organization in providing adequate security in its computer and telecommunication systems. This publication provides a standard that will be used by Federal organizations when t hese organizations specify that cryptographic-based security systems are to be used to prov ide protection for sensitive o r val uable dat a. Pr otection of a cr yptographic m odule with in a securit y s ystem is necessary to maintain the confid entiality and integrity of the information protected by the module. This standard specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied b y a cryptographic module. The standard provides four increasing, qualitative levels of security intended to cover a wide range of potential applications and env ironments. Th e security requirements cover areas related to the s ecure design an d impl ementation of a cr yptographic module. These ar eas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic module ports and interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; finite state model; physical security; operational environment; cr yptographic ke y management; electroma gnetic int erference/electromagnetic com patibility (EMI/EMC); self-tests; design assurance; and mitigation of other attacks. Key words: co mputer security , telecommunication security , cryptography, cryptographic modules, Feder al Informatio n Processing Standard (FIPS). National Institute of Standards U.S. Government Printing Office For Sale by the National and Technology Washington: 2001 Technical Information FIPS PUB 140-2 Service 64 pages (May 25, 2001) U.S. Department of Commerce ii [PDF page 3] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 May 25, 2001 Announcing the Standard for SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS PUBS) are issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) after approval by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-106) and the Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235). 1. Name of Standard. Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (FIPS PUB 140-2). 2. Ca tegory of Standard. Computer Security Standard, Cryptography. 3. Explanation. This standard specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a se curity system protecting se nsitive but unclassified inform ation (hereafter referred to as sensitive information). The standard provides four increasing, qualitative levels of security: Level 1, Level 2, Le vel 3, and Level 4. These l evels are in tended to cover th e wide range of potential applications and e nvironments i n whi ch cry ptographic modules m ay be em ployed. The securi ty requirements cove r areas related t o t he se cure design a nd i mplementation o f a cry ptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification, cryptographic module ports and interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; finite state m odel; physical security; operat ional environment; cryptographic key m anagement; electro magnetic i nterference/electromagnetic co mpatibility (EMI/EMC); self-test s; design assu rance; and m itigation of ot her at tacks. Thi s st andard supe rsedes F IPS 1 40-1, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, in its entirety. The C ryptographic M odule Validation P rogram (C MVP) validates c ryptographic modules t o Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 and other cryptography based standards. The C MVP is a joint effort bet ween NIST and the Communications Security Estab lishment (CSE) of th e Government of Canada. Products validated as conform ing to FIPS 140-2 are accepte d by the Fe deral agencies of both countries for the protection of sensitive information (United States) or Designated Information (Canada). The g oal of t he C MVP i s to pr omote t he use of val idated cry ptographic modules a nd provide Fe deral agencies with a security metric to use in procuring equipment containing validated cryptographic modules. In the CMVP, vendors of cryptographic modules use independent, accredited testing laboratories to have their m odules tested. National Voluntary La boratory Accreditation Pr ogram (NVLAP) accre dited laboratories perform cryptographic module compliance/conformance testing. 4. A pproving Authority. Secretary of Commerce. 5. Main tenance Agency. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL). 6. Cros s Index. a. FIPS PUB 46-3, Data Encryption Standard. b. FIPS PUB 74, Guidelines for Implementing and Using the NBS Data Encryption Standard. c. FIPS PUB 81, DES Modes of Operation. d. FIPS PUB 113, Computer Data Authentication. iii [PDF page 4] e. FIPS PUB 171, Key Management Using ANSI X9.17. f. FIPS PUB 180-1, Secure Hash Standard. g. FIPS PUB 186-2, Digital Signature Standard. h. Special Publication 800-2, Public Key Cryptography. i. Special Publication 800-20, Modes of Operation Validation System for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TMOVS): Requirements and Procedures These documents may be found at the CMVP URL http://www.nist.gov/cmvp. Other NIST publications may be applicable to the implementation and use of this standard. A list (NIST Publications List 91) of currently available computer security publications, including ordering information, can be obtained from NIST. 7. Applicability . This standard is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to p rotect sen sitive in formation in co mputer an d teleco mmunication system s (in cluding v oice systems) as de fined i n Sect ion 5 131 o f t he I nformation Technology M anagement R eform Act of 1 996, Public Law 104-106. T his standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal d epartments and age ncies o perate or are operated fo r t hem unde r co ntract. C ryptographic modules that have been approved for classified use may be used in lieu of modules that have been validated against this st andard. The adoption an d use o f t his st andard i s avai lable t o pri vate and c ommercial organizations. 8. Applications. Cryp tographic-based secu rity syste ms m ay b e u tilized in various co mputer and telecommunication applications (e .g., data storage, acces s control a nd personal ide ntification, network communications, radio, facs imile, an d video) an d i n various e nvironments (e. g., c entralized c omputer facilities, o ffice env ironments, an d ho stile environments). Th e cryp tographic serv ices (e.g ., en cryption, authentication, digital signature, and key management) provided by a c ryptographic module are based on many factors that are s pecific to the application and environment. Th e security lev el to which a cryptographic module is validated must be chosen to provide a level of security appropriate for the security requirements of the a pplication a nd environm ent in whic h the m odule will be utilized and the security services that the module will provide. The security requirements for a particular security level include both the securi ty re quirements speci fic t o t hat level an d t he s ecurity req uirements t hat appl y t o al l modules regardless of the level. 9. Specific ations. Fe deral In formation Pr ocessing Sta ndard (F IPS) 1 40-2, Sec urity Requirem ents for Cryptographic Modules (affixed). 10. Implementations. This standard covers implementations of cryptographic modules including, but not limited to, hardware components or modules, software/firmware programs or modules or any combination thereof. C ryptographic modules that are v alidated under the CMVP will be considered as con forming to this standard. Information about the CMVP can be obtained from the a. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory, 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8900, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900. b. Communications Secu rity Establishment, ITS Clien t Serv ices, 1500 Bro nson Av e., Ottawa, ON K1G 3Z4. c. CM VP URL http://www.nist.gov/cmvp. 11. Approved Security Functions. Cryptographic modules that conform to this standard shall employ Approved security functions such as cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key management techniques, and au thentication techn iques th at h ave been ap proved for protecting Fed eral government sen sitive information. Approved security functions include those that are either: a. specified in a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS), b. adopted in a FIPS and s pecified either in an appendix to the FIPS or in a document referenced by the FIPS, or c. specified in the list of Approved security functions. iv [PDF page 5] 12. Interpretation. Questions co ncerning t he co ntent an d s pecifications of t his standard sh ould be addressed to: Director, Informati on Technology Laboratory, ATT N: FIPS 14 0-2 Int erpretation, Nat ional Institute of St andards and Tech nology, 100 B ureau Drive, Stop 890 0, Gaith ersburg, MD 20899-8900. Resolution of questions regarding this standard will be provided by the validation authorities at NIST and CSE. 13. E xport Control. Certain cry ptographic devices a nd t echnical d ata regar ding t hem are sub ject t o Federal ex port cont rols a nd exports o f cry ptographic m odules i mplementing t his st andard a nd t echnical data regarding them must comply with these Federal regulations and be licensed by the Bureau of Export Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Applicable Federal government export controls are specified in Title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 740.17; Title 15, CFR Part 742; and Title 15, CFR Part 774, Category 5, Part 2. 14. Im plementation Sc hedule. T his st andard bec omes effect ive si x m onths aft er ap proval by the Secretary of Commerce. A transition period from November 25, 2001 until six months after the effective date is p rovided to enable all ag encies to develop plans for the acquisition of products that are co mpliant with FIPS 140-2. A gencies may retain and use F IPS 140-1 validated products that have been purchased before the end of the transition period. After the transition period, modules will no longer be tested against the FIPS 140 -1 requirements. After th e transition period, all previous validations against FIPS 140-1 will still be recognized. Figure 1 summarizes the FIPS 140-2 implementation schedule. FIPS 140-1 FIPS 140-2 APPROVAL DATE OF FIPS 140-2 EFFECTIVE DATE OF FIPS 140-2 (6 months after approval date) TRANSITION PERIOD TO FIPS 140-2 (6 months after effective date) FUTURE Figure 1. FIPS 140-2 Implementation Schedule 15. Qua lifications. Th e secu rity requ irements specified in this standard ar e based up on inf ormation provided by many sou rces within t he Fe deral government an d private i ndustry. T he re quirements are designed to protect ag ainst ad versaries m ounting co st-effective attack s on sen sitive gov ernment o r commercial dat a (e.g ., hackers, organized cri me, and econom ic competitors). Th e primary g oal in designing an effective security system is to make the cost of any attack greater than the possible payoff. v [PDF page 6] While the security requirements specified in this standard are intended to maintain the security provided by a cryptographic module, conformance to this standard is not sufficient to ensure that a particular module is secure. The operator of a cryptographic module is responsible for ensuring that the security provided by a module is sufficient and acc eptable to the owner of the information that is being protected and that any residual risk is acknowledged and accepted. Similarly, the use of a val idated cryptographic module in a computer or telecommunications system does not guarantee the security of the overall system. The responsible authority in each agency shall ensure that the security of the system is sufficient and acceptable. Since a standard of this nature must be flexible enough to adapt to advancements and innovations in science and techn ology, th is stand ard will b e reviewed ev ery five years in ord er to con sider new or revised requirements that may be needed to meet technological and economic changes. 16. Waiver Procedure. Under certain exceptional circumstances, the heads of Federal agencies, or their delegates, may approve waivers to Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS), for their agency. The heads of suc h age ncies m ay re delegate s uch a uthority o nly t o a se nior official desi gnated pursuant t o Section 3506(b) of Title 4 4, U.S. Code. Waivers shall be granted only when compliance with a stan dard would a. adversely affect the accomplishment of the mission of an operator of Federal computer system or b. cause a m ajor adver se fi nancial im pact on t he operat or t hat i s not of fset by gove rnment-wide savings. Agency heads may act upon a written waiver request containing the information detailed above. Ag ency heads may also act without a written waiver request when they determine which conditions for meeting the standard cannot b e met. Ag ency heads may approve waivers only by a written decision that explains the basis on whic h the agency head m ade t he req uired fi nding(s). A copy of eac h s uch decision, with procurement sen sitive or classified portions clearly id entified, sh all b e sen t t o: Natio nal In stitute o f Standards a nd Tech nology; ATT N: F IPS Waiver Decision, Information Tec hnology Lab oratory, 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8900, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900. In addition, notice of each waiver granted and each delegation of authority to approve waivers shall be sent promptly to the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Government Affairs of the Senate and shall be published promptly in the Federal Register. When the determination on a waiv er applies to the procurement of equipment and/or services, a notice of the wai ver det ermination m ust be published i n t he Commerce B usiness Dai ly as a part of the notice o f solicitation for offers of an acquisition or, if the waiver determination is made after that notice is published, by amendment to such notice. A copy of t he waiver, any supporting documents, the document approving the waiver and any supporting and accompanying documents, with such deletions as t he agency is authorized and decides to make under Section 552(b) of Title 5, U.S. Code, shall be part of the procurement documentation and retained by the agency. 17. Where to obtain copies. Cop ies o f th is pu blication are av ailable fro m the URL: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications. Copies are available for sale by the Natio nal Tech nical In formation Service, U. S. Depa rtment of C ommerce, Spri ngfield, VA 22161. Whe n ordering, re fer to Federal Information Pro cessing Stan dards Pub lication 140 -2 (FIPSPUB 1402) and id entify th e title. When microfiche is desired, this should be specified. Prices are published by NTIS in current catalogs and other issuances. Payment may be m ade by che ck, m oney o rder, deposit acc ount, or cha rged t o a cre dit card accepted by NTIS. 18. CHANGE NOTICE. See important change notice at the end of this document. vi [PDF page 7] TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. OVERVIEW....................................................................................................................... .................... 1 1.1 Security Level 1............................................................................................................... ............... 1 1.2 Security Level 2............................................................................................................... ............... 2 1.3 Security Level 3............................................................................................................... ............... 2 1.4 Security Level 4............................................................................................................... ............... 3 2. GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS...................................................................................... 4 2.1 Glossary of Terms .............................................................................................................. ............ 4 2.2 Acronyms ....................................................................................................................... ................ 8 3. FUNCTIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES........................................................................................ 11 4. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................... .1 2 4.1 Cryptographic Module Specification............................................................................................ 13 4.2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces ................................................................................. 14 4.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication ............................................................................................ .1 5 4.3.1 Roles.......................................................................................................................... ........... 16 4.3.2 Services................................................................................................................................. 16 4.3.3 Operator Authentication ....................................................................................................... 17 4.4 Finite State Model ............................................................................................................. ........... 19 4.5 Physical Security .............................................................................................................. ............ 20 4.5.1 General Physical Security Requirements.............................................................................. 21 4.5.2 Single-Chip Cryptographic Modules .................................................................................... 23 4.5.3 Multiple-Chip Embedded Cryptographic Modules............................................................... 24 4.5.4 Multiple-Chip Standalone Cryptographic Modules.............................................................. 25 4.5.5 Environmental Failure Protection/Testing............................................................................ 26 4.6 Operational Environment ........................................................................................................ ..... 27 4.6.1 Operating System Requirements .......................................................................................... 28 4.7 Cryptographic Key Management.................................................................................................. 30 4.7.1 Random Number Generators (RNGs)................................................................................... 30 4.7.2 Key Generation................................................................................................................. .... 31 4.7.3 Key Establishment.............................................................................................................. .. 31 4.7.4 Key Entry and Output........................................................................................................... 31 4.7.5 Key Storage .................................................................................................................... ...... 33 4.7.6 Key Zeroization ................................................................................................................ .... 33 4.8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) ................................. 33 4.9 Self-Tests..................................................................................................................... ................. 33 4.9.1 Power-Up Tests ................................................................................................................. ... 34 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.............................................................................................................. .... 35 4.10 Design Assurance ............................................................................................................... .......... 36 4.10.1 Configuration Management.................................................................................................. 36 4.10.2 Delivery and Operation......................................................................................................... 37 4.10.3 Development.................................................................................................................... ..... 37 4.10.4 Guidance Documents............................................................................................................ 38 4. 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks.............................................................................................. ............... 39 APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS .............................................. 41 APPENDIX B: RECOMMENDED SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES .................................. 45 APPENDIX C: CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SECURITY POLICY...................................................... 47 APPENDIX D: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................... 51 vii [PDF page 8] APPENDIX E: APPLICABLE INTERNET UNIFORM RESOURCE LOCATORS (URL)...................... 53 CHANGE NOTICE.................................................................................................................. .................... 54 Change Notice 1 (Superceded by Change Notice 2) ................................................................................ 54 Change Notice 2 ................................................................................................................ ....................... 55 Change Notice 3 ................................................................................................................ ....................... 60 Change Notice 4 ................................................................................................................ ....................... 