[PDF page 1] Archived NIST Technical Series Publication The attached publication has been archived (withdrawn), and is provided solely for historical purposes. It may have been superseded by another publication (indicated below). Archived Publication Series/Number: Title: Publication Date(s): Withdrawal Date: Withdrawal Note: Superseding Publication(s) The attached publication has been superseded by the following publication(s): Series/Number: Title: Author(s): Publication Date(s): URL/DOI: Additional Information (if applicable) Contact: Latest revision of the attached publication: Related information: Withdrawal announcement (link): Date updated: :ƵŶĞϮϭ͕ϮϬϭϳ NIST Special Publication 800-12 An Introduction to Computer Security: the NIST Handbook October 1995 June 21, 2017 SP 800-12 is superseded in its entirety by the publication of SP 800-12 Revision 1. NIST Special Publication 800-12 Revision 1 An Introduction to Information Security Michael Nieles; Kelley Dempsey; Victoria Yan Pillitteri June 2017 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-12r1 Computer Security Division (Information Technology Laboratory) SP 800-12 Rev. 1 (as of June 21, 2017) N/A [PDF page 2] HATlINST.OFSTAND&TECHR.I.C. NISTPUBLICATIONSAlllOBSEDS3flNISTSpecialPublication800-12 U.S.DEPARTMENTOFCOMMERCETechnologyAdministrationNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology AnIntroductiontoComputerSecurity:TheNISTHandbook BarbaraGuttmanandEdwardA.Roback COMPUTERSECURITY Assurance1)UserIssues Personnel f Access \ ControlsO KiysfcalSecurity i Audit Policy ContingencyPlanniii^ Trairang I&A PlanningRiskManagen»nt)Crypto ^JSupport/-"^&v_OperationsUProgramManagement~^Tiireats QC100.U57NO.800-121995 Nisr [PDF page 3] TheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologywasestablishedin1988byCongressto"assistindustryinthedevelopmentoftechnology...neededtoimproveproductquality,tomodernizemanufacturingprocesses,toensureproductreliability...andtofacilitaterapidcommercialization...ofproductsbasedonnewscientificdiscoveries."NIST,originallyfoundedastheNationalBureauofStandardsin1901,workstostrengthenU.S.industry'scompetitiveness;advancescienceandengineering;andimprovepublichealth,safety,andtheenvironment.Oneoftheagency'sbasicfunctionsistodevelop,maintain,andretaincustodyofthenationalstandardsofmeasurement,andprovidethemeansandmethodsforcomparingstandardsusedinscience,engineering,manufacturing,commerce,industry,andeducationwiththestandardsadoptedorrecognizedbytheFederalGovernment.AsanagencyoftheU.S.CommerceDepartment'sTechnologyAdministration,NISTconductsbasicandappliedresearchinthephysicalsciencesandengineering,anddevelopsmeasurementtechniques,testmethods,standards,andrelatedservices.TheInstitutedoesgenericandprecompetitiveworkonnewandadvancedtechnologies.NIST'sresearchfacilitiesarelocatedatGaithersburg,MD20899,andatBoulder,CO80303.Majortechnicaloperatingunitsandtheirprincipalactivitiesarelistedbelow.FormoreinformationcontactthePublicInquiriesDesk,301-975-3058. OfficeoftheDirector•AdvancedTechnologyProgram•QualityPrograms•InternationalandAcademicAffairsTechnologyServices•ManufacturingExtensionPartnership•StandardsServices•TechnologyCommercialization•MeasurementServices•TechnologyEvaluationandAssessment•InformationServicesMaterialsScienceandEngineeringLaboratory•IntelligentProcessingofMaterials•Ceramics•MaterialsReliability'•Polymers•Metallurgy•ReactorRadiationChemicalScienceandTechnologyLaboratory•Biotechnology•ChemicalKineticsandThermodynamics•AnalyticalChemicalResearch•ProcessMeasurements•SurfaceandMicroanalysisScience•Thermophysics^PhysicsLaboratory•ElectronandOpticalPhysics•AtomicPhysics•MolecularPhysics•RadiometricPhysics•QuantumMetrology•IonizingRadiation•TimeandFrequency'•QuantumPhysics' ManufacturingEngineeringLaboratory•PrecisionEngineering•AutomatedProductionTechnology•IntelligentSystems•ManufacturingSystemsIntegration•FabricationTechnologyElectronicsandElectricalEngineeringLaboratory•Microelectronics•LawEnforcementStandards•Electricity•SemiconductorElectronics•ElectromagneticFields'•ElectromagneticTechnology'•Optoelectronics'BuildingandFireResearchLaboratory•Structures•BuildingMaterials•BuildingEnvironment•FireSafety•FireScienceComputerSystemsLaboratory•OfficeofEnterpriseIntegration•InformationSystemsEngineering•SystemsandSoftwareTechnology•ComputerSecurity•SystemsandNetworkArchitecture•AdvancedSystemsComputingandAppliedMathematicsLaboratory•AppliedandComputationalMathematics^•StatisticalEngineering^•ScientificComputingEnvironments^•ComputerServices•ComputerSystemsandCommunications^•InformationSystems 'AtBoulder.CO80303.^SomeelementsatBoulder,CO80303. [PDF page 4] NISTSpecialPublication800-12AnIlltrOdUCtiontOCompUtCrSecurity:TheNISTHandbook BarbaraGuttmanandEdwardRoback COMPUTERSECURITY ComputerSystemsLaboratoryNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyGaithersburg,MD20899-0001 October1995 U.S.DepartmentofCommerceRonaldH.Brown,SecretaryTechnologyAdministrationMaryL.Good,UnderSecretaryforTechnologyNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyAratiPrabhakar,Director [PDF page 5] ReportsonComputerSystemsTechnologyTheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology(NIST)hasauniqueresponsibilityforcomputersystemstechnologywithintheFederalgovernment.NIST'sComputerSystemsLaboratory(CSL)devel-opsstandardsandguidelines,providestechnicalassistance,andconductsresearchforcomputersandrelatedtelecommunicationssystemstoachievemoreeffectiveutilizationofFederalinformationtechnol-ogyresources.CSL'sresponsibilitiesIncludedevelopmentoftechnical,management,physical,andad-ministrativestandardsandguidelinesforthecost-effectivesecurityandprivacyofsensitiveunclassifiedInformationprocessedInFederalcomputers.CSLassistsagenciesindevelopingsecurityplansandinImprovingcomputersecurityawarenesstraining.ThisSpecialPublication800seriesreportsCSLre-searchandguidelinestoFederalagenciesaswellastoorganizationsInindustry,government,andacademia. NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologySpecialPublication800-12Natl.Inst.Stand.Technol.Spec.Publ.800-12,272pages(Oct.1995)CODEN:NSPUE2 U.S.GOVERNMENTPRINTINGOFFICEWASHINGTON:1995ForsalebytheSuperintendentofDocuments,U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,Washington,DC20402 [PDF page 6] TableofContents I.INTRODUCTIONANDOVERVIEWChapter1INTRODUCTION1.1Purpose31.2IntendedAudience31.3Organization41.4ImportantTerminology51.5LegalFoundationforFederalComputerSecurityPrograms7Chapter2ELEMENTSOFCOMPUTERSECURITY2.1ComputerSecuritySupportstheMissionoftheOrganization92.2ComputerSecurityisanIntegralElementofSoundManagement102.3ComputerSecurityShouldBeCost-Effective112.4ComputerSecurityResponsibilitiesandAccountabilityShouldBeMadeExplicit122.5SystemsOwnersHaveSecurityResponsibilitiesOutsideTheirOwnOrganizations122.6ComputerSecurityRequiresaComprehensiveandIntegratedApproach132.7ComputerSecurityShouldBePeriodicallyReassessed.132.8ComputerSecurityisConstrainedbySocietalFactors.14 iii [PDF page 7] Chapter3ROLESANDRESPONSIBILITIES3.1SeniorManagement163.2ComputerSecurityManagement163.3ProgramandFunctionalManagers/ApplicationOwners163.4TechnologyProviders163.5SupportingFunctions183.6Users 19Chapter4COMMONTHREATS:ABRIEFOVERVIEW4.1ErrorsandOmissions224.2FraudandTheft234.3EmployeeSabotage244.4LossofPhysicalandInfrastructureSupport244.5MaliciousHackers244.6IndustrialEspionage264.7MaliciousCode 274.8ForeignGovernmentEspionage274.9ThreatstoPersonalPrivacy28 II.MANAGEMENTCONTROLSChapter5COMPUTERSECURITYPOLICY5.1ProgramPolicy355.2Issue-SpecificPolicy375.3System-SpecificPolicy40 iv [PDF page 8] 5.4Interdependencies425.5CostConsiderations43Chapter6COMPUTERSECURITYPROGRAMMANAGEMENT6.1StructureofaComputerSecurityProgram456.2CentralComputerSecurityPrograms476.3ElementsofanEffectiveCentralComputerSecurityProgram516.4System-LevelComputerSecurityPrograms536.5ElementsofEffectiveSystem-LevelPrograms536.6CentralandSystem-LevelProgramInteractions566.7Interdependencies566.8CostConsiderations56Chapter7COMPUTERSECURITYRISKMANAGEMENT7.1RiskAssessment597.2RiskMitigation637.3UncertaintyAnalysis677.4Interdependencies687.5CostConsiderations68Chapter8SECURITYANDPLANNINGINTHECOMPUTERSYSTEMLIFECYCLE8.1ComputerSecurityActIssuesforFederalSystems718.2BenefitsofIntegratingSecurityintheComputerSystemLifeCycle728.3OverviewoftheComputerSystemLifeCycle73 V [PDF page 9] 8.4SecurityActivitiesintheComputerSystemLifeCycle748.5Interdependencies868.6CostConsiderations86Chapter9 i ASSURANCE9.1AccreditationandAssurance909.2PlanningandAssurance929.3DesignandImplementationAssurance929.4OperationalAssurance969.5Interdependencies1019.6CostConsiderations101 III.OPERATIONALCONTROLSChapter10PERSONNEL/USERISSUES10.1Staffing10710.2UserAdministration11010.3ContractorAccessConsiderations11610.4PublicAccessConsiderations11610.5Interdependencies11710.6CostConsiderations117Chapter11PREPARINGFORCONTINGENCIESANDDISASTERS11.1Step1:IdentifyingtheMission-orBusiness-CriticalFunctions120 vi [PDF page 10] 11.2Step2:IdentifyingtheResourcesThatSupportCriticalFunctions12011.3Step3:AnticipatingPotentialContingenciesorDisasters12211.4Step4:SelectingContingencyPlanningStrategies12311.5Step5:ImplementingtheContingencyStrategies12611.6Step6:TestingandRevising12811.7Interdependencies12911.8CostConsiderations130Chapter12COMPUTERSECURITYINCIDENTHANDLING12.1BenefitsofanIncidentHandlingCapability13412.2CharacteristicsofaSuccessfulIncidentHandlingCapability13712.3TechnicalSupportforIncidentHandling13912.4Interdependencies14012.5CostConsiderations141Chapter13AWARENESS,TRAINING,ANDEDUCATION13.1Behavior14313.2Accountability14413.3Awareness14413.4Training14613.5Education14713.6Implementation14813.7Interdependencies15213.8CostConsiderations152 vii [PDF page 11] Chapter14SECURITYCONSIDERATIONSINCOMPUTERSUPPORTANDOPERATIONS14.1UserSupport15614.2SoftwareSupport15714.3ConfigurationManagement15714.4Backups15814.5MediaControls15814.6Documentation16114.7Maintenance16114.8Interdependencies16214.9CostConsiderations163Chapter15PHYSICALANDENVIRONMENTALSECURITY15.1PhysicalAccessControls16715.2FireSafetyFactors16815.3FailureofSupportingUtilities17015.4StructuralCollapse17015.5PlumbingLeaks17115.6InterceptionofData17115.7MobileandPortableSystems17215.8ApproachtoImplementation17215.9Interdependencies17415.10CostConsiderations174 viii [PDF page 12] IV.TECHNICALCONTROLSChapter16IDENTIFICATIONANDAUTHENTICATION16.1I&ABasedonSomethingtheUserKnows18016.2I&ABasedonSomethingtheUserPossesses18216.3I&ABasedonSomethingtheUserIs 18616.4ImplementingI&ASystems18716.5Interdependencies18916.6CostConsiderations189Chapter17LOGICALACCESSCONTROL17.1AccessCriteria19417.2Policy:TheImpetusforAccessControls19717.3TechnicalImplementationMechanisms19817.4AdministrationofAccessControls20417.5CoordinatingAccessControls20617.6Interdependencies20617.7CostConsiderations207Chapter18AUDITTRAILS18.1BenefitsandObjectives21118.2AuditTrailsandLogs21418.3ImplementationIssues21718.4Interdependencies22018.5CostConsiderations221 ix [PDF page 13] Chapter19CRYPTOGRAPHY19.1BasicCryptographicTechnologies22319.2UsesofCryptography22619.3ImplementationIssues23019.4Interdependencies23319.5CostConsiderations234 V.EXAMPLEChapter20ASSESSINGANDMITIGATINGTHERISKSTOAHYPOTHETICALCOMPUTERSYSTEM20.1InitiatingtheRiskAssessment24120.2HGA'sComputerSystem24220.3ThreatstoHGA'sAssets24520.4CurrentSecurityMeasures24820.5VulnerabilitiesReportedbytheRiskAssessmentTeam25720.6RecommendationsforMitigatingtheIdentifiedVulnerabilities26220.7Summary266 CrossReferenceandGeneralIndex269 X [PDF page 14] Acknowledgments NISTwouldliketothankthemanypeoplewhoassistedwiththedevelopmentofthishandbook.FortheirinitialrecommendationthatNISTproduceahandbook,wethankthemembersoftheComputerSystemSecurityandPrivacyAdvisoryBoard,inparticular,RobertCourtney,Jr.NISTmanagementofficialswhosupportedthiseffortinclude:JamesBurrows,F.LynnMcNulty,StuartKatzke,IreneGilbert,andDennisSteinauer.Inaddition,specialthanksisduethosecontractorswhohelpedcraftthehandbook,preparedrafts,teachclasses,andreviewmaterial: DanielF.SterneofTrustedInformationSystems(TIS,Glenwood,Maryland)servedasProjectManagerforTrustedInformationSystemsonthisproject.Inaddition,manyTISemployeescontributedtothehandbook,including:DavidM.Balenson,MarthaA.Branstad,LisaM.Jaworski,TheodoreM.P.Lee,CharlesP.Pfleeger,SharonP.Osuna,DiannK.Vechery,KennethM.Walker,andThomasJ.Winkler-Parenty.Additionaldraftersofhandbookchaptersinclude:LawrenceBasshamEI(NIST),RobertV.Jacobson,InternationalSecurityTechnology,Inc.(NewYork,NY)andJohnWack(NIST).Significantassistancewasalsoreceivedfrom:LisaCamahan(NIST),JamesDray(NIST),DonnaDodson(NIST),theDepartmentofEnergy,IreneGilbert(NIST),ElizabethGreer(NIST),LawrenceKeys(NIST),ElizabethLennon(NIST),JoanO'Callaghan(Bethesda,Maryland),DennisSteinauer(NIST),KibbieStreetman(OakRidgeNationalLaboratory),andtheTennesseeValleyAuthority.Moreover,thanksisextendedtothereviewersofdraftchapters.Whilemanypeopleassisted,thefollowingtwoindividualswereespeciallytireless: RobertCourtney,Jr.(RCI)andSteveLipner(MITREandTIS).Otherimportantcontributionsandcommentswerereceivedfrom:MembersoftheComputerSystemSecurityandPrivacyAdvisoryBoard,andtheSteeringCommitteeoftheFederalComputerSecurityProgramManagers'Forum. Finally,althoughspacedoesnotallowspecificacknowledgementofalltheindividualswhocontributedtothiseffort,theirassistancewascriticaltothepreparationofthisdocument.Disclaimer:Notethatreferencestospecificproductsorbrandsisforexplanatorypurposesonly;noendorsement,explicitorimplicit,isintendedorimplied. xi [PDF page 15] [PDF page 16] I.INTRODUCTIONANDOVERVIEW ! 1 [PDF page 17] [PDF page 18] Chapter1 INTRODUCTION 1.1PurposeThishandbookprovidesassistanceinsecuringcomputer-basedresources(includinghardware,software,andinformation)byexplainingimportantconcepts,costconsiderations,andinterrelationshipsofsecuritycontrols.Itillustratesthebenefitsofsecuritycontrols,themajortechniquesorapproachesforeachcontrol,andimportantrelatedconsiderations.'Thehandbookprovidesabroadoverviewofcomputersecuritytohelpreadersunderstandtheircomputersecurityneedsanddevelopasoundapproachtotheselectionofappropriatesecuritycontrols.Itdoesnotdescribedetailedstepsnecessarytoimplementacomputersecurityprogram,providedetailedimplementationproceduresforsecuritycontrols,orgiveguidanceforauditingthesecurityofspecificsystems.Generalreferencesareprovidedattheendofthischapter,andreferencesof"how-to"booksandarticlesareprovidedattheendofeachchapterinPartsII,IIIandIV.Thepurposeofthishandbookisnottospecifyrequirementsbut,rather,todiscussthebenefitsofvariouscomputersecuritycontrolsandsituationsinwhichtheirapplicationmaybeappropriate.Somerequirementsforfederalsystems^arenotedinthetext.Thisdocumentprovidesadviceandguidance;nopenaltiesarestipulated. 1.2IntendedAudienceThehandbookwaswrittenprimarilyforthosewhohavecomputersecurityresponsibilitiesandneedassistanceunderstandingbasicconceptsandtechniques.Withinthefederalgovernment,^thisincludesthosewhohavecomputersecurityresponsibilitiesforsensitivesystems. 'Itisrecognizedthatthecomputersecurityfieldcontinuestoevolve.Toaddresschangesandnewissues,NIST'sComputerSystemsLaboratorypublishestheCSLBulletinseries.Thosebulletinswhichdealwithsecurityissuescanbethoughtofassupplementstothispublication. ^Notethattheserequirementsdonotarisefromthishandbook,butfromothersources,suchastheComputerSecurityActof1987. ^IntheComputerSecurityActof1987,CongressassignedresponsibilitytoNISTforthepreparationofstandardsandguidelinesforthesecurityofsensitive/(?«temfornationalsecurityinformation(i.e.,cONFiDEhrnAL,secret,andtopsecret).Thissystemisbasedonlyupontheneedtoprotectclassifiedinformationfi"omunauthorizeddisclosure;theU.S.Governmentdoesnothaveasimilarsystemforunclassifiedinformation.Nogovernmentwideschemes(foreitherclassifiedorunclassifiedinformation)existwhicharebasedontiieneedtoprotecttheintegrityoravailabilityofinformation. [PDF page 20] 1.Introduction othercontrols.Eachchapterinthisportionofthehandbookalsoprovidesreferencesthatmaybeuseflilinactualimplementation.•TheManagementControlssectionaddressessecuritytopicsthatcanbecharacterizedasmanagerial.Theyaretechniquesandconcernsthatarenormallyaddressedbymanagementintheorganization'scomputersecurityprogram.Ingeneral,theyfocusonthemanagementofthecomputersecurityprogramandthemanagementofriskwithintheorganization.•TheOperationalControlssectionaddressessecuritycontrolsthatfocusoncontrolsthatare,broadlyspeaking,implementedandexecutedbypeople(asopposedtosystems).Thesecontrolsareputinplacetoimprovethesecurityofaparticularsystem(orgroupofsystems).Theyoftenrequiretechnicalorspecializedexpertise-andoftenrelyuponmanagementactivitiesaswellastechnicalcontrols^•TheTechnicalControlssectionfocusesonsecuritycontrolsthatthecomputersystemexecutes.Thesecontrolsaredependentupontheproperfunctioningofthesystemfortheireffectiveness.Theimplementationoftechnicalcontrols,however,alwaysrequiressignificantoperationalconsiderations-andshouldbeconsistentwiththemanagementofsecuritywithintheorganization. Finally,anexampleispresentedtoaidthereaderincorrelatingsomeofthemajortopicsdiscussedinthehandbook.Itdescribesahypotheticalsystemanddiscussessomeofthecontrolsthathavebeenimplementedtoprotectit.Thissectionhelpsthereaderbetterunderstandthedecisionsthatmustbemadeinsecuringasystem,andillustratestheinterrelationshipsamongcontrols. 1.4ImportantTerminologyTounderstandtherestofthehandbook,thereadermustbefamiliarwiththefollowingkeytermsanddefinitionsasusedinthishandbook.Inthehandbook,thetermscomputersandcomputersystemsareusedtorefertotheentirespectrumofinformationtechnology,includingapplicationandsupportsystems.Otherkeytermsinclude:ComputerSecurity:Theprotectionaffordedtoanautomatedinformationsysteminordertoattaintheapplicableobjectivesofpreservingtheintegrity,availabilityandconfidentialityofinformationsystemresources(includeshardware,software,firmware,information/data,andtelecommunications).Integrity:Inlayusage,informationhasintegritywhenitistimely,accurate,complete,andconsistent.However,computersareunabletoprovideorprotectallofthesequalities.Therefore,inthecomputersecurityfield,integrityisoftendiscussedmorenarrowlyashavingtwo 5 [PDF page 21] /.IntroductionandOverview LocationofSelectedSecurityTopicsBecausethishandbookisstructuredtofocusoncomputersecuritycontrols,theremaybeseveralsecuritytopicsthatthereadermayhavetroublelocating.Forexample,noseparatesectionisdevotedtomainframeorpersonalcomputersecurity,sincethecontrolsdiscussedinthehandbookcanbeapplied(albeitindifferentways)tovariousprocessingplatformsandsystems.Thefollowingmayhelpthereaderlocateareasofinterestnotreadilyfoundinthetableofcontents:TopicChapterAccreditation8.LifeCycle9.AssuranceFirewalls17.LogicalAccessControlsSecurityPlans8.LifeCycleTrustedSystems9.AssuranceSecurityfeatures,includingthoseincorporatedintotrustedsystems,arediscussedthroughout.Viruses&OtherMaliciousCode 9.Assurance(OperationalAssurancesection)12.IncidentHandling NetworkSecurityNetworksecurityusesthesamebasicsetofcontrolsasmainframesecurityorPCsecurity.Inmanyofthehandbookchapters,considerationsforusingthecontrolisanetworkedenvironmentareaddressed,asappropriate.Forexample,securegatewaysarediscussedasapartofAccessControl;transmittingauthenticationdataoverinsecurenetworksisdiscussedintheIdentificationandAuthenticationchapter;andtheContingencyPlanningchaptertalksaboutdataconununicationscontracts.Forthesamereason,thereisnotaseparatechapterforPC,LAN,minicomputer,ormainframesecurity. facets:dataintegrityandsystemintegrity."Dataintegrityisarequirementthatinformationandprogramsarechangedonlyinaspecifiedandauthorizedmanner."^Systemintegrityisarequirementthatasystem"performsitsintendedfunctioninanunimpairedmanner,freefromdeliberateorinadvertentunauthorizedmanipulationofthesystem."''Thedefinitionofintegrity *NationalResearchCouncil,ComputersatRisk,(Washington,DC:NationalAcademyPress,1991),p.54. 'NationalComputerSecurityCenter,Pub.NCSC-TG-004-88.6 [PDF page 22] /.Introduction hasbeen,andcontinuestobe,thesubjectofmuchdebateamongcomputersecurityexperts.Availability:A"requirementintendedtoassurethatsystemsworkpromptlyandserviceisnotdeniedtoauthorizedusers. Confidentiality:Arequirementthatprivateorconfidentialinformationnotbedisclosedtounauthorizedindividuals. 1.5LegalFoundationforFederalComputerSecurityProgramsTheexecutiveprinciplesdiscussedinthenextchapterexplaintheneedforcomputersecurity.Inaddition,withinthefederalgovernment,anumberoflawsandregulationsmandatethatagenciesprotecttheircomputers,theinformationtheyprocess,andrelatedtechnologyresources(e.g.,telecommunications).^Themostimportantarelistedbelow.•TheComputerSecurityActof1987requiresagenciestoidentifysensitivesystems,conductcomputersecuritytraining,anddevelopcomputersecurityplans.•TheFederalInformationResourcesManagementRegulation(FIRMR)istheprimaryregulationfortheuse,management,andacquisitionofcomputerresourcesinthefederalgovernment.•0MBCircularA-130(specificallyAppendixIII)requiresthatfederalagenciesestablishsecurityprogramscontainingspecifiedelements.Notethatmanymorespecificrequirements,manyofwhichareagencyspecific,alsoexist. Federalmanagersareresponsibleforfamiliarityandcompliancewithapplicablelegalrequirements.However,lawsandregulationsdonotnormallyprovidedetailedinstructionsforprotectingcomputer-relatedassets.Instead,theyspecifyrequirements-suchasrestrictingtheavailabilityofpersonaldatatoauthorizedusers.Thishandbookaidsthereaderindevelopinganeffective,overallsecurityapproachandinselectingcost-effectivecontrolstomeetsuchrequirements. "ComputersatRisk,p.54. 'AlthoughnotHsted,readersshouldbeawarethatlawsalsoexistthatmayaffectnongovernmentorganizations. 7 [PDF page 23] /.IntroductionandOverview ReferencesAuerbachPublishers(adivisionofWarrenGorham&Lament).DataSecurityManagement.Boston,MA.1995.BritishStandardsInstitute.ACodeofPracticeforInformationSecurityManagement,1993. Caelli,William,DennisLongley,andMichaelShain.InformationSecurityHandbook.NewYork,NY:StocktonPress,1991. Fites,P.,andM.Kratz.InformationSystemsSecurity:APractitioner'sReference.NewYork,NY:VanNostrandReinhold,1993.Garfinkel,S.,andG.Spafford.PracticalUNIXSecurity.Sebastopol,CA:O'Riley&Associates,Inc.,1991. InstituteofInternalAuditorsResearchFoundation.SystemAuditabilityandControlReport.AltamonteSprings,FL:TheInstituteofInternalAuditors,1991.NationalResearchCouncil.ComputersatRisk:SafeComputingintheInformationAge.Washington,DC:NationalAcademyPress,1991.Pfleeger,CharlesP.SecurityinComputing.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHaU,1989.Russell,Deborah,andG.T.Gangemi,Sr.ComputerSecurityBasics.Sebastopol,CA:O'Reilly&Associates,Inc.,1991.Ruthberg,Z.,andTipton,H.,eds.HandbookofInformationSecurityManagement.Boston,MA:AuerbachPress,1993. 8 [PDF page 24] Chapter2ELEMENTSOFCOMPUTERSECURITY Thishandbook'sgeneralapproachtocomputersecurityisbasedoneightmajorelements: 1.Computersecurityshouldsupportthemissionoftheorganization. 2.Computersecurityisanintegralelementofsoundmanagement. 3.Computersecurityshouldbecost-effective. 4.Computersecurityresponsibilitiesandaccountabilityshouldbemadeexplicit. 5.Systemownershavecomputersecurityresponsibilitiesoutsidetheirownorganizations. 6.Computersecurityrequiresacomprehensiveandintegratedapproach. 7.Computersecurityshouldbeperiodicallyreassessed. 8.Computersecurityisconstrainedbysocietalfactors. FamiliaritywiththeseelementswiUaidthereaderinbetterunderstandinghowthesecuritycontrols(discussedinlatersections)supporttheoverallcomputersecurityprogramgoals. 2.1ComputerSecuritySupportstheMissionoftheOrganization.Thepurposeofcomputersecurityistoprotectanorganization'svaluableresources,suchasinformation,hardware,andsoftware.Throughtheselectionandapplicationofappropriatesafeguards,securityhelpstheorganization'smissionbyprotectingitsphysicalandfinancialresources,reputation,legalposition,employees,andothertangibleandintangibleassets.Unfortunately,securityissometimesviewedasthwartingthemissionoftheorganizationbyimposingpoorlyselected,bothersomerulesandproceduresonusers,managers,andsystems.Onthecontrary,well-chosensecurityrulesandproceduresdonotexistfortheirownsake-theyareputinplacetoprotectimportantassetsandtherebysupporttheoverallorganizationalmission.Security,therefore,isameanstoanendandnotanendinitselfForexample,inaprivate-sectorbusiness,havinggoodsecurityisusuallysecondarytotheneedtomakeaprofit.Security,then,oughttoincreasethefirm'sabilitytomakeaprofit.Inapublic-sectoragency,securityisusuallysecondarytotheagency'sserviceprovidedtocitizens.Security,then,oughttohelpimprovetheserviceprovidedtothecitizen. 9 [PDF page 25] /.IntroductionandOverview Toactonthis,managersneedtounderstandboththeirorganizationalmissionandhoweachinformationsystemsupportsthatmission.Afterasystem'srolehasbeendefined,thesecurityrequirementsimplicitinthatrolecanbedefined.Securitycanthenbeexplicitlystatedintermsoftheorganization'smission.Therolesandfunctionsofasystemmaynotbeconstrainedtoasingleorganization.Inaninterorganizationalsystem,eachorganizationbenefitsfromsecuringthesystem.Forexample,forelectroniccommercetobesuccessful,eachoftheparticipantsrequiressecuritycontrolstoprotecttheirresources.However,goodsecurityonthebuyer'ssystemalsobenefitstheseller;thebuyer'ssystemislesslikelytobeusedforfi-audortobeunavailableorotherwisenegativelyaffecttheseller.(Thereverseisalsotrue.) 2.2ComputerSecurityisanIntegralElementofSoundManagement.Informationandcomputersystemsareoftencriticalassetsthatsupportthemissionofanorganization.Protectingthemcanbeascriticalasprotectingotherorganizationalresources,suchasmoney,physicalassets,oremployees.However,includingsecurityconsiderationsinthemanagementof^h^h^^^^^^h^h^^^h^^m^^h^^hinformationandcomputersdoesnotcompletelyeliminatethepossibilitythattheseassetswillbeharmed.Ultimately,organizationmanagershavetodecidewhatthelevelofrisktheyarewillingtoaccept,takingintoaccountthe ThischapterdrawsupontheOECD'sGuidelinesfortheSecurityofInformationSystems,whichwasendorsedbytheUnitedStates.Itprovidesfor: Accountability-Theresponsibilitiesandaccountabilityofowners,providersandusersofinformationsystemsandotherparties...shouldbeexplicit. Awareness-Owners,providers,usersandotherpartiesshouldreadilybeable,consistentwithmaintainingsecurity,togainappropriateIcnowledgeofandbeinformedabouttheexistenceandgeneralextentofmeasures...forthesecurityofinformationsystems.Ethics-TheInformationsystemsandthesecurityofinformationsystemsshouldbeprovidedandusedinsuchamannerthattherightsandlegitimateinterestofothersarerespected.Multidisciplinary-Measures,practicesandproceduresforthesecurityofinformationsystemsshouldtakeaccountofandaddressallrelevantconsiderationsandviewpoints....Proportionality-Securitylevels,costs,measures,practicesandproceduresshouldbeappropriateandproportionatetodievalueofanddegreeofrelianceontheinformationsystemsandtotheseverity,probabilityandextentofpotentialharm....Integration-Measures,practicesandproceduresforthesecurityofinformationsystemsshouldbecoordinatedandintegratedwitheachodierandothermeasures,practicesandproceduresoftheorganizationsoastocreateacoherentsystemofsecurity.Timeliness-Publicandprivateparties,atbothnationalandinternationallevels,shouldactinadmelycoordinatedmannertopreventandtorespondtobreachesofsecurityofinformationsystems.Reassessment-Thesecurityofinformationsystemsshouldbereassessedperiodically,asinformationsystemsandtherequirementsfortheirsecurityvaryovertime.Democracy-Thesecurityofinformationsystemsshouldbecompatiblevriththelegitimateuseandflowofdataandinformationinademocraticsociety. 