61 viii [PDF page 9] 1. OVE RVIEW This stand ard specifies the secu rity req uirements for a cryp tographic module utilized with in a security system p rotecting sen sitive in formation in co mputer and teleco mmunication syste ms (in cluding voice systems) as de fined i n Sect ion 5 131 o f t he I nformation Technology M anagement R eform Act of 1 996, Public Law 104-106. FIPS 140-1 was developed by a go vernment and industry working group composed of both operators and vendors. The working group identified requirements for four security levels for cryptographic modules to provide for a wide spectrum of data sensitivity (e.g., l ow value administrative data, million dollar funds transfers, and life protecting data) and a d iversity of application environments (e.g., a guarded facility, an office, a nd a com pletely unprotect ed loc ation). Four security le vels are s pecified for each of 11 requirement areas. Eac h security level offers an increase in security over the preceding level. These four increasing levels of security allow cost-effective solutions that are appropriate for different degrees of data sensitivity an d d ifferent app lication env ironments. FIPS 14 0-2 in corporates ch anges in app licable standards an d t echnology si nce t he devel opment of FIPS 140-1 as well as changes that are base d on comments received from the vendor, laboratory, and user communities. While the security requirements specified in this standard are intended to maintain the security provided by a cryptographic module, conformance to this standard is not sufficient to ensure that a particular module is secure. The operat or of a cryptographic module is responsible for ensuring that the security provided by the module is sufficient and acceptable to the owner of the information that is being protected, and that any residual risk is acknowledged and accepted. Similarly, the use of a validated cryptographic module in a computer or telecommunications system is not sufficient to ensure the security of the overall system. The overall security level of a cryptographic module must be chose n to provide a l evel of sec urity appropriate for the security req uirements of the application and environment in which the module is t o be utilized and for the sec urity services that the m odule is to provide. T he responsi ble authority in each orga nization should e nsure that their com puter and telecommunication systems that utilize cryptogra phic modules provide an acceptable level of security for the given application and environment. The importance of security awareness and of making information security a management priority should be communicated to all users. Since information securi ty requi rements vary fo r di fferent appl ications, organizations should identify their information resources and determine the sensitivity to and the potential impact of l osses. C ontrols should be based on the potential risks and s hould be selected from available controls, i ncluding a dministrative p olicies an d p rocedures, physical and e nvironmental con trols, information and data controls, software development and acquisition controls, and backup and contingency planning. The f ollowing sect ions p rovide an o verview o f t he fo ur securi ty l evels. C ommon exam ples, gi ven t o illustrate how the requirements might be met, are not intended to be restrictive or exhaustive. The location of Annexes A, B, C, and D can be found in APPENDIX D: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1.1 Security Level 1 Security Lev el 1 prov ides the lo west lev el o f secu rity. Basic secu rity requ irements are speci fied for a cryptographic module (e.g., at least one Approved algorithm or Approved security function shall be used). No specific physical security mechanisms are required in a Security Level 1 cryptographic module beyond the basic requirement for production-grade components. An e xample of a Securi ty Level 1 cryptographic module is a personal computer (PC) encryption board. 1 [PDF page 10] Security Level 1 al lows the software and firmware components of a c ryptographic module to be e xecuted on a ge neral p urpose com puting sy stem usi ng a n u nevaluated ope rating sy stem. Such im plementations may be appropriate for some low-level security applications when other controls, such as physical security, network secu rity, an d ad ministrative procedures ar e limited o r nonex istent. Th e i mplementation of cryptographic soft ware m ay be m ore cos t-effective t han corre sponding hardware-based m echanisms, enabling organizations t o s elect fro m alternative c ryptographic s olutions t o m eet lower-level se curity requirements. 1.2 Security Level 2 Security Level 2 enhances the physical security mechanisms of a Security Level 1 cryptographic module by adding the requirement for tamper-evidence, which includes the use of tamper-evident coatings or seals or for pick-resistant locks on removable covers or doors of the module. Tamper-evident coatings or seals are placed on a cryptographic module so that the coating or seal must be broken to attain physical access to the plaintext cryptographic keys and critical security parameters (CSPs) within the module. Tam per-evident seals or pick-resistant locks are placed on covers or doors to protect against unauthorized physical access. Security Level 2 req uires, at a minimum, role-based aut hentication i n whi ch a cry ptographic m odule authenticates the authorization of an operator to assume a specific role and perform a corresponding set of services. Security Level 2 al lows the software and firmware components of a c ryptographic module to be e xecuted on a general purpose computing system using an operating system that • meets the functional requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC) Protection Profiles (PPs) listed in Annex B and • is evaluated at the CC evaluation assurance level EAL2 (or higher). An equivalent evaluated trusted operating system may be used. A trusted operating system provides a level of trust so that cryptographic modules executing on general purpose computing platforms are com parable to cryptographic modules implemented using dedicated hardware systems. 1.3 Security Level 3 In addition to the tamper-evident physical security mechanisms required at Security Level 2, Security Level 3 atte mpts to pre vent the intruder from gaining access to CSPs held within the crypt ographic m odule. Physical secu rity mechanisms requ ired at Security Lev el 3 are in tended to h ave a hig h probability o f detecting and responding to attem pts at physical access, use or m odification of the cryptographic m odule. The physical security mechanisms may include the use of strong enclosures and tamper detection/response circuitry that zeroizes all plaintext CSPs when the removable covers/doors of the cryptographic module are opened. Security Level 3 requires identity-based authentication mechanisms, enhancing the security provided by the role-based aut hentication mechanisms specified for Security Level 2. A cry ptographic module authenticates the identity of an operator and verifies that the identified operator is au thorized to assume a specific role and perform a corresponding set of services. Security Level 3 re quires the entry or output of plaintext CSPs (including the entry or output of plaintext CSPs using split knowledge procedures) be performed using ports that are physically separated from other ports, or interfaces that are logically separated using a trusted path from other interfac es. Plaintext CSPs may be entered into or ou tput from the cryptographic module in encrypted form (in which case th ey may travel through enclosing or intervening systems). 2 [PDF page 11] Security Level 3 al lows the software and firmware components of a c ryptographic module to be e xecuted on a general purpose computing system using an operating system that • meets th e fu nctional requ irements sp ecified in th e PPs listed in Ann ex B with th e additional functional requirement of a Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1) and • is evaluated at the CC ev aluation assurance level EAL3 (or higher) with the additional assurance requirement of an Informal Target of Evaluation (TOE) Security Policy Model (ADV_SPM.1). An e quivalent eval uated t rusted o perating sy stem may be use d. T he im plementation of a t rusted pat h protects plaintext CSPs and the software and firmware components of the cryptographic module from other untrusted software or firmware that may be executing on the system. 1.4 Security Level 4 Security Level 4 p rovides the highest level of sec urity defined in this standard. At this security level, the physical security mechanisms provide a complete envelope of protection around the cryptographic module with the intent of detecting and responding to all unauthorized attempts at physical access. Penet ration of the crypt ographic m odule enclosure from any direction has a very high proba bility of being detected, resulting in the im mediate zeroization of all plaintext CS Ps. Security Level 4 cryptographic modules are useful for operation in physically unprotected environments. Security Level 4 also protects a cryptographic module against a security compromise due to environmental conditions o r fluctuations ou tside o f t he m odule's n ormal operating ran ges for vo ltage an d tem perature. Intentional e xcursions bey ond t he normal ope rating ra nges m ay be used by an at tacker t o t hwart a cryptographic m odule's defense s. A c ryptographic module i s re quired t o ei ther i nclude s pecial environmental protection features designed to detect fluctuations and zeroize CSPs, or to undergo rigorous environmental failure testing to provide a reasonable ass urance t hat the m odule will not be a ffected by fluctuations outside of th e normal o perating rang e i n a m anner t hat can co mpromise t he secu rity of the module. Security Level 4 al lows the software and firmware components of a c ryptographic module to be e xecuted on a general purpose computing system using an operating system that • meets the functional requirements specified for Security Level 3 and • is evaluated at the CC evaluation assurance level EAL4 (or higher). An equivalent evaluated trusted operating system may be used. 3 [PDF page 12] 2. GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 2.1 Glossary of Terms The following definitions are tailored for use in this standard: Approved: FIPS-Approved and/or NIST-recommended. Approved mode of operation: a m ode of the cryptographic module that employs only Approved security functions (not t o be c onfused with a speci fic m ode o f a n Approved s ecurity f unction, e .g., DES CBC mode). Approved secu rity fun ction: for th is stan dard, a security fun ction (e.g., cry ptographic algo rithm, cryptographic key management technique, or authentication technique) that is either a) specified in an Approved standard, b) adopted in an Approved standard and specified either in an appendix of the Approved standard or in a document referenced by the Approved standard, or c) specified in the list of Approved security functions. Authentication code: a cry ptographic checksum based on a n Approved security function (also known as a Message Authentication Code). Automated key tra nsport: the transport of cryp tographic keys, u sually in encrypted form, using electronic means such as a computer network (e.g., key transport/agreement protocols). Compromise: th e un authorized d isclosure, modification, su bstitution, or u se of sen sitive d ata (in cluding plaintext cryptographic keys and other CSPs). Confidentiality: the property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes. Control information: information that is entered into a cryptographic module for the purposes of directing the operation of the module. Critical security parameter (CSP): security-related information (e.g., secret and private cryptographic keys, and authentication data such as passwords and PINs) whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module. Cryptographic boundary: an explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds of a cry ptographic module an d cont ains al l t he har dware, soft ware, an d/or fi rmware com ponents of a cryptographic module. Cryptographic key (key): a parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that determines • the transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext data, • the transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext data, • a digital signature computed from data, • the verification of a digital signature computed from data, • an authentication code computed from data, or • an exchange agreement of a shared secret. 4 [PDF page 13] Cryptographic key com ponent (key component) : a param eter used i n con junction with ot her key components i n an Approved secu rity fu nction t o f orm a pl aintext c ryptographic key or perform a cryptographic function. Cryptographic module: the set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements Approved security functions (i ncluding c ryptographic al gorithms and ke y gener ation) and i s c ontained within t he cryptographic boundary. Cryptographic mo dule security p olicy: a precise s pecification of the security rul es under whi ch a cryptographic module will operate, i ncluding the rules derived from the requirem ents of this sta ndard and additional rules imposed by the vendor. (See Appendix C.) Crypto officer: an operator or process (subject), acting on behalf of the operator, performing cryptographic initialization or management functions. Data path: the phy sical or l ogical ro ute o ver which data passes; a p hysical dat a pat h may be shared by multiple logical data paths. Differential power a nalysis (DPA): an analysis of the variations of the electrical power cons umption of a cryptographic m odule, usi ng adva nced st atistical methods and/ or other t echniques, f or t he purpose of extracting information correlated to cryptographic keys used in a cryptographic algorithm. Digital signature: the result of a cry ptographic transformation of data which, when properly implemented, provides the services of: 1. o rigin authentication 2. d ata integrity, and 3. si gner non-repudiation. Electromagnetic co mpatibility (EMC ): th e ab ility o f electron ic d evices to fun ction satisfactorily in an electromagnetic environment without introducing intolerable electromagnetic disturbances to other devices in that environment. Electromagnetic interference (EMI): electromagnetic emissions from a devi ce, equipment, or system that interfere with the normal operation of another device, equipment, or system. Electronic key entry: the entry of cryptographic keys into a cryptographic module using electronic methods such as a smart card or a key-loading device. (The operator of the key may have no knowledge of the value of the key being entered.) Encrypted key: a cryptographic key that has been encrypted using an Approved security function with a key encrypting key, a PIN, or a password in order to disguise the value of the underlying plaintext key. Environmental failure protection (EFP): the use of features to protect against a compromise of the security of a cryptographic module due to en vironmental conditions or fluctuations outside of the module's normal operating range. Environmental failure testing (EFT): the use of testing to provide a r easonable assurance that the security of a cryptographic module will not be compromised by environmental conditions or fluctuations outside of the module's normal operating range. Error detection code (EDC): a cod e computed from data and comprised of redundant bits of information designed to detect, but not correct, unintentional changes in the data. 5 [PDF page 14] Finite state model: a mathematical model of a sequential machine that is comprised of a finite set of input events, a finite set of output events, a finite set of states, a fun ction that maps states and input to output, a function that maps states and inputs to states (a state transition function), and a specification that describes the initial state. Firmware: the programs and data components of a cryptographic module that are stored in hardware (e.g., ROM, PR OM, EPR OM, E EPROM or F LASH) within t he cry ptographic boundary and ca nnot be dynamically written or modified during execution. Hardware: the physical equipment within the cryptographic boundary used to process programs and data. Hash-based m essage a uthentication c ode ( HMAC): a message au thentication cod e that u tilizes a k eyed hash. Initialization vecto r (IV) : a vect or used i n defining t he st arting point of an en cryption p rocess within a cryptographic algorithm. Input data: information that is entered into a cryptographic module for the purposes of transformation or computation using an Approved security function. Integrity: th e property th at sensitive data h as not b een m odified or deleted in an un authorized and undetected manner. Interface: a l ogical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides a ccess to the m odule for logical information flows representing physical signals. Key encrypting key: a cryptographic key that is used for the encryption or decryption of other keys. Key establishment: the process by which cryptographic keys are securely distributed among cryptographic modules using manual transport methods (e.g., key loaders), automated methods (e.g., key transport and/or key agreement protocols), or a co mbination of a utomated and manual methods (consists of key transport plus key agreement). Key loader: a self-contained unit that is capable of storing at least one plaintext or encrypted cryptographic key or key component that can be transferred, upon request, into a cryptographic module. Key management : th e acti vities in volving t he handling of cryp tographic k eys and other related security parameters (e. g., IVs an d passwords) during the entire l ife cy cle o f the keys, including t heir generation, storage, establishment, entry and output, and zeroization. Key transport: secure transport of cryptographic keys from one cryptographic module to another module. Manual key transport: a non-electronic means of transporting cryptographic keys. Manual key entry : the entry of cryptographic keys into a cryptographic module, using devices such as a keyboard. Microcode: the elementary processor instructions that correspond to an executable program instruction. Operator: an individual accessing a cryptographic module or a process (subject) operating on behalf of the individual, regardless of the assumed role. Output data: information that is produced from a cryptographic module. 6 [PDF page 15] Password: a string of characters (letters, numbers, and other symbols) used to authenticate an identity or to verify access authorization. Personal identification number (PIN): an alphanumeric code or password used to authenticate an identity. Physical pr otection: t he safeguarding of a cry ptographic m odule, c ryptographic keys, o r C SPs using physical means. Plaintext key: an unencrypted cryptographic key. Port: a physic al entry or e xit point of a c ryptographic module that pr ovides access to the m odule for physical signals, represented by logical information flows (physically separated ports do not share the same physical pin or wire). Private key : a cry ptographic key , used w ith a publ ic k ey cry ptographic al gorithm, t hat i s uni quely associated with an entity and is not made public. Protection Profile: an implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of Targets of Evaluation (TOEs) that meet specific consumer needs. Public key: a cryptographic key used with a public key cryptographic algorithm that is uniquely associated with an entity and that may be made public. (Public keys are not considered CSPs.) Public key certificate: a set of data that uniquely identifies an entity, contains the entity's public key, and is digitally signed by a trusted party, thereby binding the public key to the entity. Public key (asymmetric) cryptographic algorithm: a cryp tographic algorithm that uses two related keys, a public key and a private key. The two keys have the property that deriving the private key from the public key is computationally infeasible. Random Numb er Generator: Ran dom Nu mber Gene rators (R NGs) used for c ryptographic ap plications typically produce a sequence of zero and one bits that may be com bined into sub-sequences or blocks of random numbers. T here are two basic clas ses: deterministic an d nondeterministic. A deterministic RNG consists of an alg orithm th at p roduces a sequ ence of b its fro m an in itial v alue called a seed . A nondeterministic R NG pr oduces out put t hat i s depende nt on som e unp redictable p hysical source t hat is outside human control. Removable cover: a cover designed to permit physical access to the contents of a cryptographic module. Secret key: a cryptographic key, used with a secret key cryptographic algorithm, that is uniquely associated with one or more entities and should not be made public. Secret key (symmetric) cryptographic algorithm: a cryptographic algorithm that uses a single secret key for both encryption and decryption. Security policy: see Cryptographic module security policy. Seed key: a secret value used to initialize a cryptographic function or operation. Simple power analysis (SPA): a direct (pri marily visual) analysis of patterns of instruction execution (or execution of i ndividual i nstructions), obtained t hrough monitoring t he vari ations i n el ectrical p ower consumption of a cryptographic module, for the purpose of re vealing the features and implementations of cryptographic algorithms and subsequently the values of cryptographic keys. 7 [PDF page 16] Software: the programs and data components within the cryptographic boundary, usually stored on erasable media (e.g., disk), that can be dynamically written and modified during execution. Split knowledge: a process by which a cryptographic key is split into multiple key components, individually sharing no k nowledge of t he ori ginal key , t hat can be subse quently i nput i nto, o r out put f rom, a cryptographic module by separate entities and combined to recreate the original cryptographic key. Status information: information that is output from a crypto graphic module for the purposes of indicating certain operational characteristics or states of the module. System software: the special software within the cryptographic boundary (e.g., operating system, compilers or utility programs) designed for a specific computer system or family of computer systems to facilitate the operation and maintenance of the computer system, and associated programs, and data. Tamper detection: the automatic determination by a cryptographic module that an attempt has been made to compromise the physical security of the module. Tamper evide nce: th e ex ternal ind ication th at an attemp t h as been made to co mpromise th e physical security o f a cryptographic module. ( The evi dence of t he t amper at tempt shoul d be o bservable b y an operator subsequent to the attempt.) Tamper res ponse: t he aut omatic act ion t aken by a cry ptographic m odule when a t amper detection has occurred (the minimum response action is the zeroization of plaintext keys and CSPs). Target of Evaluation (TOE): an information technology product or system and associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation. TEMPEST: a name r eferring to t he inv estigation, study, and con trol o f unintentional co mpromising emanations from telecommunications and automated information systems equipment. TOE Security Functions (TSF): used in the Common Criteria, a set of the TOE co nsisting of all hardware, software, and firmware that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TOE Security Policy. TOE Security Policy (TSP) : used in th e Co mmon Criteri a, a set o f ru les th at reg ulate h ow assets are managed, protected, and distributed within a Target of Evaluation. Trusted pat h: a m eans by which a n operator and a T OE Security Function ca n c ommunicate with the necessary confidence to support the TOE Security Policy. User: an individual or a process (subject) acting on behalf of the i ndividual that accesses a crypt ographic module in order to obtain cryptographic services. Validation authorities: NIST and CSE. Zeroization: a method of erasing electronically stored data, cryptographic keys, and CSPs by altering or deleting the contents of the data storage to prevent recovery of the data. 2.2 Acronyms The following acronyms and abbreviations are used throughout this standard: ANSI American National Standards Institute API Application Program Interface 8 [PDF page 17] CAPP Controlled Access Protection Profile CBC Cipher Block Chaining CC Common Criteria CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CSE Communications Security Establishment of the Government of Canada CSP Critical Security Parameter DES Data Encryption Standard DOD Department of Defense DPA Differential Power Analysis DTR Derived Test Requirements EAL Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level EDC Error Detection Code EEPROM Electronically-Erasa ble Programmable Read-Only Memory EFP Environmental Failure Protection EFT Environmental Failure Testing EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI Electromagnetic Interference EPROM Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory FCC Federal Communications Commission FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB FIPS Publication HDL Hardware Description Language HMAC Hash-Based Message Authentication Code IC Integrated Circuit IG Implementation Guidance ISO International Organization for Standardization ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria IV Initialization Vector 9 [PDF page 18] NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NTIS National Technical Information Service PIN Personal Identification Number PROM Programmable Read-Only Memory RAM Random Access Memory RNG Random Number Generator ROM Read-Only Memory SPA Simple Power Analysis TOE Target of Evaluation TSF Target of Evaluation Security Functions TSP Target of Evaluation Security Policy URL Uniform Resource Locator 10 [PDF page 19] 3. FUNCTIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES The security requirements sp ecified in th is stan dard relate to th e secure d esign and implementation o f a cryptographic m odule. The req uirements are deri ved f rom t he fol lowing high-level functional securi ty objectives for a cryptographic module: To employ and correctly implement the Approved security functions for the protection of sensitive information. • • To protect a cryptographic module from unauthorized operation or use. • To p revent t he una uthorized di sclosure o f t he cont ents of t he cry ptographic m odule, i ncluding plaintext cryptographic keys and CSPs. • To prevent t he u nauthorized a nd u ndetected m odification of t he cryptographic module an d cryptographic alg orithms, in cluding th e unauthorized mo dification, sub stitution, in sertion, and deletion of cryptographic keys and CSPs. • To provide indications of the operational state of the cryptographic module. • To ensure that the cryptographic module performs properly when o perating in an A pproved mode of operation. • To det ect er rors i n t he operation o f t he c ryptographic module a nd t o p revent t he c ompromise of sensitive data and CSPs resulting from these errors. 11 [PDF page 20] 4. SECUR ITY REQUIREMENTS This sect ion specifies t he security req uirements t hat shall be sat isfied by cry ptographic m odules conforming to th is stan dard. Th e secu rity requ irements co ver areas related to th e d esign an d implementation of a c ryptographic m odule. T hese are as i nclude c ryptographic m odule specification; module ports and i nterfaces; roles, services, and a uthentication; finite state model; physical securit y; operational en vironment; cry ptographic key management; el ectromagnetic i nterference/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC); self-tests; and d esign as surance. An add itional area concerned with th e mitigation o f other at tacks i s cur rently not t ested but t he ven dor i s re quired t o d ocument im plemented controls (e.g., differential power analysis, and TEMPEST). Table 1 s ummarizes the security require ments in each of these areas. Security Level 1 Security Level 2 Security Level 3 Security Level 4 Cryptographic Module Specification Specification of cryptographic module, cryptographic boundary, Approved algorithms, and Approved modes of operation. Description of cryptographic module, including all hardware, software, and firmware components. Statement of module security policy. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces Required and optional interfaces. Specification of all interfaces and of all input and output data paths. Data ports for unprotected critical security parameters logically or physically separated from other data ports. Roles, Services, and Authentication Logical separation of required and optional roles and services. Role-based or identity-based operator authentication. Identity-based operator authentication. Finite State Model Specification of finite state model. Required states and optional states. State transition diagram and specification of state transitions. Physical Security Production grade equipment. Locks or tamper evidence. Tamper detection and response for covers and doors. Tamper detection and response envelope. EFP or EFT. Operational Environment Single operator. Executable code. Approved integrity technique. Referenced PPs evaluated at EAL2 with specified discretionary access control mechanisms and auditing. Referenced PPs plus trusted path evaluated at EAL3 plus security policy modeling. Referenced PPs plus trusted path evaluated at EAL4. Key management mechanisms: random number and key generation, key establishment, key distribution, key entry/output, key storage, and key zeroization. Cryptographic Key Management Secret and private keys established using manual methods may be entered or output in plaintext form. Secret and private keys established using manual methods shall be entered or output encrypted or with split knowledge procedures. EMI/EMC 47 CFR FCC Part 15. Subpart B, Class A (Business use). Applicable FCC requirements (for radio). 47 CFR FCC Part 15. Subpart B, Class B (Home use). Self-Tests Power-up tests: cryptographic algorithm tests, software/firmware integrity tests, critical functions tests. Conditional tests. Design Assurance Configuration management (CM). Secure installation and generation. Design and policy correspondence. Guidance documents. CM system. Secure distribution. Functional specification. High-level language implementation. Formal model. Detailed explanations (informal proofs). Preconditions and postconditions. Mitigation of Other Attacks Specification of mitigation of attacks for which no testable requirements are currently available. Tabl e 1: Summary of security requirements A cryptographic module shall be tested against the requirements of each area addressed in this section. The cryptographic module shall be independently rated in each area. Several areas provide for increasing levels of security with cumulative security requirements for each security level. In th ese areas, the cryptographic 12 [PDF page 21] module will receive a rating that reflects the maximum security level for which the module fulfills all of the requirements of that area. In areas t hat do not provide for different levels of security (i.e., standard set of requirements), the cryptogra phic module will receive a rating c ommensurate with the overall level of security. In addition to receiving independent ratings for each of the security areas, a cryptographic module will also receive an overall rating. The overall rating will indicate the minimum of the independent ratings received in the areas. Many of the security requirements of t his standard include specific documentation requirements that are summarized i n Ap pendices A an d C . Al l doc umentation, i ncluding c opies of t he user an d i nstallation manuals, shall be provided to the testing laboratory by the vendor. 4.1 Cryptographic Module Specification A cryptographic module shall be a set of hardware, software, firmware, or some combination thereof that implements cryptographic functions or processes, including cryptographic algorithms and, optionally, key generation, a nd i s c ontained wi thin a de fined cry ptographic boundary. A cry ptographic m odule shall implement at least one Approved security function used in an Approved mode of operation. Non-Approved security functions may also be included for use in non-Approved modes of operation. The operator shall be able to d etermine wh en an Approved m ode of op eration is selected . Fo r Secu rity Lev els 1 and 2, the cryptographic m odule securi ty pol icy may speci fy w hen a cry ptographic m odule i s per forming i n an Approved mode of operation. For Security Levels 3 and 4, a cryptographic module shall indicate when an Approved mode of operation i s sel ected. (A pproved sec urity fu nctions are l isted i n Annex A t o t his standard.) A cryp tographic b oundary sh all co nsist of an exp licitly defined perimeter th at estab lishes th e ph ysical bounds o f a cryptographic m odule. If a cry ptographic m odule c onsists of s oftware or fi rmware components, the cryptographic boundary shall contain the processor(s) and other hardware components that store and protect the software and firmware components. Hardware, software, and firmware components of a cry ptographic m odule ca n be excluded from t he req uirements of t his st andard i f sh own t hat t hese components do not affect the security of the module. The following do cumentation requirements sh all ap ply t o all sec urity-specific hardware, s oftware, and firmware cont ained wi thin a cry ptographic module. The se req uirements do not ap ply t o microcode or system software whose source code is not available to the vendor or to any hardware, software, or firmware components that can be shown not to affect the security of the cryptographic module. • Documentation shall specify the hardware, software, and firmware components of a c ryptographic module, speci fy t he cry ptographic bo undary sur rounding t hese com ponents, an d descri be t he physical configuration of the module (see Section 4.5). • Documentation shall specify any hardware, software, or firmware co mponents of a cry ptographic module that are excl uded from the security requirements of this standard and explain the rationale for the exclusion. • Documentation shall speci fy the physical ports and logical interf aces and all defi ned input and output data paths of a cryptographic module. • Documentation shall specify the manual or logical controls of a cry ptographic module, physical or logical status indicators, and applicable physical, logical, and electrical characteristics. • Documentation sh all list a ll security funct ions, b oth Ap proved a nd non-Approved, t hat are employed by a cryptographic module and shall specify all modes of operation, both Approved and non-Approved. 13 [PDF page 22] • Documentation shall specify: ! a block diagram depicting all of the major hardware components of a cryptographic module and component i nterconnections, i ncluding any microprocessors, i nput/output bu ffers, plaintext/ciphertext buffers , control buffe rs, k ey stor age, wo rking me mory, and pr ogram memory, and ! the desi gn of the ha rdware, software, an d firmware com ponents o f a c ryptographic m odule. High-level specification languages for software/firmware or schematics for hardware shall be used to document the design. Documentation sh all sp ecify all secu rity-related inform ation, i ncluding secret an d priv ate cryptographic key s (b oth plaintext an d enc rypted), aut hentication dat a (e.g., passwords, P INs), CSPs, a nd other protected information (e .g., au dited e vents, au dit d ata) w hose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of the cryptographic module. • • Documentation s hall specify a cryptogra phic m odule secu rity po licy. Th e security po licy sh all include t he r ules deri ved from t he requi rements of t his standard a nd t he r ules de rived f rom any additional requirements imposed by the vendor (see Appendix C). 4.2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces A cryptographic module shall restrict all information flow and physical access points to physical ports and logical interfaces that define all entry and exit points to and from the module. Th e cryptographic module interfaces shall be logically distinct from each other although they may share one physical port (e.g., input data may enter and output data may exit via the same port) or may be distributed over one or more physical ports (e.g., input data may enter via both a serial and a parallel port). An Application Program Interface (API) of a s oftware c omponent o f a cry ptographic module m ay be defined as one or m ore l ogical interfaces(s). A cryptographic module shall have the following four logical interfaces ("input" and "output" are indicated from the perspective of the module): Data input interface. All data (except control data entered via the control input interface) that is input to and processed by a cry ptographic module (including plaintext data, ciphertext data, cryptographic keys and CSPs, authentication data, and status information from another module) shall enter via the "data input" interface. Data output interface. All data (except status data output via the status output interface) that is output from a cry ptographic module (including plaintext data, ciphertext data, cryptographic keys and C SPs, authentication dat a, a nd c ontrol i nformation f or an other m odule) s hall exi t vi a t he "dat a output" interface. All data output via the data output interface shall be inhibited when an error state exists and during self-tests (see Section 4.9). Control input interface. Al l input commands, signals, and control data (including function calls and manual co ntrols such as s witches, buttons, a nd key boards) use d t o co ntrol t he ope ration o f a cryptographic module shall enter via the "control input" interface. Status out put interface. Al l out put si gnals, i ndicators, and st atus data (i ncluding r eturn cod es and physical i ndicators s uch as Light Em itting Di odes a nd di splays) use d t o i ndicate the st atus of a cryptographic module shall exit via the "status output" interface. All ext ernal el ectrical po wer t hat i s i nput t o a c ryptographic m odule (including power fr om an ext ernal power source or batteries) s hall enter via a power port. A power port is n ot required when all power is 14 [PDF page 23] provided o r m aintained i nternally t o t he cr yptographic b oundary o f t he cry ptographic module (e .g., an internal battery). The cry ptographic m odule s hall di stinguish bet ween data and c ontrol for i nput an d data an d st atus fo r output. Al l i nput dat a ent ering t he cry ptographic module vi a t he "dat a input" i nterface shal l onl y pass through t he i nput data path. Al l output data e xiting t he c ryptographic m odule via t he " data output" interface shall only pass through the output data path. The output data path shall be logically disconnected from the circuitry and pr ocesses while performing key generation, manual key entry, or key zeroization. To prev ent the in advertent o utput of sen sitive in formation, two in dependent in ternal actio ns sh all b e required to output data via a ny out put inte rface throu gh which plainte xt cryptogra phic keys or CSPs or sensitive data are output (e.g., two different software flags are set, on e of which may be user initiated; or two hardware gates are set serially from two separate actions). SECURITY LEVELS 1 AND 2 For Security Levels 1 and 2, the physical port(s) and logi cal interface(s) used for the input and output of plaintext cryptographic keys, cryptographic key components, authentication data, and CSPs may be shared physically and logically with other ports and interfaces of the cryptographic module. SECURITY LEVELS 3 AND 4 For Security Levels 3 and 4, the physical port(s) used for the input and output of plaintext cryptographic key components, authentication d ata, an d C SPs sh all b e p hysically separat ed f rom al l ot her po rts of t he cryptographic module • • • or the logical interfaces used for the input and output of plaintext cryptographic key components, authentication data, a nd CSPs shall be l ogically separated from all other interfaces using a trusted path, and plaintext cryptographic key components, authentication data, and other CSPs shall be directly entered into the cryptographic module (e.g., via a trusted path or directly attached cable). (See Section 4.7.4.) 4.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication A cry ptographic module s hall supp ort aut horized r oles f or o perators a nd co rresponding ser vices wi thin each role. M ultiple roles may be ass umed by a sing le operat or. If a cryp tographic m odule s upports concurrent operators, then the module shall internally maintain the separation of the roles assumed by each operator a nd t he c orresponding services . An op erator is no t requ ired to assu me an authorized role to perform services where cryptographic keys and CSPs are not modified, disclosed, or substituted (e.g., show status, self-tests, or other services that do not affect the security of the module). Authentication m echanisms may b e requ ired within a c ryptographic m odule to aut henticate an operator accessing the module, and to verify that the operator is authorized to assume the requested role and perform the services within the role. 15 [PDF page 24] 4.3.1 Roles A cryptographic module shall support the following authorized roles for operators: User Role. The ro le assumed to perform general security services, including cryptographic operations and other Approved security functions. Crypto Officer Role: The role assumed to perform cryptographic initialization or management functions (e.g., module initialization, input/output of cryptographic keys and CSPs, and audit functions). If t he cry ptographic m odule al lows operators t o perform maintenance servi ces, t hen t he m odule shall support the following authorized role: Maintenance Ro le: The role assum ed t o perform phy sical maintenance an d/or l ogical maintenance services (e.g ., h ardware/software d iagnostics). All plaintext secret and pri vate keys and unprotected CSPs shall be zeroized when entering or exiting the maintenance role. A cryptographic module may support other roles or sub-roles in addition to the roles specified above. Documentation shall specify all authorized roles supported by the cryptographic module. 4.3.2 Services Services shall refer to all of the services, operations, or functions that can be performed by a cryptographic module. Service inputs shall consist of all data or control inputs to the cryptographic module that initiate or obtain specific services, operations, or functions. Service outputs shall consist of all data and status outputs that result from services, operations, or functions initiated or obtained by service inputs. Each service input shall result in a service output. A cryptographic module shall provide the following services to operators: Show Status. Output the current status of the cryptographic module. Perform Self-Tests. Initiate and run the self-tests as specified in Section 4.9. Perform Ap proved Security Fu nction. Per form at l east one Approved securi ty fun ction use d i n a n Approved mode of operation, as specified in Section 4.1. A c ryptographic m odule m ay pr ovide other se rvices, operations, or f unctions, b oth A pproved a nd non- Approved, in addition to the services specified above. Specific services may be provided in more than one role (e.g., key entry services may be provided in the user role and the crypto officer role). If a cry ptographic m odule im plements a bypass capab ility, wh ere serv ices are p rovided without cryptographic processing (e.g., transferring plaintext through the module without encryption), then • two ind ependent in ternal actio ns sh all be requ ired to activ ate th e capability to p revent th e inadvertent bypass of plaintext data due to a single error (e.g., two different software or hardware flags are set, one of which may be user-initiated), and • the module shall show status to indicate whether 16 [PDF page 25] 1) the bypass capability is not activated, and the module is exclusively providing services with cryptographic processing (e.g., plaintext data is encrypted), 2) the b ypass capability is act ivated and t he module i s exclusi vely pr oviding ser vices without cryptographic processing (e.g., plaintext data is not encrypted), or 3) th e bypass capability is a lternately activat ed a nd deacti vated and t he module is providin g some services with cryptographic process ing and som e services without cr yptographic processing (e.g., for modules with multiple communication channels, plaintext data is or is not encrypted depending on each channel configuration). Documentation shall specify: the services, operations, or functions provided by the cryptographic module, both Approved and non-Approved, • • • for each service provided by the module, the service inputs, corresponding service outputs, and the authorized role(s) in which the service can be performed, and any ser vices p rovided by t he cry ptographic module for which t he operator i s not required t o assume an auth orized role, and how these serv ices do no t m odify, d isclose, or su bstitute cryptographic keys and CSPs, or otherwise affect the security of the module. 