10 [PDF page 26] 2.ElementsofComputerSecurity costofsecuritycontrols.Aswithmanyotherresources,themanagementofinformationandcomputersmaytranscendorganizationalboundaries.Whenanorganization'sinformationandcomputersystemsarelinkedwithexternalsystems,management'sresponsibilitiesalsoextendbeyondtheorganization.Thismayrequirethatmanagement(1)knowwhatgenerallevelortypeofsecurityisemployedontheexternalsystem(s)or(2)seekassurancethattheexternalsystemprovidesadequatesecurityfortheusingorganization'sneeds. 2.3ComputerSecurityShouldBeCost-Effective.Thecostsandbenefitsofsecurityshouldbecarefullyexaminedinbothmonetaryandnon-monetarytermstoensurethatthecostofcontrolsdoesnotexceedexpectedbenefits.Securityshouldbeappropriateandproportionatetothevalueofanddegreeofrelianceonthecomputersystemsandtotheseverity,probabilityandextentofpotentialharm.Requirementsforsecurityvary,dependingupontheparticularcomputersystem.Ingeneral,securityisasmartbusinesspractice.Byinvestinginsecuritymeasures,anorganizationcanreducethefrequencyandseverityofcomputersecurity-relatedlosses.Forexample,anorganizationmayestimatethatitisexperiencingsignificantlossesperyearininventorythroughfraudulentmanipulationofitscomputersystem.Securitymeasures,suchasanimprovedaccesscontrolsystem,maysignificantlyreducetheloss. Moreover,asoundsecurityprogramcanthwarthackersandcanreducethefrequencyofviruses.Eliminationofthesekindsofthreatscanreduceunfavorablepublicityaswellasincreasemoraleandproductivity.Securitybenefits,however,dohavebothdirectandindirectcosts.Directcostsincludepurchasing,installing,andadministeringsecuritymeasures,suchasaccesscontrolsoftwareorfire-suppressionsystems.Additionally,securitymeasurescansometimesaffectsystemperformance,employeemorale,orretrainingrequirements.AllofthesehavetobeconsideredinadditiontothebasiccostofthecontrolitselfInmanycases,theseadditionalcostsmaywellexceedtheinitialcostofthecontrol(asisoftenseen,forexample,inthecostsofadministeringanaccesscontrolpackage).Solutionstosecurityproblemsshouldnotbechoseniftheycostmore,directlyorindirectly,thansimplytoleratingtheproblem. 11 [PDF page 27] /.IntroductionandOverview 2.4ComputerSecurityResponsibilitiesandAccountabilityShouldBeMadeExplicit.Theresponsibilitiesandaccountability'^ofowners,providers,andusersofcomputersystemsandotherparties"concernedwiththesecurityofcomputersystemsshouldbeexplicit.'^Theassignmentofresponsibilitiesmaybeinternaltoanorganizationormayextendacrossorganizationalboundaries.Dependingonthesizeoftheorganization,theprogrammaybelargeorsmall,evenacollateraldutyofanothermanagementofficial.However,evensmallorganizationscanprepareadocumentthatstatesorganizationpolicyandmakesexplicitcomputersecurityresponsibilities.Thiselementdoesnotspecifythatindividualaccountabilitymustbeprovidedforonallsystems.Forexample,manyinformationdisseminationsystemsdonotrequireuseridentificationand,therefore,cannotholdusersaccountable.2.5SystemsOwnersHaveSecurityResponsibilitiesOutsideTheirOwnOrganizations. Ifasystemhasexternalusers,itsownershavearesponsibilitytoshareappropriateknowledgeabouttheexistenceandgeneralextentofsecuritymeasuressothatotheruserscanbeconfidentthatthesystemisadequatelysecure.(Thisdoesnotimplythatallsystemsmustmeetanyminimumlevelofsecurity,butdoesimplythatsystemownersshouldinformtheirclientsorusersaboutthenatureofthesecurity.) Inadditiontosharinginformationaboutsecurity,organizationmanagers"shouldactinatimely,coordinatedmannertopreventandtorespondtobreachesofsecurity"tohelppreventdamageto '°Thedifferencebetweenresponsibilityandaccountabilityisnotalwaysclear.Ingeneral,responsibilityisabroaderterm,definingobligationsandexpectedbehavior.Thetermimpliesaproactivestanceonthepartoftheresponsiblepartyandacausalrelationshipbetweentheresponsiblepartyandagivenoutcome.Thetermaccountabilitygenerallyreferstotheabilitytoholdpeopleresponsiblefortheiractions.Therefore,peoplecouldberesponsiblefortheiractionsbutnotheldaccountable.Forexample,ananonymoususeronasystemisresponsiblefornotcompromisingsecuritybutcannotbeheldaccountableifacompromiseoccurssincetheactioncannotbetracedtoanindividual."Thetermotherpartiesmayincludebutisnotlimitedto:executivemanagement;programmers;maintenanceproviders;informationsystemmanagers(softwaremanagers,operationsmanagers,andnetworkmanagers);softwaredevelopmentmanagers;managerschargedwithsecurityofinformationsystems;andinternalandexternalinformationsystemauditors. Implicitistherecognitionthatpeopleorotherentities(suchascorporationsorgovernments)haveresponsibilitiesandaccountabilityrelatedtocomputersystems.Theseareresponsibilitiesandaccountabilitiesareoftensharedamongmanyentities.(Assignmentofresponsibilitiesisusuallyaccomplishedthroughtheissuanceofpolicy.SeeChapter5.) 12 [PDF page 28] 2.ElementsofComputerSecurity others.'^However,takingsuchactionshouldnofjeopardizethesecurityofsystems.2.6ComputerSecurityRequiresaComprehensiveandIntegratedApproach.Providingeffectivecomputersecurityrequiresacomprehensiveapproachthatconsidersavarietyofareasbothwithinandoutsideofthecomputersecurityfield.Thiscomprehensiveapproachextendsthroughouttheentireinformationlifecycle. 2.6.1InterdependenciesofSecurityControlsToworkeffectively,securitycontrolsoftendependupontheproperfunctioningofothercontrols.Infact,manysuchinterdependenciesexist.Ifappropriatelychosen,managerial,operational,andtechnicalcontrolscanworktogethersynergistically.Ontheotherhand,withoutafirmunderstandingoftheinterdependenciesofsecuritycontrols,theycanactuallyundermineoneanother.Forexample,withoutpropertrainingonhowandwhentouseavirus-detectionpackage,theusermayapplythepackageincorrectlyand,therefore,ineffectively.Asaresult,theusermaymistakenlybelievethattheirsystemwillalwaysbevirus-freeandmayinadvertentlyspreadavirus.Inreality,theseinterdependenciesareusuallymorecomplicatedanddifficulttoascertain. 2.6.2OtherInterdependenciesTheeffectivenessofsecuritycontrolsalsodependsonsuchfactorsassystemmanagement,legalissues,qualityassurance,andinternalandmanagementcontrols.Computersecurityneedstoworkwithtraditionalsecuritydisciplinesincludingphysicalandpersonnelsecurity.Manyotherimportantinterdependenciesexistthatareoftenuniquetotheorganizationorsystemenvironment.Managersshouldrecognizehowcomputersecurityrelatestootherareasofsystemsandorganizationalmanagement.2.7ComputerSecurityShouldBePeriodicallyReassessed.Computersandtheenvironmentstheyoperateinaredynamic.Systemtechnologyandusers,dataandinformationinthesystems,risksassociatedwiththesystemand,therefore,securityrequirementsareever-changing.Manytypesofchangesaffectsystemsecurity:technologicaldevelopments(whetheradoptedbythesystemowneroravailableforusebyothers);connectingtoexternalnetworks;achangeinthevalueoruseofinformation;ortheemergenceofanewthreat. OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment,GuidelinesfortheSecurityofInformationSystems,Paris,1992.13 [PDF page 29] /.IntroductionandOverview Inaddition,securityisneverperfectwhenasystemisimplemented.Systemusersandoperatorsdiscovernewwaystointentionallyorunintentionallybypassorsubvertsecurity.Changesinthesystemortheenvironmentcancreatenewvulnerabilities.Strictadherencetoproceduresisrare,andproceduresbecomeoutdatedovertime.Alloftheseissuesmakeitnecessarytoreassessthesecurityofcomputersystems.2.8ComputerSecurityisConstrainedbySocietalFactors.Theabilityofsecuritytosupportthemissionoftheorganization(s)maybelimitedbyvariousfactors,suchassocialissues.Forexample,securityandworkplaceprivacycanconflict.Commonly,securityisimplementedonacomputersystembyidentifyingusersandtrackingtheiractions.However,expectationsofprivacyvaryandcanbeviolatedbysomesecuritymeasures.(Insomecases,privacymaybemandatedbylaw.)Althoughprivacyisanextremelyimportantsocietalissue,itisnottheonlyone.Theflowofinformation,especiallybetweenagovernmentanditscitizens,isanothersituationwheresecuritymayneedtobemodifiedtosupportasocietalgoal.Inaddition,someauthenticationmeasures,suchasretinalscanning,maybeconsideredinvasiveinsomeenvironmentsandcultures. Theunderlyingideaisthatsecuritymeasuresshouldbeselectedandimplementedwitharecognitionoftherightsandlegitimateinterestsofothers.Thismanyinvolvebalancingthesecurityneedsofinformationownersanduserswithsocietalgoals.However,rulesandexpectationschangewithregardtotheappropriateuseofsecuritycontrols.Thesechangesmayeitherincreaseordecreasesecurity. Therelationshipbetweensecurityandsocietalnormsisnotnecessarilyantagonistic.Securitycanenhancetheaccessandflowofdataandinformationbyprovidingmoreaccurateandreliableinformationandgreateravailabilityofsystems.Securitycanalsoincreasetheprivacyaffordedtoanindividualorhelpachieveothergoalssetbysociety. ReferencesOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment.GuidelinesfortheSecurityofInformationSystems.Paris,1992. 14 [PDF page 30] Chapter3ROLESANDRESPONSIBILITIES Onefundamentalissuethatarisesindiscussionsofcomputersecurityis:"Whoseresponsibilityisit?"Ofcourse,onabasicleveltheanswerissimple:computersecurityistheresponsibilityofeveryonewhocanaffectthesecurityofacomputersystem.However,thespecificdutiesandresponsibilitiesofvariousindividualsandorganizationalentitiesvaryconsiderably.Thischapterpresentsabriefoverviewofrolesandresponsibilitiesofthevariousofficialsandorganizationalofficestypicallyinvolvedwithcomputersecurity.''*Theyincludethefollowinggroups:'^•seniormanagement•program/functionalmanagers/applicationowners,•computersecuritymanagement,•technologyproviders,•supportingorganizations,and•users.Thischapterisintendedtogivethereaderabasicfamiliaritywiththemajororganizationalelementsthatplayaroleincomputersecurity.Itdoesnotdescribeallresponsibilitiesofeachindetail,norwillthischapterapplyuniformlytoallorganizations.Organizations,likeindividuals,haveuniquecharacteristics,andnosingletemplatecanapplytoall.Smallerorganizations,inparticular,arenotlikelytohaveseparateindividualsperformingmanyofthefiinctionsdescribedinthischapter.Evenatsomelargerorganizations,someofthedutiesdescribedinthischaptermaynotbestaffedwithfull-timepersonnel.Whatisimportantisthatthesefunctionsbehandledinamannerappropriatefortheorganization.Aswiththerestofthehandbook,thischapterisnotintendedtobeusedasanauditguide. Notethatthisincludesgroupswithintheorganization;outsideorganizations(e.g.,NISTand0MB)arenotincludedinthischapter."Thesecategoriesaregeneralizationsusedtohelpaidthereader;iftheyarenotapplicabletothereader'sparticularenvironment,theycanbesafelyignored.Whileallthesecategoriesmaynotexistinaparticularorganization,thefunctionalityimpliedbythemwilloftenstillbepresent.Also,someorganizationsmayfallintomorethanonecategory.Forexample,thepersonnelofficebothsupportsthecomputersecurityprogram(e.g.,bykeepingtrackofemployeedepartures)andisalsoauserofcomputerservices. 15 [PDF page 31] /.IntroductionandOverview 3.1SeniorManagementSeniormanagementhasultimateresponsibilityfortheUltimately,responsibilityforthesuccessofansecurityofanorganization'scomputersystems,organizationlieswithitsseniormanagers.Theyestablishtheorganization'scomputersecurityprogramanditsoverallprogramgoals,objectives,andprioritiesinordertosupportthemissionoftheorganization.Ultimately,theheadoftheorganizationisresponsibleforensuringthatadequateresourcesareappliedtotheprogramandthatitissuccessful.Seniormanagersarealsoresponsibleforsettingagoodexamplefortheiremployeesbyfollowingallapplicablesecuritypractices. 3.2ComputerSecurityManagementTheComputerSecurityProgramManager(andsupportstaff)directstheorganization'sday-to-daymanagementofitscomputersecurityprogram.Thisindividualisalsoresponsibleforcoordinatingallsecurity-relatedinteractionsamongorganizationalelementsinvolvedinthecomputersecurityprogram-aswellasthoseexternaltotheorganization. 3.3ProgramandFunctionalManagers/ApplicationOwnersProgramorFunctionalManagers/ApplicationOwnersareresponsibleforaprogramorfunction(e.g.,procurementorpayroll)includingthesupportingcomputersystem.'^Theirresponsibilitiesincludeprovidingforappropriatesecurity,includingmanagement,operational,andtechnicalcontrols.Theseofficialsareusuallyassistedbyatechnicalstaffthatoverseestheactualworkingsofthesystem.Thiskindofsupportisnodifferentforotherstaffmemberswhoworkonotherprogramimplementationissues. Also,theprogramorfunctionalmanager/applicationownerisoftenaidedbyaSecurityOfficer(frequentlydedicatedtothatsystem,particularlyifitislargeorcriticaltotheorganization)indevelopingandimplementingsecurityrequirements.3.4TechnologyProvidersSystemManagement/SystemAdministrators.Thesepersonnelarethemanagersandtechnicianswhodesignandoperatecomputersystems.Theyareresponsibleforimplementingtechnicalsecurityoncomputersystemsandforbeingfamiliarwithsecuritytechnologythatrelatestotheirsystem.Theyalsoneedtoensurethecontinuityoftheirservicestomeettheneedsoffunctional Thefunctionalmanager/applicationownermayormaynotbethedataowner.Particularlywithinthegovernment,theconceptofthedataownermaynotbethemostappropriate,sincecitizensultimatelyownthedata. 16 [PDF page 32] 3.RolesandResponsibilities managersaswellasanalyzingtechnicalvulnerabilitiesintheirsystems(andtheirsecurityimplications).TheyareoftenapartofalargerInformationResourcesManagement(IRM)organization.Communications/TelecommunicationsStaff.Thisofficeisnormallyresponsibleforprovidingcommunicationsservices,includingvoice,data,video,andfaxservice.Theirresponsibilitiesforcommunicationsystemsaresimilartothosethatsystemsmanagementofficialshavefortheirsystems.ThestaffmaynotbeseparatefromothertechnologyserviceprovidersortheIRMoffice. SystemSecurityManager/Officers.Oftenassistingsystemmanagementofficialsinthiseffortisasystemsecuritymanager/officerresponsibleforday-to-daysecurityimplementation/administrationduties.Althoughnotnormallypartofthecomputersecurityprogrammanagementoffice,thisofficerisresponsibleforcoordinatingthesecurityeffortsofaparticularsystem(s).Thispersonworkscloselywithsystemmanagementpersonnel,thecomputersecurityprogrammanager,andtheprogramorfunctionalmanager'ssecurityofficer.Infact,dependingupontheorganization,thismaybethesameindividualastheprogramorfunctionalmanager'ssecurityofficer.Thispersonmayormaynotbeapartoftheorganization'soverallsecurityoffice. HelpDesk.WhetherornotaHelpDeskistaskedwithincidenthandling,itneedstobeabletorecognizesecurityincidentsandreferthecallertotheappropriatepersonororganizationforaresponse. WhatisaProgram/FunctionalManager?Hietermprogram/functionalmanagerorapplicationownermaynotbefamiliarorimmediatelyapparenttoallreaders.Theexamplesprovidedbelowshouldhelpthereaderbetterunderstandthisimportantconcept.Inreviewingtheseexamples,notethatcomputersystemsoftenservemorethanonegrouporfimction.Example1.Apersonnelsystemservesanentireorganization.However,thePersonnelManagerwouldnormallybetheapplicationowner.Thisapplieseveniftheapplicationisdistributedsothatsupervisorsandclerksthroughouttheorganizationuseandupdatethesystem.Example#2.Afederalbenefitssystemprovidesmonthlybenefitchecksto500,000citizens.Theprocessingisdoneonamainiramedatacenter.TheBenefitsProgramManageristheapplicationowner.Example3.Amainframedataprocessingorganizationsupportsseverallargeapplications.ThemainframedirectorisnottheFunctionalManagerforanyoftheapplications.Example4.A100-persondivisionhasadiversecollectionofpersonalcomputers,workstations,andminicomputersusedforgeneralofficesupport,Internetconnectivity,andcomputer-orientedresearch.ThedivisiondirectorwouldnormallybetheFunctionalManagerresponsibleforthesystem. 17 [PDF page 33] /.IntroductionandOverview 3.5SupportingFunctions'^Thesecurityresponsibilitiesofmanagers,technologyprovidersandsecurityofficersaresupportedbyfunctionsnormallyassignedtoothers.Someofthemoreimportantofthesearedescribedbelow.Audit.Auditorsareresponsibleforexaminingsystemstoseewhetherthesystemismeetingstatedsecurityrequirements,includingsystemandorganizationpolicies,andwhethersecuritycontrolsareappropriate.Informalauditscanbeperformedbythoseoperatingthesystemunderreviewor,ifimpartialityisimportant,byoutsideauditors.'^ PhysicalSecurity.Thephysicalsecurityofficeisusuallyresponsiblefordevelopingandenforcingappropriatephysicalsecuritycontrols,inconsultationwithcomputersecuritymanagement,programandfunctionalmanagers,andothers,asappropriate.Physicalsecurityshouldaddressnotonlycentralcomputerinstallations,butalsobackupfacilitiesandofficeenvironments.Inthegovernment,thisofficeisoftenresponsiblefortheprocessingofpersonnelbackgroundchecksandsecurityclearances.DisasterRecovery/ContingencyPlanningStajf.Someorganizationshaveaseparatedisasterrecovery/contingencyplanningstaff.Inthiscase,theyarenormallyresponsibleforcontingencyplanningfortheorganizationasawhole,andnormallyworkwithprogramandfunctionalmangers/applicationowners,thecomputersecuritystaff,andotherstoobtainadditional Categorizationoffunctionsandorganizationsinthissectionassupportingisinnowaymeanttoimplyanydegreeoflessenedimportance.Also,notethatthislistisnotall-inclusive.Additionalsupportingfunctionsthatcanbeprovidedmayincludeconfigurationmanagement,independentverificationandvalidation,andindependentpenetrationtestingteams.Thetermoutsideauditorsincludesbothauditorsexternaltotheorganizationasawholeandtheorganization'sinternalauditstaff.Forpurposesofthisdiscussion,bothareoutsidethemanagementchainresponsiblefortheoperationofthesystem. WhoShouldBetheAccreditingOfficial?TheAccreditingOfficialsareagencyofficialswhohaveauthoritytoacceptanapplication'ssecuritysafeguardsandapproveasystemforoperation.TheAccreditingOfficialsmustalsobeauthorizedtoallocateresourcestoachieveacceptablesecurityandtoremedysecuritydeficiencies.Withoutthisauthority,theycannotrealisticallytakeresponsibilityfortheaccreditationdecision.Ingeneral.Accreditorsareseniorofficials,whomaybetheProgramorFunctionManager/ApplicationOwner.Forsomeverysensitiveapplications,theSeniorExecutiveOfficerisappropriateasanAccreditingOfficial.Ingeneral,themoresensitivetheapplication,tihehighertheAccreditingOfficialsareintheorganization.Whereprivacyisaconcern,federalmanagerscanbeheldpersonallyliableforsecurityinadequacies.Theissuingoftheaccreditationstatementfixessecurityresponsibility,thusmakingexplicitaresponsibilitythatmightotherwisebeimplicit.Accreditorsshouldconsulttheagencygeneralcounseltodeterminetheirpersonalsecurityliabilities. Notethataccreditationisaformalityuniquetothegovernment Source:NISTFIPS102 18 [PDF page 34] 3.RolesandResponsibilities contingencyplanningsupport,asneeded.QualityAssurance.Manyorganizationshaveestablishedaqualityassuranceprogramtoimprovetheproductsandservicestheyprovidetotheircustomers.Thequalityofficershouldhaveaworkingknowledgeofcomputersecurityandhowitcanbeusedtoimprovethequalityoftheprogram,forexample,byimprovingtheintegrityofcomputer-basedinformation,theavailabilityofservices,andtheconfidentialityofcustomerinformation,asappropriate.Procurement.Theprocurementofficeisresponsibleforensuringthatorganizationalprocurementshavebeenreviewedbyappropriateofficials.Theprocurementofficecannotberesponsibleforensuringthatgoodsandservicesmeetcomputersecurityexpectations,becauseitlacksthetechnicalexpertise.Nevertheless,thisofficeshouldbeknowledgeableaboutcomputersecuritystandardsandshouldbringthemtotheattentionofthoserequestingsuchtechnology.TrainingOffice.Anorganizationhastodecidewhethertheprimaryresponsibilityfortrainingusers,operators,andmanagersincomputersecurityrestswiththetrainingofficeorthecomputersecurityprogramoffice.Ineithercase,thetwoorganizationsshouldworktogethertodevelopaneffectivetrainingprogram.Personnel.Thepersonnelofficeisnormallythefirstpointofcontactinhelpingmanagersdetermineifasecuritybackgroundinvestigationisnecessaryforaparticularposition.Thepersonnelandsecurityofficesnormallyworkcloselyonissuesinvolvingbackgroundinvestigations.Thepersonnelofficemayalsoberesponsibleforprovidingsecurity-relatedexitprocedureswhenemployeesleaveanorganization.RiskManagement/PlanningStajf.Someorganizationshaveafull-timestaffdevotedtostudyingalltypesofriskstowhichtheorganizationmaybeexposed.Thisfunctionshouldincludecomputersecurity-relatedrisks,althoughthisofficenormallyfocuseson"macro"issues.Specificriskanalysesforspecificcomputersystemsisnormallynotperformedbythisoffice. PhysicalPlant.Thisofficeisresponsibleforensuringtheprovisionofsuchservicesaselectricalpowerandenvironmentalcontrols,necessaryforthesafeandsecureoperationofanorganization'ssystems.Oftentheyareaugmentedbyseparatemedical,fire,hazardouswaste,orlifesafetypersonnel. 3.6UsersUsersalsohaveresponsibilitiesforcomputersecurity.Twokindsofusers,andtheirassociatedresponsibilities,aredescribedbelow.UsersofInformation.Individualswhouseinformationprovidedbythecomputercanbe 19 [PDF page 35] /.IntroductionandOverview consideredthe"consumers"oftheapplications.Sometimestheydirectlyinteractwiththesystem(e.g.,togenerateareportonscreen)-inwhichcasetheyarealsousersofthesystem(asdiscussedbelow).Othertimes,theymayonlyreadcomputer-preparedreportsoronlybebriefedonsuchmaterial.Someusersofinformationmaybeveryfarremovedfromthecomputersystem.Usersofinformationareresponsibleforlettingthefunctionalmangers/applicationowners(ortheirrepresentatives)knowwhattheirneedsarefortheprotectionofinformation,especiallyforitsintegrityandavailability. UsersofSystems.Individualswhodirectlyusecomputersystems(typicallyviaakeyboard)areresponsibleforfollowingsecurityprocedures,forreportingsecurityproblems,andforattendingrequiredcomputersecurityandfunctionaltraining. ReferencesWood,CharlesCresson."HowtoAchieveaClearDefinitionofResponsibilitiesforInformationSecurity."DATAPROInformationSecurityService,IS115-200-101,7pp.April1993. 20 [PDF page 36] Chapter4COMMONTHREATS:ABRIEFOVERVIEW Computersystemsarevulnerabletomanythreatsthatcaninflictvarioustypesofdamageresultinginsignificantlosses.Thisdamagecanrangefromerrorsharmingdatabaseintegritytofiresdestroyingentirecomputercenters.Lossescanstem,forexample,fromtheactionsofsupposedlytrustedemployeesdefraudingasystem,fromoutsidehackers,orfromcarelessdataentryclerks.Precisioninestimatingcomputersecurity-relatedlossesisnotpossiblebecausemanylossesareneverdiscovered,andothersare"sweptunderthecarpet"toavoidunfavorablepublicity.Theeffectsofvariousthreatsvariesconsiderably:someaffecttheconfidentialityorintegrityofdatawhileothersaffecttheavailabilityofasystem.Thischapterpresentsabroadviewoftheriskyenvironmentinwhichsystemsoperatetoday.Thethreatsandassociatedlossespresentedinthischapterwereselectedbasedontheirprevalenceandsignificanceinthecurrentcomputingenvironmentandtheirexpectedgrowth.Thislistisnotexhaustive,andsomethreatsmaycombineelementsfrommorethanonearea.Thisoverviewofmanyoftoday'scommonthreatsmayproveusefultoorganizationsstudyingtheirownthreatenvironments;however,theperspectiveofthischapterisverybroad.Thus,threatsagainstparticularsystemscouldbequitedifferentfromthosediscussedhere.^° Tocontroltherisksofoperatinganinformationsystem,managersandusersneedtoknowthevulnerabilitiesofthesystemandthethreatsthatmayexploitthem.Knowledgeofthethreat^'environmentallowsthesystemmanagertoimplementthemostcost-effectivesecuritymeasures.Insomecases,managersmayfinditmorecost-effectivetosimplytoleratetheexpectedlosses.Suchdecisionsshouldbebasedontheresultsofariskanalysis.(SeeChapter7.) "Asistrueforthispublicationasawhole,thischapterdoesnotaddressthreatstonationalsecuritysystems,whichfalloutsideofNIST'spurview.Theterm"nationalsecuritysystems"isdefinedinNationalSecurityDirective42(7/5/90)asbeing"thosetelecommunicationsandinformationsystemsoperatedbytheU.S.Government,itscontractors,oragents,thatcontainclassifiedinformationor,assetforthin10U.S.C.2315,thatinvolvesintelligenceactivities,involvescryptologicactivitiesrelatedtonationalsecurity,involvescommandandcontrolofmilitaryforces,involvesequipmentthatisanintegralpartofaweaponorweaponsystem,orinvolvesequipmentthatiscriticaltothedirectfulfillmentofmilitaryorintelligencemissions." ^°Adiscussionofhowthreats,vulnerabilities,safeguardselectionandriskmitigationarerelatediscontainedinChapter7,RiskManagement. 21Notethatoneprotectsagainstthreatsthatcanexploitavulnerability.Ifavulnerabilityexistsbutnothreatexiststotakeadvantageofit,littleornothingisgainedbyprotectingagainstthevulnerability.SeeChapter7,RiskManagement.21 [PDF page 37] /.IntroductionandOverview 4.1ErrorsandOmissionsErrorsandomissionsareanimportantthreattodataandsystemintegrity.Theseerrorsarecausednotonlybydataentryclerksprocessinghundredsoftransactionsperday,butalsobyalltypesofuserswhocreateandeditdata.Manyprograms,especiallythosedesignedbyusersforpersonalcomputers,lackqualitycontrolmeasures.However,eventhemostsophisticatedprogramscannotdetectalltypesofinputerrorsoromissions.Asoundawarenessandtrainingprogramcanhelpanorganizationreducethenumberandseverityoferrorsandomissions.Users,dataentryclerks,systemoperators,andprogrammersfrequentlymakeerrorsthatcontributedirectlyorindirectlytosecurityproblems.Insomecases,theerroristhethreat,suchasadataentryerrororaprogrammingerrorthatcrashesasystem.Inothercases,theerrorscreatevulnerabilities.Errorscanoccurduringallphasesofthesystemslifecycle.Along-termsurveyofcomputer-relatedeconomiclossesconductedbyRobertCourtney,acomputersecurityconsultantandformermemberoftheComputerSystemSecurityandPrivacyAdvisoryBoard,foundthat65percentoflossestoorganizationsweretheresultoferrorsandomissions.^^Thisfigurewasrelativelyconsistentbetweenbothprivateandpublicsectororganizations.Programminganddevelopmenterrors,oftencalled"bugs,"canrangeinseverityfrombenigntocatastrophic.Ina1989studyfortheHouseCommitteeonScience,SpaceandTechnology,entitledBugsintheProgram,thestaffoftheSubcommitteeonInvestigationsandOversightsummarizedthescopeandseverityofthisproblemintermsofgovernmentsystemsasfollows:Asexpendituresgrow,sodoconcernsaboutthereliability,costandaccuracyofever-largerandmorecomplexsoftwaresystems.Theseconcernsareheightenedascomputersperformmorecriticaltasks,wheremistakescancausefinancialturmoil,accidents,orinextremecases,death.^^Sincethestudy'spublication,thesoftwareindustryhaschangedconsiderably,withmeasurableimprovementsinsoftwarequality.Yetsoftware"horrorstories"stillabound,andthebasicprinciplesandproblemsanalyzedinthereportremainthesame.Whiletherehavebeengreat "ComputerSystemSecurityandPrivacyAdvisoryBoard,1991AnnualReport(Gaithersburg,MD),March1992,p.18.Thecategoriesintowhichtheproblemswereplacedandthepercentagesofeconomiclossattributedtoeachwere:65%,errorsandomissions;13%,dishonestemployees;6%,disgruntledemployees;8%,lossofsupportinginfrastructure,includingpower,communications,water,sewer,transportation,fire,flood,civilunrest,andstrikes;5%,water,notrelatedtofiresandfloods;lessthan3%,outsiders,includingviruses,espionage,dissidents,andmalcontentsofvariouskinds,andformeremployeeswhohavebeenawayformorethansixweeks."HouseCommitteeonScience,SpaceandTechnology,SubcommitteeonInvestigationsandOversight,BugsintheProgram:ProblemsinFederalGovernmentComputerSoftwareDevelopmentandRegulation,101stCong.,1stsess.,3Augustl989,p.2. 22 [PDF page 38] 4.Threats:ABriefOverview improvementsinprogramquality,asreflectedindecreasingerrorsper1000linesofcode,theconcurrentgrowthinprogramsizeoftenseriouslydiminishesthebeneficialeffectsoftheseprogramqualityenhancements. Installationandmaintenanceerrorsareanothersourceofsecurityproblems.Forexample,anauditbythePresident'sCouncilforIntegrityandEfficiency(PCIE)in1988foundthateveryoneofthetenmainframecomputersitesstudiedhadinstallationandmaintenanceerrorsthatintroducedsignificantsecurityvulnerabilities.