4.3.3 Operator Authentication Authentication m echanisms may b e requ ired within a c ryptographic m odule to aut henticate an operator accessing the module and to verify that the operator is authorized to assume the requested role and perform services within that role. Depending on the security level, a cryptographic module shall support at least one of the following mechanisms to control access to the module: Role-Based Authentication: If role-base d authentication mechanisms are suppo rted by a cry ptographic module, the module shall require that one or more roles either be implicitly or explicitly selected by t he operator and shall authenticate the assumption of the selected role (or set o f roles). Th e cryptographic module is not required to authenticate the individual identity of the operator. The selection of roles and the aut hentication o f t he assum ption of sel ected rol es m ay be co mbined. If a cry ptographic module permits an o perator to change roles, then the module shall authenticate the assumption of any role that was not previously authenticated. Identity-Based Au thentication: If i dentity-based authentication m echanisms are su pported by a cryptographic module, the module shall require that the operator be individually identified, shall require that one or m ore roles either be implicitly or explicitly selected by the operator, and shall au thenticate the identity of the operator and the au thorization of th e operator to assume th e selected role (or set o f roles). The authentication of the identity of the operator, selection of roles, and the authorization of the assumption of the selected roles may be co mbined. I f a cryptographic module permits an operator to change roles, then the module shall verify the authorization of the identified operator to assume any role that was not previously authorized. A cryptographic module may permit an authenticated operator to perform all of the services allowed within an authorized role, or m ay require separate authentication for each service or for different sets of servi ces. When a cry ptographic m odule i s po wered o ff a nd s ubsequently po wered on, t he r esults of previous authentications shall not be retained and the module shall require the operator to be re-authenticated. Various t ypes of a uthentication dat a m ay be re quired by a cry ptographic m odule t o im plement t he supported au thentication m echanisms, in cluding (b ut no t limited to ) th e k nowledge o r p ossession of a password, P IN, cry ptographic key , o r e quivalent; p ossession of a physical key , t oken, or e quivalent; or 17 [PDF page 26] verification of per sonal c haracteristics (e. g., bi ometrics). Au thentication d ata within a cr yptographic module shall be protected against unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution. The initialization of authentication mechanisms may warrant special treatment. If a cry ptographic module does not contain the authentication data required to authenticate the operator for the first time the module is accessed, t hen other a uthorized m ethods (e. g., proce dural controls or use of factory-set or default authentication data) shall be use d to control access t o the m odule and initialize the aut hentication mechanisms. The strength of the authentication mechanism shall conform to the following specifications: • For each atte mpt to use the authe ntication m echanism, the proba bility shall be less than one in 1,000,000 that a ra ndom att empt will suc ceed or a false acceptanc e will occur (e.g., guessing a password or PIN , false acceptance error rate of a bi ometric device, or s ome c ombination o f authentication methods). • For m ultiple attempts to use th e au thentication m echanism d uring a on e-minute p eriod, th e probability shall be less than one in 100,000 t hat a random attempt will succee d or a false acceptance will occur. • Feedback of au thentication data to an o perator sh all b e obscured du ring au thentication (e.g., no visible display of characters when entering a password). • Feedback provided to an operator during an attempted authentication shall not weaken the strength of the authentication mechanism. Documentation shall specify: the authentication mechanisms supported by a cryptographic module, • • • • the types of authentication data required by the module to implement the supported authentication mechanisms, the authorized methods used to c ontrol access to the module for the first time and initialize the authentication mechanisms, and the strength of the authentication mechanisms supported by the module. SECURITY LEVEL 1 For Sec urity Level 1, a cry ptographic m odule i s n ot required t o em ploy aut hentication m echanisms t o control access to the module. If aut hentication mechanisms are not supporte d by a cry ptographic module, the module shall require that one or more roles either be implicitly or explicitly selected by the operator. SECURITY LEVEL 2 For Security Level 2, a cr yptographic module shall employ role-based authentication to control access to the module. SECURITY LEVELS 3 AND 4 For Sec urity Levels 3 a nd 4, a cry ptographic m odule shal l em ploy identity-based au thentication mechanisms to control access to the module. 18 [PDF page 27] 4.4 Finite State Model The o peration of a cry ptographic m odule shal l be speci fied usi ng a fi nite st ate model (or eq uivalent) represented by a state transition diagram and/or a state transition table. The state transition diagram and/or state transition table includes: all operational and error states of a cryptographic module, • • • • • • the corresponding transitions from one state to another, the input events that cause transitions from one state to another, and the output events resulting from transitions from one state to another. A cryptographic module shall include the following operational and error states: Power on /off sta tes. St ates for pri mary, secon dary, or backup p ower. These st ates m ay di stinguish between power sources being applied to a cryptographic module. Crypto officer states. State s in which t he crypt o officer se rvices a re performed (e. g., c ryptographic initialization and key management). Key/CSP entry states. States for entering cryptographic keys and CSPs into the cryptographic module. User states. States in which authorized users obtain security services, perform cryptographic operations, or perform other Approved or non-Approved functions. Self-test states. States in which the cryptographic module is performing self-tests. Error states. States when the cryptographic module has encountered an err or (e.g., failed a sel f-test or attempted to encrypt when missing operational keys or CSPs). Er ror states may include "hard" errors that i ndicate an eq uipment m alfunction and t hat m ay r equire m aintenance, ser vice or re pair of t he cryptographic module, or re coverable "soft" errors that may require i nitialization or resetting of t he module. Recovery from error states shall be possible except for those caused by hard errors that require maintenance, service, or repair of the cryptographic module. A cryptographic module may contain other states including, but not limited to, the following: Bypass states . States in wh ich a b ypass cap ability is activated an d services are provided withou t cryptographic processing (e.g., transferring plaintext through the cryptographic module). Maintenance states. States for maintaining and servicing a cryptographic module, including physical and logical maintenance testing. If a cryptographic module contains a maintenance role, then a maintenance state shall be included. Documentation shal l i nclude a repre sentation o f t he fi nite st ate model (o r eq uivalent) usi ng a state transition diagram and/or state transition table that shall specify: all operational and error states of a cryptographic module, the corresponding transitions from one state to another, 19 [PDF page 28] the input eve nts, including data inputs a nd control inputs, that cause tra nsitions from one state to another, and • • the output events, including internal module conditions, data outputs, and status outputs resulting from transitions from one state to another. 4.5 Physical Security A cry ptographic module sha ll em ploy phy sical securi ty mechanisms in or der t o res trict unaut horized physical access to the contents of the module and to dete r unauthorized use or modification of the module (including substitution of the entire module) when installed. All hard ware, software, firmware, and data components within the cryptographic boundary shall be protected. A cry ptographic module t hat i s im plemented com pletely i n soft ware s uch t hat t he physical securi ty i s provided solely by the host platform is not subject to the physical security requirements of this standard. Physical secu rity requi rements are s pecified f or t hree defined p hysical em bodiments of a cry ptographic module: • Single-chip cryptographic modules are physical embodiments in which a single integrated circuit (IC) chip may be used as a standalone device or may be embedded within an enclosure or a product that may not be p hysically protected. E xamples of si ngle-chip cry ptographic m odules i nclude single IC chips or smart cards with a single IC chip. Multiple-chip embedded cryptographic modules are physical embodiments in which two or more IC chips are i nterconnected and are embedded within an enclosure or a product that may not be physically protected . Ex amples o f m ultiple-chip emb edded cryp tographic m odules in clude adapters and expansion boards. • • Multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules are physical embodiments in which two or more IC chips are interconnected and the entire enclosure is physically protected. Examples of multiple- chip, standalone cryptographic modules include encrypting routers or secure radios. Depending on t he physical security m echanisms of a c ryptographic module, u nauthorized at tempts at physical access, use, or modification will have a high probability of being detected • subsequent to an attempt by leaving visible signs (i.e., tamper evidence) and/or • during an at tempt so t hat appropriate actions can be t aken by the cryptographic module to protect plaintext secret and private keys and CSPs (i.e., tamper response). Table 2 summarizes the physical security requirements, both general and embodiment-specific, for each of the four sec urity levels. The gene ral physi cal secur ity requi rements at each security level are all three distinct phy sical em bodiments of a cry ptographic module. The em bodiment-specific phy sical sec urity requirements at each sec urity le vel enhance the ge neral re quirements at the s ame level, and the embodiment-specific requirements of the previous level. 20 [PDF page 29] General Requirements for all Embodiments Single-Chip Cryptographic Modules Multiple-Chip Embedded Cryptographic Modules Multiple-Chip Standalone Cryptographic Modules Security Level 1 Production-grade components (with standard passivation). No additional requirements. If applicable, production-grade enclosure or removable cover. Production-grade enclosure. Security Level 2 Evidence of tampering (e.g., cover, enclosure, or seal). Opaque tamper-evident coating on chip or enclosure. Opaque tamper-evident encapsulating material or enclosure with tamper-evident seals or pick-resistant locks for doors or removable covers. Opaque enclosure with tamper- evident seals or pick-resistant locks for doors or removable covers. Security Level 3 Automatic zeroization when accessing the maintenance access interface. Tamper response and zeroization circuitry. Protected vents. Hard opaque tamper-evident coating on chip or strong removal-resistant and penetration resistant enclosure. Hard opaque potting material encapsulation of multiple chip circuitry embodiment or applicable Multiple-Chip Standalone Security Level 3 requirements. Hard opaque potting material encapsulation of multiple chip circuitry embodiment or strong enclosure with removal/penetration attempts causing serious damage. Security Level 4 EFP or EFT for temperature and voltage. Hard opaque removal-resistant coating on chip. Tamper detection envelope with tamper response and zeroization circuitry. Tamper detection/ response envelope with tamper response and zeroization circuitry. Table 2: Summary of physical security requirements In general, Security Level 1 requires minimal physical protection. Security Level 2 requires the addition of tamper-evident mechanisms. Securi ty Lev el 3 adds re quirements for t he use of st rong e nclosures wi th tamper detecti on and res ponse m echanisms for rem ovable co vers an d d oors. Security Level 4 a dds requirements for the use of strong enclosures with tamper detection and response mechanisms for the entire enclosure. En vironmental failure p rotection (EFP) or environmental fai lure testin g (EFT) is requ ired at Security Level 4. Tamper detection and tamper response are not substitutes for tamper evidence. Security require ments are s pecified for a maintenance a ccess interface when a c ryptographic m odule is designed to permit physical access (e.g., by the module vendor or other authorized individuals). 4.5.1 General Physical Security Requirements The following requirements shall apply to all physical embodiments. • Documentation shall specify the physical embodiment and the security level for which the physical security mechanisms of a cryptographic module are implemented. • Documentation shall specify the physical security mechanisms of a cryptographic module. If a cryptographic module includes a maintenance role that requires physical access to the contents of the module or if the m odule is designed to permit physical access (e.g., by the module vendor or other authorized individual), then: • ! a maintenance access interface shall be defined, 21 [PDF page 30] ! the maintenance access interface s hall include all physical access paths to the c ontents of the cryptographic module, including any removable covers or doors, ! any rem ovable cove rs or doors incl uded with in the maintenance access interface s hall be safeguarded using the appropriate physical security mechanisms, ! all plaintext se cret and private keys a nd CSPs shall be zeroized when the maintenance access interface is accessed, and ! documentation shall specify the maintenance access interface and how plaintext secret an d private keys and CSPs are zeroized when the maintenance access interface is accessed. SECURITY LEVEL 1 The following requirements shall apply to all cryptographic modules for Security Level 1. • The cryptographic module shall consist of production-grade components that shall include standard passivation t echniques (e .g., a co nformal coat ing o r a s ealing c oat ap plied over t he m odule’s circuitry to protect against environmental or other physical damage). • When performing physical maintenance, all plaintext secret and private keys and other unprotected CSPs co ntained i n t he cry ptographic m odule shal l be zeroized. Ze roization s hall ei ther be performed procedurally by the operator or automatically by the cryptographic module. SECURITY LEVEL 2 In addition to the general requirements for Security Level 1, the following requirement shall apply to all cryptographic modules for Security Level 2. • The cryptographic module shall provide evidence of tampering (e.g., on the cover, enclosure, and seal) when physical access to the module is attempted. SECURITY LEVEL 3 In addition to the general requirements for Security Levels 1 and 2, the following requirements shall apply to all cryptographic modules for Security Level 3. • If t he cry ptographic m odule contains a ny doors or rem ovable cove rs or if a m aintenance access interface is defined, the n the m odule shall contain tamper response and zeroization circuitry. The tamper response and zeroization circuitry shall immediately zeroize all p laintext secret and private keys and CSPs when a door is opened, a cove r is removed, or when the m aintenance access interface is accessed. The ta mper response and zeroization circuitry shall remain operational when plaintext secret and pri vate cry ptographic key s or CSPs are containe d w ithin t he cryp tographic module. • If the crypt ographic m odule contai ns ve ntilation hole s or slits, then the holes or slits shall be constructed in a manner that prevents undetected physical probing inside the enclosure (e.g., require at least one 90 degree bend or obstruction with a substantial blocking material). SECURITY LEVEL 4 In a ddition t o the ge neral requirements for Secu rity Leve ls 1, 2, a nd 3, t he f ollowing req uirement shal l apply to all cryptographic modules for Security Level 4. 22 [PDF page 31] • The cry ptographic module shall ei ther i nclude environmental fai lure protection (EFP) feat ures or undergo environmental failure testing (EFT) as specified in Section 4.5.5. 4.5.2 Single-Chip Cryptographic Modules In addition to the general security requirements specified in Section 4.5.1, the following requirements are specific to single-chip cryptographic modules. SECURITY LEVEL 1 There are no additional Security Level 1 requirements for single-chip cryptographic modules. SECURITY LEVEL 2 In addition to the requirements for Security Level 1, the following requirements shall apply to single-chip cryptographic modules for Security Level 2. • The cryptographic module shall be cove red with a t amper-evident coating (e.g., a t amper-evident passivation m aterial or a t amper-evident material cover ing t he pa ssivation) or co ntained i n a tamper-evident enclosure to deter direct observation, probing, or manipulation of the module and to provide evidence of attempts to tamper with or remove the module. • The t amper-evident c oating o r t amper-evident e nclosure shal l be opaque within t he visible spectrum. SECURITY LEVEL 3 In add ition t o th e requ irements fo r Secu rity Lev els 1 and 2, t he fo llowing requ irements sh all app ly to single-chip cryptographic modules for Security Level 3. Either • the cryptographic module shall be covered with a hard opaque tamper-evident coating (e.g., a hard opaque epoxy covering the passivation) or • the enclosure shall be implemented so that attempts at removal or penetration of the enclosure shall have a high probability of ca using serious damage to the cryptographic module (i.e., the module will not function). SECURITY LEVEL 4 In addition to the requirements for Security Levels 1, 2, and 3, th e following requirements shall apply to single-chip cryptographic modules for Security Level 4. • The c ryptographic m odule s hall be co vered with a ha rd, o paque rem oval-resistant c oating with hardness a nd adhesion c haracteristics suc h that a ttempting t o peel or pry th e co ating fro m th e module will ha ve a high probability of res ulting in serious damage to the module (i.e., the m odule will not function). • The removal-resistant coating shall have solvency characteristics such that dissolving the coating will have a high probability of dissolving or seri ously damaging the module (i.e., the module will not function). 23 [PDF page 32] 4.5.3 Multiple-Chip Embedded Cryptographic Modules In addition to the general security requirements specified in Section 4.5.1, the following requirements are specific to multiple-chip embedded cryptographic modules. SECURITY LEVEL 1 The fo llowing requ irement shall ap ply to multiple-chip e mbedded cryp tographic mo dules fo r Secu rity Level 1. • If t he c ryptographic m odule is cont ained w ithin an encl osure or r emovable co ver, a production- grade enclosure or removable cover shall be used. SECURITY LEVEL 2 In addition to the requirement for Security Level 1, the following requirements shall apply to multiple-chip embedded cryptographic modules for Security Level 2. Either • the cryptogra phic module com ponents shal l be cove red with a tam per-evident coating or potting material (e.g., etch-resistant coating or bleeding paint) or contained in a tamper-evident enclosure to deter direct observation, probing, or manipulation of m odule components and t o provide evidence of attempts to tamper with or remove module components, and • the tamper-evident coating or tamper-evident enclosure shall be opaque within the visible spectrum, or • the cryptographic module shall be entirely contained within a metal or hard plastic production-grade enclosure that may include doors or removable covers, • the enclosure shall be opaque within the visible spectrum, and • if the enclosure includes any doors or removable covers, then the doors or covers shall be locked with pick-resistant mechanical locks employing physical or logical keys or shall be protected with tamper-evident seals (e.g., evidence tape or holographic seals). SECURITY LEVEL 3 In add ition t o th e requ irements fo r Secu rity Lev els 1 and 2, t he fo llowing requ irements sh all app ly to multiple-chip embedded cryptographic modules for Security Level 3. Either • the m ultiple-chip em bodiment of th e circ uitry within th e cryptogra phic module s hall be cove red with a hard coating or potting material (e.g., a hard epoxy material) that is opaque within the visible spectrum or • the applicable Security Level 3 requirements for m ultiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules shall apply. (Section 4.5.4) 24 [PDF page 33] SECURITY LEVEL 4 In addition to the requirements for Security Levels 1, 2, and 3, th e following requirements shall apply to multiple-chip embedded cryptographic modules for Security Level 4. • The cryptographic module components shall be covered by potting m aterial or contained within a n enclosure encapsulated by a tamper detection envelope (e.g., a flexible mylar printed circuit with a serpentine geometric pattern of conductors or a wire-wound package or a non-flexible, brittle circuit or a st rong en closure) t hat sh all detect t ampering by means su ch as cu tting, drillin g, m illing, grinding, or dissolving of t he potting m aterial or enclosure to an exte nt sufficient for accessing plaintext secret and private keys cryptographic keys or CSPs. • The c ryptographic m odule shall contain tamper res ponse and zeroiz ation circ uitry that shall continuously m onitor th e tam per d etection en velope a nd, up on t he det ection o f t ampering, shal l immediately z eroize all plai ntext sec ret and private cry ptographic ke ys and C SPs. The tam per response and zeroization circu itry sh all remain operational w hen plaintext sec ret a nd p rivate cryptographic keys or CSPs are contained within the cryptographic module. 4.5.4 Multiple-Chip Standalone Cryptographic Modules In addition to the general security requirements specified in Section 4.5.1, the following requirements are specific to multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules. SECURITY LEVEL 1 The following req uirement s hall ap ply t o multiple-chip standalone cry ptographic m odules for Security Level 1. • The c ryptographic m odule s hall be e ntirely cont ained within a m etal or hard plastic pr oduction- grade enclosure that may include doors or removable covers. SECURITY LEVEL 2 In addition to the requirements for Security Lev el 1, the following requirements shall apply to m ultiple- chip standalone cryptographic modules for Security Level 2. • The enclosure of the cryptographic module shall be opaque within the visible spectrum. • If the enclosure of the cryptographic module includes any doors or removable covers, then the doors or covers shall be locked with pick-resistant mechanical locks employing physical or logical keys or shall be protected with tamper-evident seals (e.g., evidence tape or holographic seals). SECURITY LEVEL 3 In add ition t o th e requ irements fo r Secu rity Lev els 1 and 2, t he fo llowing requ irements sh all app ly to multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules for Security Level 3. Either • the m ultiple-chip em bodiment of th e circ uitry within th e cryptogra phic module s hall be cove red with a hard potting material (e.g., a hard epoxy material) that is opaque within the visible spectrum or 25 [PDF page 34] • the cryptographic module shall be contained within a strong enclosure such that attempts at removal or penetration of the enclosure will have a high probability of causing serious damage to the module (i.e., the module will not function). SECURITY LEVEL 4 In addition to the requirements for Security Levels 1, 2, and 3, th e following requirements shall apply to multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules for Security Level 4. • The potting material o r enclosure of the cryptographic module shall be en capsulated by a ta mper detection e nvelope, by t he use of t amper det ection m echanisms such as cover s witches (e .g., microswitches, magnetic Hall effect switches, permanent magnetic actuators, etc.), motion detectors (e.g., ultrasonic, infrared, or microwave), or other tamper detection mechanisms as described above for multiple-chip embedded cryptographic modules. The tamper detection mechanisms shall detect tampering by means such as cutting, drilling, milling, grinding, or dissolving of the potting material or enclosure, to an extent sufficient for acc essing plaintext secret and pr ivate cryptographic keys and CSPs. • The c ryptographic m odule shall contain tamper res ponse and zeroiz ation circ uitry that shall continuously m onitor th e tam per d etection en velope a nd, up on t he det ection o f t ampering, shal l immediately z eroize all plai ntext sec ret and private cry ptographic ke ys and C SPs. The tam per response and zeroization circuitry shall remain operational when plaintext cryptographic keys and CSPs are contained within the cryptographic module. 4.5.5 Environmental Failure Protection/Testing The el ectronic devi ces a nd c ircuitry are designed t o operate wi thin a p articular ra nge of e nvironmental conditions. Deliberate or accid ental excursions outside the specified normal operating ranges of voltage and tem perature can caus e erratic operation or failure of the electronic devices or circuitry that can compromise the sec urity of t he c ryptographic m odule. R easonable a ssurance t hat the sec urity o f a cryptographic module cannot be com promised by e xtreme environmental conditions c an be provided by having t he m odule em ploy envi ronmental fai lure pr otection (EF P) f eatures o r u ndergo envi ronmental failure testing (EFT). For Security Levels 1, 2, and 3, a cry ptographic module is not required to employ environmental failure protection ( EFP) feat ures o r un dergo e nvironmental failure testin g (EFT). At Secu rity Lev el 4 , a cryptographic module shal l either em ploy en vironmental fai lure p rotection (EFP) f eatures o r undergo environmental failure testing (EFT). 4.5.5.1 Environmental Failure Protection Features (Alternative 1) Environmental fai lure p rotection (EF P) fe atures s hall pr otect a cry ptographic module agai nst u nusual environmental conditions or fluctuations (accidental or induced) outside of the module's normal operating range t hat can com promise the secu rity of t he module. In part icular, t he cry ptographic m odule shal l monitor an d c orrectly resp ond t o fl uctuations i n t he operating temperature and voltage ou tside o f the specified normal operating ranges. The EFP features s hall involve elect ronic ci rcuitry or devices t hat continuously m easure the operating temperature a nd voltage of a cry ptographic module. If t he t emperature or v oltage fall out side o f t he cryptographic module's nor mal operat ing ran ge, t he protection ci rcuitry shal l ei ther ( 1) shutdown t he module t o pr event f urther ope ration or (2) i mmediately zeroi ze all pl aintext secret an d pr ivate cryptographic keys and CSPs. Documentation shall specify the normal operating ranges of a cryptographic module and the environmental failure protection features employed by the module. 26 [PDF page 35] 4.5.5.2 Environmental Failure Testing Procedures (Alternative 2) Environmental failure testing (EFT) sh all involve a co mbination of analysis, simulation, and testing of a cryptographic m odule to provi de r easonable assurance that environm ental conditions or fluctua tions (accidental or i nduced) outside the m odule's normal operating ranges for temperature and voltage will not compromise the security of the module. EFT shall demonstrate that, if the operating temperature or voltage falls outside the normal operating range of the cryptographic module resulting in a failure of the electronic devices or circuitry within the module, at no time shall the security of the cryptographic module be compromised. The temperature range to be tested shall be from -100° to +200° Celsius (-150° to +400° Fahrenheit). The voltage range to be tested shall be from the smallest negative voltage (with respect to ground) that causes the zeroization of the electronic devices or circuitry to the smallest positive voltage (with respect to ground) that cause s the zeroization of the elect ronic devices or circuitry, including reversing th e polarity of th e voltages. Documentation s hall speci fy t he normal ope rating r anges of t he cry ptographic m odule an d t he environmental failure tests performed. 4.6 Operational Environment The operational en vironment of a cry ptographic m odule refe rs t o t he management of t he so ftware, firmware, and/or hardware components required for the module to operate. The operational environment can be non-modifiable (e.g., firmware contained in ROM, or software contained in a computer with I/O devices di sabled), or m odifiable (e .g., firmware cont ained i n R AM or s oftware e xecuted by a ge neral purpose c omputer). An operating sy stem is an im portant co mponent o f t he op erating envi ronment of a cryptographic module. A general purpose operational environment refers to t he use of a commercially-available general purpose operating system (i.e., resource manager) that manages the software and firmware components within the cryptographic boundary, and also manages system and operator(s) processes/thread(s), including general- purpose application software such as word processors. A limited operational environment refers to a static non-modifiable virtual operational environment (e.g., JAVA v irtual machine on a non-programmable PC card ) w ith no underlying general pu rpose operating system upon which the operational environment uniquely resides. A modifiable o perational enviro nment refe rs t o an operating en vironment t hat may be rec onfigured t o add/delete/modify functionality, and/or may include general purpose operating system capabilities (e.g., use of a com puter O/S, confi gurable smart car d O/S, or programmable fi rmware). Ope rating system s are considered to be modifiable operational environments if software/firmware components can be modified by the operator and/or the ope rator can loa d and e xecute software or firmware (e.g., a wo rd processor) that was not included as part of the validation of the module. If the operational environment is a modifiable operational environment, the operating system requirements in Section 4.6.1 sh all app ly. If t he op erational en vironment is a li mited op erational en vironment, th e operating system requirements in Section 4.6.1 do not apply. Documentation shal l speci fy t he operat ional en vironment fo r a cry ptographic module, i ncluding, i f applicable, t he o perating sy stem em ployed by t he m odule, an d for Se curity Le vels 2, 3, an d 4, t he Protection Profile and the CC assurance level. 27 [PDF page 36] 4.6.1 Operating System Requirements SECURITY LEVEL 1 The following requirements shall apply to operating systems for Security Level 1. • For Security Lev el 1 on ly, th e op erating syste m sh all be rest ricted t o a si ngle o perator m ode o f operation (i.e., concurrent operators are explicitly excluded). • For Sec urity Level 1 only, t he cry ptographic m odule sh all preve nt ac cess by ot her processes t o plaintext private and secret keys, CSPs, and intermediate key generation values during the time the cryptographic module i s execut ing/operational. Proce sses that are spaw ned by the cry ptographic module are owned by t he module an d a re n ot owned by ext ernal processes/operators. N on- cryptographic processes shall not interrupt a cryptographic module during execution. • All cryptographic software and firmware shall be installed in a form that protects the s oftware and firmware source and executable code from unauthorized disclosure and modification. • A cry ptographic mechanism using an Approved i ntegrity t echnique (e .g., a n A pproved m essage authentication code or digital signature algorithm) shall be applied to all cryptographic software and firmware co mponents within t he c ryptographic m odule. This cry ptographic mechanism requirement may be incorporated as part of the Software/Firmware Integrity Test (Section 4.9.1) if an Approved authentication technique is employed for that test. SECURITY LEVEL 2 In addition to the applicable requirements for Security Level 1, the following requirements shall also apply for Security Level 2. • All cry ptographic so ftware a nd firmware, cryptographic keys an d C SPs, an d c ontrol and st atus information shall be under the control of ! an operating system that meets the functional requirements specified in the Protection Profiles listed in Annex B and is evaluated at the CC evaluation assurance level EAL2, or ! an equivalent evaluated trusted operating system. To protect plaintext data, cryptographic software and firmware, cryptographic keys and CSPs, an d authentication data, the discretionary access control mechanisms of the ope rating system shall be configured to: • ! Specify the set of roles that can execute stored cryptographic software and firmware. ! Specify t he s et of roles t hat can modify (i.e., write, replace, and delete) the following cryptographic module s oftware or firmware c omponents st ored within t he cry ptographic boundary: cry ptographic p rograms, cry ptographic dat a ( e.g., cry ptographic keys a nd au dit data), CSPs, and plaintext data. ! Specify the s et of roles that can read the following cryptographic software components stored within t he cry ptographic bo undary: cry ptographic dat a ( e.g., cry ptographic key s a nd audi t data), CSPs, and plaintext data. ! Specify the set of roles that can enter cryptographic keys and CSPs. 28 [PDF page 37] • • − − − − − − − − − • The operating system shall prevent all operators and executing processes from modifying executing cryptographic processes (i.e., loaded and executing c ryptographic program images). In this case, executing processes refer to all n on-operating system p rocesses (i.e., op erator-initiated), cryptographic or not. The operating system shall prevent operators and executing processes from reading cryptographic software stored within the cryptographic boundary. • The operating system shall provide an audit mechanism to record modifications, accesses, deletions, and additions of cryptographic data and CSPs. ! The following events shall be recorded by the audit mechanism: attempts to provide invalid input for crypto officer functions, and the addition or deletion of an operator to/from a crypto officer role. ! The audit mechanism shall be capable of auditing the following events: operations to process audit data stored in the audit trail, requests to use authentication data management mechanisms, use of a security-relevant crypto officer function, requests to access user authentication data associated with the cryptographic module, use of an authentication mechanism (e.g., login) associated with the cryptographic module, explicit requests to assume a crypto officer role, and the allocation of a function to a crypto officer role. SECURITY LEVEL 3 In ad dition to the app licable requirements fo r Security Lev els 1 an d 2, the fo llowing requirements s hall apply for Security Level 3. All cry ptographic so ftware a nd firmware, cryptographic keys an d C SPs, an d c ontrol and st atus information shall be under the control of ! an operating system that meets the functional requirements specified in the Protection Profiles listed in Ann ex B. Th e operating system shall be eval uated at the CC evaluation as surance level EAL3 and include the following additional requirements: Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1) and Informal TOE Security Policy Model (ADV_SPM.1), or ! an equivalent evaluated trusted operating system. • All cry ptographic key s a nd CSPs, a uthentication d ata, con trol in puts, an d status ou tputs sh all be communicated via a truste d mechanism (e.g., a dedicated I/O physical port or a t rusted path). If a trusted path is used, the Target of Evaluation Security Functions (TSF) shall support the trusted path between th e TSF and th e o perator when a p ositive TSF-to-op erator con nection is req uired. Communications via this trusted path shall be activated exclusively by an operator or the TSF and shall be logically isolated from other paths. • In addition to the audit requirements of Security Level 2, the following events shall be recorded by the audit mechanism: ! attempts to use the trusted path function, and ! identification of the initiator and target of a trusted path. 29 [PDF page 38] SECURITY LEVEL 4 In addition to the applicable requirements for Security Levels 1, 2, and 3, the following requirements shall also apply to operating systems for Security Level 4. All cryptographic software, cryptographic keys and C SPs, and c ontrol and st atus information shall be under the control of • ! an operating system that meets the functional requirements specified in the Protection Profiles listed in Ann ex B. Th e operating system shall be eval uated at the CC evaluation as surance level EAL4, or ! an equivalent evaluated trusted operating system. 4.7 Cryptographic Key Management The se curity re quirements f or cryptographic ke y m anagement encom pass the entire lifecycle of cryptographic key s, cry ptographic key c omponents, a nd C SPs em ployed by t he cry ptographic module. Key m anagement i ncludes ra ndom num ber and key ge neration, key est ablishment, key di stribution, key entry/output, key st orage, a nd key ze roization. A c ryptographic m odule m ay al so em ploy t he key management mechanisms of another cryptographic module. Encrypted cryptographic keys and CSPs refer to key s an d CSPs t hat are encry pted u sing a n A pproved al gorithm or Approved securi ty fu nction. Cryptographic key s and C SPs encry pted using a n on-Approved al gorithm or p roprietary al gorithm or method are considered in plaintext form, within the scope of this standard Secret keys, private keys, and CSPs shall be protected within the cryptographic module from unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution. Public keys shall be protected within the cryptographic module against unauthorized modification and substitution. Documentation shall specify all cryptographic keys, cryptographic key components, and CSPs employed by a cryptographic module. 4.7.1 Random Number Generators (RNGs) A cryptographic module may employ random number generators (RNGs). If a cryptographic module employs Approved or non-Approved RNGs in an Approved mode of operation, the data output from the RNG shall pass the continuous random number generator test as specified in Section 4.9.2. Approved RNGs shall be subject to the cryptographic algorithm test in Section 4.9.1. Approved RNGs are listed in Annex C to this standard. Until such time as an Approved nondeterministic RNG standard exists, nondeterministic RNGs approved for use in classified applications may be used for key generation or to seed Approved deterministic RNGs used in key generation. Commercially available nondeterministic RNGs may be used for the purpose of generating seeds for Approved deterministic RNGs. Nondeterministic RNGs shall comply with all applicable RNG requirements of this standard. An Approved RNG shall be used for the generation of cryptographic keys used by an Approved security function. The output from a non-Approved RNG may be used 1) as input (e.g., seed, and seed key) to an Approved deterministic RNG or 2) to generate initialization vectors (IVs) for Approved security function(s). The seed and seed key shall not have the same value. Documentation shall specify each RNG (Approved and non-Approved) employed by a cryptographic module. 30 [PDF page 39] 4.7.2 Key Generation A cryptographic module may generate cryptographic keys internally. Cryptographic keys generated by the cryptographic module for use by an Ap proved algorithm or security function shall be generated using an Approved key generat ion m ethod. Ap proved key gene ration m ethods are l isted i n Ann ex C t o t his standard. If an Approved key generation method requires input from a RNG, then an Approved RNG that meets the requirements specified in Section 4.7.1 shall be used. Compromising the sec urity of the key generation m ethod (e.g., guessi ng the see d value to i nitialize the deterministic RNG) shall require as least as many operations as determining the value of the generated key. If a seed key is ent ered during t he key g eneration process, e ntry o f t he key s hall m eet t he key e ntry requirements speci fied i n S ection 4.7.4. If i ntermediate key generation values ar e o utput from t he cryptographic module, the va lues shall be output either 1) in encrypted form or 2) under split knowle dge procedures. Documentation shall specify each of the key generation methods (Approved and non-Approved) employed by a cryptographic module. 4.7.3 Key Establishment Key establishment may be performed by automated methods (e.g., use of a public key algorithm), manual methods (use of a manually-transported key loading device), or a c ombination of automated and manual methods. If k ey est ablishment m ethods a re em ployed b y a cry ptographic m odule, o nly A pproved key establishment methods shall be used. Approved key establishment methods are listed in Annex D to this standard. If, i n l ieu o f an Approved key est ablishment method, a ra dio c ommunications c ryptographic module implements Over-T he-Air-Rekeying (OTAR), it sh all b e im plemented as sp ecified in th e TIA/EIA Telecommunications Systems Bulletin, APCO Proj ect 25, Over-The-Air-Rekeying (OTAR) Protocol, New Technology Standards Pr oject, Di gital Radio Tec hnical St andards, TSB 102.AACA, Ja nuary, 1 996, Telecommunications Industry Association. Compromising th e secu rity o f th e key estab lishment method (e.g ., com promising the secu rity o f the algorithm used for key establishment) shall require at least as many operations as determining the value of the cryptographic key being transported or agreed upon. If a key transport method is used, the cryptographic key being transported shall meet the key entry/output requirements of Section 4.7.4. If a key agreement method is used (e.g., a cryptographic key is derived from shared intermediate values), the shared values are not required to meet the key entry/output requirements of Section 4.7.4. Documentation shall specify the key establishment methods employed by a cryptographic module. 4.7.4 Key Entry and Output Cryptographic keys may be entered into or output from a cryptographic module. If cryptographic keys are entered into or output from a cry ptographic module, the entry or output of keys shall be performed using either m anual (e. g., via a keyboard) or el ectronic m ethods (e.g., smart card s/tokens, PC car ds, or o ther electronic key loading devices). A seed key, if entered during key generation, shall be entered in the same manner as cryptographic keys. 31 [PDF page 40] All encrypted secret and private keys, entered into or output from a cry ptographic module and used in an Approved mode of operation, shall be encrypted using an Approved algorithm. Public keys may be entered into or output from a cry ptographic module in plaintext form. A cryptographic module shall associate a key (secret, private, or public) entere d into or output from the module with the correct entity (i.e., person, group, or process) to which the key is assigned. Manually-entered cryptographic keys (keys entered using manual methods) shall be verified during entry into a crypt ographic m odule for accuracy using t he m anual key entry test specified in Section 4.9.2. During key entry, the manually entered values may be t emporarily displayed to allow visual verification and to improve accuracy. If encrypted cryptographic keys or key components are manually entered into the cryptographic module, then the plaintext values of the cryptographic keys or key components shall not be displayed. Documentation shall specify the key entry and output methods employed by a cryptographic module. SECURITY LEVELS 1 AND 2 For Security Levels 1 and 2, secret and private keys established using automated methods shall be entered into and output from a cryptographic module in encrypted form. Secret and private keys established using manual methods may be entered into or output from a cryptographic module in plaintext form. SECURITY LEVELS 3 AND 4 For Security Levels 3 and 4: Secret and private keys established using automated methods shall be entered into and output from a cryptographic module in encrypted form. • • Secret and private keys established using manual methods shal l be e ntered i nto or output from a cryptographic module either (1) in encry pted form or (2) using split knowledge proce dures (i.e., as two or more plaintext cryptographic key components). If split knowledge procedures are used: ! the cryptographic module shall separately authenticate the operator entering or outputting each key component, ! plaintext cry ptographic key components s hall be di rectly ent ered i nto or output f rom t he cryptographic module (e. g., via a t rusted path or directly at tached ca ble) wi thout t raveling through any enclosing or intervening systems where the key components may inadvertently be stored, combined, or otherwise processed (see Section 4.2), ! at least two key components shall be required to reconstruct the original cryptographic key, ! documentation shall prove that if knowledge of n key components is required to reconstruct the original k ey, then knowledge of an y n-1 key com ponents pr ovides no information ab out t he original key other than the length, and ! documentation shall specify the procedures employed by a cryptographic module. 