^'* 4.2FraudandTheftComputersystemscanbeexploitedforbothfraudandtheftbothby"automating"traditionalmethodsoffraudandbyusingnewmethods.Forexample,individualsmayuseacomputertoskimsmallamountsofmoneyfromalargenumberoffinancialaccounts,assumingthatsmalldiscrepanciesmaynotbeinvestigated.Financialsystemsarenottheonlyonesatrisk.Systemsthatcontrolaccesstoanyresourcearetargets(e.g.,timeandattendancesystems,inventorysystems,schoolgradingsystems,andlong-distancetelephonesystems).Computerfraudandtheftcanbecommittedbyinsidersoroutsiders.Insiders(i.e.,authorizedusersofasystem)areresponsibleforthemajorityoffraud.A1993InformationWeek/EmstandYoungstudyfoundthat90percentofChiefInformationOfficersviewedemployees"whodonotneedtoknow"informationasthreats.'^^TheU.S.DepartmentofJustice'sComputerCrimeUnitcontendsthat"insidersconstitutethegreatestthreattocomputersystems."^^Sinceinsidershavebothaccesstoandfamiliaritywiththevictimcomputersystem(includingwhatresourcesitcontrolsanditsflaws),authorizedsystemusersareinabetterpositiontocommitcrimes.Insiderscanbebothgeneralusers(suchasclerks)ortechnicalstaffmembers.Anorganization'sformeremployees,withtheirknowledgeofanorganization'soperations,mayalsoposeathreat,particularlyiftheiraccessisnotterminatedpromptly.Inadditiontotheuseoftechnologytocommitfraudandtheft,computerhardwareandsoftwaremaybevulnerabletotheft.Forexample,onestudyconductedbySafewareInsurancefoundthat$882millionworthofpersonalcomputerswaslostduetotheftin1992.^^ ^President'sCouncilonIntegrityandEfficiency,ReviewofGeneralControlsinFederalComputerSystems,October,1988.BobViolinoandJosephC.Panettieri,"TemptingFate,"InformationWeek,October4,1993:p.42.^LetterfromScottChamey,Chief,ComputerCrimeUnit,U.S.DepartmentofJustice,toBarbaraGuttman,NIST.July29,1993.""Theft,PowerSurgesCauseMostPCLosses,"InfosecurityNews,September/October,1993,13.'23 [PDF page 39] /.IntroductionandOverview 4.3EmployeeSabotageEmployeesaremostfamiliarwiththeiremployer'scomputersandapplications,includingknowingwhatactionsmightcausethemostdamage,mischief,orsabotage.Thedownsizingoforganizationsinboththepublicandprivatesectorshascreatedagroupofindividualswithorganizationalknowledge,whomayretainpotentialsystemaccess(e.g.,ifsystemaccountsarenotdeletedinatimelymanner).Thenumberofincidentsofemployeesabotageisbelievedtobemuchsmallerthantheinstancesoftheft,butthecostofsuchincidentscanbequitehigh.MartinSprouse,authorofSabotageintheAmericanWorkplace,reportedthatthemotivationforsabotagecanrangefromaltruismtorevenge:Aslongaspeoplefeelcheated,bored,harassed,endangered,orbetrayedatwork,sabotagewillbeusedasadirectmethodofachievingjobsatisfaction-thekindthatneverhastogetthebosses'approval.^^ 4.4LossofPhysicalandInfrastructureSupportThelossofsupportinginfrastructureincludespowerfailures(outages,spikes,andbrownouts),lossofcommunications,wateroutagesandleaks,sewerproblems,lackoftransportationservices,fire,flood,civilunrest,andstrikes.TheselossesincludesuchdramaticeventsastheexplosionattheWorldTradeCenterandtheChicagotunnelflood,aswellasmorecommonevents,suchasbrokenwaterpipes.ManyoftheseissuesarecoveredinChapter15.Alossofinfrastructureoftenresultsinsystemdowntime,sometimesinunexpectedways.Forexample,employeesmaynotbeabletogettoworkduringawinterstorm,althoughthecomputersystemmaybefianctional. 4.5MaliciousHackersThetermmalicioushackers,sometimescalledcrackers,referstothosewhobreakintocomputers Commonexamplesofcomputer-relatedemployeesabotageinclude:•destroyinghardwareorfacilities,•plantinglogicbombsthatdestroyprogramsordata,•enteringdataincorrectly,•"crashing"systems,•deletingdata,•holdingdatahostage,and•changingdata. Charney.MartinSprouse,ed..SabotageintheAmericanWorkplace:AnecdotesofDissatisfaction,MischiefandRevenge(SanFrancisco,CA:PressureDropPress,1992),p.7. 24 [PDF page 40] 4.Threats:ABriefOverview withoutauthorization.Theycanincludebothoutsidersandinsiders.Muchoftheriseofhackeractivityisoftenattributedtoincreasesinconnectivityinbothgovernmentandindustry.One1992studyofaparticularInternetsite(i.e.,onecomputersystem)foundthathackersattemptedtobreakinatleastonceeveryotherday.^°Thehackerthreatshouldbeconsideredintermsofpastandpotentialftituredamage.Althoughcurrentlossesduetohackerattacksaresignificantlysmallerthanlossesduetoinsidertheftandsabotage,thehackerproblemiswidespreadandserious.Oneexampleofmalicioushackeractivityisthatdirectedagainstthepublictelephonesystem.StudiesbytheNationalResearchCouncilandtheNationalSecurityTelecommunicationsAdvisoryCommitteeshowthathackeractivityisnotlimitedtotollfraud.Italsoincludestheabilitytobreakintotelecommunicationssystems(suchasswitches),resultinginthedegradationordisruptionofsystemavailability.Whileunabletoreachaconclusionaboutthedegreeofthreatorrisk,thesestudiesunderscoretheabUityofhackerstocauseseriousdamage.^''Thehackerthreatoftenreceivesmoreattentionthanmorecommonanddangerousthreats.TheU.S.DepartmentofJustice'sComputerCrimeUnitsuggeststhreereasonsforthis. •First,thehackerthreatisamorerecentlyencounteredthreat.Organizationshavealwayshadtoworryabouttheactionsoftheirownemployeesandcouldusedisciplinarymeasurestoreducethatthreat.However,thesemeasuresareineffectiveagainstoutsiderswhoarenotsubjecttotherulesandregulationsoftheemployer.•Second,organizationsdonotknowthepurposesofahacker-somehackersbrowse,somesteal,somedamage.Thisinabilitytoidentifypurposescansuggestthathackerattackshavenolimitations.•Third,hackerattacksmakepeoplefeelvulnerable,particularlybecausetheiridentityisunknown.Forexample,supposeapainterishiredtopaintahouseand,onceinside,stealsapieceofjewelry.Otherhomeownersintheneighborhoodmaynotfeelthreatenedbythiscrimeandwillprotectthemselvesbynotdoingbusinesswiththatpainter.Butifaburglarbreaksintothesamehouseandstealsthesame ^°StevenM.Bellovin,"ThereBeDragons,"ProceedingsoftheThirdUsenixUNIXSecuritySymposium. ^'NationalResearchCouncil,GrowingVulnerabilityofthePublicSwitchedNetworks:ImplicationforNationalSecurityEmergencyPreparedness(Washington,DC:NationalAcademyPress),1989."ReportoftheNationalSecurityTaskForce,November1990.25 [PDF page 41] /.IntroductionandOverview pieceofjewelry,theentireneighborhoodmayfeelvictimizedandvulnerable. 4.6IndustrialEspionageIndustrialespionageistheactofgatheringproprietarydatafromprivatecompaniesorthegovernment^'*forthepurposeofaidinganothercompany(ies).Industrialespionagecanbeperpetratedeitherbycompaniesseekingtoimprovetheircompetitiveadvantageorbygovernmentsseekingtoaidtheirdomesticindustries.Foreignindustrialespionagecarriedoutbyagovernmentisoftenreferredtoaseconomicespionage.Sinceinformationisprocessedandstoredoncomputersystems,computersecuritycanhelpprotectagainstsuchthreats;itcandolittle,however,toreducethethreatofauthorizedemployeessellingthatinformation.Industrialespionageisontherise.A1992studysponsoredbytheAmericanSocietyforIndustrialSecurity(ASIS)foundthatproprietarybusinessinformationthefthadincreased260percentsince1985.Thedataindicated30percentofthereportedlossesin1991and1992hadforeigninvolvement.Thestudyalsofoundthat58percentoftheftswereperpetratedbycurrentorformeremployees.Thethreemostdamagingtypesofstoleninformationwerepricinginformation,manufacturingprocessinformation,andproductdevelopmentandspecificationinformation.Othertypesofinformationstolenincludedcustomerlists,basicresearch,salesdata,personneldata,compensationdata,costdata,proposals,andstrategicplans.Withintheareaofeconomicespionage,theCentralIntelligenceAgencyhasstatedthatthemainobjectiveisobtaininginformationrelatedtotechnology,butthatinformationonU.S.Governmentpolicydeliberationsconcerningforeignaffairsandinformationoncommodities,interestrates,andothereconomicfactorsisalsoatarget.TheFederalBureauofInvestigationconcursthattechnology-relatedinformationisthemaintarget,butalsolistscorporateproprietaryinformation,suchasnegotiatingpositionsandothercontractingdata,asatarget. Charney. ^*Thegovernmentisincludedherebecauseitoftenisthecustodianforproprietarydata(e.g.,patentapplications).Thefiguresof30and58percentarenotmutuallyexclusive.RichardJ.HeffernanandDanT.Swartwood,"TrendsinCompetitiveIntelligence,"SecurityManagement37,no.1(January1993),pp.70-73."RobertM.Gates,testimonybeforetheHouseSubcommitteeonEconomicandCommercialLaw,CommitteeontheJudiciary,29April]992.WilliamS.Sessions,testimonybeforetheHouseSubcommitteeonEconomicandCommercialLaw,CommitteeontheJudiciary,29April1992.26 [PDF page 42] 4.Threats:ABriefOverview 4.7MaliciousCodeMaliciouscodereferstoviruses,worms,Trojanhorses,logicbombs,andother"uninvited"software.Sometimesmistakenlyassociatedonlywithpersonalcomputers,maliciouscodecanattackotherplatforms.A1993studyofvirusesfoundthatwhilethenumberofknownvirusesisincreasingexponentially,thenumberofvirusincidentsisnot.^^Thestudyconcludedthatvirusesarebecomingmoreprevalent,butonly"gradually."TherateofPC-DOSvirusincidentsinmediumtolargeNorthAmericanbusinessesappearstobeapproximately1per1000PCsperquarter;thenumberofinfectedmachinesisperhaps3or4timesthisfigureifweassumethatmostsuchbusinessesareatleastweaklyprotectedagainstviruses."*"' Actualcostsattributedtothepresenceofmaliciouscodehaveresultedprimarilyfromsystemoutagesandstafftimeinvolvedinrepairingthesystems.Nonetheless,thesecostscanbesignificant. MaliciousSoftware:AFewKeyTermsVirus:Acodesegmentthatreplicatesbyattachingcopiesofitselftoexistingexecutables.Thenewcopyofthevirusisexecutedwhenauserexecutesthenewhostprogram.Thevirusmayincludeanadditional"payload"thattriggerswhenspecificconditionsaremet.Forexample,somevirusesdisplayatextstringonaparticulardate.Therearemanytypesofviruses,includingvariants,overwriting,resident,stealth,andpolymorphic.TrojanHorse:Aprogramthatperformsadesiredtask,butthatalsoincludesunexpected(andundesirable)fiinctions.Considerasanexampleaneditingprogramforamultiusersystem.Thisprogramcouldbemodifiedtorandomlydeleteoneoftheusers'fileseachtimetheyperformausefiilfunction(editing),butthedeletionsareunexpectedanddefinitelyundesired!Worm:Aself-replicatingprogramthatisself-containedanddoesnotrequireahostprogram.Theprogramcreatesacopyofitselfandcausesittoexecute;nouserinterventionisrequired.Wormscommonlyusenetworkservicestopropagatetootherhostsystems.Source:NISTSpecialPublication800-5. 4.8ForeignGovernmentEspionageInsomeinstances,threatsposedbyforeigngovernmentintelligenceservicesmaybepresent.Inadditiontopossibleeconomicespionage,foreignintelligenceservicesmaytargetunclassified JeffreyO.KephartandSteveR.White,"MeasuringandModelingComputerVirusPrevalence,"Proceedings,1993IEEEComputerSocietySymposiumonResearchinSecurityandPrivacy(May1993):14.^Ibid. Estimatesofvirusoccurrencesmaynotconsiderthestrengthofanorganization'santivirusprogram.27 [PDF page 43] /.IntroductionandOverview systemstofurthertheirintelligencemissions.Someunclassifiedinformationthatmaybeofinterestincludestravelplansofseniorofficials,civildefenseandemergencypreparedness,manufacturingtechnologies,satellitedata,personnelandpayrolldata,andlawenforcement,investigative,andsecurityfiles.Guidanceshouldbesoughtfromthecognizantsecurityofficeregardingsuchthreats. 4.9ThreatstoPersonalPrivacyTheaccumulationofvastamountsofelectronicinformationaboutindividualsbygovernments,creditbureaus,andprivatecompanies,combinedwiththeabilityofcomputerstomonitor,process,andaggregatelargeamountsofinformationaboutindividualshavecreatedathreattoindividualprivacy.Thepossibilitythatallofthisinformationandtechnologymaybeabletobelinkedtogetherhasarisenasaspecterofthemoderninformationage.Thisisoftenreferredtoas"BigBrother."Toguardagainstsuchintrusion.Congresshasenactedlegislation,overtheyears,suchasthePrivacyActof1974andtheComputerMatchingandPrivacyProtectionActof1988,whichdefinestheboundariesofthelegitimateusesofpersonalinformationcollectedbythegovernment.Thethreattopersonalprivacyarisesfrommanysources.Inseveralcasesfederalandstateemployeeshavesoldpersonalinformationtoprivateinvestigatorsorother"informationbrokers."Onesuchcasewasuncoveredin1992whentheJusticeDepartmentannouncedthearrestofovertwodozenindividualsengagedinbuyingandsellinginformationfromSocialSecurityAdministration(SSA)computerfiles.'*^Duringtheinvestigation,auditorslearnedthatSSAemployeeshadunrestrictedaccesstoover130millionemploymentrecords.Anotherinvestigationfoundthat5percentoftheemployeesinoneregionoftheIRShadbrowsedthroughtaxrecordsoffriends,relatives,andcelebrities.'*^Someoftheemployeesusedtheinformationtocreatefraudulenttaxrefunds,butmanywereactingsimplyoutofcuriosity. Asmoreofthesecasescometolight,manyindividualsarebecomingincreasinglyconcernedaboutthreatstotheirpersonalprivacy.AJuly1993specialreportinMacWorldcitedpollingdatatakenbyLouisHarrisandAssociatesshowingthatin1970only33percentofrespondentswereconcernedaboutpersonalprivacy.By1990,thatnumberhadjumpedto79percent.'*'* Whilethemagnitudeandcosttosocietyofthepersonalprivacythreataredifficulttogauge,itis HouseCommitteeonWaysandMeans,SubcommitteeonSocialSecurity,IllegalDisclosureofSocialSecurityEarningsInformationbyEmployeesoftheSocialSecurityAdministrationandtheDepartmentofHealthandHumanServices'OfficeofInspectorGeneral:Hearing,102ndCong.,2ndsess.,24September1992,Serial102-131.StephenBarr,"ProbeFindsIRSWorkersWere'Browsing'inFiles,"TheWashingtonPost,3August1993,p.Al.^CharlesFiller,"SpecialReport:WorkplaceandConsumerPrivacyUnderSiege,"MacWorld,July1993,pp.1-14. 28 [PDF page 44] 4.Threats:ABriefOverview apparentthatinformationtechnologyisbecomingpowerfulenoughtowarrantfearsofbothgovernmentandcorporate"BigBrothers."Increasedawarenessoftheproblemisneeded.ReferencesHouseCommitteeonScience,SpaceandTechnology,SubcommitteeonInvestigationsandOversight.BugsintheProgram:ProblemsinFederalGovernmentComputerSoftwareDevelopmentandRegulation.101stCongress,1stsession,August3,1989.NationalResearchCouncil.ComputersatRisk:SafeComputingintheInformationAge.Washington,DC:NationalAcademyPress,1991.NationalResearchCouncil.GrowingVulnerabilityofthePublicSwitchedNetworks:ImplicationforNationalSecurityEmergencyPreparedness.Washington,DC:NationalAcademyPress,1989.Neumann,PeterG.Computer-RelatedRisks.Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1994.Schwartau,W.InformationWarfare.NewYork,NY:ThundersMouthPress,1994(Rev.1995).Sprouse,Martin,ed.SabotageintheAmericanWorkplace:AnecdotesofDissatisfaction,Mischief,andRevenge.SanFrancisco,CA:PressureDropPress,1992. 29 [PDF page 45] [PDF page 46] 11.MANAGEMENTCONTROLS 31 [PDF page 47] [PDF page 48] Chapter5COMPUTERSECURITYPOLICY Indiscussionsofcomputersecurity,thetermpolicyhasmorethanonemeaning.'*^Policyisseniormanagement'sdirectivestocreateacomputersecurityprogram,establishitsgoals,andassignresponsibilities.Thetermpolicyisalsousedtorefertothespecificsecurityrulesforparticularsystems.'*^Additionally,policymayrefertoentirelydifferentmatters,suchasthespecificmanagerialdecisionssettinganorganization'se-mailprivacypolicyorfaxsecuritypolicy. Inthischapterthetermcomputersecuritypolicyisdefinedasthe"documentationofPolicymeansdifferentthingstodifferentpeople.Thecomputersecuritydecisions"-whichcoversterm"poUcy"isusedinthischapterinabroadallthetypesofpoUcydescribedabove.'^In"^^""^^^importantcomputersecurity-relateddecisions.makingthesedecisions,managersfacehardchoicesinvolvingresourceallocation,wmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm^mmcompetingobjectives,andorganizationalstrategyrelatedtoprotectingbothtechnicalandinformationresourcesaswellasguidingemployeebehavior.Managersatalllevelsmakechoicesthatcanresultinpolicy,withthescopeofthepolicy'sapplicabilityvaryingaccordingtothescopeofthemanager'sauthority.Inthischapterweusethetermpolicyinabroadmannertoencompassallofthetypesofpolicydescribedabove-regardlessofthelevelofmanagerwhosetstheparticularpolicy. Managerialdecisionsoncomputersecurityissuesvarygreatly.Todifferentiateamongvariouskindsofpolicy,thischaptercategorizesthemintothreebasictypes:•Programpolicyisusedtocreateanorganization'scomputersecurityprogram.•Issue-specificpoliciesaddressspecificissuesofconcerntotheorganization. Therearevariationsintheuseofthetermpolicy,asnotedina1994OfficeofTechnologyAssessmentreport,InformationSecurityandPrivacyinNetworkEnvironments:"SecurityPolicyrefersheretothestatementsmadebyorganizations,corporations,andagenciestoestablishoverallpolicyoninformationaccessandsafeguards.AnothermeaningcomesfromtheDefensecommunityandreferstotherulesrelatingclearancesofuserstoclassificationofinformation.Inanotherusage,securitypoliciesareusedtorefineandimplementthebroader,organizationalsecuritypolicy...." Thesearethekindofpoliciesthatcomputersecurityexpertsrefertoasbeingenforcedbythesystem'stechnicalcontrolsaswellasitsmanagementandoperationalcontrols. Ingeneral,policyissetbyamanager.However,insomecases,itmaybesetbyagroup(e.g.,anintraorganizationalpolicyboard).33 [PDF page 49] //.ManagementControls •System-specificpoliciesfocusondecisionstakenbymanagementtoprotectaparticularsystem."*^ Procedures,standards,andguidelinesareusedtodescribehowthesepolicieswillbeimplementedwithinanorganization.(Seefollowingbox.) ToolstoImplementPolicy:Standards,Guidelines,andProceduresBecausepolicyiswrittenatabroadlevel,organizationsalsodevelopstandards,guidelines,andproceduresthatofferusers,managers,andothersaclearerapproachtoimplementingpolicyandmeetingorganizationalgoals.Standardsandguidelinesspecifytechnologiesandmethodologiestobeusedtosecuresystems.Proceduresareyetmoredetailedstepstobefollowedtoaccomplishparticularsecurity-relatedtasks.Standards,guidelines,andproceduresmaybepromulgatedthroughoutanorganizationviahandbooks,regulations,ormanuals.Organizationalstandards(nottobeconftisedwithAmericanNationalStandards,FEPS,FederalStandards,orothernationalorinternationalstandards)specifyuniformuseofspecifictechnologies,parameters,orprocedureswhensuchuniformusewillbenefitanorganization.Standardizationoforganizationwideidentificationbadgesisatypicalexample,providingeaseofemployeemobilityandautomationofentry/exitsystems.Standardsarenormallycompulsorywithinanorganization.Guidelinesassistusers,systemspersonnel,andothersineffectivelysecuringtheirsystems.Thenatureofguidelines,however,immediatelyrecognizesthatsystemsvaryconsiderably,andimpositionofstandardsisnotalwaysachievable,appropriate,orcost-effective.Forexample,anorganizationalguidelinemaybeusedtohelpdevelopsystem-specificstandardprocedures.Guidelinesareoftenusedtohelpensurethatspecificsecuritymeasuresarenotoverlooked,althoughtheycanbeimplemented,andcorrectlyso,inmorethanoneway.Proceduresnormallyassistincomplyingwithapplicablesecuritypolicies,standards,andguidelines.Theyaredetailedstepstobefollowedbyusers,systemoperationspersonnel,orotherstoaccomplishaparticulartask(e.g.,preparingnewuseraccountsandassigningtheappropriateprivileges). Someorganizationsissueoverallcomputersecuritymanuals,regulations,handbooks,orsimilardocuments.Thesemaymixpolicy,guidelines,standards,andprocedures,sincedieyarecloselylinked.Whilemanualsandregulationscanserveasimportanttools,itisoftenusefuliftheyclearlydistinguishbetweenpolicyanditsimplementation.Thiscanhelpinpromotingflexibilityandcost-effectivenessbyofferingalternativeimplementationapproachestoachievingpolicygoals. Familiaritywithvarioustypesandcomponentsofpolicywillaidmanagersinaddressingcomputersecurityissuesimportanttotheorganization.Effectivepoliciesultimatelyresultinthe Asystemreferstotheentirecollectionofprocesses,boththoseperformedmanuallyandthoseusingacomputer(e.g.,manualdatacollectionandsubsequentcomputermanipulation),whichperformsafunction.Thisincludesbothapplicationsystemsandsupportsystems,suchasanetwork.34 [PDF page 50] 5.ComputerSecurityPolicy developmentandimplementationofabettercomputersecurityprogramandbetterprotectionofsystemsandinformation.Thesetypesofpolicyaredescribedtoaidthereader'sunderstanding/'Itisnotimportantthatonecategorizesspecificorganizationalpoliciesintothesethreecategories;itismoreimportanttofocusonthefunctionsofeach. 5.1ProgramPolicyAmanagementofficial,normallytheheadoftheorganizationorthesenioradministrationofficial,issuesprogrampolicytoestablish(orrestructure)theorganization'scomputersecurityprogramanditsbasicstructure.Thishigh-levelpolicydefinesthepurposeoftheprogramanditsscopewithintheorganization;assignsresponsibilities(tothecomputersecurityorganization)fordirectprogramimplementation,aswellasotherresponsibilitiestorelatedoffices(suchastheInformationResourcesManagement[IRM]organization);andaddressescomplianceissues. Programpolicysetsorganizationalstrategicdirectionsforsecurityandassignsresourcesforitsimplementation.5.1.1BasicComponentsofProgramPolicyComponentsofprogrampolicyshouldaddress:Purpose.Programpolicynormallyincludesastatementdescribingwhytheprogramisbeingestablished.Thismayincludedefiningthegoalsoftheprogram.Security-relatedneeds,suchasintegrity,availability,andconfidentiality,canformthebasisoforganizationalgoalsestablishedinpolicy.Forinstance,inanorganizationresponsibleformaintaininglargemission-criticaldatabases,reductioninerrors,dataloss,datacorruption,andrecoverymightbespecificallystressed.Inanorganizationresponsibleformaintainingconfidentialpersonaldata,however,goalsmightemphasizestrongerprotectionagainstunauthorizeddisclosure.Scope.Programpolicyshouldbeclearastowhichresources~includingfacilities,hardware,andsoftware,information,andpersonnel—thecomputersecurityprogramcovers.Inmanycases,theprogramwillencompassaUsystemsandorganizationalpersonnel,butthisisnotalwaystrue.Insomeinstances,itmaybeappropriateforanorganization'scomputersecurityprogramtobemorelimitedinscope. Nostandardtermsexistforvarioustypesofpolicies.Thesetermsareusedtoaidthereader'sunderstandingofthistopic;noimpHcationoftheirwidespreadusageisintended. 35 [PDF page 51] //.ManagementControls Responsibilities.Oncethecomputersecurityprogramisestablished,itsmanagementisProgrampolicyestablishesthesecurityprogramandnormallyassignedtoeitheranewlycreatedorassignsprogrammanagementandsupportingexistingoffice.'°responsibilities. Theresponsibilitiesofofficialsandofficesthroughouttheorganizationalsoneedtobeaddressed,includinglinemanagers,applicationsowners,users,andthedataprocessingorIRMorganizations.Thissectionofthepolicystatement,forexample,woulddistinguishbetweentheresponsibilitiesofcomputerservicesprovidersandthoseofthemanagersofapplicationsusingtheprovidedservices.Thepolicycouldalsoestablishoperationalsecurityofficesformajorsystems,particularlythoseathighriskormostcriticaltoorganizationaloperations.Italsocanserveasthebasisforestablishingemployeeaccountability.Attheprogramlevel,responsibilitiesshouldbespecificallyassignedtothoseorganizationalelementsandofficialsresponsiblefortheimplementationandcontinuityofthecomputersecuritypolicy.^' Compliance.Programpolicytypicallywilladdresstwocomplianceissues: 1.Generalcompliancetoensuremeetingtherequirementstoestablishaprogramandtheresponsibilitiesassignedthereintovariousorganizationalcomponents.Oftenanoversightoffice(e.g.,theInspectorGeneral)isassignedresponsibilityformonitoringcompliance,includinghowwelltheorganizationisimplementingmanagement'sprioritiesfortheprogram. 2.Theuseofspecifiedpenaltiesanddisciplinaryactions.Sincethesecuritypolicyisahigh-leveldocument,specificpenaltiesforvariousinfractionsarenormallynotdetailedhere;instead,thepolicymayauthorizethecreationofcompliancestructuresthatincludeviolationsandspecificdisciplinaryaction(s).^^ Theprogrammanagementstructureshouldbeorganizedtobestaddressthegoalsoftheprogramandrespondtotheparticularoperatingandriskenvironmentoftheorganization.Importantissuesforthestructureofthecomputersecurityprogramincludemanagementandcoordinationofsecurity-relatedresources,interactionwithdiversecommunities,andtheabilitytorelayissuesofconcern,trade-offs,andrecommendedactionstouppermanagement.(SeeChapter6,ComputerSecurityProgramManagement.)Inassigningresponsibilities,itisnecessarytobespecific;suchassignmentsas"computersecurityiseveryone'sresponsibility,"inreality,meannoonehasspecificresponsibility."Theneedtoobtainguidancefromappropriatelegalcounseliscriticalwhenaddressingissuesinvolvingpenaltiesanddisciplinaryactionforindividuals.Thepolicydoesnotneedtorestatepenaltiesalreadyprovidedforbylaw,althoughtheycanbelistedifthepolicywillalsobeusedasanawarenessortrainingdocument.36 [PDF page 52] 5.ComputerSecurityPolicy Thosedevelopingcompliancepolicyshouldrememberthatviolationsofpolicycanbeunintentionalonthepartofemployees.Forexample,nonconformancecanoftenbeduetoalackofknowledgeortraining. 5.2Issue-SpecificPolicyWhereasprogrampolicyisintendedtoaddressthebroadorganizationwidecomputersecurityprogram,issue-specificpoliciesaredevelopedtofocusonareasofcurrentrelevanceandconcern(andsometimescontroversy)toanorganization.Managementmayfinditappropriate,forexample,toissueapolicyonhowtheorganizationwlUapproachcontingencyplanning(centralizedvs.decentralized)ortheuseofaparticularmethodologyformanagingrisktosystems.Apolicycouldalsobeissued,forexample,ontheappropriateuseofacutting-edgetechnology(whosesecurityvulnerabilitiesarestilllargelyunknown)withintheorganization.Issue-specificpoliciesmayalsobeappropriatewhennewissuesarise,suchaswhenimplementingarecentlypassedlawrequiringadditionalprotectionofparticularinformation.Programpolicyisusuallybroadenoughthatitdoesnotrequiremuchmodificationovertime,whereasissue-specificpoliciesarelikelytorequiremorefrequentrevisionaschangesintechnologyandrelatedfactorstakeplace.Ingeneral,forissue-specificandsystem-specificpolicy,theissuerisaseniorofficial;themoreglobal,controversial,orresource-intensive,themoreseniortheissuer. 5.2.1ExampleTopicsforIssue-SpecificPolicy^^Therearemanyareasforwhichissue-specificpolicymaybeappropriate.Twoexamplesareexplainedbelow.InternetAccess.ManyorganizationsarelookingattheInternetasameansforexpandingtheirresearchopportunitiesandcommunications.Unquestionably,connectingtotheInternetyieldsmanybenefits-andsomedisadvantages.SomeissuesanInternetaccesspolicymayaddressincludewhowillhaveaccess,whichtypesofsystemsmaybeconnectedtothenetwork,whattypesofinformationmaybetransmittedviathenetwork,requirementsforuserauthenticationforInternet-connectedsystems,andtheuseoffirewallsandsecuregateways. BothnewtechnologiesandUieappearanceofnewthreatsoftenrequirethecreationofissue-specificpolicies. Examplespresentedinthissectionarenotall-inclusivenormeanttoimplythatpoliciesineachoftheseareasarerequiredbyallorganizations. 