32 [PDF page 41] 4.7.5 Key Storage Cryptographic key s st ored within a cry ptographic m odule shal l be s tored ei ther i n pl aintext f orm or encrypted form. Pla intext secret and private keys shall not be accessi ble from outside the cryptographic module to unauthorized operators. A cryptographic module shall associate a cry ptographic key (secret, private, or public) stored within the module with the correct entity (e.g., person, group, or process) to which the key is assigned. Documentation shall specify the key storage methods employed by a cryptographic module. 4.7.6 Key Zeroization A cry ptographic module sha ll pro vide m ethods t o ze roize al l pl aintext secret and private cry ptographic keys an d C SPs wi thin t he module. Zer oization of en crypted cry ptographic key s and C SPs o r key s otherwise physically or l ogically protected within an additional embedded validated module (meeting the requirements of this standard) is not required. Documentation shall specify the key zeroization methods employed by a cryptographic module. 4.8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) Cryptographic modules shall meet t he fo llowing re quirements fo r E MI/EMC. R adios a re e xplicitly excluded from these requirements but shall meet all applicable FCC requirements. Documentation shall include proof of conformance to EMI/EMC requirements. SECURITY LEVELS 1 AND 2 For Se curity Levels 1 an d 2, a cry ptographic m odule s hall (at a minimum) confo rm t o t he EM I/EMC requirements speci fied by 47 Code o f Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (i.e., for business use). SECURITY LEVELS 3 AND 4 For Se curity Levels 3 an d 4, a cry ptographic m odule s hall (at a minimum) confo rm t o t he EM I/EMC requirements speci fied by 47 Code o f Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B (i.e., for home use). 4.9 Self-Test s A c ryptographic module sha ll perform power-up self-tests and c onditional self-tests to e nsure t hat the module is functioning properly. Power-up self-tests shall be performed when the cryptographic module is powered up. Conditional self-tests shall be performed when an applicable security function or operation is invoked (i.e., security functions for which self-tests are required). A c ryptographic module may perform other power-up or conditional self-tests in addition to the tests specified in this standard. If a cryptographic module fails a self-test, the module shall enter an error state and output an error indicator via the status output interface. T he cryptographic module shall not perform any cryptographic operations while in an e rror state. All da ta output via the data output interface s hall be inhi bited when an e rror state exists. 33 [PDF page 42] Documentation shall specify: the self-tests performed by a cryptographic module, including power-up and conditional tests, • • • • • • the error states that a cryptographic module can enter when a self-test fails, and the co nditions and action s necessary to exit th e error states and res ume n ormal ope ration of a cryptographic module (i.e., this may include maintenance of the module, or returning the module to the vendor for servicing.) 4.9.1 Power-Up Tests Power-up tests shall be performed by a cryptographic module when the module is powered up (after being powered off, reset, rebooted, etc.). The power-up tests shall be initiated automatically and shall not require operator intervention. When the power-up tests are co mpleted, the res ults (i.e., indications of success or failure) shall be out put via the “status output” interface. All data output via the data output interface shall be inhibited when the power-up tests are performed. In a ddition t o per forming t he p ower-up t ests whe n powered up, a c ryptographic module shal l permit operators to initiate the tests on demand for periodic testing of the module. Resetting, rebooting, and power cycling are acceptable means for the on-demand initiation of power-up tests. A cry ptographic m odule shal l per form the fol lowing po wer-up t ests: cry ptographic al gorithm t est, software/firmware integrity test, and critical functions test. Cryptographic algorithm test. A cryptographic algorithm test using a known answer shall be conducted for all cryptographic functions (e.g., encryption, decryption, authentication, and random number generation) of each Approved cryptographic algorithm implemented by a cryptogra phic module. A known-answer test involves operating the cryptographic algorithm on data for w hich the correct output is already known and comparing the calculated output with the previously generated output (the known answer). If the calculated output does not equal the known answer, the known-answer test shall fail. Cryptographic al gorithms whos e o utputs vary for a given set o f i nputs (e.g., t he Di gital Si gnature Algorithm) shall b e tested using a kno wn-answer test or shall be tested u sing a pair-wise consistency test (specified below). Message digest algorithms shall have an independent known-answer test or the known- answer test shall b e included with the associated cryptographic algorith m test (e.g., the Dig ital Signature Standard). If a cryptographic module includes two independent implementations of the same cryptographic algorithm, then: the known-answer test may be omitted, the outputs of two implementations shall be continuously compared, and if the outputs of two implementations are not equal, the cryptographic algorithm test shall fail. Software/firmware integrity test. A software/firmware integrity test using an error detection code (EDC) or Approved aut hentication t echnique (e.g., a n A pproved m essage a uthentication co de or di gital si gnature algorithm) sha ll be ap plied t o al l val idated so ftware a nd fi rmware c omponents within a c ryptographic module whe n t he module i s po wered u p. The soft ware/firmware i ntegrity t est i s not req uired for any software a nd firmware com ponents excl uded f rom the security re quirements of t his st andard ( refer t o 34 [PDF page 43] Section 4.1). If th e calculated result does not equal the previously generated result, the software/firmware test shall fail. If an EDC is used, the EDC shall be at least 16 bits in length. Critical functions test. Other security functions critical to th e secure operation of a cryptographic module shall be tested whe n the m odule is powe red up as pa rt of the power-up tests. Ot her critical security functions performed under specific conditions shall be tested as conditional tests. Documentation sh all sp ecify all secu rity fu nctions cr itical to th e secu re op eration of a cr yptographic module and shall identify the applicable power-up tests and conditional tests performed by the module. 4.9.2 Conditional Tests Conditional tests shall be pe rformed by a cryptogra phic m odule whe n the conditions specifie d for the following test s o ccur: pair-wise con sistency test, software/firmware lo ad test, m anual k ey en try test, continuous random number generator test, and bypass test. Pair-wise consistency test (for public and private keys) . I f a c ryptographic module generates public or private k eys, then th e fo llowing p air-wise co nsistency tests fo r public an d private k eys sh all be performed: 1. If t he keys ar e used t o pe rform an app roved key t ransport m ethod, t hen t he p ublic key shal l encrypt a p laintext value. The resulting ciphertext valu e sh all b e com pared to th e o riginal plaintext value. If the two values are equal, then the test shall fail. If the two values differ, then the private key shall be used to decrypt the ciphertext and the resulting value shall be compared to the original plaintext value. If the two values are not equal, the test shall fail. 2. If t he key s a re use d t o perform t he cal culation a nd verification of digital si gnatures, t hen t he consistency of the keys shall be t ested by the calculation and verification of a di gital signature. If the digital signature cannot be verified, the test shall fail. Software/firmware loa d test . If s oftware or fi rmware com ponents can be e xternally l oaded i nto a cryptographic module, then the following software/firmware load tests shall be performed: 1. An Approved authentication technique (e.g., an Approved message authentication code, digital signature al gorithm, o r HM AC) sh all b e ap plied to all v alidated so ftware and firm ware components w hen t he c omponents are ext ernally l oaded i nto a cry ptographic module. The software/firmware load test is not required for any software and firmware components excluded from the security requirements of this standard (refer to Section 4.1). 2. The calcu lated resu lt sh all be compared with a pre viously generate d re sult. If t he ca lculated result does not equal the previously generated result, the software/firmware load test shall fail. Manual key e ntry test . If cry ptographic key s o r key com ponents are m anually entered i nto a cryptographic module, then the following manual key entry tests shall be performed: 1. The cryptographic key or key components shall have a n EDC applied, or shall be ent ered using duplicate entries. 2. If an EDC is used, the EDC shall be at least 16 bits in length. 3. If the EDC cannot be verified, or the duplicate entries do not match, the test shall fail. 35 [PDF page 44] Continuous random nu mber gene rator test. If a cry ptographic m odule employs A pproved o r non- Approved RNGs in an Approved mode of operation, the module shall perform the following continuous random number generator test on each RNG that tests for failure to a constant value. 1. If each call to a R NG produces blocks of n bits (w here n > 15), the first n-bit block generated after power-up, initialization, or reset sh all not be used, but shall be saved for co mparison with the next n-bit bl ock t o be g enerated. Each su bsequent gene ration of an n-bit b lock sh all b e compared wi th the pr eviously generated bl ock. Th e test sh all fail if an y two co mpared n-bit blocks are equal. 2. If each call to a RNG produces fewer th an 16 bits, th e first n b its generated after power-up , initialization, or reset (for some n > 15) shall not be used, but shall be saved for comparison with the ne xt n generated bi ts. Each s ubsequent ge neration of n bits sh all b e co mpared with th e previously generated n bits. The test fails if any two compared n-bit sequences are equal. Bypass test . I f a c ryptographic m odule i mplements a bypass cap ability wh ere th e services m ay be provided wi thout cry ptographic pr ocessing (e.g ., t ransferring p laintext through th e mo dule), th en the following bypass tests shall be performed to ensure that a single point of failure of module components will not result in the unintentional output of plaintext: 1. A cry ptographic m odule s hall t est for t he co rrect operation o f the ser vices providing cryptographic processing when a switch takes place between an exclusive bypass service and an exclusive cryptographic service. 2. If a cry ptographic m odule can aut omatically al ternate bet ween a by pass se rvice and a cryptographic service, providing some services with cryptographic processing and some services without cry ptographic pr ocessing, t hen t he module s hall t est for t he c orrect o peration o f t he services p roviding c ryptographic p rocessing w hen t he mechanism go verning t he s witching procedure is modified (e.g., an IP address source/destination table). Documentation shall specify the mechanism or logic governing the switching procedure. 4.10 Design Assurance Design assurance refers to the use of best practices by the vendor of a cry ptographic module during the design, d eployment, and operation of a cryp tographic m odule, providing assu rance t hat th e m odule is properly tested , con figured, d elivered, in stalled, an d developed, an d th at th e proper op erator guidance documentation is p rovided. Security requirements are s pecified f or co nfiguration management, del ivery and operation, development, and guidance documents. 4.10.1 Configuratio n Management Configuration ma nagement s pecifies t he security re quirements fo r a c onfiguration management sy stem implemented by a cryptographic module vendor, providing assurance that the functional requirements and specifications are realized in the implementation. A co nfiguration m anagement sy stem shal l be im plemented for a c ryptographic m odule a nd m odule components within the cryptographic boundary, and for associated module documentation. Each version of each configuration item (e.g., cryptographic module, module components, user guidance, security policy, and operating sy stem) t hat com prises t he m odule and a ssociated d ocumentation shal l be assi gned and labeled with a unique identification number. 36 [PDF page 45] 4.10.2 Delivery and Operation Delivery and operation specifies the security requi rements for the secure delivery, installation, and startup of a c ryptographic m odule, p roviding as surance t hat t he m odule i s secu rely del ivered t o a uthorized operators, and is installed and initialized in a correct and secure manner. SECURITY LEVEL 1 For Security Level 1, documentation shall specify the procedures for secure installation, initialization, and startup of a cryptographic module. SECURITY LEVELS 2, 3, AND 4 For Security Levels 2, 3 , and 4 , in addition to the requirements of Security Lev el 1, documentation shall specify t he p rocedures re quired f or m aintaining sec urity while di stributing an d delivering ver sions of a cryptographic module to authorized operators. 4.10.3 Developm ent Development specifies the security requirements for the representation of a cry ptographic module security functionality at various levels of a bstraction from t he functiona l interface to the i mplementation representation. Devel opment p rovides a ssurance t hat t he i mplementation o f a c ryptographic m odule corresponds to the module security policy and functional specification. Functional specification refers to a high-level description of the ports and interfaces visible to the operator and a high-level description of the behavior of the cryptographic module. SECURITY LEVEL 1 The following requirements shall apply to cryptographic modules for Security Level 1. Documentation sh all sp ecify th e cor respondence b etween th e d esign of th e h ardware, so ftware, and fi rmware components of a cry ptographic m odule and t he cry ptographic m odule secu rity policy (see Section 4.1). • • • • If a cryptographic module contains software or firmware components, documentation shall specify the source code for the software and firmware components, annotated with comments that clearly depict the correspondence of the components to the design of the module. If a cry ptographic m odule contains hardware com ponents, documentation s hall speci fy t he schematics and/or Hardware Description Language (HDL) listings for the hardware components. SECURITY LEVEL 2 In addition to the requirements for Security Level 1, the following requirement shall apply to cryptographic modules for Security Level 2. Documentation shall specify a functional specification that informally describes a cryptographic module, the external ports and interfaces of the module, and the purpose of the interfaces. SECURITY LEVEL 3 In add ition t o th e requ irements fo r Secu rity Lev els 1 and 2, t he fo llowing requ irements sh all app ly to cryptographic modules for Security Level 3. 37 [PDF page 46] All software and firmware components within a cryptographic module shall be implemented using a high-level language, except that the limited use of a low-level language (e.g., assembly language or m icrocode) is allo wed if essen tial to t he performance of the m odule or when a high-le vel language is not available. • • If HDL i s used, al l hardware com ponents within a cry ptographic module sh all be i mplemented using a high-level specification language. SECURITY LEVEL 4 In addition to the requirements for Security Levels 1, 2, and 3, th e following requirements shall apply to cryptographic modules for Security Level 4. • Documentation s hall s pecify a form al model that describes th e rules and ch aracteristics o f th e cryptographic module secu rity pol icy. T he formal model s hall be s pecified u sing a formal specification language that is a ri gorous notation b ased on estab lished mathematics, su ch as first order logic or set theory. • Documentation shall specify a rationale that demonstrates the consistency and completeness of the formal model with respect to the cryptographic module security policy. • Documentation s hall speci fy an i nformal pro of o f t he c orrespondence between t he f ormal model and the functional specification. • For each cryptographic module hardware, software, and firmware component, the source code shall be annotated with comments that specify (1) the preconditions required upon entry into the module component, function, or procedure in order to execute correctly and (2) the postconditions expected to be t rue when exec ution of t he m odule com ponent, f unction, or p rocedure i s co mplete. The preconditions and postconditions may be specified using any notation that is sufficiently detailed to completely and u nambiguously expl ain t he beha vior of t he cry ptographic m odule com ponent, function, or procedure. • Documentation shal l spe cify an i nformal pro of of t he co rrespondence bet ween t he design of t he cryptographic module (as re flected by the prec ondition and postcondition a nnotations) and the functional specification. RECOMMENDED SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES FOR ALL LEVELS Implementation of software and firmware components within a cryptographic module using recommended development practices listed in Appe ndix B will facilitate th e analysis of the com ponents for conformance to the requirements in this standard and will reduce the chance of design errors. 4.10.4 Guidance Documents Crypto officer guidance is concerned with the correct configuration, maintenance, and administration of the cryptographic module. User guidance describes the security functions of the cryptographic module along with instructions, guidelines, and wa rnings for t he secure use of t he module. I f a cry ptographic module supports a maintenance role, user/crypto officer guidance describes the physical and/or logical maintenance services for operators assuming the maintenance role. Crypto officer guidance shall specify: 38 [PDF page 47] • the adm inistrative functions, secu rity ev ents, secu rity parameters (an d parameter v alues, as appropriate), physical ports , and logical interfaces of the crypto graphic module available to the crypto officer, • procedures on how to administer the cryptographic module in a secure manner, and • assumptions regarding user behavior that are relevant to the secure operation of the cryptographic module. User guidance shall specify: the Approved security functions, physical ports, and logical interfaces available to t he users of a cryptographic module, and • • all user responsibilities necessary for the secure operation of a cryptographic module. 4. 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks Cryptographic modules may be susceptible to other attacks for which testable security requirements were not av ailable at th e ti me th is v ersion of th e stand ard was issu ed (e.g ., po wer an alysis, ti ming an alysis, and/or fault in duction) or t he attack s were ou tside of the scop e of th e stan dard (e.g ., TEMPEST). Susceptibility of a cryptogra phic m odule to suc h attacks depe nds on module type, im plementation, and implementation e nvironment. S uch at tacks m ay be o f pa rticular c oncern for c ryptographic m odules implemented in ho stile env ironments (e.g ., wh ere th e att ackers m ay b e th e au thorized op erators of th e module). Suc h t ypes of at tacks ge nerally rel y on t he anal ysis of i nformation obt ained f rom sour ces physically external to the module. In all cases, the attacks attempt to determine some knowledge about the cryptographic keys an d C SPs wi thin t he c ryptographic module. B rief s ummaries of cu rrently k nown attacks are provided below. Power Analysis: Attacks based on the analysis of power consumption can be divided into two general categories, Si mple Powe r A nalysis (SP A) and Differential Po wer An alysis (DPA). SPA invo lves a direct (primarily visual) analysis of electrical power consumption patterns and timings derived from the execution of i ndividual i nstructions carr ied ou t b y a cryp tographic module during a cryptographi c process. The patterns are obtained through monitoring the variations in electrical power consumption of a cryptographic module for the purpose of revealing the features and implementations of cryptographic algorithms an d sub sequently v alues of cryp tographic keys. DPA h as th e sam e g oals bu t u tilizes advanced st atistical methods an d/or other t echniques t o a nalyze t he variations of t he electrical po wer consumption of a crypt ographic m odule. Cryptographic modules that utilize external power (direct current) sourc es appea r to be at greatest risk. Methods t hat may reduce t he overal l risk of Power Analysis attacks include the use of capacitors to level the powe r consumption, the use of internal power sources, and the manipulation of the individual operations of the algorithms or processes to level the rate of power consumption during cryptographic processing. Timing A nalysis: Tim ing Analysis attacks rely on preci sely measuring t he time require d by a cryptographic module t o perform speci fic m athematical ope rations ass ociated with a cry ptographic algorithm o r process. The ti ming informatio n co llected is an alyzed to determine th e relationship between t he i nputs t o t he module an d t he cry ptographic key s used by t he u nderlying al gorithms or processes. The analysis of the relationship may be used to exploit the timing measurements to reveal the cryptographic key or CSPs . Tim ing Anal ysis attack s assum e that the attack er h as kn owledge o f the design of t he cryptographic module. M anipulation o f t he i ndividual o perations of t he al gorithms or processes to reduce timing fluctuations during processing is one method to reduce the risk of this attack. Fault In duction: Fau lt In duction attack s utilize ex ternal fo rces such as m icrowaves, tem perature extremes, and voltage m anipulation t o caus e pr ocessing e rrors within t he cry ptographic module. A n analysis of these errors and their patterns can be used in an attempt to reverse engineer the cryptographic 39 [PDF page 48] module, revealing certain features and implementations of cryptographic algorithms and s ubsequently revealing t he values of c ryptographic key s. C ryptographic m odules with l imited phy sical securi ty appear to be at greatest ris k. Proper selection of physical security features may be used to reduce the risk of this attack. TEMPEST: TEMPEST attack s invo lve t he rem ote o r external det ection an d c ollection of t he electromagnetic si gnals em itted f rom a cryptographic m odule a nd associ ated e quipment du ring processing. Such an attack can be used to obtain keystroke information, messages displayed on a video screen, and other forms of c ritical security information (e.g., cryptographic keys). Special shielding of all components, including network cabling, is the mechanism used t o reduce the risk of such an attack. Shielding reduces and, in some cases, prevents the emission of electromagnetic signals. If a cryptographic module is designed to mitigate one or more specific attacks, then the module’s security policy sh all sp ecify th e secu rity m echanisms e mployed b y th e m odule to m itigate th e attack (s). Th e existence and proper fu nctioning of th e secu rity m echanisms will b e validated when req uirements an d associated tests are developed. 