37 [PDF page 53] //.ManagementControls E-MailPrivacy.Usersofcomputere-mailsystemshavecometorelyuponthatserviceforinformalcommunicationwithcolleaguesandothers.However,sincethesystemistypicallyownedbytheemployingorganization,fromtime-to-time,managementmaywishtomonitortheemployee'se-mailforvariousreasons(e.g.,tobesurethatitisusedforbusinesspurposesonlyoriftheyaresuspectedofdistributingviruses,sendingoffensivee-mail,ordisclosingorganizationalsecrets.)Ontheotherhand,usersmayhaveanexpectationofprivacy,similartothataccordedU.S.mail.Policyinthisareaaddresseswhatlevelofprivacywillbeaccordede-mailandthecircumstancesunderwhichitmayormaynotberead.5.2.2BasicComponentsofIssue-SpecificPolicyAssuggestedforprogrampolicy,ausefulstructureforissue-specificpolicyistobreakthepolicyintoitsbasiccomponents.IssueStatement.Toformulateapolicyonanissue,managersfirstmustdefinetheissuewithanyrelevantterms,distinctions,andconditionsincluded.Itisalsooftenusefialtospecifythegoalorjustificationforthepolicy-whichcanbehelpfiilingainingcompliancewiththepolicy.Forexample,anorganizationmightwanttodevelopanissue-specificpolicyontheuseof"unofficialsoftware,"whichmightbedefinedtomeananysoftwarenotapproved,purchased,screened,managed,andownedbytheorganization.Additionally,theapplicabledistinctionsandconditionsmightthenneedtobeincluded,forinstance,forsoftwareprivatelyownedbyemployeesbutapprovedforuseatwork,andforsoftwareownedandusedbyotherbusinessesundercontracttotheorganization.StatementoftheOrganization'sPosition.Oncetheissueisstatedandrelatedtermsandconditionsarediscussed,thissectionisusedtoclearlystatetheorganization'sposition(i.e.,management'sdecision)ontheissue.Tocontinuethepreviousexample,thiswouldmeanstatingwhetheruseofunofficialsoftwareasdefinedisprohibitedinallorsomecases,whethertherearefbrtherguidelinesforapprovalanduse,orwhethercase-by-caseexceptionswillbegranted,bywhom,andonwhatbasis. Applicability.Issue-specificpoliciesalsoneedtoincludestatementsofapplicability.Thismeansclarifyingwhere,how,when,towhom,andtowhataparticularpoUcyapplies.Forexample,itcouldbethatthehypotheticalpolicyonunofficialsoftwareisintendedtoapplyonlytotheorganization'sownon-siteresourcesandemployeesandnottocontractorswithofficesatother Otherpotentialcandidatesforissue-specificpoliciesinclude:approachtoriskmanagementandcontingencyplanning,protectionofconfidential/proprietaryinformation,unauthorizedsoftware,acquisitionofsoftware,doingcomputerworkathome,bringingindisksfromoutsidetheworkplace,accesstootheremployees'files,encryptionoffilesande-mail,rightsofprivacy,responsibilityforcorrectnessofdata,suspectedmaliciouscode,andphysicalemergencies. 38 [PDF page 54] 5.ComputerSecurityPolicy locations.Additionally,thepolicy'sapplicabilitytoemployeestravellingamongdifferentsitesand/orworkingathomewhoneedtotransportandusedisksatmultiplesitesmightneedtobeclarified. RolesandResponsibilities.Theassignmentofrolesandresponsibilitiesisalsousuallyincludedinissue-specificpolicies.Forexample,ifthepolicypermitsunofficialsoftwareprivatelyownedbyemployeestobeusedatworkwiththeappropriateapprovals,thentheapprovalauthoritygrantingsuchpermissionwouldneedtobestated.(Policywouldstipulate,who,byposition,hassuchauthority.)Likewise,itwouldneedtobeclarifiedwhowouldberesponsibleforensuringthatonlyapprovedsoftwareisusedonorganizationalcomputerresourcesand,perhaps,formonitoringusersinregardtounofficialsoftware.Compliance.Forsometypesofpolicy,itmaybeappropriatetodescribe,insomedetail,theinfractionsthatareunacceptable,andtheconsequencesofsuchbehavior.Penaltiesmaybeexplicitlystatedandshouldbeconsistentwithorganizationalpersonnelpoliciesandpractices.Whenused,theyshouldbecoordinatedwithappropriateofficialsandofficesand,perhaps,employeebargainingunits.Itmayalsobedesirabletotaskaspecificofficewithintheorganizationtomonitorcompliance.PointsofContactandSupplementaryInformation.Foranyissue-specificpolicy,theappropriateindividualsintheorganizationtocontactforfurtherinformation,guidance,andcomplianceshouldbeindicated.Sincepositionstendtochangelessoftenthanthepeopleoccupyingthem,specificpositionsmaybepreferableasthepointofcontact.Forexample,forsomeissuesthepointofcontactmightbealinemanager;forotherissuesitmightbeafacilitymanager,technicalsupportperson,systemadministrator,orsecurityprogramrepresentative.Usingtheaboveexampleoncemore,employeeswouldneedtoknowwhetherthepointofcontactforquestionsandproceduralinformationwouldbetheirimmediatesuperior,asystemadministrator,oracomputersecurityofficial. SomeHelpfulHintsonPolicyTobeeffective,policyrequiresvisibility.Visibilityaidsimplementationofpolicybyhelpingtoensurepolicyisfullycommunicatedthroughouttheorganization.Managementpresentations,videos,paneldiscussions,guestspeakers,question/answerforums,andnewslettersincreasevisibility.Theorganization'scomputersecuritytrainingandawarenessprogramcaneffectivelynotifyusersofnewpolicies.Italsocanbeusedtofamiliarizenewemployeeswiththeorganization'spoUcies.Computersecuritypoliciesshouldbeintroducedinamannerthatensuresthatmanagement'sunqualifiedsupportisclear,especiallyinenvironmentswhereemployeesfeelinundatedwithpolicies,directives,guidelines,andprocedures.Theorganization'spolicyisthevehicleforemphasizingmanagement'scommitmenttocomputersecurityandmakingcleartheirexpectationsforemployeeperformance,behavior,andaccountability.TobeefiFective,policyshouldbeconsistentwithotherexistingdirectives,laws,organizationalculture,guidelines,procedures,andtheorganization'soverallmission.ItshouldalsobeintegratedintoandconsistentwithotherorganizationalpoUcies(e.g.,personnelpolicies).Onewaytohelpensurethisistocoordinatepoliciesduringdevelopmentwithotherorganizationaloffices. 39 [PDF page 55] //.ManagementControls Guidelinesandproceduresoftenaccompanypolicy.Theissue-specificpolicyonunofficialsoftware,forexample,mightincludeproceduralguidelinesforcheckingdisksbroughttoworkthathadbeenusedbyemployeesatotherlocations. 5.3System-SpecificPolicyProgrampolicyandissue-specificpolicybothaddresspolicyfromabroadlevel,usuallyencompassingtheentireorganization.However,theydonotprovidesufficientinformationordirection,forexample,tobeusedinestablishinganaccesscontrollistorintrainingusersonwhatactionsarepermitted.System-specificpolicyfillsthisneed.Itismuchmorefocused,sinceitaddressesonlyonesystem.Manysecuritypolicydecisionsmayapplyonlyatthesystemlevelandmayvaryfromsystemtosystemwithinthesameorganization.Whilethesedecisionsmayappeartobetoodetailedtobepolicy,theycanbeextremelyimportant,withsignificantimpactsonsystemusageandsecurity.Thesetypesofdecisionscanbemadebyamanagementofficial,notbyatechnicalsystemadministrator.^'*(Theimpactsofthesedecisions,however,areoftenanalyzedbytechnicalsystemadministrators.) System-specificsecuritypolicyincludestwocomponents:securityobjectivesandoperationalsecurityrules.Itisoftenaccompaniedbyimplementingproceduresandguidelines. Todevelopacohesiveandcomprehensivesetofsecuritypolicies,officialsmayuseamanagementprocessthatderivessecurityrulesfromsecuritygoals.Itishelpfultoconsideratwo-levelmodelforsystemsecuritypolicy:securityobjectivesandoperationalij,,,,,^,,,,,^,,,^,,,^^ securityrules,whichtogethercomprisethesystem-specificpolicy.Closelylinkedandoftendifficulttodistinguish,however,istheimplementationofthepolicyintechnology.5.3.1SecurityObjectivesThefirststepinthemanagementprocessistodefinesecurityobjectivesforthespecificsystem.Although,thisprocessmaystartwithananalysisoftheneedforintegrity,availability,andconfidentiality,itshouldnotf^^g/^g/^^g^ggggggggggggggg^^stopthere.Asecurityobjectiveneedstomorespecific;itshouldbeconcreteandwelldefined.Italsoshouldbestatedsothatitisclear SampleSecurityObjectiveOnlyindividualsintheaccountingandpersonneldepartmentsareauthorizedtoprovideormodifyinformationusedinpayrollprocessing. Itisimportanttorememberthatpolicyisnotcreatedinavacuum.Forexample,itiscriticaltounderstandthesystemmissionandhowthesystemisintendedtobeused.Also,usersmayplayanimportantroleinsettingpolicy. 40 [PDF page 56] 5.ComputerSecurityPolicy thattheobjectiveisachievable.Thisprocesswillalsodrawuponotherapplicableorganizationpolicies. Securityobjectivesconsistofaseriesofstatementsthatdescribemeaningfulactionsaboutexplicitresources.Theseobjectivesshouldbebasedonsystemfunctionalormissionrequirements,butshouldstatethesecurityactionsthatsupporttherequirements.Developmentofsystem-specificpolicywillrequiremanagementtomaketrade-offs,sinceitisunlikelythatalldesiredsecurityobjectiveswillbeabletobefullymet.Managementwillfacecost,operational,technical,andotherconstraints.5.3.2OperationalSecurityRulesAftermanagementdeterminesthesecurityobjectives,therulesforoperatingasystemcanbelaidout,forexample,todefineauthorizedandunauthorizedmodification.Who(byjobcategory,organizationplacement,orname)candowhat SampleOperationalSecurityRule(e.g.,modify,delete)towhichspecificclassesandrecordsofdata,andunderwhatconditions.PersonnelclerksmayupdatefieldsforweeklyThedegreeofspecificityneededforattendance,chargestoannualleave,employeeoperationalsecurityrulesvariesgreatly.Theaddresses,andtelephonenumbers.Personnelmoredetailedtherulesare,uptoapoint,the^P^'^j^^^^"P^"^"f^information.No ,, employeesmayupdatetheirownrecords,easieritistoknowwhenonehasbeenviolated.Itisalso,uptoapoint,easierto^i^automatepolicyenforcement.However,overlydetailedrulesmaymakethejobofinstructingacomputertoimplementthemdifficultorcomputationallycomplex.Inadditiontodecidingthelevelofdetail,managementshoulddecidethedegreeofformalityindocumentingthesystem-specificpolicy.Onceagain,themoreformalthedocumentation,theeasieritistoenforceandtofollowpolicy.Ontheotherhand,policyatthesystemlevelthatistoodetailedandformalcanalsobeanadministrativeburden.Ingeneral,goodpracticesuggestsareasonablydetailedformalstatementoftheaccessprivilegesforasystem.Documentingaccesscontrolspolicywillmakeitsubstantiallyeasiertofollowandtoenforce.(SeeChapters10and17,PersonnelAJserIssuesandLx)gicalAccessControl.)Anotherareathatnormallyrequiresadetailedandformalstatementistheassignmentofsecurityresponsibilities.Otherareasthatshouldbeaddressedaretherulesforsystemusageandtheconsequencesofnoncompliance.Policydecisionsinotherareasofcomputersecurity,suchasthosedescribedinthishandbook,areoftendocumentedintheriskanalysis,accreditationstatements,orproceduralmanuals.However,anycontroversial,atypical,oruncommonpolicieswillalsoneedformalstatements.Atypical41 [PDF page 57] //.ManagementControls policieswouldincludeanyareaswherethesystempolicyisdifferentfromorganizationalpolicyorfromnormalpracticewithintheorganization,eithermoreorlessstringent.Thedocumentationforatopicalpolicycontainsastatementexplainingthereasonfordeviationfromtheorganization'sstandardpolicy. 5.3.3System-SpecificPolicyImplementationTechnologyplaysanimportant-butnotsole-roleinenforcingsystem-specificpolicies.Whentechnologyisusedtoenforcepolicy,itisimportantnottoneglectnontechnology-basedmethods.Forexample,technicalsystem-basedcontrolscouldbeusedtolimittheprintingofconfidentialreportstoaparticularprinter.However,correspondingphysicalsecuritymeasureswouldalsohavetobeinplacetolimitaccesstotheprinteroutputorthedesiredsecurityobjectivewouldnotbeachieved.Technicalmethodsfrequentlyusedtoimplementsystem-securitypolicyarelikelytoincludetheuseoflogicalaccesscontrols.However,thereareotherautomatedmeansofenforcingorsupportingsecuritypolicythattypicallysupplementlogicalaccesscontrols.Forexample,technologycanbeusedtoblocktelephoneusersfromcallingcertainnumbers.Intrusion-detectionsoftwarecanalertsystemadministratorstosuspiciousactivityorcantakeactiontostoptheactivity.Personalcomputerscanbeconfiguredtopreventbootingfromafloppydisk. Technology-basedenforcementofsystem-securitypolicyhasbothadvantagesanddisadvantages.Acomputersystem,properlydesigned,programmed,installed,configured,andmaintained,^^consistentlyenforcespolicywithinthecomputersystem,althoughnocomputercanforceuserstofollowallprocedures.Managementcontrolsalsoplayanimportantrole-andshouldnotbeneglected.Inaddition,deviationsfromthepolicymaysometimesbenecessaryandappropriate;suchdeviationsmaybedifficulttoimplementeasilywithsometechnicalcontrols.Thissituationoccursfrequentlyifimplementationofthesecuritypolicyistoorigid(whichcanoccurwhenthesystemanalystsfailtoanticipatecontingenciesandprepareforthem).5.4InterdependenciesPolicyisrelatedtomanyofthetopicscoveredinthishandbook:ProgramManagement.Policyisusedtoestablishanorganization'scomputersecurityprogram,andisthereforecloselytiedtoprogrammanagementandadministration.Bothprogramandsystem-specificpolicymaybeestablishedinanyoftheareascoveredinthishandbook.Forexample,anorganizationmaywishtohaveaconsistentapproachtoincidenthandlingforallits "Doingallofthesethingsproperlyis,unfortunately,theexceptionratherthantherule.Confidenceinthesystem'sabilitytoenforcesystem-specificpolicyiscloselytiedtoassurance.(SeeChapter9,Assurance.)42 [PDF page 58] 5.ComputerSecurityPolicy systems-andwouldissueappropriateprogrampolicytodoso.Ontheotherhand,itmaydecidethatitsapplicationsaresufficientlyindependentofeachotherthatapplicationmanagersshoulddealwithincidentsonanindividualbasis. AccessControls.System-specificpolicyisoftenimplementedthroughtheuseofaccesscontrols.Forexample,itmaybeapolicydecisionthatonlytwoindividualsinanorganizationareauthorizedtorunacheck-printingprogram.Accesscontrolsareusedbythesystemtoimplement(orenforce)thispolicy. LinkstoBroaderOrganizationalPolicies.Thischapterhasfocusedonthetypesandcomponentsofcomputersecuritypolicy.However,itisimportanttorealizethatcomputersecuritypoliciesareoftenextensionsofanorganization'sinformationsecuritypoliciesforhandlinginformationinotherforms(e.g.,paperdocuments).Forexample,anorganization'se-mailpolicywouldprobablybetiedtoitsbroaderpolicyonprivacy.Computersecuritypoliciesmayalsobeextensionsofotherpolicies,suchasthoseaboutappropriateuseofequipmentandfacilities. 5.5CostConsiderationsAnumberofpotentialcostsareassociatedwithdevelopingandimplementingcomputersecuritypolicies.Overall,themajorcostofpolicyisthecostofimplementingthepolicyanditsimpactsupontheorganization.Forexample,establishingacomputersecurityprogram,accomplishedthroughpolicy,doesnotcomeatnegligiblecost. Othercostsmaybethoseincurredthroughthepolicydevelopmentprocess.Numerousadministrativeandmanagementactivitiesmayberequiredfordrafting,reviewing,coordinating,clearing,disseminating,andpublicizingpolicies.Inmanyorganizations,successfulpolicyimplementationmayrequireadditionalstaffingandtraining-andcantaketime.Ingeneral,thecoststoanorganizationforcomputersecuritypolicydevelopmentandimplementationwiUdependuponhowextensivethechangeneededtoachievealevelofriskacceptabletomanagement.ReferencesHowe,D."InformationSystemSecurityEngineering:CornerstonetotheFuture."Proceedingsofthe15thNationalComputerSecurityConference.Baltimore,MD,Vol.1,October15,1992.pp.244-251. Fites,P.,andM.Kratz."PolicyDevelopment."InformationSystemsSecurity:APractitioner'sReference.NewYork,NY:VanNostrandReinhold,1993.pp.411-427. 43 [PDF page 59] //.ManagementControls Lobel,J."EstablishingaSystemSecurityPolicy."FoilingtheSystemBreakers.NewYork,NY:McGraw-Hill,1986.pp.57-95.Menkus,B."ConcernsinComputerSecurity."ComputersandSecurity.11(3),1992.pp.211-215.OfficeofTechnologyAssessment."FederalPolicyIssuesandOptions."DefendingSecrets,SharingData:NewLocksforElectronicInformation.Washington,DC:U.SCongress,OfficeofTechnologyAssessment,1987.pp.151-160.OfficeofTechnologyAssessment."MajorTrendsinPolicyDevelopment."DefendingSecrets,SharingData:NewLocksandKeysforElectronicInformation.Washington,DC:U.S.Congress,OfficeofTechnologyAssessment,1987.p.131-148. O'Neill,M.,andF.Henninge,Jr."UnderstandingADPSystemandNetworkSecurityConsiderationsandRiskAnalysis."ISSAAccess.5(4),1992.pp.14-17. Peltier,Thomas."DesigningInformationSecurityPoliciesThatGetResults."InfosecurityNews.4(2),1993.pp.30-31.President'sCouncilonManagementImprovementandthePresident'sCouncilonIntegrityandEfficiency.ModelFrameworkforManagementControlOverAutomatedInformationSystem.Washington,DC:President'sCouncilonManagementImprovement,January1988.Smith,J."PrivacyPoliciesandPractices:InsidetheOrganizationalMaze."CommunicationsoftheACM.36(12),1993.pp.104-120.Sterne,D.F."OntheBuzzwordComputerSecurityPolicy.'"InProceedingsoftheI99IIEEESymposiumonSecurityandPrivacy,Oakland,CA:May1991.pp.219-230.Wood,CharlesCresson."DesigningCorporateInformationSecurityPolicies."DATAPROReportsonInformationSecurity,April1992. 44 [PDF page 60] Chapter6COMPUTERSECURITYPROGRAMMANAGEMENT Computersandtheinformationtheyprocessarecriticaltomanyorganizations'abilitytoperformtheirmissionandbusinessfunctions.Itthereforemakessensethatexecutivesviewcomputersecurityasamanagementissueandseektoprotecttheirorganization'scomputerresourcesastheywouldanyothervaluableasset.Todothiseffectivelyrequiresdevelopingofacomprehensivemanagementapproach.ThischapterpresentsanorganizationwideapproachtocomputersecurityanddiscussesOMBCircularA-130,"ManagementofFederalitsimportantmanagementfunction."BecauseInformationResources,"requiresthatfederalagenciesorganizationsdiffervastlyinsize,complexity,establishcomputersecurityprograms.managementstyles,andculture,itisnotmammammmm^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^mpossibletodescribeoneidealcomputersecurityprogram.However,thischapterdoesdescribesomeofthefeaturesandissuescommontomanyfederalorganizations. 6.1StructureofaComputerSecurityProgramManycomputersecurityprogramsthataredistributedthroughouttheorganizationhavedifferentelementsperformingvariousfunctions.Whilethisapproachhasbenefits,thedistributionofthecomputersecurityfunctioninmanyorganizationsishaphazard,usuallybaseduponhistory(i.e.,whowasavailableintheorganizationtodowhatwhentheneedarose).Ideally,thedistributionofcomputersecurityfunctionsshouldresultfromaplannedandintegratedmanagementphilosophy.Managingcomputersecurityatmultiplelevelsbringsmanybenefits.Eachlevelcontributestotheoverallcomputersecurityprogramwithdifferenttypesofexpertise,authority,andresources.Ingeneral,higher-levelofficials(suchasthoseattheheadquartersorunitlevelsintheagencydescribedabove)betterunderstandtheorganizationasawholeandhavemoreauthority.Ontheotherhand,lower-levelofficials(atthecomputerfacilityandapplicationslevels)aremorefamiliarwiththespecificrequirements,bothtechnicalandprocedural,andproblemsofthesystemsand Thischapterisprimarilydirectedatfederalagencies,whicharegenerallyverylargeandcomplexorganizations.Thischapterdiscussesprogramswhicharesuitedtomanagingsecurityinsuchenvironments.Theymaybewhollyinappropriateforsmallerorganizationsorprivatesectorfirms."Thischapteraddressesthemanagementofsecurityprograms,notthevariousactivitiessuchasriskanalysisorcontingencyplanningthatmakeupaneffectivesecurityprogram.45 [PDF page 61] //.ManagementControls Sourcesof(Some)RequirementsforFederalUnclassifiedComputerSecurityPrograms President ExecutiveOrders Laws AgencyManagement Afederalagencycomputersecurityprogramiscreatedandoperatesinanenvironmentrichinguidanceanddirectionfromotherorganizations.Figure6.1illustratessomeoftheexternalsourcesofrequirementsandguidancedirectedtowardagencymanagementwithregardtocomputersecurityWhileafulldiscussionofeachisoutsidethescopeofthischapter,itisimportanttorealizethataprogramdoesnotoperateinavacuum;federalorganizationsareconstrained—bybothstatuteandregulation--inanumberofways.Figure6. 1 theusers.Thelevelsofcomputersecurityprogrammanagementshouldbecomplementary;eachcanhelptheotherbemoreeffective.Sincemanyorganizationshaveatleasttwolevelsofcomputersecuritymanagement,thischapterdividescomputersecurityprogrammanagementintotwolevels:thecentrallevelandthesystemlevel.(Eachorganization,though,mayhaveitsownuniquestructure.)Thecentralcomputer46 [PDF page 62] 6.ComputerSecurityProgramManagement SampleFederalAgencyManagementStructure applicationlevelApplicationB-1.1ApplicationB-1.2 ApplicationB-1.3 ApplicationB-2.1ApplicationB-2. 2 ApplicationB-2.3 ApplicationB-3.1ApplicationB-3.2 ApplicationB-3.3 Figure6.2showsamanagementstracturebasedonthatofanactualfederalagency.Theagencyconsistsofthreemajorunits,eachwithseverallargecomputerfacibtiesrunningmnbipicapplications.Thistypeoforganizationneedstomanagecomputersecurityattheagencylevel,theumtlevel,thecomputerfacilitylevel,andtheapplication/evel.Figure6.2securityprogramcanbeusedtoaddresstheoverallmanagementofcomputersecuritywithinanorganizationoramajorcomponentofanorganization.Thesystem-levelcomputersecurityprogramaddressesthemanagementofcomputersecurityforaparticularsystem. 6.2CentralComputerSecurityProgramsThepurposeofacentralcomputersecurityprogramistoaddresstheoverallmanagementof 47 [PDF page 63] //.ManagementControls computersecuritywithinanorganization.Inthefederalgovernment,theorganizationcouldconsistofadepartment,agency,orothermajoroperatingunit. Aswiththemanagementofallresources,centralcomputersecuritymanagementcanbeperformedinmanypracticalandcost-effectiveways.Theimportanceofsoundmanagementcannotbeoveremphasized.Thereisalsoadownsidetocentrallymanagedcomputersecurityprograms.Specifically,theypresentgreaterriskthaterrorsinjudgementwillbemorewidelypropagatedthroughouttheorganization.Astheystrivetomeettheirobjectives,managersneedtoconsiderthefullimpactofavailableoptionswhenestablishingtheircomputersecurityprograms.6.2.1BenefitsofCentralComputerSecurityProgramsAcentralsecurityprogramshouldprovidetwoquitedistincttypesofbenefits:•Increasedefficiencyandeconomyofsecuritythroughouttheorganization,and•theabilitytoprovidecentralizedenforcementandoversight.BothofthesebenefitsareinkeepingwiththepurposeofthePaperworkReductionAct,asimplementedin0MBCircularA-130.ThePaperworkReductionActestablishesabroadmandateforagenciestoperformtheirinformationmanagementactivitiesinanefficient,effective,andeconomicalmanner.... Agenciesshallassureanadequatelevelofsecurityforallagencyautomatedinformationsystems,whethermaintainedin-houseorcommercially.^^6.2.2Efficient,EconomicCoordinationofInformationAcentralcomputersecurityprogramhelpstocoordinateandmanageeffectiveuseofsecurity-relatedresourcesthroughouttheorganization.Themostimportantoftheseresourcesarenormallyinformationfinancialresources.Soundandtimelyinformationisnecessaryformanagerstoaccomplishtheirtaskseffectively.However,mostorganizationshavetroublecollectinginformationfrommyriadsourcesandeffectivelyprocessinganddistributingitwithintheorganization.Thissectiondiscussessomeofthesourcesandelficientusesofcomputersecurityinformation.Withinthefederalgovernment,manyorganizationssuchastheOfficeofManagementand OMBCircularA-130,Section5;AppendixIII,Section3. 48 [PDF page 64] 6.ComputerSecurityProgramManagement Budget,theGeneralServicesAdministration,theNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,andtheNationalTelecommunicationsandInformationAdministration,provideinformationoncomputer,telecommunications,orinformationresources.Thisinformationincludessecurity-relatedpolicy,regulations,standards,andguidance.Aportionoftheinformationischannelledthroughtheseniordesignatedofficialforeachagency(seeFederalInformationResourcesManagementRegulation[FIRMR]Part201-2).Agenciesareexpectedtohavemechanismsinplacetodistributetheinformationtheseniordesignatedofficialreceives.Computersecurity-relatedinformationisalsoavailablefromprivateandfederalprofessionalsocietiesandgroups.ThesegroupswiUoftenprovidetheinformationasapublicservice,althoughsomeprivategroupschargeafeeforit.However,evenforinformationthatisfreeorinexpensive,thecostsassociatedwithpersonnelgatheringtheinformationcanbehigh. Internalsecurity-relatedinformation,suchaswhichprocedureswereeffective,virusinfections,securityproblems,andsolutions,needtobesharedwithinanorganization.Oftenthisinformationisspecifictotheoperatingenvironmentandcultureoftheorganization.AcomputersecurityprogramadministeredattheorganizationlevelcanprovideawaytocoUecttheinternalsecurity-relatedinformationanddistributeitasneededthroughouttheorganization.Sometimesanorganizationcanalsosharethisinformationwithexternalgroups.SeeFigure6.3. Anotheruseofaneffectiveconduitofinformationistoincreasethecentralcomputersecurityprogram'sabihtytoinfluenceexternalandinternalpolicydecisions.Ifthecentralcomputersecurityprogramofficecanrepresenttheentireorganization,thenitsadviceismorelikelytobeheededbyuppermanagementandexternalorganizations.However,tobeeffective,thereshouldbeexcellentcommunicationbetweenthesystem-levelcomputersecurityprogramsandtheorganizationlevel.Forexample,ifanorganizationwereconsideringconsolidatingitsmainframesintoonesite(orconsideringdistributingtheprocessingcurrentlydoneatonesite),personnelatthecentralprogramcouldprovideinitialopinionsaboutthesecurityimplications.However,tospeakauthoritatively,centralprogrampersonnelwouldhavetoactuallyknowthesecurityimpactsoftheproposedchange-informationthatwouldhavetobeobtainedfromthesystem-levelcomputersecurityprogram.Besidesbeingabletohelpanorganizationuseinformationmorecosteffectively,acomputersecurityprogramcanalsohelpanorganizationbetterspenditsscarcesecuritydollars.Organizationscandevelopexpertiseandthenshareit,reducingtheneedtocontractoutrepeatedlyforsimilarservices.Thecentralcomputersecurityprogramcanhelpfacilitateinformationsharing.49 Anorganization'scomponentsmaydevelopspecializedexpertise,whichcanbesharedamongcomponents.Forexample,oneoperatingunitmayprimarilyuseUNIXandhavedevelopedskillsinUNIXsecurity.Asecondoperatingunit(withonlyoneUNIXmachine),mayconcentrateonMVSsecurityandrelyonthefirstunit'sknowledgeandskillsforitsUNIXmachine. [PDF page 65] //.ManagementControls SomePrincipalSecurityProgramInteractions Figure6.3showsasimplifiedversionoftheflowofcomputersecurity-relatedinformationamongvariouspartsofanorganizationandacrossdifferentorganizations. Figure6.3Personnelatthecentralcomputersecurityprogramlevelcanalsodeveloptheirownareasofexpertise.Forexample,theycouldsharpentheirskillscouldincontingencyplanningandriskanalysistohelptheentireorganizationperformthesevitalsecurityfunctions. 50 [PDF page 66] 6.ComputerSecurityProgramManagement Besidesallowinganorganizationtoshareexpertiseand,therefore,savemoney,acentralcomputersecurityprogramcanuseitspositiontoconsolidaterequirementssotheorganizationcannegotiatediscountsbasedonvolumepurchasingofsecurityhardwareandsoftware.Italsofacilitatessuchactivitiesasstrategicplanningandorganizationwideincidenthandlingandsecuritytrendanalysis. 6.2.3CentralEnforcementandOversightBesideshelpinganorganizationimprovetheeconomyandefficiencyofitscomputersecurityprogram,acentralizedprogramcanincludeanindependentevaluationorenforcementfianctiontoensurethatorganizationalsubunitsarecost-effectivelysecuringresourcesandfollowingapplicablepolicy.WhiletheOfficeoftheInspectorGeneral(OIG)andexternalorganizations,suchastheGeneralAccountingOffice(GAO),alsoperformavaluableevaluationrole,theyoperateoutsidetheregularmanagementchannels.Chapters8and9ftirtherdiscusstheroleofindependentaudit. Thereareseveralreasonsforhavinganoversightfunctionwithintheregularmanagementchannel.First,computersecurityisanimportantcomponentinthemanagementoforganizationalresources.Thisisaresponsibilitythatcannotbetransferredorabandoned.Second,maintaininganinternaloversightfunctionallowsanorganizationtofindandcorrectproblemswithoutthepotentialembarrassmentofanIGorGAOauditorinvestigation.Third,theorganizationmayfinddifferentproblemsfi^omthosethatanoutsideorganizationmayfind.Theorganizationunderstandsitsassets,threats,systems,andproceduresbetterthananexternalorganization;additionally,peoplemayhaveatendencytobemorecandidwithinsiders. 6.3ElementsofanEffectiveCentralComputerSecurityProgramForacentralcomputersecurityprogramtobeeffective,itshouldbeanestablishedpartoforganizationmanagement.Ifsystemmanagersandapplicationsownersdonotneedtoconsistentlyinteractwiththesecurityprogram,thenitcanbecomeanemptytokenofuppermanagement's"commitmenttosecurity." StableProgramManagementFunction.Awell-establishedprogramwillhaveaprogrammanagerrecognizedwithintheorganizationasthecentralcomputersecurityprogrammanager.Inaddition,theprogramwillbestaffedwithablepersonnel,andlinkswillbeestablishedbetweentheprogrammanagementfunctionandcomputersecuritypersonnelinotherpartsoftheorganization.Acomputersecurityprogramisacomplexfunctionthatneedsastablebasefromwhichtodirectthemanagementofsuchsecurityresourcesasinformationandmoney.Thebenefitsofanoversightfunctioncannotbeachievedifthecomputersecurityprogramisnotrecognizedwithinanorganizationashavingexpertiseandauthority. 51 [PDF page 67] //.ManagementControls StableResourceBase.Awell-establishedprogramwillhaveastableresourcebaseintermsofpersonnel,funds,andothersupport.Withoutastableresourcebase,itisimpossibletoplanandexecuteprogramsandprojectseffectively. ExistenceofPolicy.Policyprovidesthefoundationforthecentralcomputersecurityprogramandisthemeansfordocumentingandpromulgatingimportantdecisionsaboutcomputersecurity.Acentralcomputersecurityprogramshouldalsopublishstandards,regulations,andguidelinesthatimplementandexpandonpolicy.(SeeChapter5.) PublishedMissionandFunctionsStatement.Apublishedmissionstatementgroundsthecentralcomputersecurityprogramintotheuniqueoperatingenvironmentoftheorganization.Thestatementclearlyestablishesthefunctionofthecomputersecurityprogramanddefinesresponsibilitiesforboththecomputersecurityprogramandotherrelatedprogramsandentities.Withoutsuchastatement,itisimpossibletodevelopcriteriaforevaluatingtheeffectivenessoftheprogram.Long-TermComputerSecurityStrategy.Awell-establishedprogramexploresanddevelopslong-termstrategiestoincorporatecomputersecurityintothenextgenerationofinformationtechnology.Sincethecomputerandtelecommunicationsfieldmovesrapidly,itisessentialtoplanforfutureoperatingenvironments.ComplianceProgram.Acentralcomputersecurityprogramneedstoaddresscompliancewithnationalpoliciesandrequirements,aswellasorganization-specificrequirements.NationalrequirementsincludethoseprescribedundertheComputerSecurityActof1987,OMBCircularA-130,theFIRMR,andFederalInformationProcessingStandards.IntraorganizationalLiaison.Manyofficeswithinanorganizationcanaffectcomputersecurity.TheInformationResourcesManagementorganizationandphysicalsecurityofficearetwoobviousexamples.However,computersecurityoftenoverlapswithotheroffices,suchassafety,reliabilityandqualityassurance,internalcontrol,ortheOfficeoftheInspectorGeneral.Aneffectiveprogramshouldhaveestablishedrelationshipswiththesegroupsinordertointegratecomputersecurityintotheorganization'smanagement.Therelationshipsshouldencompassmorethanjustthesharingofinformation;theofficesshouldinfluenceeachother.LiaisonwithExternalGroups.Therearemanysourcesofcomputersecurityinformation,suchas ExampleAgencyIRMofficesengageinstrategicandtacticalplanningforbothinformationandinformationtechnology,inaccordancewiththePaperworkReductionActandOMBCircularA-130.Securityshouldbeanimportantcomponentoftheseplans.Thesecurityneedsoftheagencyshouldbereflectedintheinformationtechnologychoicesandtheinformationneedsoftheagencyshouldbereflectedinthesecurityprogram. 52 [PDF page 68] 6.ComputerSecurityProgramManagement NIST'sComputerSecurityProgramManagers'Forum,computersecurityclearinghouse,andtheForumofIncidentResponseandSecurityTeams(FIRST).Anestablishedprogramwillbeknowledgeableofandwilltakeadvantageofexternalsourcesofinformation.Itwillalsobeaproviderofinformation. 6.4System-LevelComputerSecurityProgramsWhilethecentralprogramaddressestheentirespectrumofcomputersecurityforanorganization,system-levelprogramsensureappropriateandcost-effectivesecurityforeachsystem.Thisincludesinfluencingdecisionsaboutwhatcontrolstoimplement,purchasingandinstallingtechnicalcontrols,day-to-daycomputersecurityadministration,evaluatingsystemvulnerabilities,andrespondingtosecurityproblems.Itencompassesalltheareasdiscussedinthehandbook.System-levelcomputersecurityprogrampersonnelarethelocaladvocatesforcomputersecurity.Thesystemsecuritymanager/officerraisestheissueofsecuritywiththecognizantsystemmanagerandhelpsdevelopsolutionsforsecurityproblems.Forexample,hastheapplicationownermadeclearthesystem'ssecurityrequirements?Willbringinganewfunctiononlineaffectsecurity,andifso,how?Isthesystemvulnerabletohackersandviruses?Hasthecontingencyplanbeentested?Raisingthesekindsofquestionswillforcesystemmanagersandapplicationownerstoidentifyandaddresstheirsecurityrequirements.6.5ElementsofEffectiveSystem-LevelProgramsLikethecentralcomputersecurityprogram,manyfactorsinfluencehowsuccessfulasystem-levelcomputersecurityprogramis.Manyofthesearesimilartothecentralprogram.Thissectionaddressessomeadditionalconsiderations.SecurityPlans.TheComputerSecurityActmandatesthatagenciesdevelopcomputersecurityandprivacyplansforsensitivesystems.Theseplansensurethateachfederalandfederalinterestsystemhasappropriateandcost-effectivesecurity.System-levelsecuritypersonnelshouldbeinapositiontodevelopandimplementsecurityplans.Chapter8discussestheplansinmoredetail. System-SpecificSecurityPolicy.Manycomputersecuritypolicyissuesneedtobeaddressedonasystem-specificbasis.Theissuescanvaryforeachsystem,althoughaccesscontrolandthedesignationofpersonnelwithsecurityresponsibilityarelikelytobeneededforaUsystems.Acohesiveandcomprehensivesetofsecuritypoliciescanbedevelopedbyusingaprocessthat Asisimpliedbythename,anorganizationwilltypicallyhaveseveralsystem-levelcomputersecurityprograms.Insettinguptheseprograms,theorganizationshouldcarefullyexaminethescopeofeachsystem-levelprogram.System-levelcomputersecurityprogramsmayaddress,forexample,thecomputingresourceswithinanoperationalelement,amajorapplication,oragroupofsimilarsystems(eithertechnologicallyorfunctionally). 53 [PDF page 69] //.ManagementControls derivessecurityrulesfromsecuritygoals,asdiscussedinChapter5. LifeCycleManagement.AsdiscussedinChapter8,securitymustbemanagedthroughoutasystem'slifecycle.Thisspecificallyincludesensuringthatchangestothesystemaremadewithattentiontosecurityandthataccreditationisaccomplished.IntegrationWithSystemOperations.Thesystem-levelcomputersecurityprogramshouldconsistofpeoplewhounderstandthesystem,itsmission,itstechnology,anditsoperatingenvironment.Effectivesecuritymanagementusuallyneedstobeintegratedintothemanagementofthesystem.Effectiveintegrationwillensurethatsystemmanagersandapplicationownersconsidersecurityintheplanningandoperationofthesystem.Thesystemsecuritymanager/officershouldbeabletoparticipateintheselectionandimplementationofappropriatetechnicalcontrolsandsecurityproceduresandshouldunderstandsystemvulnerabilities.Also,thesystem-levelcomputersecurityprogramshouldbecapableofrespondingtosecurityproblemsinatimelymanner.Forlargesystems,suchasamainframedatacenter,thesecurityprogramwilloftenincludeamanagerandseveralstaffpositionsinsuchareasasaccesscontrol,useradministration,andcontingencyanddisasterplanning.Forsmallsystems,suchasanofficewidelocal-area-network(LAN),theLANadministratormayhaveadjunctsecurityresponsibilities. SeparationFromOperations.Anaturaltensionoftenexistsbetweencomputersecurityandoperationalelements.Inmanyinstances,operationalcomponents—whichtendtobefarlargerandthereforemoreinfluential—seektoresolvethistensionbyembeddingthecomputersecurityprogramincomputeroperations.Thetypicalresultofthisorganizationalstrategyisacomputersecurityprogramthatlacksindependence,hasminimalauthority,receiveslittlemanagementattention,andhasfewresources.Asearlyas1978,GAOidentifiedthisorganizationalmodeasoneoftheprincipalbasicweaknessesinfederalagencycomputersecurityprograms.System-levelprogramsfacethisproblemmostoften.Thisconflictbetweentheneedtobeapartofsystemmanagementandtheneedforindependencehasseveralsolutions.Thebasisofmanyofthesolutionsisalinkbetweenthecomputersecurityprogramanduppermanagement,oftenthroughthecentralcomputersecurityprogram.Akeyrequirementofthissetupistheexistenceofareportingstructurethatdoesnotincludesystemmanagement.Anotherpossibilityisforthecomputersecurityprogramtobecompletelyindependentofsystemmanagementandtoreportdirectlytohighermanagement.Therearemanyhybridsandpermutations,suchasco-locationofcomputersecurityandsystemsmanagementstaffbutseparatereporting(andsupervisory)structures.Figure6.4presentsoneexampleof ^"GeneralAccountingOtfice,"AutomatedSystemSecurity--FederalAgenciesShouldStrengthenSafeguardsOverPersonalandOtherSensitiveData,"GAOReportLCD78-123,Washington,DC,1978.54 [PDF page 70] 6.ComputerSecurityProgramManagement ExampleofOrganizationalPlacementofComputerSecurityFunctions Figure6.4illustratesoneexampleoftheplacementofthecomputersecurityprogram-levelandsystem-levelfunctions.Theprogram-levelfunctionislocatedwithintheIRMorganizationandsetspolicyfortheorganizationasawhole.Thesystem-levelfunction,locatedwithintheDataCenter,providesforday-to-daysecurityatthatsite.Notethat,althoughnotpictured,othersystem-levelprogramsmayexistforotherfacilities(e.g.,underanotherAssistantSecretary). Figure6.4placementofthecomputersecurityprogramwithinatypicalFederalagency.^' Noimplicationthatthisstructureisidealisintended. 55 [PDF page 71] //.ManagementControls 6.6CentralandSystem-LevelProgramInteractionsAsystem-levelprogramthatisnotintegratedintotheorganizationalprogrammayhavedifficultyinfluencingsignificantareasaffectingsecurity.Thesystem-levelcomputersecurityprogramimplementsthepolicies,guidance,andregulationsofthecentralcomputersecurityprogram.Thesystem-levelofficealsolearnsfromtheinformationdisseminatedbythecentralprogramandusestheexperienceandexpertiseoftheentireorganization.Thesystem-levelcomputersecurityprogramfurtherdistributesinformationtosystemsmanagementasappropriate.Communications,however,shouldnotbejustoneway.System-levelcomputersecurityprogramsinformthecentralofficeabouttheirneeds,problems,incidents,andsolutions.Analyzingthisinformationallowsthecentralcomputersecurityprogramtorepresentthevarioussystemstotheorganization'smanagementandtoexternalagenciesandadvocateprogramsandpoliciesbeneficialtothesecurityofallthesystems. 6.7InterdependenciesThegeneralpurposeofthecomputersecurityprogram,toimprovesecurity,causesittooverlapwithotherorganizationaloperationsaswellastheothersecuritycontrolsdiscussedinthehandbook.Thecentralorsystemcomputersecurityprogramwilladdressmostcontrolsatthepolicy,procedural,oroperationallevel. Policy.Policyisissuedtoestablishthecomputersecurityprogram.Thecentralcomputersecurityprogram(s)normallyproducespolicy(andsupportingproceduresandguidelines)concerninggeneralandorganizationalsecurityissuesandoftenissue-specificpolicy.However,thesystem-levelcomputersecurityprogramnormallyproducespolicyforthatsystem.Chapter5providesadditionalguidance.LifeCycleManagement.Theprocessofsecuringasystemoveritslifecycleistheroleofthesystem-levelcomputersecurityprogram.Chapter8addressestheseissues. IndependentAudit.TheindependentauditfiinctiondescribedinChapters8and9shouldcomplementacentralcomputersecurityprogram'scompliancefunctions. 6.8CostConsiderationsThischapterdiscussedhowanorganizationwidecomputersecurityprogramcanmanagesecurityresources,includingfinancialresources,moreeffectively.Thecostconsiderationsforasystem-levelcomputersecurityprogramaremorecloselyalignedwiththeoverallcostsavingsinhavingsecurity. 56 [PDF page 72] 6.ComputerSecurityProgramManagement Themostsignificantdirectcostofacomputersecurityprogramispersonnel.Inaddition,manyprogramsmakefrequentandeffectiveuseofconsultantsandcontractors.Aprogramalsoneedsfundsfortrainingandfortravel,oversight,informationcollectionanddissemination,andmeetingswithpersonnelatotherlevelsofcomputersecuritymanagement.ReferencesFederalInformationResourcesManagementRegulations,especially201-2.GeneralServicesAdministration.Washington,DC.GeneralAccountingOffice.AutomatedSystemsSecurity-FederalAgenciesShouldStrengthenSafeguardsOverPersonalandOtherSensitiveData.GAOReportLCD78-123.Washington,DC.1978.GeneralServicesAdministration.InformationResourcesSecurity:WhatEveryFederalManagerShouldKnow.Washington,DC.Helsing,C,M.Swanson,andM.Todd.ExecutiveGuidetotheProtectionofInformationResources.,SpecialPublication500-169.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,1989.Helsing,C,M.Swanson,andM.Todd.ManagementGuidefortheProtectionofInformationResources.SpecialPublication500-170.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,1989."ManaginganOrganizationWideSecurityProgram."ComputerSecurityInstitute,SanFrancisco,CA.(course)OfficeofManagementandBudget."GuidanceforPreparationofSecurityPlansforFederalComputerSystemsThatContainSensitiveInformation."0MBBulletin90-08.Washington,DC,1990.OfficeofManagementandBudget.ManagementofFederalInformationResources.0MBCircularA-130.Owen,R.,Jr."SecurityManagement:UsingtheQualityApproach."Proceedingsofthe15thNationalComputerSecurityConference.Baltimore,MD:Vol.2,1992.pp.584-592.Spiegel,L."GoodLANSecurityRequiresAjialysisofCorporateData."Infoworld.15(52),1993.p.49. 57 [PDF page 73] //.ManagementControls U.S.Congress.ComputerSecurityActof1987.PublicLaw100-235.1988. 58 [PDF page 74] Chapter7COMPUTERSECURITYRISKMANAGEMENT Riskisthepossibilityofsomethingadversehappening.Riskmanagementistheprocessofassessingrisk,takingstepstoreducerisktoanacceptablelevelandmaintainingthatlevelofrisk.Thoughperhapsnotalwaysawareofit,individualsmanageriskseveryday.Actionsasroutineasbucklingacarsafetybelt,carryinganumbrellawhenrainisforecast,orwritingdownalistofthingstodoratherthantrustingtomemoryfallintothepurviewofriskmanagement.Peoplerecognizevariousthreatstotheirbestinterestsandtakeprecautionstoguardagainstthemortominimizetheireffects. Bothgovernmentandindustryroutinelymanageamyriadofrisks.Forexample,tomaximizethereturnontheirinvestments,businessesmustoftendecidebetweenaggressive(buthigh-risk)andslow-growth(butmoresecure)investmentplans.Thesej,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,^^ decisionsrequireanalysisofrisk,relativetopotentialbenefits,considerationofalternatives,and,finally,implementationofwhatmanagementdeterminestobethebestcourseofaction. Managementisconcernedwithmanytypesofrisk.Computersecurityriskmanagementaddressesriskswhicharisefromanorganization'suseofinformationtechnology. Riskassessmentoftenproducesanimportantsidebenefit-indepthknowledgeaboutasystemandanorganizationasriskanalyststrytofigureouthowsystemsandftinctionsareinterrelated. Whiletherearemanymodelsandmethodsforriskmanagement,thereareseveralbasicactivitiesandprocessesthatshouldbeperformed.Indiscussingriskmanagement,itisimportanttorecognizeitsbasic,mostfundamentalassumption:computerscannot^^^^j,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,^^^,,^^everbefullysecured.Thereisalwaysrisk,whetheritisfromatrustedemployeewhodefraudsthesystemorafirethatdestroyscriticalresources.Riskmanagementismadeupoftwoprimaryandoneunderlyingactivities;riskassessmentandriskmitigationaretheprimaryactivitiesanduncertaintyanalysisistheunderlyingone. 7.1RiskAssessmentRiskassessment,theprocessofanalyzingandinterpretingrisk,iscomprisedofthreebasicactivities:(1)determiningtheassessment'sscopeandmethodology;(2)collectingandanalyzing 59 [PDF page 75] //.ManagementControls data;and3)interpretingtheriskanalysisresults.^^ 7.1.1DeterminingtheAssessment'sScopeandMethodologyThefirststepinassessingriskistoidentifythesystemunderconsideration,thepartofthesystemthatwillbeanalyzed,andtheanalyticalmethodincludingitslevelofdetailandformality. telecommunications,adatacenter,oranentireorganization. TheassessmentmaybefocusedoncertainareaswhereeitherthedegreeofriskisAriskassessmentcanfocusonmanydifferentareasunknownorisknowntobehigh.Differentsuchas:technicalandoperationalcontrolstobepartsofasystemmaybeanalyzedingreater^f'^i^^l^":!'^^.1.orlesserdetail.Definingthescopeandboundarycanhelpensureacost-effectiveassessment.Factorsthatinfluencescope,,,,,,,,^,1,,,,,^^,,,,,,,,^^^^^^,,^^^,,,^^^^^^^,^,,,,^^includewhatphaseofthelifecycleasystemisin:moredetailmightbeappropriateforanewsystembeingdevelopedthanforanexistingsystemundergoinganupgrade.Anotherfactoristherelativeimportanceofthesystemunderexamination:themoreessentialthesystem,themorethoroughtheriskanalysisshouldbe.Athirdfactormaybethemagnitudeandtypesofchangesthesystemhasundergonesincethelastriskanalysis.Theadditionofnewinterfaceswouldwarrantadifferentscopethanwouldinstallinganewoperatingsystem.Methodologiescanbeformalorinformal,detailedorsimplified,highorlowlevel,quantitative(computationallybased)orqualitative(basedondescriptionsorrankings),oracombinationofthese.NosinglemethodisbestforaUusersandaUenvironments.Howtheboundary,scope,andmethodologyaredefinedwillhavemajorconsequencesintermsof(1)thetotalamountofeffortspentonriskmanagementand(2)thetypeandusefulnessoftheassessment'sresults.Theboundaryandscopeshouldbeselectedinawaythatwillproduceanoutcomethatisclear,specific,andusefultothesystemandenvironmentunderscrutiny. 7.1.2CollectingandAnalyzingDataGooddocumentationofriskassessmentswillmakeRiskhasmanydifferentcomponents:assets,laterriskassessmentslesstimeconsumingand,ifathreats,vulnerabilities,safeguards,'^"^^^'O"^^^P^^P^^^"particularJ11i-uJrr,-securitydecisionsweremade,consequences,andlikelihood.Thisexaminationnormallyincludesgatheringdataaboutthethreatenedareaandsynthesizing ''^Manydifferenttermsareusedtodescriberiskmanagementanditselements.ThedefinitionsusedinthispaperarebasedontheNISTRiskManagementFramework.60 [PDF page 76] 7.ComputerSecurityRiskManagement andanalyzingtheinformationtomakeituseful. Becauseitispossibletocollectmuchmoreinformationthancanbeanalyzed,stepsneedtobetakentolimitinformationgatheringandanalysis.Thisprocessiscalledscreening.Ariskmanagementeffortshouldfocusonthoseareasthatresultinthegreatestconsequencetotheorganization(i.e.,cancausethemostharm).Thiscanbedonebyrankingthreatsandassets. Ariskmanagementmethodologydoesnotnecessarilyneedtoanalyzeeachofthecomponentsofriskseparately.Forexample,assets/consequencesorthreats/likelihoodsmaybeanalyzedtogether.AssetValuation.Theseincludetheinformation,software,personnel,hardware,andphysicalassets(suchasthecomputerfacility).Thevalueofanassetconsistsofitsintrinsicvalueandthenear-termimpactsandlong-termconsequencesofitscompromise.ConsequenceAssessment.Theconsequenceassessmentestimatesthedegreeofharmorlossthatcouldoccur.Consequencesreferstotheoverall,aggregateharmthatoccurs,notjusttothenear-termorimmediateimpacts.Whilesuchimpactsoftenresultindisclosure,modification,destruction,ordenialofservice,consequencesarethemoresignificantlong-termeffects,suchaslostbusiness,failuretoperformthesystem'smission,lossofreputation,violationofprivacy,injury,orlossoflife.Themoreseveretheconsequencesofathreat,thegreatertherisktothesystem(and,therefore,theorganization).ThreatIdentification.Athreatisanentityoreventwiththepotentialtoharmthesystem.Typicalthreatsareerrors,fraud,disgruntledemployees,fires,waterdamage,hackers,andviruses.Threatsshouldbeidentifiedandanalyzedtodeterminethelikelihoodoftheiroccurrenceandtheirpotentialtoharmassets. Inadditiontolookingat"big-ticket"threats,theriskanalysisshouldinvestigateareasthatarepoorlyunderstood,new,orundocumented.Ifafacilityhasawell-testedphysicalaccesscontrolsystem,lessefforttoidentifythreatsmaybewarrantedforitthanforunclear,untestedsoftwarebackupprocedures.Theriskanalysisshouldconcentrateonthosethreatsmostlikelytooccurandaffectimportantassets.Insomecases,determiningwhichthreatsarerealisticisnotpossibleuntilafterthethreatanalysisisbegun.Chapter4providesadditionaldiscussionoftoday'smostprevalentthreats. SafeguardAnalysis.Asafeguardisanyaction,device,procedure,technique,orothermeasurethatreducesasystem'svulnerabilitytoathreat.Safeguardanalysisshouldincludeanexaminationoftheeffectivenessoftheexistingsecuritymeasures.Itcanalsoidentifynewsafeguardsthatcouldbeimplementedinthesystem;however,thisisnormallyperformedlaterintheriskmanagementprocess.61 [PDF page 77] //.ManagementControls VulnerabilityAnalysis.Avulnerabilityisaconditionorweaknessin(orabsenceof)securityprocedures,technicalcontrols,physicalcontrols,orothercontrolsthatcouldbeexploitedbyathreat.Vulnerabilitiesareoftenanalyzedintermsofmissingsafeguards.Vulnerabilitiescontributetoriskbecausetheymay"allow"athreattoharmthesystem.Theinterrelationshipofvulnerabilities,threats,andassetsiscriticaltotheanalysisofrisk.SomeoftheseinterrelationshipsarepicturedinFigure7.1.However,thereareotherinterrelationshipssuchasthepresenceofavulnerabilityinducingathreat.(Forexample,anormallyhonestemployeemightbetemptedtoalterdatawhentheemployeeseesthataterminalhasbeenleftloggedon.) Threats,Vulnerabilities,Safeguards,andAssets 1 CO o.cS J2eJ3WT3 UuuH 00 [PDF page 91] //.ManagementControls 8.4.1.1ConductingaSensitivityAssessmentAsensitivityassessmentlooksatthesensitivityofboththeinformationtobeprocessedandthesystemitself.Theassessmentshouldconsiderlegalimplications,organizationpolicy(includingfederalandagencypolicyifafederalsystem),andthefunctionalneedsofthesystem.Sensitivityisnormallyexpressedintermsofintegrity,availability,andconfidentiality.Suchfactorsastheimportanceofthesystemtotheorganization'smissionandtheconsequencesofunauthorizedmodification,unauthorizeddisclosure,orunavailabilityofthesystemordataneedtobeexaminedwhenassessingsensitivity.Toaddressthesetypesofissues,thepeoplewhouseorownthesystemorinformationshouldparticipateintheassessment.Asensitivityassessmentshouldanswerthefollowingquestions:•Whatinformationishandledbythesystem?•Whatkindofpotentialdamagecouldoccurthrougherror,unauthorizeddisclosureormodification,orunavailabilityofdataorthesystem?•Whatlawsorregulationsaffectsecurity(e.g.,thePrivacyActortheFairTradePracticesAct)?•Towhatthreatsisthesystemorinformationparticularlyvulnerable?•Aretheresignificantenvironmentalconsiderations(e.g.,hazardouslocationofsystem)?•Whatarethesecurity-relevantcharacteristicsoftheusercommunity(e.g.,leveloftechnicalsophisticationandtrainingorsecurityclearances)?•Whatinternalsecuritystandards,regulations,orguidelinesapplytothissystem?Thesensitivityassessmentstartsananalysisofsecuritythatcontinuesthroughoutthelifecycle.Theassessmenthelpsdetermineiftheprojectneedsspecialsecurityoversight,iffurtheranalysisis Thedefinitionofsensitiveisoftenmisconstrued.Sensitiveissynonymouswithimportantorvaluable.Somedataissensitivebecauseitmustbekeptconfidential.Muchmoredata,however,issensitivebecauseitsintegrityoravailabilitymustbeassured.TheComputerSecurityActand0MBCircularA-130clearlystatethatinformationissensitiveifitsunauthorizeddisclosure,modification(i.e.,lossofintegrity),orunavailabilitywouldharmtheagency.Ingeneral,themoreimportantasystemistothemissionoftheagency,themoresensitiveitis. 76 [PDF page 92] 8.LifeCycleSecurity neededbeforecommittingtobeginsystemdevelopment(toensurefeasibilityatareasonablecost),orinrareinstances,whetherthesecurityrequirementsaresostrenuousandcostlythatsystemdevelopmentoracquisitionwillnotbepursued.Thesensitivityassessmentcanbeincludedwiththesysteminitiationdocumentationeitherasaseparatedocumentorasasectionofanotherplanningdocument.Thedevelopmentofsecurityfeatures,procedures,andassurances,describedinthenextsection,buildsonthesensitivityassessment.Asensitivityassessmentcanalsobeperformedduringtheplanningstagesofsystemupgrades(foreitherupgradesbeingprocuredordevelopedinhouse).Inthiscase,theassessmentfocusesontheaffectedareas.Iftheupgradesignificantlyaffectstheoriginalassessment,stepscanbetakentoanalyzetheimpactontherestofthesystem.Forexample,arenewcontrolsneeded?WiUsomecontrolsbecomeunnecessary?8.4.2Development/AcquisitionFormostsystems,thedevelopment/acquisitionphaseismorecomplicatedthantheinitiationphase.Securityactivitiescanbedividedintothreeparts: •determiningsecurityfeatures,assurances,andoperationalpractices;•incorporatingthesesecurityrequirementsintodesignspecifications;and•actuallyacquiringthem.Thesedivisionsapplytosystemsthataredesignedandbuiltinhouse,tosystemsthatarepurchased,andtosystemsdevelopedusingahybridapproach.Duringthisphase,technicalstaffandsystemsponsorsshouldactivelyworktogethertoensurethatthetechnicaldesignsreflectthesystem'ssecurityneeds.Aswithdevelopmentandincorporationofothersystemrequirements,thisprocessrequiresanopendialoguebetweentechnicalstaffandsystemsponsors.Itisimportanttoaddresssecurityrequirementseffectivelyinsynchronizationwithdevelopmentoftheoverallsystem.8.4.2.1DeterminingSecurityRequirementsDuringthefirstpartofthedevelopment/acquisitionphase,systemplannersdefinetherequirementsofthesystem.Securityrequirementsshouldbedevelopedatthesametime.Theserequirementscanbeexpressedastechnicalfeatures(e.g.,accesscontrols),assurances(e.g.,backgroundchecksforsystemdevelopers),oroperationalpractices(e.g.,awarenessandtraining).Systemsecurityrequirements,likeothersystemrequirements,arederivedfromanumberofsourcesincludinglaw,policy,applicablestandardsandguidelines,functionalneedsofthesystem,andcost-benefittrade-offs.77 [PDF page 93] //.ManagementControls Law.Besidesspecificlawsthatplacesecurityrequirementsoninformation,suchasthePrivacyActof1974,therearelaws,courtcases,legalopinions,andothersimilarlegalmaterialthatmayaffectsecuritydirectlyorindirectly. Policy.AsdiscussedinChapter5,managementofficialsissueseveraldifferenttypesofpolicy.Systemsecurityrequirementsareoftenderivedfromissue-specificpolicy. StandardsandGuidelines.International,national,andorganizationalstandardsandguidelinesareanothersourcefordeterminingsecurityfeatures,assurances,andoperationalpractices.Standardsandguidelinesareoftenwritteninan"if...then"manner(e.g.,ifthesystemisencryptingdata,thenaparticularcryptographicalgorithmshouldbeused).Manyorganizationsspecifybaselinecontrolsfordifferenttypesofsystems,suchasadministrative,mission-orbusiness-critical,orproprietary.Asrequired,specialcareshouldbegiventointeroperabilitystandards.FunctionalNeedsoftheSystem.ThepurposeofsecurityistosupporttheSanctionofthesystem,nottoundermineit.Therefore,manyaspectsofthefunctionofthesystemwillproducerelatedsecurityrequirements.Cost-BenefitAnalysis.Whenconsideringsecurity,cost-benefitanalysisisdonethroughriskassessment,whichexaminestheassets,threats,andvulnerabilitiesofthesysteminordertodeterminethemostappropriate,cost-effectivesafeguards(thatcomplywithapplicablelaws,policy,standards,andthefunctionalneedsofthesystem).Appropriatesafeguardsarenormallythosewhoseanticipatedbenefitsoutweightheircosts.Benefitsandcostsincludemonetaryandnonmonetaryissues,suchaspreventedlosses,maintaininganorganization'sreputation,decreaseduserfriendliness,orincreasedsystemadministration.Riskassessment,likecost-benefitanalysis,isusedtosupportdecisionmaking.Ithelpsmanagersselectcost-effectivesafeguards.Theextentoftheriskassessment.Likethatofothercost-benefitanalyses,shouldbecommensuratewiththecomplexityandcost(normallyanindicatorofcomplexity)ofthesystemandtheexpectedbenefitsoftheassessment.RiskassessmentisfurtherdiscussedinChapter7. Riskassessmentcanbeperformedduringtherequirementsanalysisphaseofaprocurementorthedesignphaseofasystemdevelopmentcycle.Riskshouldalsonormallybeassessedduringthedevelopment/acquisitionphaseofasystemupgrade.Theriskassessmentmaybeperformedonceormultipletimes,dependingupontheproject'smethodology.Careshouldbetakenindifferentiatingbetweensecurityriskassessmentandprojectriskanalysis.Manysystemdevelopmentandacquisitionprojectsanalyzetheriskoffailingtosuccessfullycompletetheproject-adifferentactivityfromsecurityriskassessment. 