40 [PDF page 49] APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS The following check list summarizes the documentation requirements of this standard. All documentation shall be provided to the validation facility by the vendor of a cryptographic module. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION • Specification of t he hardware, s oftware, a nd fi rmware c omponents of a cry ptographic m odule, specification of the cryptographic boundary surrounding these components, and description of the physical configuration of the module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of any hardware, software, or firmware components of a c ryptographic module that are excluded from the security requirements of this standard and an explanation of the rationale for the exclusion. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of t he p hysical p orts a nd l ogical i nterfaces o f a cry ptographic m odule. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of the manual or logical controls of a cryptographic module, physical or logical status indicators, and applicable physical, logical, and electrical characteristics. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • List of al l se curity fu nctions, both Approved an d non-Approved, t hat are em ployed by a cryptographic module an d s pecification o f al l m odes o f o peration, b oth Approved an d non- Approved. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Block diagram de picting al l of t he m ajor hardware c omponents o f a c ryptographic module an d component i nterconnections, i ncluding any m icroprocessors, i nput/output buf fers, plaintext/ciphertext buffers, control buffers, key storage, working memory, and program memory. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • • Specification of the design of the hardware, software, and firmware components of a cryptographic module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) Specification of all security-related in formation, including secret a nd priv ate c ryptographic keys (both plaintext and e ncrypted), aut hentication dat a (e.g., passwords, PIN s), C SPs, an d ot her protected i nformation (e. g., audi ted eve nts, audi t dat a) wh ose di sclosure or m odification can compromise the security of the cryptographic module. • Specification of a cry ptographic m odule secu rity pol icy i ncluding t he r ules derived f rom t he requirements of this standard and the rules derived from any additional requirements imposed by the vendor). (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES • Specification of the physical ports and logical interfaces of a cryp tographic module and all defined input and output data paths. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION • Specification of all authorized roles supported by a cryptographic module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) 41 [PDF page 50] • Specification of t he se rvices, ope rations, o r fu nctions p rovided by a cry ptographic m odule, bot h Approved and non-Approved. For eac h service, specification of the service inputs, corresponding service outputs, and the aut horized role(s) in which the service can be pe rformed. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of any se rvices p rovided by a cry ptographic module f or which t he o perator i s not required to assume an authorized role, and how these services do not modify, disclose, or substitute cryptographic keys and CSPs, or otherwise affect the security of the module. • Specification of the authentication mechanisms supported by a cry ptographic module, the types of authentication data requ ired to im plement su pported au thentication m echanisms, th e au thorized methods used to control access to the m odule for the first tim e and initia lize the authe ntication mechanism, and the corresponding strength of the mechanisms supported by the module. (Security Levels 2, 3, and 4) FINITE STATE MODEL • Representation of a fi nite state model (or equivalent) using the state transition diagram and/or state transition tab le th at sp ecifies all o perational a nd error states, co rresponding tran sitions fro m o ne state to another, input events (including data inputs and control outputs) that cause transitions from one state to anot her, an d output events (including internal module c onditions, data outputs, a nd status outputs) resulting from transitions from one state to another. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) PHYSICAL SECURITY • Specification of t he p hysical em bodiment and secu rity l evel for w hich t he phy sical securi ty mechanisms of a cry ptographic m odule ar e im plemented. Speci fication o f t he p hysical securi ty mechanisms that are employed by a module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • If a cryptographic module includes a maintenance role that requires physical access to the contents of the m odule or if the module is designe d to pe rmit physical access, speci fication of the maintenance access interface and how plaintext secret and private keys and CSPs are to be zeroized when the maintenance access interface is accessed. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of t he norm al ope rating ra nges of a c ryptographic m odule. Specific ation of the environmental failure protection features employed by a c ryptographic module or specification of the environmental failure tests performed. (Security Level 4) OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT • Specification of the operational environment for the cryptographic module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Identification of t he operating sy stem em ployed by a cry ptographic module, t he appl icable Protection Profile, and the CC assurance level. (Security Levels 2, 3, and 4) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT • Specification of all cryptographic keys, cryptographic key components, and CSPs employed by a cryptographic module. • Specification of each RNG (Approved and non-Approved) employed by a cry ptographic module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of each of the key generation methods (Approved and non-Approved) employed by a cryptographic module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) 42 [PDF page 51] • Specification of t he key est ablishment methods em ployed by a cry ptographic m odule. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of the key entry and output methods employed by a cryptographic module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • If split knowledge procedures are used, proof that if knowledge of n key components is required to reconstruct the original key, then knowledge that any n-1 key components provides no information about th e origin al k ey other th an leng th, and specification of t he sp lit-knowledge pro cedures employed by a cryptographic module. (Security Levels 3 and 4) • Specification of the key storage methods employed by a cryptographic module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of t he key ze roization m ethods em ployed by a cry ptographic module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE/ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY • Proof of conformance to EMI/EMC requirements. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) SELF-TESTS • Specification of t he sel f-tests perf ormed by a cry ptographic m odule i ncluding power-up a nd conditional tests. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of the error states that a cryptographic module can enter when a self-test fails, and the conditions and actions necessary to exit the error states and resume normal operation of a module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of all security functions critical to the secure operation of a cryptographic module and identification of t he a pplicable p ower-up tests and c onditional t ests p erformed by t he m odule. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • If a cryptographic module implements a bypass ca pability, specification of the mechanism or logic governing the switching procedure. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) DESIGN ASSURANCE • Specification of procedures for sec ure i nstallation, ge neration, an d st art-up of a cr yptographic module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of the procedures for maintaining security while distributing and delivering versions of a cryptographic module to authorized operators. (Security Level 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of t he co rrespondence b etween t he design of t he ha rdware, so ftware, a nd fi rmware components of a cryptographic module and the cryptographic module security policy (i.e., the rules of operation). (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • If a cry ptographic module contains software or firmware components, specification of the source code for the software and firmware components, annotated with comments that clearly depict the correspondence of the components to the design of the module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) 43 [PDF page 52] • If a c ryptographic module c ontains ha rdware com ponents, speci fication of t he sch ematics and/ or Hardware Description Language (HDL) listings for the hardware components. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • Functional sp ecification th at informally d escribes a cry ptographic module, the ex ternal ports and interfaces of the module, and the purpose of the interfaces. (Security Levels 2, 3, and 4) • Specification of a form al model that desc ribes th e rules and c haracteristics of the cryptogra phic module security policy, using a fo rmal specification language that is a ri gorous notation based on established mathematics, such as first order logic or set theory. (Security Level 4) • Specification of a rationale that demonstrates the consistency and completeness of the formal model with respect to the cryptographic module security policy. (Security Level 4) • Specification of an inform al proof of the co rrespondence between the form al model and the functional specification. (Security Level 4) • For each hardware, software, and firmware component, source code annotation with comments that specify (1) the preconditions required upon entry into the module component, function or procedure in order to execute correctly and (2) the postconditions expected to be t rue when execution of t he module component, function, or procedure is complete. (Security Level 4) • Specification of an i nformal proof of the correspondence between the design of the cryptographic module (as reflected by the prec ondition and postcondition a nnotations) and t he functional specification. (Security Level 4) • For crypto officer guidance, specification of: ! the ad ministrative fun ctions, secu rity ev ents, security p arameters (an d parameter v alues, as appropriate), physical ports, and logical interfaces of the cryptographic module available to the crypto officer (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4), ! procedures on how to administer the cryptographic module in a secure manner (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4), and ! assumptions regarding user be havior t hat i s relev ant to th e secure operation of th e cryptographic module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) • For user guidance, specification of ! the Approved security functions, physical ports, and logical interfaces available to the users of the cryptographic module (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4), and ! all user responsibilities necessary for the secure operation of the module. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS • If a cryptographic module is designed to mitigate one or more specific attacks, specification in the module’s security pol icy of the sec urity m echanisms em ployed by the cryptographic m odule to mitigate the attack(s). (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) SECURITY POLICY • See Appendix C. (Security Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4) 44 [PDF page 53] APPENDIX B: RECOMMENDED SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES This Appendix i s p rovided f or i nformational pu rposes only and does not co ntain sec urity re quirements applicable to cryptographic modules within the scope of the standard. Life-cycle s oftware en gineering rec ommendations (dealing wit h th e sp ecification, con struction, verification, t esting, m aintenance, a nd documentation of software) sho uld be fol lowed. Software engineering practices may include documented unit testing, code reviews, explicit high-level and low-level design documents, exp licit requ irements an d fun ctional speci fications, structure c harts a nd data flow diagrams, fu nction-point a nalysis, defect an d re solution t racking, configuration management, and a documented software development process. For all software d evelopment, both large and small, the following programming techniques are co nsistent with current practices and should be used to facilitate analysis of software components of a cryptogra phic module and to reduce chances of programming errors. MODULAR DESIGN • A m odular design i s recommended, es pecially for m oderate t o l arge-scale soft ware development efforts. Each software module should have well-defined and readily understood logical interfaces. • Software components should be constructed using the principles of data abstraction. If available, an object-oriented, high-level language that supports the construction of a bstract data types should be used. • The software should be hierarchically structured as a series of layers. SOFTWARE MODULE/PROCEDURE INTERFACES • Entries to a software m odule or procedure should be through external calls o n explicitly defined interfaces. • Each procedure should have only one entry point and at most two exit points, one for normal exits and one for error exits. • Data should be communicated between software modules and between procedures through the use of arg ument lists an d/or exp licit retu rn values. Gl obal v ariables shou ld not b e used am ong procedures e xcept w here ne cessary f or t he implementation o f a bstract data t ypes. I nput values should be checked for range err ors using assertion st atements (if provided by the programming language in use). INTERNAL CONSTRUCTION • Each procedure should perform only a single, well-defined function. • Control fl ow within a si ngle t hread of e xecution s hould be defined using o nly seque ncing, structured p rogramming co nstructs fo r con ditionals (e.g., if-th en-else or case), and stru ctured constructs for loops (e.g., while-do or repeat-until). • If concurrent execution is em ployed (e.g., via multiple threads, tasks, or processes), the software components should enforce limits on t he maximum allowable degree of concurrency and s hould use structured synchronization constructs to control access to shared data. 45 [PDF page 54] • Equivalence of vari ables should not be used to perm it multiple memory usa ge fo r con flicting purposes. • Robust c ommand parsing a nd ra nge c hecking m echanisms shoul d be i mplemented t o guard against malformed requests, out-of-range parameters, and I/O buffer overflows. IN-LINE DOCUMENTATION • Each s oftware module, procedure, a nd m ajor programming co nstruct sho uld be documented specifying t he fu nctions per formed alon g wi th a (formal or i nformal) speci fication o f preconditions and postconditions. • Each loop s hould be preceded by a convi ncing arg ument (as a co mment) th at termin ation is guaranteed. • Variable names should be used in only one context within the same procedure. • Each va riable should ha ve an associated comment identifying th e purpose of the va riable and noting the range of allowable values, including if the range is unrestricted. • If c oncurrency i s em ployed, t he d ocumentation sh ould s pecify ho w l imits are enf orced o n t he maximum allowable degree of concurrency and how accesses to s hared data are sy nchronized in order to avoid (possibly undetected) run-time errors. ASSEMBLY LANGUAGE The following additional programming practices sho uld be used when the implementation is in assembly language. • All code should be position independent except where appropriate security concerns, efficiency, or hardware constraints require position dependency. • All register references should use symbolic register names. • Self-modifying code should not be used. • All procedures should be responsible for saving and restoring the contents of any register that is used within the procedure. • Control transfer instructions should not use numeric literals. • Each unit should contain comments describing register use in the unit. 46 [PDF page 55] APPENDIX C: CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SECURITY POLICY A cryptographic module securi ty policy shall be i ncluded in the documentation provided by the vendor. The following paragraphs outline the required contents of the security policy. C.1 Definition of Cryptographic Module Security Policy A cryptographic module security policy shall consist of: • a specification of the security rules, under which a cr yptographic module shall operate, including the security rules derived from the requirements of th e standard and the additional security rules imposed by the vendor. The specification shall be sufficiently detailed to answer the following questions: • What access does operator X, performing service Y while in role Z, have to security-relevant dat a item W for e very role, se rvice, a nd sec urity-relevant d ata i tem cont ained i n t he c ryptographic module? • What physical security mechanisms are implem ented to protect a crypt ographic module and what actions are required to ensure that the physical security of a module is maintained? • What security m echanisms are im plemented in a cryptographic module to mitigate against attacks for which testable requirements are not defined in the standard? C.2 Purpose of Cryptographic Module Security Policy There are two major reasons for developing and following a precise cryptographic module security policy: • To provide a sp ecification of th e crypto graphic secu rity th at will allo w ind ividuals and organizations to det ermine whet her a cry ptographic m odule, as i mplemented, sat isfies a st ated security policy. • To describe to individuals and organizations the capabilities, protection, and access rights provided by the crypt ographic m odule, there by al lowing a n as sessment of whether the module will adequately serve the individual or organizational security requirements. C.3 Specification of a Cryptographic Module Security Policy A cryptographic module security policy shall be express ed in terms of rol es, services, and cryptographic keys and CSPs. At a minimum, the following shall be specified: • an identification and authentication (I&A) policy, • an access control policy, • a physical security policy, and • a security policy for mitigation of other attacks. 47 [PDF page 56] C.3.1 Identification and Authentication Policy The cryp tographic m odule security po licy sh all sp ecify an id entification an d au thentication policy, including • all ro les (e.g., u ser, cry pto officer, and main tenance) a nd ass ociated t ype of a uthentication (e.g., identity-based, role-based, or none) and • the authentication data re quired of each role or operat or (e.g., password or biometric data) and the corresponding strength of the authentication mechanism. C.3.2 Access Control Policy The cryptographic module security policy shall specify an access control policy. The specification shall be of s ufficient detail to id entify the cryptographic keys and CSPs that the operat or has access to while performing a service, and the type(s) of access the operator has to the parameters. The security policy shall specify: • all roles supported by a cryptographic module, • all services provided by a cryptographic module, • all cryptographic keys and CSPs employed by the cryptographic module, including ! secret, private, and public cryptographic keys (both plaintext and encrypted), ! authentication data such as passwords or PINs, and ! other security-relevant information (e.g., audited events and audit data), • for each role, the services an operator is authorized to perform within that role, and • for each service within each role, the type(s) of access to the cryptographic keys and CSPs. C.3.3 Physical Security Policy The cryptographic module security policy shall specify a physical security policy, including: • the p hysical securi ty m echanisms t hat are im plemented i n a cry ptographic m odule (e.g., t amper- evident seals, locks, tamper response and zeroization switches, and alarms) and • the actions required by the operator(s) to ensure that physical security is maintained (e.g., periodic inspection of tamper-evident seals or testing of tamper response and zeroization switches). C.3.4 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The cryp tographic module secu rity po licy sh all sp ecify a secu rity pol icy fo r mitigation of other at tacks, including the security mechanisms implemented to mitigate the attacks. C.4 Security Policy Check List Tables The following check list tables may be used as guides to ensure the security policy is complete and contains the appropriate details: 48 [PDF page 57] Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data … … … … … … … … Table C1. Roles and Required Identification and Authentication Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism … … … … Table C2. Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms Role Authorized Services … … … … … … Table C3. Services Authorized for Roles Service Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Type(s) of Access (e.g., RWE) … … … … … … … … … … Table C4. Access Rights within Services 49 [PDF page 58] Physical Security Mechanisms Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test Inspection/Test Guidance Details … … … … … … … … … … Table C5. Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms Other Attacks Mitigation Mechanism Specific Limitations … … … … … … … … … … Table C6. Mitigation of Other Attacks 50 [PDF page 59] APPENDIX D: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY American Bankers Association, Digital Si gnatures u sing Reversi ble Pu blic K ey C ryptography f or t he Financial Services Industry (rDSA), ANSI X9.31-1998, Washington, D.C., 1998. American Bankers Association, Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation, ANSI X9.52-1998, Washington, D.C., 1998. American Bankers Association, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, American National Standard X9.62-1998, Washington, D.C., 1998. Common Criteria Implementation Board (CCIB), International Standard (IS) 15408, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2, May 1998, ISO/IEC JTC 1 and Common Criteria Implementation Board. Computer Security Act of 1987, 40 U.S. Code 759, (Public Law 100-235), January 8, 1988. Department of Defe nse, Department of D efense Tr usted C omputer System Eval uation C riteria, D OD 5200.28-STD, December 1985. Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, U.S. Code, (Public Law 104-106), 10 February 1996. Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), Harmonized Criteria of France – Germany - the Netherlands - the United Kingdom, Version 1.1, January 1991. Keller, Sh aron an d Sm id, Miles, Modes of Oper ation Val idation S ystem ( MOVS): Req uirements an d Procedures, Special Pu blication 800-17, Gaith ersburg, M D, National Institute o f Stand ards and Technology, February 1998. Keller, Sharon, Modes of Operation Validation System for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TMOVS): Requirements an d Procedures, Sp ecial Pu blication 800-20 , Gaithersburg, M D, National In stitute o f Standards and Technology, October 1999. Lee, Annabelle, Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government, Special Publication 800-21, Gaithersburg, MD, National Institute of Standards and Technology, November, 1999. National In stitute o f Standards and Tech nology, FIPS 14 0-2 Annex A : Appr oved Security Functions , available at URL: http://www.nist.gov/cmvp. National In stitute of Standards and Techno logy, FIPS 140-2 A nnex B : Approved Pro tection Profiles, available at URL: http://www.nist.gov/cmvp. National Institute of Stan dards and Techn ology, FIPS 14 0-2 Annex C : Ap proved Ra ndom N umber Generators, available at URL: http://www.nist.gov/cmvp. National Institute of Stan dards an d Technology, FIPS 1 40-2 A nnex D: A pproved K ey Est ablishment Techniques, available at URL: http://www.nist.gov/cmvp. National In stitute of Stand ards and Techn ology, Computer Da ta Authentication, F ederal Information Processing Standards Publication 113, 30 May 1985. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Data Encryption Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46-3, October 25, 1999. 51 [PDF page 60] National Institute of Standards and Technology and Communications Security Establishment, Derived Test Requirements(DTR) for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, available at URL: http://www.nist.gov/cmvp. National Institute of Standards and Technology, DES Modes of Operation, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 81, December 2, 1980. National Institute o f Standards and Techn ology, Di gital Si gnature Standard (DSS), Federal I nformation Processing Standards Publication 186-2, January 27, 2000. National Institute of Stan dards an d Technolo gy, Digital Si gnature St andard Val idation Syst em (DSSVS) User’s Guide, June 20, 1997. National Institute of Stan dards an d Techno logy, En tity Au thentication Using Pub lic Key Cryp tography, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 196, February 18, 1997. National In stitute of Standards and Techn ology, Guideline fo r t he Use of Ad vanced Au thentication Technology Alternatives, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 190, September 28, 1994. National In stitute o f Stand ards and Tech nology and Co mmunications Secu rity Estab lishment, Implementation Guidance (IG) for FIPS 140-2, available at URL: http://www.nist.gov/cmvp. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Key Management using ANSI X9.17, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 171, April 27, 1992. National In stitute o f Stan dards and Tech nology, Secure Has h St andard, Fe deral I nformation Pro cessing Standards Publication 180-1, April 17, 1995. National Institute o f Standards and Techn ology, Security Requi rements f or C ryptographic M odules, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-1, January 11, 1994. Office of Management and Budget, Security of Federal Automated Information Resources, Appendix III to OMB Circular No. A-130, February 8, 1996. Telecommunications I ndustry Associ ation, Over-The-Air-Rekeying (OTAR) Protocol , New Tec hnology Standards Pr oject, Di gital Radi o Tec hnical St andards, TI A/EIA Tel ecommunications Sy stems B ulletin, APCO Project 25, TSB102.AACA, January 1996. 52 [PDF page 61] APPENDIX E: APPLICABLE INTERNET UNIFORM RESOURCE LOCATORS (URL) Communications Security Establishment (CSE): http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP): http://www.nist.gov/cmvp NIST Information Technology Laboratory (NIST ITL): http://www.nist.gov/itl NIST Security Publications including FIPS and Special Publications: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications National Technical Information Service (NTIS): http://www.ntis.gov National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP): http://ts.nist.gov/nvlap National Information Assurance Partnership® (NIAP): http://niap.nist.gov/ Validated Protection Profiles: http://niap.nist.gov/cc-scheme/PPRegistry.html 53 [PDF page 62] CHANGE NOTICES Change Notice 1 (Superseded by Change Notice 2) FIPS PUB 140-2, SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY Gaithersburg, MD 20899 DATE OF CHANGE: 2001 October 10 Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, specifies t he s ecurity re quirements that will be satisfie d by a c ryptographic m odule utilized withi n a security system protecting sen sitive bu t u nclassified i nformation (hereafter referred t o as sensitiv e information). This change notice provides a correctio n to th e required intervals for the len gth of run s test in dicated in Table 3 in Section 4.9.1 Power-Up Tests. Table 3 as orig inally p ublished, in correctly sp ecified t he requ ired in tervals. The c orrect intervals are indicated. Incorrect Length of Run Required Interval 1 2,343 – 2,657 2 1,135 – 1,365 3 542 – 708 4 251 – 373 5 111 – 201 6+ 111 - 201 Correct Length of Run Required Interval 1 2,315 – 2,685 2 1,114 – 1,386 3 527 - 723 4 240 - 384 5 103 - 209 6+ 103 - 209 Questions regarding this change notice may be directed to Annabelle Lee (annabelle.lee@nist.gov, 301-975-2941). 54 [PDF page 63] Change Notice 2 FIPS PUB 140-2, SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY Gaithersburg, MD 20899 DATE OF CHANGE: 2002 December 03 TITLE: Random Number Generator Requirements Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information (hereafter referred to as sensitive information). This change notice provides corrections to the requirements for random number generator used by cryptographic modules. These corrections involve paragraphs 4.7.1 and 4.9.1 of FIPS 140-2. Table 1 – Summary of security requirements has also been corrected and involves the random number generator requirements. This change notice also provides a correction to the Table 1 – Summary of security requirements. The correction involves text found in the requirements of Physical Security at Security Level 4. Finally, this change notice replaces the term “modes” used in paragraph 4.9.1 Cryptographic algorithm test with “cryptographic functions” which clarifies the standard. In the corrected paragraphs and table below, the deleted text is struck out and the added text is underlined. Change Notice 2 supersedes Change Notice 1. The Derived Test Requirements for FIPS 140-2 are also affected by these corrections. Questions regarding this change notice may be directed to Annabelle Lee (annabelle.lee@nist.gov, 301-975-2941). 4.7.1 Random Number Generators (RNGs) A cryptographic module may employ random number generators (RNGs). If a cryptographic module employs Approved or non-Approved RNGs in an Approved mode of operation, the data output from the RNG shall pass the continuous random number generator test as specified in Section 4.9.2. Depending on the security level, the data output from an Approved RNG shall pass all statistical tests for randomness as specified in Section 4.9.1. Approved deterministic RNGs shall be subject to the cryptographic algorithm test in Section 4.9.1. Approved RNGs are listed in Annex C to this standard. Until such time as an Approved nondeterministic RNG standard exists, nondeterministic RNGs approved for use in classified applications may be used for key generation or to seed Approved deterministic RNGs used in key generation. Commercially available nondeterministic RNGs may be used for the purpose of generating seeds for Approved deterministic RNGs. Nondeterministic RNGs shall comply with all applicable RNG requirements of this standard. An Approved RNG shall be used for the generation of cryptographic keys used by an Approved security function. The output from a non-Approved RNG may be used 1) as input (e.g., seed, and seed key) to an 55 [PDF page 64] Approved deterministic RNG or 2) to generate initialization vectors (IVs) for Approved security function(s). The seed and seed key shall not have the same value. Documentation shall specify each RNG (Approved and non-Approved) employed by a cryptographic module. 4.9.1 Power-Up Tests Power-up tests shall be performed by a cryptographic module when the module is powered up (after being powered off, reset, rebooted, etc.). The power-up tests shall be initiated automatically and shall not require operator intervention. When the power-up tests are co mpleted, the res ults (i.e., indications of success or failure) shall be out put via the “status output” interface. All data output via the data output interface shall be inhibited when the power-up tests are performed. In a ddition t o per forming t he p ower-up t ests whe n powered up, a c ryptographic module shal l permit operators to initiate the tests on demand for periodic testing of the module. Resetting, rebooting, and power cycling are acceptable means for the on-demand initiation of power-up tests. A cryptographic module shall perform the following power-up tests: cryptographic algorithm test, software/firmware integrity test, and critical functions test. SECURITY LEVELS 1 AND 2 For Security Levels 1 and 2, a cryptographic module shall perform the following power-up tests: cryptographic algorithm test, software/firmware integrity test, and critical functions test. Statistical random number generator tests may be performed by the cryptographic module but are not required at Security Levels 1 and 2. SECURITY LEVEL 3 For Security Level 3, in addition to the tests specified for Security Levels 1 and 2, a cryptographic module shall perform all o f the statistical ran dom number tests on demand by the operator and may perform the tests when the module is powered up. SECURITY LEVEL 4 For Security Level 4, in addition to the tests specified for Security Levels 1,2 and 3, a cryptographic module shall also perform all of the statistical random number generator tests when the module is powered up. Cryptographic algorithm test. A cryptographic algorithm test using a known answer shall be conducted for all modes cryptographic functions (e.g., en cryption, decryption, authentication, and deterministic random number generation) of each Approved cryptographic algorithm implemented by a cryptographic module. A known-answer test in volves operating the cryptographic algorithm on da ta for which the correct output is already kn own and com paring t he cal culated out put wi th t he pre viously generat ed o utput (t he k nown answer). If the calculated output does not equal the known answer, the known-answer test shall fail. Cryptographic al gorithms whos e o utputs vary for a given set o f i nputs (e.g., t he Di gital Si gnature Algorithm) shall b e tested using a kno wn-answer test or shall be tested u sing a pair-wise consistency test (specified below). Message digest algorithms shall have an independent known-answer test or the known- answer test shall b e included with the associated cryptographic algorith m test (e.g., the Dig ital Signature Standard). 56 [PDF page 65] If a cryptographic module includes two independent implementations of the same cryptographic algorithm, then: • the known-answer test may be omitted, • the outputs of two implementations shall be continuously compared, and • if the outputs of two implementations are not equal, the cryptographic algorithm test shall fail. Software/firmware integrity test. A software/firmware integrity test using an error detection code (EDC) or Approved aut hentication t echnique (e.g., a n A pproved m essage a uthentication co de or di gital si gnature algorithm) sha ll be ap plied t o al l val idated so ftware a nd fi rmware c omponents within a c ryptographic module whe n t he module i s po wered u p. The soft ware/firmware i ntegrity t est i s not req uired for any software a nd firmware com ponents excl uded f rom the security re quirements of t his st andard ( refer t o Section 4.1). If th e calculated result does not equal the previously generated result, the software/firmware test shall fail. If an EDC is used, the EDC shall be at least 16 bits in length. Critical functions test. Other security functions critical to th e secure operation of a cryptographic module shall be tested whe n the m odule is powe red up as pa rt of the power-up tests. Ot her critical security functions performed under specific conditions shall be tested as conditional tests. Documentation sh all sp ecify all secu rity fu nctions cr itical to th e secu re op eration of a cr yptographic module and shall identify the applicable power-up tests and conditional tests performed by the module. Statistical random number generator tests. If statistical random number generator tests are required (i.e., depending on the sec urity l evel), a cry ptographic m odule em ploying R NGs s hall per form t he f ollowing statistical tests for ra ndomness. A single bit strea m of 20,000 consecutive bits of output from each RNG shall be subjected to the following four tests: monobit test, poker test, runs test, and long runs test. The monobit test Count the number of ones in the 20,000 bit stream. Denote this quantity by X. The test is passed if 9,725 < X < 10,275. The poker test Divide t he 20,000 bi t st ream i nto 5, 000 co nsecutive 4 bi t segm ents. Count an d st ore t he n umber of occurrences of the 16 possible 4 bit values. Denote f(i) as the number of each 4 bit value i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 15. Evaluate the following: 5000 - ][f(i)* (16/5000) = X 2 15 =0i       ∑ The test is passed if 2.16 < X < 46.17. The runs test 57 [PDF page 66] A run is defined as a maximal sequence of consecutive bits of either all ones or all zeros th at is part of the 20,000 bit sample stream. The incidences of runs (for both consecutive zeros and consecutive ones) of all lengths (≥ 1) in the sample stream should be counted and stored. The test is passed if the runs that occur (of lengths 1 through 6) are each within the corresponding interval specified in the tab le below. This must hold for both the zeros and ones (i.e., all 12 counts must lie in the specified interval). For the purposes of this test, runs of greater than 6 are considered to be of length 6. Length of Run Required Interval 1 2,343 – 2,657 2 1,135 – 1,365 3 542 - 708 4 251 - 373 5 111 - 201 6+ 111 - 201 Table 3. Required intervals for length of runs test The long runs test A long run is defined to be a run of length 26 or more (of either zeros or ones). On the sample of 20,000 bits, the test is passed if there are no long runs. 58 [PDF page 67] Security Level 1 Security Level 2 Security Level 3 Security Level 4 Cryptographic Module Specification Specification of cryptographic module, cryptographic boundary, Approved algorithms, and Approved modes of operation. Description of cryptographic module, including all hardware, software, and firmware components. Statement of module security policy. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces Required and optional interfaces. Specification of all interfaces and of all input and output data paths. Data ports for unprotected critical security parameters logically or physically separated from other data ports. Roles, Services, and Authentication Logical separation of required and optional roles and services. Role-based or identity-based operator authentication. Identity-based operator authentication. Finite State Model Specification of finite state model. Required states and optional states. State transition diagram and specification of state transitions. Physical Security Production grade equipment. Locks or tamper evidence. Tamper detection and response for covers and doors. Tamper detection and response envelope. EFP and or EFT. Operational Environment Single operator. Executable code. Approved integrity technique. Referenced PPs evaluated at EAL2 with specified discretionary access control mechanisms and auditing. Referenced PPs plus trusted path evaluated at EAL3 plus security policy modeling. Referenced PPs plus trusted path evaluated at EAL4. Key management mechanisms: random number and key generation, key establishment, key distribution, key entry/output, key storage, and key zeroization. Cryptographic Key Management Secret and private keys established using manual methods may be entered or output in plaintext form. Secret and private keys established using manual methods shall be entered or output encrypted or with split knowledge procedures. EMI/EMC 47 CFR FCC Part 15. Subpart B, Class A (Business use). Applicable FCC requirements (for radio). 47 CFR FCC Part 15. Subpart B, Class B (Home use). Power-up tests: cryptographic algorithm tests, software/firmware integrity tests, critical functions tests. Conditional tests. Self-Tests Statistical RNG tests – callable on demand. Statistical RNG tests – performed at power-up. Design Assurance Configuration management (CM). Secure installation and generation. Design and policy correspondence. Guidance documents. CM system. Secure distribution. Functional specification. High-level language implementation. Formal model. Detailed explanations (informal proofs). Preconditions and postconditions. Mitigation of Other Attacks Specification of mitigation of attacks for which no testable requirements are currently available. Tabl e 1: Summary of security requirements 59 [PDF page 68] Change Notice 3 FIPS PUB 140-2, SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY Gaithersburg, MD 20899 DATE OF CHANGE: 2002 December 03 TITLE: Pair-Wise Consistency Test Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information (hereafter referred to as sensitive information). This change notice provides corrections to the requirements for pair-wise consistency test for public/ private keys used for key agreement. These corrections involve paragraphs 4.9.2 of FIPS 140-2. In the corrected paragraphs below, the deleted text is struck out and the added text is underlined. The Derived Test Requirements for FIPS 140-2 is also affected by these corrections. Questions regarding this change notice may be directed to Annabelle Lee (annabelle.lee@nist.gov, 301-975-2941). 4.9.2 Conditional Tests Conditional tests shall be pe rformed by a cryptogra phic m odule whe n the conditions specifie d for the following test s o ccur: pair-wise con sistency test, software/firmware lo ad test, m anual k ey en try test, continuous random number generator test, and bypass test. Pair-wise consistency test (for public and private keys) . I f a c ryptographic module generates public or private k eys, then th e fo llowing p air-wise co nsistency tests fo r public an d private k eys sh all be performed: 1. If the keys are used to perform an approved key transport method or encryption, then the public key shall e ncrypt a plaintext value . T he resu lting ci phertext v alue shall b e co mpared to th e original plaintext value. If t he two values are equal, then the test sh all fail. If t he two values differ, then the private key shall b e used to decrypt the ciphertext and the resulting value shall be compared to the original plaintext value. If the two values are not equal, the test shall fail. 2. If t he keys are used t o pe rform key agreem ent, t hen t he cry ptographic module s hall creat e a second, com patible key pai r. The cry ptographic m odule shall per form both si des o f t he key agreement algorithm and shall compare the resulting shared values. If the shared values are not equal, the test shall fail. 2. If the keys are used to perform the cal culation and verification of digital si gnatures, then the consistency of the keys shall be tested by the calculation and verification of a digital signature. If the digital signature cannot be verified, the test shall fail. 60 [PDF page 69] 61 Change Notice 4 FIPS PUB 140-2, SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY Gaithersburg, MD 20899 DATE OF CHANGE: 2002 December 03 TITLE: Limited Operational Environment Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information (hereafter referred to as sensitive information). This change notice provides a correction to the definition of a Limited Operational Environment. This correction involves paragraph 4.6 of FIPS 140-2. In the corrected paragraph below, the deleted text is struck out and the added text is underlined. Questions regarding this change notice may be directed to Annabelle Lee (annabelle.lee@nist.gov, 301-975-2941). 4.6 Operational Environment A limited operational environment refers to a static non-m odifiable virtual operational environment (e.g., JAVA virtual machine or on a non-programmable PC card) with no underlying general purpose operating system upon which the opera tional environment uniquely resides.