78 [PDF page 94] 8.LifeCycleSecurity 8.4.2.2IncorporatingSecurityRequirementsIntoSpecificationsDeterminingsecurityfeatures,assurances,andoperationalpracticescanyieldsignificantsecurityinformationandoftenvoluminousrequirements.Thisinformationneedstobevalidated,updated,andorganizedintothedetailedsecurityprotectionrequirementsandspecificationsusedbysystemsdesignersorpurchasers.Specificationscantakeonquitedifferentforms,dependingonthemethodologyusedfortodevelopthesystem,orwhetherthesystem,orpartsofthesystem,arebeingpurchasedofftheshelf. Asspecificationsaredeveloped,itmaybenecessarytoupdateinitialriskassessments.Asafeguardrecommendedbytheriskassessmentcouldbeincompatiblewithotherm^mmmmmmmmmmmmBmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmrequirements,oracontrolmaybedifficulttoimplement.Forexample,asecurityDevelopingtestingspecificationsearlycanbecritical^^u-uvJ-1• ijtobeingabletocost-effectivelytestsecurityfeatures,requirementthatprohibitsdial-inaccesscould^ j jpreventemployeesfromcheckingtheire-mail|,a,,,BMBi^™«™BBHBBHBBMBBBM^whileawayfromtheoffice. Besidesthetechnicalandoperationalcontrolsofasystem,assurancealsoshouldbeaddressed.Thedegreetowhichassurance(thatthesecurityfeaturesandpracticescananddoworkcorrectlyandeffectively)isneededshouldbedeterminedearly.Oncethedesiredlevelofassuranceisdetermined,itisnecessarytofigureouthowthesystemwillbetestedorreviewedtodeterminewhetherthespecificationshavebeensatisfied(toobtainthedesiredassurance).Thisappliestobothsystemdevelopmentsandacquisitions.Forexample,ifrigorousassuranceisneeded,theabilitytotestthesystemortoprovideanotherformofinitialandongoingassuranceneedstobedesignedintothesystemorotherwiseprovidedfor.SeeChapter9formoreinformation.8.4.2.3ObtainingtheSystemandRelatedSecurityActivitiesDuringthisphase,thesystemisactuallybuiltorbought.Ifthesystemisbeingbuilt,securityactivitiesmayincludedevelopingthesystem'ssecurityaspects,monitoringthedevelopmentprocessitselfforsecurityproblems,respondingtochanges,andmonitoringthreat.ThreatsorvulnerabilitiesthatmayariseduringthedevelopmentphaseincludeTrojanhorses,incorrectcode,poorlyfunctioningdevelopmenttools,manipulationofcode,andmaliciousinsiders. Ifthesystemisbeingacquiredofftheshelf,securityactivitiesmayincludemonitoringtoensuresecurityisapartofmarketsurveys,contractsolicitationdocuments,andevaluationofproposedsystems.Manysystemsuseacombinationofdevelopmentandacquisition.Inthiscase,securityactivitiesincludebothsets. Thisisanexampleofarisk-baseddecision. 79 [PDF page 95] I //.ManagementControls Asthesystemisbuiltorbought,choicesaremadeaboutthesystem,whichcanaffectsecurity.Thesechoicesincludeselectionofspecificoff-the-shelfproducts,finalizinganarchitecture,orselectingaprocessingsiteorplatform.Additionalsecurityanalysiswillprobablybenecessary. Infederalgovernmentcontracting,itisoftenuse&lifpersonnelwithsecurityexpertiseparticipateasmembersofthesourceselectionboardtohelpevaluatethesecurityaspectsofproposals. Inadditiontoobtainingthesystem,operationalpracticesneedtobedeveloped.Theserefertohumanactivitiesthattakeplacearoundthesystemsuchascontingencyplanning,awarenessandtraining,andpreparingdocumentation.ThechaptersintheOperationalControlssectionofthishandbookdiscusstheseareas.Theseneedtobedevelopedalongwiththesystem,althoughtheyareoftendevelopedbydifferentindividuals.Theseareas,liketechnicalspecifications,shouldbeconsideredfromthebeginningofthedevelopmentandacquisitionphase.8.4.3ImplementationAseparateimplementationphaseisnotalwaysspecifiedinsomelifecycleplanningefforts.(Itisoftenincorporatedintotheendofdevelopmentandacquisitionorthebeginningofoperationandmaintenance.)However,fromasecuritypointofview,acriticalsecurityactivity,accreditation,occursbetweendevelopmentandthestartofsystemoperation.Theotheractivitiesdescribedinthissection,turningonthecontrolsandtesting,areoftenincorporatedattheendofthedevelopment/acquisitionphase.8.4.3.1Install/Turn-OnControlsWhileobvious,thisactivityisoftenoverlooked.Whenacquired,asystemoftencomeswithsecurityfeaturesdisabled.Theseneedtobeenabledandconfigured.Formanysystemsthisisacomplextaskrequiringsignificantskills.Custom-developedsystemsmayalsorequiresimilarwork.8.4.3.2SecurityTestingSystemsecuritytestingincludesboththetestingoftheparticularpartsofthesystemthathavebeendevelopedoracquiredandthetestingoftheentiresystem.Securitymanagement,physicalfacilities,personnel,procedures,theuseofcommercialorin-houseservices(suchasnetworkingservices),andcontingencyplanningareexamplesofareasthataffectthesecurityoftheentiresystem,butmaybespecifiedoutsideofthedevelopmentoracquisitioncycle.Sinceonlyitemswithinthedevelopmentoracquisitioncyclewillhavebeentestedduringsystemacceptancetesting,separatetestsorreviewsmayneedtobeperformedfortheseadditionalsecurityelements 80 [PDF page 96] 8.LifeCycleSecurity Securitycertificationisaformaltestingofthesecuritysafeguardsimplementedinthecomputersystemtodeterminewhethertheymeetapplicablerequirementsandspecifications.^^Toprovidemorereliabletechnicalinformation,certificationisoftenperformedbyanindependentreviewer,ratherthanbythepeoplewhodesignedthesystem.8.4.3.3AccreditationSystemsecurityaccreditationistheformalauthorizationbytheaccrediting(management)officialforsystemoperationandanexplicitacceptanceofrisk.Itisusuallysupportedbyareviewofthesystem,includingitsmanagement,operational,andtechnicalcontrols.Thisreviewmayincludeadetailedtechnicalevaluation(suchasaFederalInformationProcessingStandard102certification,particularlyforcomplex,critical,orhigh-risksystems),securityevaluation,riskassessment,audit,orothersuchreview.Ifthelifecycleprocessisbeingusedtomanageaproject(suchasasystemupgrade),itisimportanttorecognizethattheaccreditationisfortheentiresystem,notjustforthenewaddition.Thebestwaytoviewcomputersecurityaccreditationisasaformofqualitycontrol.Itforcesmanagersandtechnicalstafftoworktogethertofindthebestfitforsecurity,giventechnicalconstraints,operationalconstraints,andmissionrequirements.Theaccreditationprocessobligesmanagerstomakecriticaldecisionsregardingtheadequacyofsecuritysafeguards.Adecisionbasedonreliableinformationabouttheeffectivenessoftechnicalandnon-technicalsafeguardsandtheresidualriskismorelikelytobeasounddecision.Afterdecidingontheacceptabilityofsecuritysafeguardsandresidualrisks,theaccreditingofficialshouldissueaformalaccreditationstatement.Whilemostflawsinsystemsecurityarenotsevereenoughtoremoveanoperationalsystemfromserviceortopreventanewsystemfrombecomingoperational,theflawsmayrequiresomerestrictionsonoperation(e.g.,limitationsondial-inaccessorelectronicconnectionstootherorganizations).Insomecases,aninterimaccreditationmaybegranted,allowingthesystemtooperaterequiringreviewattheendofthe ™Somefederalagenciesuseabroaderdefinitionofthetermcertificationtorefertosecurityreviewsorevaluations,formalorinformation,thattakeplacepriortoandareusedtosupportaccreditation. SampleAccreditationStateraentInaccordancewith(OrganizationDirective),Iherebyissueanaccreditationfor(nameofsystem).Thisaccreditationismyformaldeclarationthatasatisfactorylevelofoperationalsecurityispresentandthatthesystemcanoperateunderreasonablerisk.Thisaccreditationisvalidforthreeyears.Thesystemwillbere-evaluatedannuallytodetermineifchangeshaveoccurredaffectingitssecurity. 81 [PDF page 97] //.ManagementControls interimperiod,presumablyaftersecurityupgradeshavebeenmade.8.4.4OperationandMaintenanceManysecurityactivitiestakeplaceduringtheoperationalphaseofasystem'slife.Ingeneral,thesefallintothreeareas:(1)securityoperationsandadministration;(2)operationalassurance;and(3)periodicre-analysisofthesecurity.Figure8.2diagramstheflowofsecurityactivitiesduringtheoperationalphase.8.4.4.1SecurityOperationsandAdministrationOperationofasysteminvolvesmanysecurityactivitiesdiscussedthroughoutthishandbook.Performingbackups,holdingtrainingclasses,managingcryptographickeys,keepingupwithuseradministrationandaccessprivileges,andupdatingsecuritysoftwarearesomeexamples."mm8.4.4.2OperationalAssuranceuranceexamineswhetherasystemisSecurityisneverperfectwhenasystemis ''mfoitscurrentsecurityimplemented.Inaddition,systemusersand' '"'^^'^^^^^^^^"^J. .•. 11 -rateorusethesystemandtheoperatorsdiscovernewwaystointentionally;n^-alcontrolsorunintentionallybypassorsubvertsecurity.Changesinthesystemortheenvironmentcan' createnewvulnerabilities.Strictadherencetoproceduresisrareovertime,andproceduresbecomeoutdated.Thinkingriskisminimal,usersmaytendtobypasssecuritymeasuresandprocedures.AsshowninFigure8.2,changesoccur.Operationalassuranceisonewayofbecomingawareofthesechangeswhethertheyarenewvulnerabilities(oroldvulnerabilitiesthathavenotbeencorrected),systemchanges,orenvironmentalchanges.Operationalassuranceistheprocessofreviewinganoperationalsystemtoseethatsecuritycontrols,bothautomatedandmanual,arefianctioningcorrectlyandeffectively. Tomaintainoperationalassurance,organizationsusetwobasicmethods:systemauditsandmonitoring.Thesetermsareusedlooselywithinthecomputersecuritycommunityandoftenoverlap.Asystemauditisaone-timeorperiodiceventtoevaluatesecurity.Monitoringreferstoanongoingactivitythatexamineseitherthesystemortheusers.Ingeneral,themore"real-time"anactivityis,themoreitfallsintothecategoryofmonitoring.(SeeChapter9.) 82 [PDF page 98] V3 C/3 3afeWViCODO3« 2COs>»J.CO iti^ 013S"1§S2«o«u62 (N00I [PDF page 99] //.ManagementControls 8.4.4.3ManagingChangeComputersystemsandtheenvironmentsinwhichtheyoperatechangecontinually.InresponsetovariouseventssuchasuserSecuritychangemanagementhelpsdevelopnewcomplaints,availabilityofnewfeaturesandsecurityrequirements,services,orthediscoveryofnewthreatsj,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,^^ andvulnerabilities,systemmanagersandusersmodifythesystemandincorporatenewfeatures,newprocedures,andsoftwareupdates.Theenvironmentinwhichthesystemoperatesalsochanges.Networkingandinterconnectionstendtoincrease.Anewusergroupmaybeadded,possiblyexternalgroupsoranonymousgroups.Newthreatsmayemerge,suchasincreasesinnetworkintrusionsorthespreadofpersonalcomputerviruses.Ifthesystemhasaconfigurationcontrolboardorotherstructuretomanagetechnicalsystemchanges,asecurityspecialistcanbeassignedtotheboardtomakedeterminationsaboutwhether(andifso,how)changeswillaffectsecurity. Securityshouldalsobeconsideredduringsystemupgrades(andotherplannedchanges)andindeterminingtheimpactofunplannedchanges.AsshowninFigure8.2,whenachangeoccursorisplanned,adeterminationismadewhetherthechangeismajororminor.Amajorchange,suchasreengineeringthestructureofthesystem,significantlyaffectsthesystem.Majorchangesofteninvolvethepurchaseofnewhardware,software,orservicesorthedevelopmentofnewsoftwaremodules.Anorganizationdoesnotneedtohaveaspecificcutoffformajor-minorchangedecisions.Aslidingscalebetweenthetwocanbeimplementedbyusingacombinationofthefollowingmethods:•Majorchange.Amajorchangerequiresanalysistodeterminesecurityrequirements.Theprocessdescribedabovecanbeused,althoughtheanalysismayfocusonlyonthearea(s)inwhichthechangehasoccurredorwilloccur.Iftheoriginalanalysisandsystemchangeshavebeendocumentedthroughoutthelifecycle,theanalysiswillnormallybemucheasier.Sincethesechangesresultinsignificantsystemacquisitions,developmentwork,orchangesinpolicy,thesystemshouldbereaccreditedtoensurethattheresidualriskisstillacceptable.•Minorchange.Manyofthechangesmadetoasystemdonotrequiretheextensiveanalysisperformedformajorchanges,butdorequiresomeanalysis.Eachchangecaninvolvealimitedriskassessmentthatweighsthepros(benefits)andcons(costs)andthatcanevenbeperformedon-the-flyatmeetings.Eveniftheanalysisisconductedinformally,decisionsshouldstillbeappropriatelydocumented.Thisprocessrecognizesthateven"small"decisionsshouldbe84 [PDF page 100] 8.LifeCycleSecurity risk-based.8.4.4.4PeriodicReaccreditationPeriodically,itisusefultoformallyreexaminethesecurityofasystemfromawiderperspective.Theanalysis,whichleadstoreaccreditation,shouldaddresssuchquestionsas:Isthesecuritystillsufficient?Aremajorchangesneeded?Thereaccreditationshouldaddresshigh-levelsecurityandmanagementconcernsaswellastheimplementationofthesecurity.Itisnotalwaysnecessarytoperformanewriskassessmentorcertificationinconjunctionwiththere-accreditation,buttheactivitiessupporteachother(andbothneedbeperformedperiodically).Themoreextensivesystemchangeshavebeen,themoreextensivetheanalysesshouldbe(e.g.,ariskassessmentorre-certification).Ariskassessmentislikelytouncoversecurityconcernsthatresultinsystemchanges.Afterthesystemhasbeenchanged,itmayneedtesting(includingcertification).Managementthenreaccreditsthesystemforcontinuedoperationiftheriskisacceptable.8.4.5DisposalThedisposalphaseofthecomputersystemlifecycleinvolvesthedispositionofinformation,hardware,andsoftware.Informationmaybemovedtoanothersystem,archived,discarded,ordestroyed.Whenarchivinginformation,considerthemethodforretrievingtheinformationinthefuture.Thetechnologyusedtocreatetherecordsmaynotbereadilyavailableinthefuture.Hardwareandsoftwarecanbesold,givenaway,ordiscarded.Thereisrarelyaneedtodestroyhardware,exceptforsomestoragemediacontainingconfidentialinformationthatcannotbesanitizedwithoutdestruction.Thedispositionofsoftwareneedstobeinkeepingwithitslicenseorotheragreementswiththedeveloper,ifapplicable.Somelicensesaresite-specificorcontainotheragreementsthat Itisimportanttoconsiderlegalr^uirementsforrecordsretentionwhendisposingofcomputersystems.Forfederalsystems,systemmanagementofficialsshouldconsultwiththeiragencyofficeresponsibleforretainingandarchivingfederalrecords. MediaSanitizationSinceelectronicinformationiseasytocopyandtransmit,informationthatissensitivetodisclosure. oftenneedstobecontrolledthroughoutthecomputersystemlifecyclesothatmanagerscanensureitsproperdisposition.ITieremovalofinformationfromastoragemedium(suchasaharddiskortape)iscalledsanitization.Differentkindsofsanitizationprovidedifferentlevelsofprotection.Adistinctioncanbemadebetweenclearinginformation(renderingitunrecoverablebykeyboardattack)andpurging(renderinginformationunrecoverableagainstlaboratoryattack).Hierearethreegeneralmethodsofpurgingmedia:overwriting,degaussing(formagneticmediaonly),anddestruction. 85 [PDF page 101] //.ManagementControls preventthesoftwarefrombeingtransferred.Measuresmayalsohavetobetakenforthefutureuseofdatathathasbeenencrypted,suchastakingappropriatestepstoensurethesecurelong-termstorageofcryptographickeys. 8.5InterdependenciesLikemanymanagementcontrols,lifecycleplanningreliesuponothercontrols.Threecloselylinkedcontrolareasarepolicy,assurance,andriskmanagement.Policy.Thedevelopmentofsystem-specificpolicyisanintegralpartofdeterminingthesecurityrequirements.Assurance.Goodlifecyclemanagementprovidesassurancethatsecurityisappropriatelyconsideredinsystemdesignandoperation.RiskManagement.Themaintenanceofsecuritythroughouttheoperationalphaseofasystemisaprocessofriskmanagement:analyzingrisk,reducingrisk,andmonitoringsafeguards.Riskassessmentisacriticalelementindesigningthesecurityofsystemsandinreaccreditations. 8.6CostConsiderationsSecurityisafactorthroughoutthelifecycleofasystem.Sometimessecuritychoicesaremadebydefault,withoutanyoneanalyzingwhychoicesaremade;sometimessecuritychoicesaremadecarefully,basedonanalysis.Thefirstcaseislikelytoresultinasystemwithpoorsecuritythatissusceptibletomanytypesofloss.Inthesecondcase,thecostoflifecyclemanagementshouldbemuchsmallerthanthelossesavoided.Themajorcostconsiderationsforlifecyclemanagementarepersonnelcostsandsomedelaysasthesystemprogressesthroughthelifecycleforcompletinganalysesandreviewsandobtainingmanagementapprovals. Itispossibletoovermanageasystem:tospendmoretimeplanning,designing,andanalyzingriskthanisnecessary.Planning,byitself,doesnotfurtherthemissionorbusinessofanorganization.Therefore,whilesecuritylifecyclemanagementcanyieldsignificantbenefits,theeffortshouldbecommensuratewiththesystem'ssize,complexity,andsensitivityandtherisksassociatedwiththesystem.Ingeneral,thehigherthevalueofthesystem,thenewerthesystem'sarchitecture,technologies,andpractices,andtheworsetheimpactifthesystemsecurityfails,themoreeffortshouldbespentonlifecyclemanagement.ReferencesCommunicationsSecurityEstablishment.AFrameworkforSecurityRiskManagementin 86 [PDF page 102] 8.LifeCycleSecurity InformationTechnologySystems.Canada.Dykman,CharleneA.ed.,andCharlesK.Davis,asc.ed.ControlObjectives-ControlsinanInformationSystemsEnvironment:Objectives,Guidelines,andAuditProcedures,(fourthedition).CarolStream,IL:TheEDPAuditorsFoundation.Inc.,April1992.Guttman,Barbara.ComputerSecurityConsiderationsinFederalProcurements:AGuideforProcurementInitiators,ContractingOfficers,andComputerSecurityOfficials.SpecialPublication800-4.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,March1992. InstituteofInternalAuditorsResearchFoundation.SystemAuditabilityandControlReport.AltamonteSprings,FL:TheInstituteofInternalAuditors,1991.Murphy,Michael,andXeniaLeyParker.HandbookofEDPAuditing,especiallyChapter2"TheAuditingProfession,"andChapter3,"TheEDPAuditingProfession."Boston,MA:Warren,Gorham&Lamont,1989.NationalBureauofStandards.GuidelineforComputerSecurityCertificationandAccreditation.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication102.September1983.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology."DispositionofSensitiveAutomatedInformation."ComputerSystemsLaboratoryBulletin.October1992.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology."SensitivityofInformation."ComputerSystemsLaboratoryBulletin.November1992.OfficeofManagementandBudget."GuidanceforPreparationofSecurityPlansforFederalComputerSystemsThatContainSensitiveInformation."0MBBulletin90-08.1990.Ruthberg,ZellaG,BonnieT.FisherandJohnW.LainhartIV.SystemDevelopmentAuditor.Oxford,England:ElsevierAdvancedTechnology,1991.Ruthberg,Z.,etal.GuidetoAuditingforControlsandSecurity:ASystemDevelopmentLifeCycleApproach.SpecialPublication500-153.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalBureauofStandards.April1988.VickersBenzel,T.C.DevelopingTrustedSystemsUsingDOD-STD-2I67A.Oakland,CA:IEEEComputerSocietyPress,1990.Wood,C."BuildingSecurityIntoYourSystemReducestheRiskofaBreach."LANTimes,10(3),1993.p47. 87 [PDF page 103] [PDF page 104] Chapter9ASSURANCE Computersecurityassuranceisthedegreeofconfidenceonehasthatthesecuritymeasures,bothtechnicalandoperational,workasintendedtoprotectthesystemandtheinformationitprocesses.Assuranceisnot,however,anabsoluteguaranteethatthemeasuresworkasintended.Likethecloselyrelatedareasofreliabilityandquality,assurancecanbedifficulttoanalyze;however,itissomethingpeopleexpectandobtain(thoughoftenwithoutrealizingit).Forexample,peoplemayroutinelygetproductrecommendationsfromcolleaguesbutmaynotconsidersuchrecomjnendationsasprovidingassurance.Assuranceisadegreeofconfidence,notatruemeasureofhowsecurethesystemactuallyis.Thisdistinctionisnecessarybecauseitisextremelydifficult~andinmanycasesvirtuallyimpossible—toknowexactlyhowsecureasystemis. Assuranceisachallengingsubjectbecauseitisdifficulttodescribeandevenmoredifficulttoquantify.Becauseofthis,manypeoplerefertoassuranceasa"warmfuzzyfeeling"thatcontrolsworkasintended.However,itispossibletoapplyamorerigorousapproachbyknowingtwothings:(1)whoneedstobeassuredand(2)whattypesofassurancecanbeobtained.Thepersonwhoneedstobeassuredisthemanagementofficialwhoisultimatelyresponsibleforthesecurityofthesystem.Withinthefederalgovernment,thispersonistheauthorizingoraccreditingojficiaV^Therearemanymethodsandtoolsforobtainingassurance.Fordiscussionpurposes,thischaptercategorizesassuranceintermsofageneralsystemlifecycle.Thechapterfirstdiscussesplanningforassuranceandthenpresentsthetwocategoriesofassurancemethodsandtools:(1)designandimplementationassuranceand(2)operationalassurance.Operationalassuranceisfurthercategorizedintoauditsandmonitoring.Thedivisionbetweendesignandimplementationassuranceandoperationalassurancecanbefuzzy.Whilesuchissuesasconfigurationmanagementorauditsarediscussedunderoperationalassurance,theymayalsobevitalduringasystem'sdevelopment.Thediscussiontendstofocusmoreontechnicalissuesduringdesignandimplementationassuranceandtobeamixtureof Accreditationisaprocessusedprimarilywithinthefederalgovernment.Itistheprocessofmanagerialauthorizationforprocessing.Differentagenciesmayuseothertermsforthisapprovalfunction.ThetermsusedhereareconsistentwithFederalInformationProcessingStandard102,GuidelineforComputerSecurityCertificationandAccreditation.(Seereferencesectionofthischapter.) Securityassuranceisthedegreeofconfidenceonehasthatthesecuritycontrolsoperatecorrectlyandprotectthesystemasintended. 89 [PDF page 105] //.ManagementControls management,operational,andtechnicalissuesunderoperationalassurance.Thereadershouldkeepinmindthatthedivisionissomewhatartificialandthatthereissubstantialoverlap. 9.1AccreditationandAssuranceAccreditationisamanagementofficial'sformalacceptanceoftheadequacyofasystem'ssecurity.Thebestwaytoviewcomputersecurityaccreditationisasaformofqualitycontrol.Itforcesmanagersandtechnicalstafftoworktogethertofindworkable,cost-effectivesolutionsgivensecurityneeds,technicalconstraints,operationalconstraints,andmissionorbusinessrequirements.Theaccreditationprocessobligesmanagerstomakethecriticaldecisionregardingtheadequacyofsecuritysafeguardsand,therefore,torecognizeandperformtheirroleinsecuringtheirsystems.Inorderforthedecisionstobesound,theyneedtobebasedonreliableinformationabouttheimplementationofbothtechnicalandnontechnicalsafeguards.Theseinclude:•Technicalfeatures(Dotheyoperateasintended?).•Operationalpractices(Isthesystemoperatedaccordingtostatedprocedures?).•Overallsecurity(Aretherethreatswhichthetechnicalfeaturesandoperationalpracticesdonotaddress?).•Remainingrisks(Aretheyacceptable?).Acomputersystemshouldbeaccreditedbeforethesystembecomesoperationalwithperiodicreaccreditationaftermajorsystemchangesorwhensignificanttimehaselapsed.^^Evenifasystemwasnotinitiallyaccredited,theaccreditationprocesscanbeinitiatedatanytime.Chapter8ftirtherdiscussesaccreditation.9.1.1AccreditationandAssuranceAssuranceisanextremelyimportant~butnottheonly~elementinaccreditation.Asshowninthediagram,assuranceaddresseswhetherthetechnicalmeasuresandproceduresoperateeither(1)accordingtoasetofsecurityrequirementsandspecificationsor(2)accordingtogeneralqualityprinciples.Accreditationalsoaddresseswhetherthesystem'ssecurityrequirementsarecorrectandwellimplementedandwhetherthelevelofqualityissufficientlyhigh.TheseactivitiesarediscussedinChapters7and8. 0MBCircularA-130requiresmanagementsecurityauthorizationofoperationforfederalsystems. 90 [PDF page 106] 9.Assurance 9.1.2SelectingAssuranceMethodsTheaccreditingofficialmakesthefinaldecisionabouthowmuchandwhattypesofassuranceareneededforasystem.Forthisdecisiontobeinformed,itisderivedfromareviewofsecurity,suchasariskassessmentorotherstudy(e.g.,certification),asdeemedappropriatebytheaccreditingofficial.^^Theaccreditingofficialneedstobeinapositiontoanalyzetheprosandconsofthecostofassurance,thecostofcontrols,andtheriskstotheorganization.Attheendoftheaccreditationprocess,theaccreditingofficialwUlbetheonetoaccepttheremainingrisk.Thus, Inthepast,accreditationhasbeendefinedtorequireacertification,whichisanin-depthtestingoftechnicalcontrols.Itisnowrecognizedwithinthefederalgovernmentthatotheranalyses(e.g.,ariskanalysisoraudit)canalsoprovidesufficientassuranceforaccreditation. 91 [PDF page 107] //.ManagementControls theselectionofassurancemethodsshouldbecoordinatedwiththeaccreditingofficial. Inselectingassurancemethods,theneedforassuranceshouldbeweighedagainstitscost.Assurancecanbequiteexpensive,especiallyifextensivetestingisdone.Eachmethodhasstrengthsandweaknessesintermsofcostandwhatkindofassuranceisactuallybeingdelivered.Acombinationofmethodscanoftenprovidegreaterassurance,sincenomethodisfoolproof,andcanbelesscostlythanextensivetesting. Theaccreditingofficialisnottheonlyarbiterofassurance.Otherofficialswhousethesystemshouldalsobeconsulted.(Forexample,aProductionManagerwhoreliesonaSupplySystemshouldprovideinputtotheSupplyManager.)Inaddition,theremaybeconstraintsoutsidetheaccreditingofficial'scontrolthatalsoaffecttheselectionofmethods.Forinstance,someofthemethodsmayundulyrestrictcompetitioninacquisitionsoffederalinformationprocessingresourcesormaybecontrarytotheorganization'sprivacypolicies.Certainassurancemethodsmayberequiredbyorganizationalpolicyordirective. 9.2PlanningandAssuranceAssuranceplanningshouldbeginduringtheplanningphaseofthesystemlifecycle,eitherfornewsystemsorasystemupgrades.Planningforassurancewhenplanningforothersystemrequirementsmakessense.Ifasystemisgoingtoneedextensivetesting,itshouldbebuilttofacilitatesuchtesting. Planningforassurancehelpsamanagermakedecisionsaboutwhatkindofassurancewillbecost-effective.IfamanagerwaitsuntilasystemisbuUtorboughttoconsiderassurance,thenumberofwaystoobtainassurancemaybemuchsmallerthanifthemanagerhadplannedforitearlier,andtheremainingassuranceoptionsmaybemoreexpensive.9.3DesignandImplementationAssuranceDesignandimplementationassuranceaddresseswhetherthefeaturesofasystem,application,orcomponentmeetssecurityrequirementsandspecificationsandwhethertheyaretheyarewelldesignedandwellbuilt.Chapter8discussesthesourceforsecurityrequirementsandspecifications.Designandimplementationassuranceexaminessystemdesign,development,andinstallation.Designandimplementationassuranceisusuallyassociated Designandimplementationassuranceshouldbeexaminedfromtwopointsofview:thecomponentandthesystem.Componentassurancelooksatthesecurityofaspecificproductorsystemcomponent,suchasanoperatingsystem,application,securityadd-on,ortelecommunicationsmodule.Systemassurancelooksatthesecurityoftheentiresystem,includingtheinteractionbetweenproductsandmodules. 92 [PDF page 108] 9.Assurance withthedevelopment/acquisitionandimplementationphaseofthesystemlifecycle;however,itshouldalsobeconsideredthroughoutthelifecycleasthesystemismodified.Asstatedearlier,assurancecanaddresswhethertheproductorsystemmeetsasetofsecurityspecifications,oritcanprovideotherevidenceofquality.Thissectionoutlinesthemajormethodsforobtainingdesignandimplementationassurance.9.3.1TestingandCertificationTestingcanaddressthequalityofthesystemasbuilt,asimplemented,orasoperated.Thus,itcanbeperformedthroughoutthedevelopmentcycle,aftersysteminstallation,andthroughoutitsoperationalphase.Somecommontestingtechniquesincludefunctionaltesting(toseeifagivenfiinctionworksaccordingtoitsrequirements)orpenetrationtesting(toseeifsecuritycanbebypassed).Thesetechniquescanrangefromtryingseveraltestcasestoin-depthstudiesusingmetrics,automatedtools,ormultipledetailedtestcases.Certificationisaformalprocessfortestingcomponentsorsystemsagainstaspecifiedsetofsecurityrequirements.Certificationisnormallyperformedbyanindependentreviewer,ratherthanoneinvolvedinbuildingthesystem.Certificationismoreoftencost-effectiveforcomplexorhigh-risksystems.Lessformalsecuritytestingcanbeusedforlower-risksystems.Certificationcanbeperformedatmanystagesofthesystemdesignandimplementationprocessandcantakeplaceinalaboratory,operatingenvironment,orboth.9.3.2NISTConformanceTestingandValidationSuitesNISTproducesvalidationsuitesandconformancetestingtodetermineifaproduct(software,hardware,firmware)meetsspecifiedstandards.Thesetestsuitesaredevelopedforspecificstandardsandusemanymethods.Conformancetostandardscanbeimportantformanyreasons,includinginteroperabilityorstrengthofsecurityprovided.NISTpublishesalistofvalidatedproductsquarterly.9.3.3UseofAdvancedorTrustedDevelopmentInthedevelopmentofbothcommercialoff-the-shelfproductsandmorecustomizedsystems,theuseofadvancedortrustedsystemarchitectures,developmentmethodologies,orsoftwareengineeringtechniquescanprovideassurance.Examplesincludesecuritydesignanddevelopmentreviews,formalmodeling,mathematicalproofs,ISO9000qualitytechniques,oruseofsecurityarchitectureconcepts,suchasatrustedcomputingbase(TCB)orreferencemonitor.9.3.4UseofReliableArchitecturesSomesystemarchitecturesareintrinsicallymorereliable,suchassystemsthatusefault-tolerance.93 [PDF page 109] //.ManagementControls redundance,shadowing,orredundantarrayofinexpensivedisks(RAID)features.Theseexamplesareprimarilyassociatedwithsystemavailability. 9.3.5UseofReliableSecurityOnefactorinreliablesecurityistheconceptofeaseofsafeuse,whichpostulatesthatasystemthatiseasiertosecurewillbemorelikelytobesecure.Securityfeaturesmaybemorelikelytobeusedwhentheinitialsystemdefaultstothe"mostsecure"option.Inaddition,asystem'ssecuritymaybedeemedmorereliableifitdoesnotuseverynewtechnologythathasnotbeentestedinthe"real"world(oftencalled"bleeding-edge"technology).Conversely,asystemthatusesolder,well-testedsoftwaremaybelesslikelytocontainbugs.9.3.6EvaluationsAproductevaluationnormallyincludestesting.Evaluationscanbeperformedbymanytypesoforganizations,includinggovernmentagencies,bothdomesticandforeign;independentorganizations,suchastradeandprofessionalorganizations;othervendorsorcommercialgroups;orindividualusersoruserconsortia.Productreviewsintradeliteratureareaformofevaluation,asaremoreformalreviewsmadeagainstspecificcriteria.Importantfactorsforusingevaluationsarethedegreeofindependenceoftheevaluatinggroup,whethertheevaluationcriteriareflectneededsecurityfeatures,therigorofthetesting,thetestingenvironment,theageoftheevaluation,thecompetenceoftheevaluatingorganization,andthelimitationsplacedontheevaluationsbytheevaluatinggroup(e.g.,assumptionsaboutthethreatoroperatingenvironment).9.3.7AssuranceDocumentationTheabilitytodescribesecurityrequirementsandhowtheyweremetcanreflectthedegreetowhichasystemorproductdesignerunderstandsapplicablesecurityissues.Withoutagoodunderstandingoftherequirements,itisnotlikelythatthedesignerwiUbeabletomeetthem.Assurancedocumentationcanaddressthesecurityeitherforasystemorforspecificcomponents.System-leveldocumentationshoulddescribethesystem'ssecurityrequirementsandhowtheyhavebeenimplemented,includinginterrelationshipsamongapplications,theoperatingsystem,ornetworks.System-leveldocumentationaddressesmorethanjusttheoperatingsystem,thesecuritysystem,andapplications;itdescribesthesystemasintegratedandimplementedinaparticularenvironment.Componentdocumentationwillgenerallybeanoff-the-shelfproduct,whereasthesystemdesignerorimplementerwillgenerallydevelopsystemdocumentation.9.3.8AccreditationofProducttoOperateinSimilarSituationTheaccreditationofaproductorsystemtooperateinasimilarsituationcanbeusedtoprovide94 [PDF page 110] 9.Assurance someassurance.However,itisimportanttorealizethatanaccreditationisenvironment-andsystem-specific.Sinceaccreditationbalancesriskagainstadvantages,thesameproductmaybeappropriatelyaccreditedforoneenvironmentbutnotforanother,evenbythesameaccreditingofficial. 9.3.9Self-CertificationAvendor's,integrator's,orsystemdeveloper'sself-certificationdoesnotrelyonanimpartialorindependentagenttoperformatechnicalevaluationofasystemtoseehowwellitmeetsastatedsecurityrequirement.Eventhoughitisnotimpartial,itcanstillprovideassurance.Theself-certifier'sreputationisontheUne,andaresultingcertificationreportcanbereadtodeterminewhetherthesecurityrequirementwasdefinedandwhetherameaningfulreviewwasperformed.Ahybridcertificationispossiblewheretheworkisperformedundertheauspicesorreviewofanindependentorganizationbyhavingthatorganizationanalyzetheresultingreport,performspotchecks,orperformotheroversight.Thismethodmaybeabletocombinethelowercostandgreaterspeedofaself-certificationwiththeimpartialityofanindependentreview.Thereview,however,maynotbeasthoroughasindependentevaluationortesting. 9.3.10Warranties,IntegrityStatements,andLiabilitiesWarrantiesareanothersourceofassurance.Ifamanufacturer,producer,systemdeveloper,orintegratoriswillingtocorrecterrorswithincertaintimeframesorbythenextrelease,thisshouldgivethesystemmanagerasenseofcommitmenttotheproductandoftheproduct'squality.Anintegritystatementisaformaldeclarationorcertificationoftheproduct.Itcanbebackedupbyapromiseto(a)fixtheitem(warranty)or(b)payforlosses(liability)iftheproductdoesnotconformtotheintegritystatement.9.3.11Manufacturer'sPublishedAssertionsAmanufacturer'sordeveloper'spublishedassertionorformaldeclarationprovidesalimitedamountofassurancebasedexclusivelyonreputation.9.3.12DistributionAssurance Itisoftenimportanttoknowthatsoftwarehasarrivedunmodified,especiallyifitisdistributedelectronically.Insuchcases,checkbitsordigitalsignaturescanprovidehighassurancethatcodehasnotbeenmodified.Anti-virussoftwarecanbeusedtochecksoftwarethatcomesfromsourceswithunknownreliability(suchasabulletinboard). 95 [PDF page 111] //.ManagementControls 9.4OperationalAssuranceDesignandimplementationassuranceaddressesthequalityofsecurityfeaturesbuiltintosystems.Operationalassuranceaddresseswhetherthesystem'stechnicalfeaturesarebeingbypassedorhavevulnerabilitiesandwhetherrequiredproceduresarebeingfollowed.Itdoesnotaddresschangesinthesystem'ssecurityrequirements,whichcouldbecausedbychangestothesystemanditsoperatingorthreatenvironment.(ThesechangesareaddressedinChapter8.) Securitytendstodegradeduringtheoperationalphaseofthesystemlifecycle.Systemusersandoperatorsdiscovernewwaystointentionallyorunintentionallybypassorsubvertsecurity(especiallyifthereisaperceptionthatbypassingsecurityimprovesfunctionality).Usersandadministratorsoftenthinkthatnothingwillhappentothemortheirsystem,sotheyshortcutsecurity.Strictadherencetoproceduresisrare,andtheybecomeoutdated,anderrorsinthesystem'sadministrationcommonlyoccur.Organizationsusetwobasicmethodstomaintainoperationalassurance:•Asystemaudit—aone-timeorperiodiceventtoevaluatesecurity.Anauditcanvarywidelyinscope:itmayexamineanentiresystemforthepurposeofreaccreditationoritmayinvestigateasingleanomalousevent.•Monitoring—anongoingactivitythatchecksonthesystem,itsusers,ortheenvironment.Ingeneral,themore"real-time"anactivityis,themoreitfallsintothecategoryofmonitoring.Thisdistinctioncancreatesomeunnecessarylinguistichairsplitting,especiallyconcerningsystem-generatedaudittrails.DailyorweeklyreviewingoftheaudittraU(forunauthorizedaccessattempts)isgenerallymonitoring,whileanhistoricalreviewofseveralmonths'worthofthetrail(tracingtheactionsofaspecificuser)isprobablyanaudit. 9.4.1AuditMethodsandToolsAnauditconductedtosupportoperationalassuranceexamineswhetherthesystemismeetingstatedorimpliedsecurityrequirementsincludingsystemandorganizationpolicies.Someauditsalsoexaminewhethersecurityrequirementsareappropriate,butthisisoutsidethescopeofoperationalassurance.(SeeChapter8.)Lessformalauditsareoftencalledsecurityreviews. 96 [PDF page 112] 9.Assurance Auditscanbeself-administeredorindependent(eitherinternalorexternal).^'*Bothtypescanprovideexcellentinformationabouttechnical,procedural,managerial,orotheraspectsofsecurity.Theessentialdifferencebetweenaself-auditandanindependentauditis^^mmmi^^^^mmi^^^m^^^mmmmm^^objectivity.Reviewsdonebysystemmanagementstaff,oftencalledself-audits/assessments,haveaninherentconflictofinterest.Thesystemmanagementstaffmayhavelittleincentivetosaythatthecomputersystemwaspoorlydesignedorissloppily^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^mmmmmoperated.Ontheotherhand,theymaybemotivatedbyastrongdesiretoimprovethesecurityofthesystem.Inaddition,theyareknowledgeableaboutthesystemandmaybeabletofindhiddenproblems. Apersonwhoperformsanindependentauditshouldbefreefrompersonalandexternalconstraintswhichmayimpairtheirindependenceandshouldbeorganizationallyindependent. Theindependentauditor,bycontrast,shouldhavenoprofessionalstakeinthesystem.Independentauditmaybeperformedbyaprofessionalauditstaffinaccordancewithgenerallyacceptedauditingstandards.Therearemanymethodsandtools,someofwhicharedescribedhere,thatcanbeusedtoauditasystem.Severalofthemoverlap.9.4.1.1AutomatedToolsEvenforsmallmultiusercomputersystems,itisabigjobtomanuallyreviewsecurityfeatures.Automatedtoolsmakeitfeasibletoreviewevenlargecomputersystemsforavarietyofsecurityflaws.Therearetwotypesofautomatedtools:(1)activetools,whichfindvulnerabilitiesbytryingtoexploitthem,and(2)passivetests,whichonlyexaminethesystemandinfertheexistenceofproblemsfromthestateofthesystem.Automatedtoolscanbeusedtohelpfindavarietyofthreatsandvulnerabilities,suchasimproperaccesscontrolsoraccesscontrolconfigurations,weakpasswords,lackofintegrityofthesystemsoftware,ornotusingallrelevantsoftwareupdatesandpatches.Thesetoolsareoftenverysuccessfulatfindingvulnerabilitiesandaresometimesusedbyhackerstobreakintosystems.Nottakingadvantageofthesetoolsputssystemadministratorsatadisadvantage.Manyofthetoolsaresimpletouse;however,someprograms(suchasaccess-controlauditingtoolsforlarge AnexampleofanmternalauditorinthefederalgovernmentistheInspectorGeneral.TheGeneralAccountingOfficecanperformtheroleofexternalauditorinthefederalgovernment.Intheprivatesector,thecorporateauditstaffservestheroleofinternalauditor,whileapublicaccountingfirmwouldbeanexternalauditor. 97 [PDF page 113] //.ManagementControls mainframesystems)requirespecializedskilltouseandinterpret. TheGeneralAccountingOfficeprovidesstandardsandguidanceforinternalcontrolsauditsoffederalagencies. 9.4.1.2InternalControlsAuditAnauditorcanreviewcontrolsinplaceanddeterminewhethertheyareeffective.Theauditorwilloftenanalyzebothcomputerand11^^11,1^^11^,1^^noncomputer-basedcontrols.Techniquesusedincludeinquiry,observation,andtesting(ofboththecontrolsthemselvesandthedata).Theauditcanalsodetectillegalacts,errors,irregularities,oralackofcompliancewithlawsandregulations.Securitychecklistsandpenetrationtesting,discussedbelow,maybeused. Warning:SecurityCheckliststhatarepassed(e.g.,withaB+orbetterscore)areoftenusedmistakenlyasproof(insteadofanindication)thatsecurityissufficientAlso,managersofsystemswhich"fail"achecklistoftenfocustoomuchattentionon"gettingthepoints,"ratherthanwhetherthesecuritymeasuresmakessenseintheparticularenvironmentandarecorrectlyimplemented. 9.4.1.3SecurityChecklistsWithinthegovernment,thecomputersecurityplanprovidesachecklistagainstwhichthesystemcanbeaudited.Thisplan,discussedinChapter8,outUnesthemajorsecurityconsiderationsforasystem,includingmanagement,operational,andtechnicalissues.Oneadvantageofusingacomputermmm^^^^^^^m^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^msecurityplanisthatitreflectstheuniquesecurityenvironmentofthesystem,ratherthanagenericlistofcontrols.Otherchecklistscanbedeveloped,whichincludenationalororganizationalsecuritypoliciesandpractices(oftenreferredtoasbaselines).Listsof"generallyacceptedsecuritypractices"(GSSPs)canalsobeused.Careneedstobetakensothatdeviationsfromthelistarenotautomaticallyconsideredwrong,sincetheymaybeappropriateforthesystem'sparticularenvironmentortechnicalconstraints.Checklistscanalsobeusedtoverifythatchangestothesystemhavebeenreviewedfromasecuritypointofview.Acommonauditexaminesthesystem'sconfigurationtoseeifmajorchanges(suchasconnectingtotheInternet)haveoccurredthathavenotyetbeenanalyzedfromasecuritypointofview.9.4.1.4PenetrationTestingPenetrationtestingcanusemanymethodstoattemptasystembreak-in.Inadditiontousingactiveautomatedtoolsasdescribedabove,penetrationtestingcanbedone"manually."Themostusefultypeofpenetrationtestingistousemethodsthatmightreallybeusedagainstthesystem.ForhostsontheInternet,thiswouldcertainlyincludeautomatedtools.Formanysystems,laxproceduresoralackofinternalcontrolsonapplicationsarecommonvulnerabilitiesthatpenetrationtestingcantarget.Anothermethodis"socialengineering,"whichinvolvesgetting98 [PDF page 114] 9.Assurance usersoradministratorstodivulgeinformationaboutsystems,includingtheirpasswords.9.4.2MonitoringMethodsandToolsSecuritymonitoringisanongoingactivitythatlooksforvulnerabilitiesandsecurityproblems.Manyofthemethodsaresimilartothoseusedforaudits,butaredonemoreregularlyor,forsomeautomatedtools,inrealtime.9.4.2.1ReviewofSystemLogsAsdiscussedinChapter8,aperiodicreviewofsystem-generatedlogscandetectsecurityproblems,includingattemptstoexceedaccessauthorityorgainsystemaccessduringunusualhours.9.4.2.2AutomatedToolsSeveraltypesofautomatedtoolsmonitorasystemforsecurityproblems.Someexamplesfollow:•Virusscannersareapopularmeansofcheckingforvirusinfections.Theseprogramstestforthepresenceofvirusesinexecutableprogramfiles. •Checksummingpresumesthatprogramfilesshouldnotchangebetweenupdates.Theyworkbygeneratingamathematicalvaluebasedonthecontentsofaparticularfile.Whentheintegrityofthefileistobeverified,thechecksumisgeneratedonthecurrentfileandcomparedwiththepreviouslygeneratedvalue.Ifthetwovaluesareequal,theintegrityofthefileisverified.Programchecksummingcandetectviruses,Trojanhorses,accidentalchangestofilescausedbyhardwarefailures,andotherchangestofiles.However,theymaybesubjecttocovertreplacementbyasystemintruder.Digitalsignaturescanalsobeused.•Passwordcrackerscheckpasswordsagainstadictionary(eithera"regular"dictionaryoraspecializedonewitheasy-to-guesspasswords)andalsocheckifpasswordsarecommonpermutationsoftheuserID.Examplesofspecialdictionaryentriescouldbethenamesofregionalsportsteamsandstars;commonpermutationscouldbetheuserIDspelledbackwards.•Integrityverificationprogramscanbeusedbysuchapplicationstolookforevidenceofdatatampering,errors,andomissions.Techniquesincludeconsistencyandreasonablenesschecks Whilepenetrationtestingisaverypowerfultechnique,itshouldpreferablybeconductedwiththeknowledgeandconsentofsystemmanagement.Unknownpenetrationattemptscancausealotofstressamongoperationspersonnel,andmaycreateunnecessarydisturbances. 99 [PDF page 115] //.ManagementControls andvalidationduringdataentryandprocessing.Thesetechniquescancheckdataelements,asinputorasprocessed,againstexpectedvaluesorrangesofvalues;analyzetransactionsforproperflow,sequencing,andauthorization;orexaminedataelementsforexpectedrelationships.Theseprogramscompriseaveryimportantsetofprocessesbecausetheycanbeusedtoconvincepeoplethat,iftheydowhattheyshouldnotdo,accidentallyorintentionally,theywillbecaught.Manyoftheseprogramsrelyuponloggingofindividualuseractivities. •Intrusiondetectorsanalyzethesystemaudittrail,especiallylog-ons,connections,operatingsystemcalls,andvariouscommandparameters,foractivitythatcouldrepresentunauthorizedactivity.IntrusiondetectioniscoveredinChapters12and18. •Systemperformancemonitoringanalyzessystemperformancelogsinrealtimetolookforavailabilityproblems,includingactiveattacks(suchasthe1988Internetworm)andsystemandnetworkslowdownsandcrashes.9.4.2.3ConfigurationManagementFromasecuritypointofview,configurationmanagementprovidesassurancethatthesysteminoperationisthecorrectversion(configuration)ofthesystemandthatanychangestobemadearereviewedforsecurityimplications.Configurationmanagementcanbeusedtohelpensurethatchangestakeplaceinanidentifiableandcontrolledenvironmentandthattheydonotunintentionallyharmanyofthesystem'sproperties,includingitssecurity.Someorganizations,particularlythosewithverylargesystems(suchasthefederalgovernment),useaconfigurationcontrolboardforconfigurationmanagement.Whensuchaboardexists,itishelpfultohaveacomputersecurityexpertparticipate.Inanycase,itisusefultohavecomputersecurityofficersparticipateinsystemmanagementdecisionmaking.Changestothesystemcanhavesecurityimplicationsbecausetheymayintroduceorremovevulnerabilitiesandbecausesignificantchangesmayrequireupdatingthecontingencyplan,riskanalysis,oraccreditation.9.4.2.4TradeLiterature/Publications/ElectronicNewsInadditiontomonitoringthesystem,itisusefultomonitorexternalsourcesforinformation.Suchsourcesastradeliterature,bothprintedandelectronic,haveinformationaboutsecurityvulnerabilities,patches,andotherareasthatimpactsecurity.TheForumofIncidentResponseTeams(FIRST)hasanelectronicmailinglistthatreceivesinformationonthreats,vulnerabilities, 100 [PDF page 116] 9.Assurance andpatches. 9.5InterdependenciesAssuranceisanissueforeverycontrolandsafeguarddiscussedinthishandbook.AreuserIDandaccessprivilegeskeptuptodate?Hasthecontingencyplanbeentested?Cantheaudittrailbetamperedwith?Oneimportantpointtobereemphasizedhereisthatassuranceisnotonlyfortechnicalcontrols,butforoperationalcontrolsaswell.Althoughthechapterfocusedoninformationsystemsassurance,itisalsoimportanttohaveassurancethatmanagementcontrolsareworkingwell.Isthesecurityprogrameffective?Arepoliciesunderstoodandfollowed?Asnotedintheintroductiontothischapter,theneedforassuranceismorewidespreadthanpeopleoftenrealize. LifeCycle.Assuranceiscloselylinkedtotheplanningforsecurityinthesystemlifecycle.Systemscanbedesignedtofacilitatevariouskindsoftestingagainstspecifiedsecurityrequirements.Byplanningforsuchtestingearlyintheprocess,costscanbereduced;insomecases,withoutproperplanning,somekindsofassurancecannotbeotherwiseobtained. 9.6CostConsiderationsTherearemanymethodsofobtainingassurancethatsecurityfeaturesworkasanticipated.Sinceassurancemethodstendtobequalitativeratherthanquantitative,theywiUneedtobeevaluated.Assurancecanalsobequiteexpensive,especiallyifextensivetestingisdone.Itisusefultoevaluatetheamountofassurancereceivedforthecosttomakeabest-valuedecision.Ingeneral,personnelcostsdriveupthecostofassurance.Automatedtoolsaregenerallylimitedtoaddressingspecificproblems,buttheytendtobelessexpensive. ReferencesBorsook,P."SeekingSecurity."Byte.18(6),1993.pp.119-128.Dykman,CharleneA.ed.,andCharlesK.Davis,asc.ed.ControlObjectives-ControlsinanInformationSystemsEnvironment:Objectives,Guidelines,andAuditProcedures,(fourthedition).CarolStream,IL:TheEDPAuditorsFoundation,Inc.,April1992.Farmer,DanandWietseVenema."ImprovingtheSecurityofYourSitebyBreakingIntoIt."AvailablefromFTP.WIN.TUE.nl.1993. 'ForinformationonFIRST,sende-mailtoFIRST-SEC@FIRST.ORG.101 [PDF page 117] //.ManagementControls Guttman,Barbara.ComputerSecurityConsiderationsinFederalProcurements:AGuideforProcurementInitiators,ContractingOfficers,andComputerSecurityOfficials.SpecialPublication800-4.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,March1992.Howe,D."InformationSystemSecurityEngineering:CornerstonetotheFuture."Proceedingsofthe15thNationalComputerSecurityConference,Vol1.(Baltimore,MD)Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,1992.pp.244-251.Levine,M."AuditServeSecurityEvaluationCriteria."AuditVision.2(2).1992,pp.29-40.NationalBureauofStandards.GuidelineforComputerSecurityCertificationandAccreditation.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication102.September1983.NationalBureauofStandards.GuidelineforLifecycleValidation,Verification,andTestingofComputerSoftware.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication101.June1983.NationalBureauofStandards.GuidelineforSoftwareVerificationandValidationPlans.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication132.November1987.Nuegent,W.,J.GiUigan,L.Hoffman,andZ.Ruthberg.TechnologyAssessment:MethodsforMeasuringtheLevelofComputerSecurity.SpecialPublication500-133.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalBureauofStandards,1985.Peng,WendyW.,andDoloresR.Wallace.SoftwareErrorAnalysis.SpecialPublication500-209.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,1993.Peterson,P."InfosecurityandShrinkingMedia."ISSAAccess.5(2),1992.pp.19-22.Pfleeger,C,S.Pfleeger,andM.Theofanos,"AMethodologyforPenetrationTesting."ComputersandSecurity.?>{!),\9%9.'p'p.6X3-620.Polk,W.Timothy,andLawrenceBassham.AGuidetotheSelectionofAnti-VirusToolsandTechniques.SpecialPublication800-5.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,December1992.Polk,W.Timothy.AutomatedToolsforTestingComputerSystemVulnerability.SpecialPublication800-6.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,December1992. 102 [PDF page 118] 9.Assurance President'sCouncilonIntegrityandEfficiency.ReviewofGeneralControlsinFederalComputerSystems.Washington,DC:President'sCouncilonIntegrityandEfficiency,October1988.President'sCouncilonManagementImprovementandthePresident'sCouncilonIntegrityandEfficiency.ModelFrameworkforManagementControlOverAutomatedInformationSystem.Washington,DC:President'sCouncilonManagementImprovement,January1988.Ruthberg,ZellaG,BonnieT.FisherandJohnW.LainhartIV.SystemDevelopmentAuditor.Oxford,England:ElsevierAdvancedTechnology,1991.Ruthburg,Zella,etal.GuidetoAuditingforControlsandSecurity:ASystemDevelopmentLifeCycleApproach.SpecialPublication500-153.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalBureauofStandards,April1988.StrategicDefenseInitiationOrganization.TrustedSoftwareMethodology.Vols.1andII.SDI-S-SD-91-000007.June17,1992.Wallace,Dolores,andJ.C.Cherniasvsky.GuidetoSoftwareAcceptance.SpecialPublication500-180.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,April1990.Wallace,Dolores,andRogerFugi.SoftwareVerificationandValidation:ItsRoleinComputerAssuranceandItsRelationshipwithSoftwareProductManagementStandards.SpecialPublication500-165.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,September1989.Wallace,DoloresR.,LauraM.Ippolito,andD.RichardKuhn.HighIntegritySoftwareStandardsandGuidelines.SpecialPublication500-204.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,1992.Wood,C,etal.ComputerSecurity:AComprehensiveControlsChecklist.NewYork,NY:JohnWUey&Sons,1987. 103 [PDF page 119] [PDF page 120] III.OPERATIONALCONTROLS 105 [PDF page 121] [PDF page 122] Chapter10PERSONNEL/USERISSUESManyimportantissuesincomputersecurityinvolvehumanusers,designers,implementors,andmanagers.Abroadrangeofsecurityissuesrelatetohowtheseindividualsinteractwithcomputersandtheaccessandauthoritiestheyneedtodotheirjob.Nocomputersystemcanbesecuredwithoutproperlyaddressingthesesecurityissues. Thischapterexaminesissuesconcerningthestaffingofpositionsthatinteractwithcomputersystems;theadministrationofusersonasystem,includingconsiderationsforterminatingemployeeaccess;andspecialconsiderationsthatmayarisewhencontractorsorthepublichaveaccesstosystems.Personnelissuesarecloselylinkedtologicalaccesscontrols,discussedinChapter17. 10.1staffingThestaffingprocessgenerallyinvolvesatleastfourstepsandcanapplyequallytogeneralusersaswellastoapplicationmanagers,systemmanagementpersonnel,andsecuritypersonnel.Thesefourstepsare:(1)definingthejob,normallyinvolvingthedevelopmentofapositiondescription;(2)determiningthesensitivityoftheposition;(3)fillingtheposition,whichinvolvesscreeningapplicantsandselectinganindividual;and(4)training. 10.1.1Groundbreaking-PositionDefinitionEarlyintheprocessofdefiningaposition,securityissuesshouldbeidentifiedanddealtwith.Onceapositionhasbeenbroadlydefined,theresponsiblesupervisorshoulddeterminethetypeofcomputeraccessneededfortheposition.Therearetwogeneralprinciplestoapplywhengrantingaccess:separationofdutiesandleastprivilege.Separationofdutiesreferstodividingrolesandresponsibilitiessothatasingleindividualcannotsubvertacriticalprocess.Forexample,infinancialsystems,nosingleindividualshouldnormallybegivenauthoritytoissuechecks.Rather,onepersoninitiatesarequestforapaymentandanotherauthorizesthatsamepayment.Ineffect,checksandbalancesneedtobedesignedintoboththeprocessaswellasthespecific,individualpositionsofpersonnelwhowillimplementtheprocess.Ensuringthatsuchdutiesarewelldefinedistheresponsibilityofmanagement.Leastprivilegereferstothesecurityobjectiveofgrantingusersonlythoseaccessestheyneedto Adistinctionismadebetweenusersandpersonnel,sincesomeusers(e.g.,contractorsandmembersofthepublic)maynotbeconsideredpersonnel(i.e.,employees).107 [PDF page 123] ///.OperationalControls performtheirofficialduties.Dataentryclerks,forexample,maynothaveanyneedtorunanalysisreportsoftheirdatabase.However,leastprivilegedoesnotmeanthatalluserswiUhaveextremelylittlefunctionalaccess;someemployeeswillhavesignificantaccessifitisrequiredfortheirposition.However,applyingthisprinciplemaylimitthedamageresultingfromaccidents,errors,orunauthorizeduseofsystemresources.Itisimportanttomakecertainthattheimplementationofleastprivilegedoesnotinterferewiththeabilitytohavepersonnelsubstituteforeachotherwithoutunduedelay.Withoutcarefulplanning,accesscontrolcaninterferewithcontingencyplans.10.1.2DeterminingPositionSensitivityKnowledgeofthedutiesandaccesslevelsthataparticularpositionwiUrequireisnecessaryfordeterminingthesensitivityoftheposition.Theresponsiblemanagementofficialshouldcorrectlyidentifypositionsensitivitylevelssothatappropriate,cost-effectivescreeningcanbecompleted.Variouslevelsofsensitivityareassignedtopositionsinthefederalgovernment.Determiningtheappropriatelevelisbaseduponsuchfactorsasthetypeanddegreeofharm(e.g.,disclosureofprivateinformation,interruptionofcriticalprocessing,computerfraud)theindividualcancausethroughmisuseofthecomputersystemaswellasmoretraditionalfactors,suchasaccesstoclassifiedinformationandfiduciaryresponsibilities.Specificagencyguidanceshouldbefollowedonthismatter. Itisimportanttoselecttheappropriatepositionsensitivity,sincecontrolsinexcessofthesensitivityofthepositionwastesresources,whiletoolittlemaycauseunacceptablerisks. 10.1.3FillingthePosition--ScreeningandSelectingOnceaposition'ssensitivityhasbeendetermined,thepositionisreadytobestaffed.Inthefederalgovernment,thistypicallyincludespublishingaformalvacancyannouncementandidentifyingwhichapplicantsmeetthepositionrequirements.Moresensitivepositionstypicallyrequirepreemploymentbackgroundscreening;screeningafteremploymenthascommenced(post-entry-on-duty)maysufficeforlesssensitivepositions.Backgroundscreeninghelpsdeterminewhetheraparticularindividualissuitableforagivenposition.Forexample,inpositionswithhigh-levelfiduciaryresponsibility,thescreeningprocesswillattempttoascertaintheperson'si,,,,,^,^^^,^,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,^^trustworthinessandappropriatenessforaparticularposition.Inthefederalgovernment,thescreeningprocessisformalizedthroughaseriesofbackgroundchecksconductedthroughacentralinvestigativeofficewithinthe Ingeneral,itismoreeffectivetouseseparationofdutiesandleastprivilegetolimitthesensitivityoftheposition,ratherthanrelyingonscreeningtoreducetherisktotheorganization. 108 [PDF page 124] 10.PersonnelIUserIssues organizationorthroughanotherorganization(e.g.,theOfficeofPersonnelManagement).WithintheFederalGovernment,themostbasicscreeningtechniqueinvolvesacheckforacriminalhistory,checkingFBIfingerprintrecords,andotherfederalindices.Moreextensivebackgroundchecksexamineotherfactors,suchasaperson'sworkandeducationalhistory,personalinterview,historyofpossessionoruseofillegalsubstances,andinterviewswithcurrentandformercolleagues,neighbors,andfriends.Theexacttypeofscreeningthattakesplacedependsuponthesensitivityofthepositionandapplicableagencyimplementingregulations.Screeningisnotconductedbytheprospectiveemployee'smanager;rather,agencysecurityandpersonnelofficersshouldbeconsultedforagency-specificguidance.OutsideoftheFederalGovernment,employeescreeningisaccomplishedinmanyways.Policiesvaryconsiderablyamongorganizationsduetothesensitivityofexamininganindividual'sbackgroundandqualifications.Organizationalpoliciesandproceduresnormallytrytobalancefearsofinvasivenessandslanderagainsttheneedtodevelopconfidenceintheintegrityofemployees.Onetechniquemaybetoplacetheindividualinalesssensitivepositioninitially. ForboththeFederalGovernmentandprivatesector,findingsomethingcompromisinginaperson'sbackgrounddoesnotnecessarilymeantheyareunsuitableforaparticularjob.Adeterminationshouldbemadebasedonthetypeofjob,thetypeoffindingorincident,andotherrelevantfactors.Inthefederalgovernment,thisprocessisreferredtoasadjudication.10.1.4EmployeeTrainingandAwarenessEvenafteracandidatehasbeenhired,thestaffingprocesscannotyetbeconsideredcomplete-employeesstillhavetobetrainedtodotheirjob,whichincludescomputersecurityresponsibilitiesandduties.AsdiscussedinChapter13,suchsecuritytrainingcanbeverycost-effectiveinpromotingsecurity. Somecomputersecurityexpertsarguethatemployeesmustreceiveinitialcomputersecuritytrainingbeforetheyaregrantedanyaccesstocomputersystems.Othersarguethatthismustbearisk-baseddecision,perhapsgrantingonlyrestrictedaccess(or,perhaps,onlyaccesstotheirPC)untiltherequiredtrainingiscompleted.Bothapproachesrecognizethatadequatelytrainedemployeesarecrucialtotheeffectivefunctioningofcomputersystemsandapplications.Organizationsmayprovideintroductorytrainingpriortograntinganyaccesswithfollow-upmoreextensivetraining.Inaddition,althoughtrainingofnewusersiscritical,itisimportanttorecognizethatsecuritytrainingandawarenessactivitiesshouldbeongoingduringthetimean Inthefederalgovernment,separateanduniquescreeningproceduresarenotestablishedforeachposition.Rather,positionsarecategorizedbygeneralsensitivityandareassignedacorrespondinglevelofbackgroundinvestigationorotherchecks.109 [PDF page 125] ///.OperationalControls individualisasystemuser.(SeeChapter13foramorethoroughdiscussion.) Figure10.1 10.2UserAdministrationEffectiveadministrationofusers'computeraccessisessentialtomaintainingsystemsecurity.Useraccountmanagementfocusesonidentification,authentication,andaccessauthorizations.Thisisaugmentedbytheprocessofauditingandotherwiseperiodicallyverifyingthelegitimacyofcurrentaccountsandaccessauthorizations.Finally,thereareconsiderationsinvolvedinthetimelymodificationorremovalofaccessandassociatedissuesforemployeeswhoarereassigned,promoted,orterminated,orwhoretire. 110 [PDF page 126] 10.PersonnelIUserIssues 10.2.1UserAccountManagementUseraccountmanagementinvolves(1)theprocessofrequesting,establishing,issuing,andclosinguseraccounts;(2)trackingusersandtheirrespectiveaccessauthorizations;and(3)managingthesefunctions.Useraccountmanagementtypicallybeginswitharequestfromtheuser'ssupervisortothesystemmanagerforasystemaccount.Ifauseristohaveaccesstoaparticularapplication,thisrequestmaybesentthroughtheapplicationmanagertothesystemmanager.Thiswillensurethatthesystemsofficereceivesformalapprovalfromthe"applicationmanager"fortheemployeetobegivenaccess.Therequestwillnormallystatethelevelofaccesstobegranted,perhapsbyfunctionorbyspecifyingaparticularuserprofile.(Oftenwhenmorethanoneemployeeisdoingthesamejob,a"profile"ofpermittedauthorizationsiscreated.)Systemsoperationsstaffwillnormallythenusetheaccountrequesttocreateanaccountforthenewuser.Theaccesslevelsoftheaccountwillbeconsistentwiththoserequestedbythesupervisor.Thisaccountwillnormallybeassignedselectedaccessauthorizations.Thesearesometimesbuiltdirectlyintoapplications,andothertimesrelyupontheoperatingsystem."Add-on"access^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m^mapplicationsarealsoused.Theseaccesslevelsandauthorizationsareoftentiedtospecificaccesslevelswithinanapplication. Level1234 ExampleofAccessLevelsWithinanApplicationFunctionCreateRecordsEditGroupArecordsEditGroupBrecordsEditallrecords Next,employeeswillbegiventheiraccountinformation,includingtheaccountidentifier(e.g.,userID)andameansofauthentication(e.g.,passwordorsmartcard/PIN).OneissuethatmayariseatthisstageiswhethertheuserIDistobetiedtotheparticularpositionanemployeeholds(e.g.,ACC5foranaccountant)ortheindividualemployee(e.g.,BSMITHforBrendaSmith).TyinguserIDstopositionsmaysimplifyadministrativeoverheadinsomecases;however,itmaymakeauditingmoredifficultasonetriestotracetheactionsofaparticularindividual.ItisnormallymoreadvantageoustotietheuserIDtotheindividualemployee.However,iftheuserIDiscreatedandtiedtoaposition,procedureswillhavetobeestablishedtochangethemifemployeesswitchjobsorareotherwisereassigned.Whenemployeesaregiventheiraccount,itisoftenconvenienttoprovideinitialorrefreshertrainingandawarenessoncomputersecurityissues.Usersshouldbeaskedtoreviewasetofrulesandregulationsforsystemaccess.Toindicatetheirunderstandingoftheserules,manyorganizationsrequireemployeestosignan"acknowledgmentstatement,"whichmayalsostatecausesfordismissalorprosecutionundertheComputerFraudandAbuseActandother 111 [PDF page 127] ///,OperationalControls applicablestateandlocallaws.Whenuseraccountsarenolongerrequired,thesupervisorshouldinformtheapplicationmanagerandsystemmanagementofficesoaccountscanberemovedinatimelymanner.Oneusefulsecondarycheckistoworkwiththelocalorganization'spersonnelofficertoestablishaprocedureforroutinenotificationofemployeedeparturestothesystemsoffice.Furtherissuesarediscussedinthe"Termination"sectionofthischapter. Itisessentialtorealizethataccessandauthorizationadministrationisacontinuingprocess.NewuseraccountsareaddedwhMeothersaredeleted.Permissionschange:sometimespermanently,sometimestemporarily.Newapplicationsareadded,upgraded,andremoved.Trackingthisinformationtokeepituptodateisnoteasy,butisnecessarytoallowusersaccesstoonlythosefunctionsnecessarytoaccomplishtheirassignedresponsibilities-therebyhelpingtomaintaintheprincipleofleastprivilege.Inmanagingtheseaccounts,thereisaneedtobalancetimelinessofserviceandrecordkeeping.Whilesoundrecordkeepingpracticesarenecessary,delaysinprocessingrequests(e.g.,changerequests)mayleadtorequestsformoreaccessthanisreallynecessary-justtoavoiddelaysshouldsuchaccesseverberequired.Managingthisprocessofuseraccessisalsoonethat,particularlyforlargersystems,isoftendecentralized.Regionalofficesmaybegrantedtheauthoritytocreateaccountsandchangeuseraccessauthorizationsortosubmitformsrequestingthatthecentralizedaccesscontrolfunctionmakethenecessarychanges.Approvalofthesechangesisimportant-itmayrequiretheapprovalofthefileownerandthesupervisoroftheemployeewhoseaccessisbeingchanged.10.2.2AuditandManagementReviewsFromtimetotime,itisnecessarytoreviewuseraccountmanagementonasystem.Withintheareaofuseraccessissues,suchreviewsmayexaminethelevelsofaccesseachindividualhas,conformitywiththeconceptofleastprivilege,whetherallaccountsarestillactive,whethermanagementauthorizationsareup-to-date,whetherrequiredtraininghasbeencompleted,andsoforth. SampleUserAccountandPasswordAcknowledgmentForm Iherebyacknowledgepersonalreceiptofthesystempassword(s)associatedwiththeuserIdslistedbelow.IunderstandtliatIamresponsibleforprotectingthepassword(s),willcomplywithallapplicablesystemsecuritystandards,andwillnotdivulgemypassword(s)toanyperson.IfurtherunderstandthatImustreporttotheInformationSystemsSecurityOfficeranyproblemIencounterintheuseofthepassword(s)orwhenIhavereasontobelievethattheprivatenatureofmypasswofd(s)hasbeencompromised. '"^Wheneverusersareaskedtosignadocument,appropriatereviewbyorganizationallegalcounseland,ifapplicable,byemployeebargainingunitsshouldbeaccomplished.112 [PDF page 128] 10.PersonnelIUserIssues Thesereviewscanbeconductedonatleasttwolevels:^"(1)onanapplication-by-applicationbasisor(2)onasystemwidebasis.Bothkindsofreviewscanbeconductedby,amongothers,in-housesystemspersonnel(aself-audit),theorganization'sinternalauditstaff,orexternalauditors.Forexample,agoodpracticeisforapplicationmanagers(anddataowners,ifdifferent)toreviewallaccesslevelsofallapplicationuserseverymonth-andsignaformalaccessapprovallist,whichwinprovideawrittenrecordoftheapprovals.Whileitmayinitiallyappearthatsuchreviewsshouldbeconductedbysystemspersonnel,theyusuallyarenotfullyeffective.Systempersonnelcanverifythatusersonlyhavethoseaccessesthattheirmanagershavespecified.Howeverbecauseaccessrequirementsmaychangeovertime,itisimportanttoinvolvetheapplicationmanager,whoisoftentheonlyindividualinapositiontoknowcurrentaccessrequirements.Outsideauditorganizations(e.g.,theInspectorGeneral[IG]ortheGeneralAccountingOffice)mayalsoconductaudits.Forexample,theIGmaydirectamoreextensivereviewofpermissions.Thismayinvolvediscussingtheneedforparticularaccesslevelsforspecificindividualsorthenumberofuserswithsensitiveaccess.Forexample,howmanyemployeesshouldreallyhaveauthorizationtothecheck-printingfunction?(Auditorswillalsoexaminenon-computeraccessbyreviewing,forexample,whoshouldhavephysicalaccesstothecheckprinterorblank-checkstock.)10.2.3DetectingUnauthorized/IllegalActivitiesSeveralmechanismsareusedbesidesauditing^'andanalysisofaudittrailstodetectunauthorizedandillegalacts.(SeeChapters9and18.)Forexample,fraudulentactivitiesmayrequiretheregularphysicalpresenceoftheperpetrator(s).Insuchcases,thefraudmaybedetectedduringtheemployee'sabsence.Mandatoryvacationsforcriticalsystemsandapplicationspersonnelcanhelpdetectsuchactivity(however,thisisnotaguarantee,forexample,ifproblemsaresavedfortheemployeestohandleupontheirreturn).Itisusefultoavoidcreatinganexcessivedependenceuponanysingleindividual,sincethesystemwillhavetofunctionduringperiodsofabsence.Particularlywithinthegovernment,periodicrescreeningofpersonnelisusedtoidentifypossibleindicationsofillegalactivity(e.g.,livingalifestyleinexcessofknownincomelevel). 10.2.4TemporaryAssignmentsandIn-houseTransfersOnesignificantaspectofmanagingasysteminvolveskeepinguseraccessauthorizationsuptodate.Accessauthorizationsaretypicallychangedundertwotypesofcircumstances:(1)changeinjobrole,eithertemporarily(e.g.,whilecoveringforanemployeeonsickleave)orpermanently °Notethatthisisnotaneither/ordistinction. 'Thetermauditingisusedhereinabroadsensetorefertothereviewandanalysisofpastevents. 113 [PDF page 129] ///.OperationalControls (e.g.,afteranin-housetransfer)and(2)terminationdiscussedinthefollowingsection.Usersoftenarerequiredtoperformdutiesoutsidetheirnormalscopeduringtheabsenceofothers.Thisrequiresadditionalaccessauthorizations.Althoughnecessary,suchextraaccessauthorizationsshouldbegrantedsparinglyandmonitoredcareftilly,consistentwiththeneedtomaintainseparationofdutiesforinternalcontrolpurposes.Also,theyshouldberemovedpromptlywhennolongerrequired.Permanentchangesareusuallynecessarywhenemployeeschangepositionswithinanorganization.Inthiscase,theprocessofgrantingaccountauthorizations(describedinSection10.2.1)willoccuragain.Atthistime,however,isitalsoimportantthataccessauthorizationsofthepriorpositionberemoved.Manyinstancesof"authorizationcreep"haveoccurredwithemployeescontinuingtomaintainaccessrightsforpreviouslyheldpositionswithinanorganization.Thispracticeisinconsistentwiththeprincipleofleastprivilege. 10.2.5TerminationTerminationofauser'ssystemaccessgenerallycanbecharacterizedaseither"friendly"or"unfriendly."Friendlyterminationmayoccurwhenanemployeeisvoluntarilytransferred,resignstoacceptabetterposition,orretires.Unfriendlyterminationmayincludesituationswhentheuserisbeingfiredforcause,"RIFed,"*^orinvoluntarilytransferred.Fortunately,theformersituationismorecommon,butsecurityissueshavetobeaddressedinbothsituations. 10.2.5.1FriendlyTerminationFriendlyterminationreferstotheremovalofanemployeefromtheorganizationwhenthereisnoreasontobelievethattheterminationisotherthanmutuallyacceptable.Sinceterminationscanbeexpectedregularly,thisisusuallyaccomplishedbyimplementingastandardsetofproceduresforoutgoingortransferringemployees.Thesearepartofthestandardemployee"out-processing,"andareputinplace,forexample,toensurethatsystemaccountsareremovedinatimelymanner.Out-processingofteninvolvesasign-outforminitialedbyeachfunctionalmanagerwithaninterestintheseparation.Thisnormallyincludesthegroup(s)managingaccesscontrols,thecontrolofkeys,thebriefingontheresponsibilitiesforconfidentialityandprivacy,thelibrary,thepropertyclerk,andseveralotherfunctionsnotnecessarilyrelatedtoinformationsecurity.Inaddition,otherissuesshouldbeexaminedaswell.Thecontinuedavailabilityofdata,forexample,mustoftenbeassured.Inboththemanualandtheelectronicworlds,thismayinvolvedocumentingproceduresorfilingschemes,suchashowdocumentsarestoredontheharddisk,andhowaretheybackedup.Employeesshouldbeinstructedwhetherornotto"cleanup"their RIFisatermusedwithinthegovernmentasshorthandfor"reductioninforce." 114 [PDF page 130] 10.PersonnelIUserIssues PCbeforeleaving.Ifcryptographyisusedtoprotectdata,theavailabilityofcryptographickeystomanagementpersonnelmustbeensured.Authenticationtokensmustbecollected.Confidentialityofdatacanalsobeanissue.Forexample,doemployeesknowwhatinformationtheyareallowedtosharewiththeirimmediateorganizationalcolleagues?Doesthisdifferfromtheinformationtheymaysharewiththepublic?Theseandotherorganizational-specificissuesshouldbeaddressedthroughoutanorganizationtoensurecontinuedaccesstodataandtoprovidecontinuedconfidentialityandintegrityduringpersonneltransitions.(Manyoftheseissuesshouldbeaddressedonanongoingbasis,notjustduringpersonneltransitions.)Thetrainingandawarenessprogramnormallyshouldaddresssuchissues. 10.2.5.2UnfriendlyTerminationUnfriendlyterminationinvolvestheremovalofanemployeeunderinvoluntaryoradverseconditions.Thismayincludeterminationforcause,RIF,involuntarytransfer,resignationfor"personalityconflicts,"andsituationswithpendinggrievances.Thetensioninsuchterminationsmaymultiplyandcomplicatesecurityissues.Additionally,alloftheissuesinvolvedinfriendlyterminationsarestillpresent,butaddressingthemmaybeconsiderablymoredifficult. Thegreatestthreatfromunfriendlyterminationsislikelytocomefromthosepersonnelwhoarecapableofchangingcodeormodifyingthesystemorapplications.Forexample,systemspersonnelareideallypositionedtowreakconsiderablehavoconsystemsoperations.Withoutappropriatesafeguards,personnelwithsuchaccesscanplacelogicbombs(e.g.,ahiddenprogramtoeraseadisk)incodethatwillnotevenexecuteuntilaftertheemployee'sdeparture.Backupcopiescanbedestroyed.Thereareevenexampleswherecodehasbeen"heldhostage."Butotheremployees,suchasgeneralusers,canalsocausedamage.Errorscanbeinputpurposeftilly,documentationcanbemisfiled,andother"random"errorscanbemade.Correctingthesesituationscanbeextremelyresourceintensive. Giventhepotentialforadverseconsequences,securityspecialistsroutinelyrecommendthatsystemaccessbeterminatedasquicklyaspossibleinsuchsituations.Ifemployeesaretobefired,systemaccessshouldberemovedatthesametime(orjustbefore)theemployeesarenotifiedoftheirdismissal.Whenanemployeenotifiesanorganizationofaresignationanditcanbereasonablyexpectedthatitisonunfriendlyterms,systemaccessshouldbeimmediatelyterminated.Duringthe"notice"period,itmaybenecessarytoassigntheindividualtoarestrictedareaandfunction.Thismaybeparticularlytrueforemployeescapableofchangingprogramsormodifyingthesystemorapplications.Inothercases,physicalremovalfromtheiroffices(and,ofcourse,logicalremoval,whenlogicalaccesscontrolsexist)maysuffice. 115 [PDF page 131] ///.OperationalControls 10.3ContractorAccessConsiderationsManyfederalagenciesaswellasprivateorganizationsusecontractorsandconsultantstoassistwithcomputerprocessing.Contractorsareoftenusedforshorterperiodsoftimethanregularemployees.Thisfactormaychangethecost-effectivenessofconductingscreening.Theoftenhigherturnoveramongcontractorpersonnelgeneratesadditionalcostsforsecurityprogramsintermsofuseradministration. 10.4PublicAccessConsiderationsManyfederalagencieshavebeguntodesign,develop,andimplementpublicaccesssystemsforelectronicdisseminationofinformationtothepublic.Somesystemsprovideelectronicinteractionbyallowingthepublictosendinformationtothegovernment(e.g.,electronictaxfiling)aswellastoreceiveit.Whensystemsaremadeavailableforaccessbythepublic(oralargeorsignificantsubsetthereof),additionalsecurityissuesarisedueto:(1)increasedthreatsagainstpublicaccesssystemsand(2)thedifficultyofsecurityadministration.Whilemanycomputersystemshavebeenvictimsofhackerattacks,publicaccess0MBCircularA-130,AppendixIII"SecurityofsystemsarewellknownandhavepublishedFederalAutomatedInformation"andNISTCSLphonenumbersandnetworkaccessIDs.In^"^'^^'^"SecurityIssuesinPublicAccessSystems"A1 1 \Au-bothrecommendsegregatinginformationmadeaddition,asuccessfulattackcouldresultina •.,. Zvi jdirectlyaccessibletothepublicfromofficialrecords.lotofpublicity.Forthesereasons,publicaccesssystemsaresubjecttoagreaterthreatf^ggggg/ggigggggggggggg^^fromhackerattacksontheconfidentiality,availability,andintegrityofinformationprocessedbyasystem.Ingeneral,itissafetosaythatwhenasystemismadeavailableforpublicaccess,therisktothesystemincreases-andoftentheconstraintsonitsusearetightened.Besidesincreasedriskofhackers,publicaccesssystemscanbesubjecttoinsidermalice.Forexample,anunscrupuloususer,suchasadisgruntledemployee,maytrytointroduceerrorsintodatafilesintendedfordistributioninordertoembarrassordiscredittheorganization.Attacksonpublicaccesssystemscouldhaveasubstantialimpactontheorganization'sreputationandthelevelofpublicconfidenceduetothehighvisibilityofpublicaccesssystems.Othersecurityproblemsmayarisefromunintentionalactionsbyuntrainedusers. Insystemswithoutpublicaccess,thereareproceduresforenrollingusersthatofteninvolvesomeusertrainingandfrequentlyrequirethesigningofformsacknowledginguserresponsibilities.Inaddition,userprofilescanbecreatedandsophisticatedauditmechanismscanbedevelopedtodetectunusualactivitybyauser.Inpublicaccesssystems,usersareoftenanonymous.Thiscancomplicatesystemsecurityadministration. 116 [PDF page 132] 10.PersonnelIUserIssues Inmostsystemswithoutpublicaccess,usersaretypicallyamixofknownemployeesorcontractors.Inthiscase,imperfectlyimplementedaccesscontrolschemesmaybetolerated.However,whenopeningupasystemtopublicaccess,additionalprecautionsmaybenecessarybecauseoftheincreasedthreats. 10.5InterdependenciesUserissuesaretiedtotopicsthroughoutthishandbook.TrainingandAwarenessdiscussedinChapter13isacriticalpartofaddressingtheuserissuesofcomputersecurity. IdentificationandAuthenticationandAccessControlsinacomputersystemcanonlypreventpeoplefromdoingwhatthecomputerisinstructedtheyarenotallowedtodo,asstipulatedbyPolicy.Therecognitionbycomputersecurityexpertsthatmuchmoreharmcomesfrompeopledoingwhattheyareallowedtodo,butshouldnotdo,pointstotheimportanceofconsideringuserissuesinthecomputersecuritypicture,andtheimportanceofAuditing.Policy,particularlyitscompliancecomponent,iscloselylinkedtopersonnelissues.Adeterrenteffectarisesamonguserswhentheyareawarethattheirmisconduct,intentionalorunintentional,willbedetected.Thesecontrolsalsodependonmanager's(1)selectingtherighttypeandlevelofaccessfortheiremployeesand(2)informingsystemmanagersofwhichemployeesneedaccountsandwhattypeandlevelofaccesstheyrequire,and(3)promptlyinformingsystemmanagersofchangestoaccessrequirements.Otherwise,accountsandaccessescanbegrantedtoormaintainedforpeoplewhoshouldnothavethem.10.6CostConsiderationsTherearemanysecuritycostsunderthecategoryofuserissues.Amongtheseare: Screening—Costsofinitialbackgroundscreeningandperiodicupdates,asappropriate.^^TrainingandAwareness~Costsoftrainingneedsassessments,trainingmaterials,coursefees,andsoforth,asdiscussedseparatelyinChapter13. UserAdministration~Costsofmanagingidentificationandauthenticationwhich,particularlyfor Whenanalyzingthecostsofscreening,itisimportanttorealizethatscreeningisoftenconductedtomeetrequirementswhollyunrelatedtocomputersecurity. 117 [PDF page 133] III.OperationalControls largedistributedsystems,mayberathersignificant. AccessAdministration—Particularlybeyondtheinitialaccountset-up,areongoingcostsofmaintaininguseraccessescurrentlyandcompletely.Auditing~Althoughsuchcostscanbereducedsomewhatwhenusingautomatedtools,consistent,resource-intensivehumanreviewisstilloftennecessarytodetectandresolvesecurityanomalies.References Fites,P.,andM.Kratz.InformationSystemsSecurity:APractitioner'sReference.NewYork,NY:VanNostrandReinhold,1993.(SeeespeciallyChapter6.) NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology."SecurityIssuesinPublicAccessSystems."ComputerSystemsLaboratoryBulletin.May1993.North,S."ToCatchaXrimoid."'BeyondComputing.1(1),1992.pp.55-56.Pankau,E."TheConsummateInvestigator."SecurityManagement.37(2),1993.pp.37-41.Schou,C,W.Machonachy,F.LynnMcNulty,andA.Chantker."InformationSecurityProfessionalismforthe1990s."ComputerSecurityJournal.9(1),1992.pp.27-38.Wagner,M."PossibilitiesAreEndless,andFrightening."OpenSystemsToday.November8(136),1993.pp.16-17.Wood,C."BePreparedBeforeYouFire."InfosecurityNews.5(2),1994.pp.51-54.Wood,C."Duress,TerminationsandInformationSecurity."ComputersandSecurity.12(6),1993.pp.527-535. 118 [PDF page 134] Chapter11PREPARINGFORCONTINGENCIESANDDISASTERSAcomputersecuritycontingencyisaneventwiththepotentialtodisruptcomputeroperations,therebydisruptingcriticalmissionandbusinessfunctions.Suchaneventcouldbeapoweroutage,hardwarefailure,fire,orstorm.Iftheeventisverydestructive,itisoftencalledadisaster.^'* Toavertpotentialcontingenciesanddisastersorminimizethedamagetheycauseorganizationscantakestepsearlytocontroltheevent.Generallycalledcontingencyplanning,thisactivityiscloselyrelatedtoincidenthandling,whichprimarilyaddressesmalicioustechnicalthreatssuchashackersandviruses.*^ Contingencyplanningdirectlysupportsanorganization'sgoalofcontinuedoperations.Organizationspracticecontingencyplanningbecauseitmakesgoodbusinesssense. Contingencyplanninginvolvesmorethanplanningforamoveoffsiteafteradisasterdestroysadatacenter.Italsoaddresseshowtokeepanorganization'scriticalfunctionsoperatingintheeventofdisruptions,bothlargeandsmall.Thisbroaderperspectiveoncontingencyplanningisbasedonthedistributionofcomputersupportthroughoutanorganization.Thischapterpresentsthecontingencyplanningprocessinsixsteps:^^ 1.Identifyingthemission-orbusiness-criticalfunctions. 2.Identifyingtheresourcesthatsupportthecriticalfunctions. 3.Anticipatingpotentialcontingenciesordisasters. 4.Selectingcontingencyplanningstrategies. "Thereisnodistinctdividinglinebetweendisastersandothercontingencies.Othernamesincludedisasterrecovery,businesscontinuity,continuityofoperations,orbusinessresumptionplanning.Someorganizationsincludeincidenthandlingasasubsetofcontingencyplanning.TherelationshipisfurtherdiscussedinChapter12,IncidentHandling.Someorganizationsandmethodologiesmayuseadifferentorder,nomenclature,number,orcombinationofsteps.Thespecificstepscanbemodified,aslongasthebasicfunctionsareaddressed.119 [PDF page 135] ///.OperationalControls 5.Implementingthecontingencystrategies. 6.Testingandrevisingthestrategy. 11.1Step1:IdentifyingtheMission-orBusiness-CriticalFunctions Hiischapterreferstoanorganizationashavingcriticalmissionorbusinessfiinctions.Ingovernmentorganizations,thefocusisnormallyonperformingamission,suchasprovidingcitizenbenefits.Inprivateorganizations,thefocusisnormallyonconductingabusiness,suchasmanufacturingwidgets. Protectingthecontinuityofanorganization'smissionorbusinessisverydifficultifitisnotclearlyidentified.Managersneedtounderstandtheorganizationfromapointofviewthatusuallyextendsbeyondtheareatheycontrol.Thedefinitionofanorganization'scriticalmissionorbusinessfunctionsisoftencalledabusinessplan.Sincethedevelopmentofabusinessplanwillbeusedtosupportcontingencyplanning,itisnecessarynotonlytoidentifycriticalmissionsandbusinesses,butalsotosetprioritiesforthem.Afullyredundantcapabilityforeachfunctionisprohibitivelyexpensiveformostorganizations.Intheeventofadisaster,certainfunctionswillnotbeperformed.Ifappropriateprioritieshavebeenset(andapprovedbyseniormanagement),itcouldmeanthedifferenceintheorganization'sabilitytosurviveadisaster. 11.2Step2:IdentifyingtheResourcesThatSupportCriticalFunctions Inmanycases,thelongeranorganizationiswithoutaresource,themorecriticalthesituationbecomes.Forexample,thelongeragarbagecollectionstrikelasts,themorecriticalthesituationbecomes. Afteridentifyingcriticalmissionsandbusinessfunctions,itisnecessarytoidentifythesupportingresources,thetimeframesinwhicheachresourceisused(e.g.,istheresourceneededconstantlyoronlyattheendofthemonth?),andtheeffectonthemission^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^morbusinessoftheunavailabilityoftheresource.Inidentifyingresources,atraditionalproblemhasbeenthatdifferentmanagersoverseedifferentresources.Theymaynotrealizehowresourcesinteracttosupporttheorganization'smissionorbusiness.Manyoftheseresourcesarenotcomputerresources.Contingencyplanningshouldaddressalltheresourcesneededtoperformafunction,regardlesswhethertheydirectlyrelatetoacomputer.^^ However,sincethisisacomputersecurityhandbook,thedescriptionsherefocusonthecomputer-relatedresources.Thelogisticsofcoordinatingcontingencyplanningforcomputer-relatedandotherresourcesisanimportantconsideration. 120 [PDF page 136] 11.PreparingforContingenciesandDisasters Theanalysisofneededresourcesshouldbeconductedbythosewhounderstandhowthefunctionisperformedandthedependenciesofvariousresourcesonotherresourcesandothercriticalrelationships.Thiswillallowanorganizationtoassignprioritiestoresourcessincenotallelementsofallresourcesarecrucialtothecriticalfunctions.11.2.1HumanResourcesPeopleareperhapsanorganization'smostobviousresource.Somefunctionsrequiretheeffortofspecificindividuals,somerequirespecializedexpertise,andsomeonlyrequireindividualswhocanbetrainedtoperformaspecifictask.Withintheinformationtechnologyfield,humanresourcesinclude^^^^^hhhbmmbothoperators(suchastechniciansorsystemprogrammers)andusers(suchasdataentryclerksorinformationanalysts). ResourcesThatSupportCriticalFunctionsHumanResourcesProcessingCapabilityComputer-BasedServicesDataandApplicationsPhysicalInfrastructureDocunientsandPapers 11.2.2ProcessingCapabilityTraditionallycontingencyplanninghasfocuseddown,howcanapplicationsdependentonitcontinuetobeprocessed?).Althoughtheneedfordatacenterbackupremainsvital,today'sotherprocessingalternativesarealsoimportant.Lx)calareanetworks(LANs),minicomputers,workstations,andpersonalcomputersinallformsofcentralizedanddistributedprocessingmaybeperformingcriticaltasks. 11.2.3AutomatedApplicationsandDataComputersystemsrunapplicationsthatprocessdata.Withoutcurrentelectronicversionsofbothapplicationsanddata,computerizedprocessingmaynotbepossible.Iftheprocessingisbeingperformedonalternatehardware,theapplicationsmustbecompatiblewiththealternatehardware,operatingsystemsandothersoftware(includingversionandconfiguration),andnumerousothertechnicalfactors.Becauseof processingpower(i.e.,ifthedatacenteris ContingencyPlanningTeamsTounderstandwhatresourcesareneededfromeachofthesixresourcecategoriesandtounderstandhowtheresourcessupportcriticalftmctions,itisoftennecessarytoestablishacontingencyplanningteam.Atypicalteamcontainsrepresentativesfromvariousorganizationalelements,andisoftenheadedbyacontingencyplanningcoordinator.Ithasrepresentativesfromthefollowingthreegroups: 1. business-orientedgroups,suchasrepresentativesfromftmctionalareas; 2.facilitiesmanagement;and 3.technologymanagement.Variousothergroupsarecalledonasneededincludingfinancialmanagement,personnel,training,safety,computersecurity,physicalsecurity,andpublicaffairs. 121 [PDF page 137] ///.OperationalControls thecomplexity,itisnormallynecessarytoperiodicallyverifycompatibility.(SeeStep6,TestingandRevising.)11.2.4Computer-BasedServicesAnorganizationusesmanydifferentkindsofcomputer-basedservicestoperformitsfunctions.Thetwomostimportantarenormallycommunicationsservicesandinformationservices.Communicationscanbefurthercategorizedasdataandvoicecommunications;however,inmanyorganizationsthesearemanagedbythesameservice.Informationservicesincludeanysourceofinformationoutsideoftheorganization.Manyofthesesourcesarebecomingautomated,includingon-linegovernmentandprivatedatabases,newsservices,andbulletinboards.11.2.5PhysicalInfrastructureForpeopletoworkeffectively,theyneedasafeworkingenvironmentandappropriateequipmentandutilities.Thiscanincludeofficespace,heating,cooling,venting,power,water,sewage,otherutilities,desks,telephones,faxmachines,personalcomputers,terminals,courierservices,filecabinets,andmanyotheritems.Inaddition,computersalsoneedspaceandutilities,suchaselectricity.Electronicandpapermediausedtostoreapplicationsanddataalsohavephysicalrequirements.11.2.6DocumentsandPapersManyfunctionsrelyonvitalrecordsandvariousdocuments,papers,orforms.Theserecordscouldbeimportantbecauseofalegalneed(suchasbeingabletoproduceasignedcopyofaloan)orbecausetheyaretheonlyrecordoftheinformation.Recordscanbemaintainedonpaper,microfiche,microfilm,magneticmedia,oropticaldisk. 11.3Step3:AnticipatingPotentialContingenciesorDisastersAlthoughitisimpossibletothinkofallthethingsthatcangowrong,thenextstepistoidentifyalikelyrangeofproblems.Thedevelopmentofscenarioswillhelpanorganizationdevelopaplantoaddressthewiderangeofthingsthatcangowrong.Scenariosshouldincludesmallandlargecontingencies.Whilesomegeneralclassesofcontingencyscenariosareobvious,imaginationandcreativity,aswellasresearch,canpointtootherpossible,butlessobvious,contingencies.Thecontingencyscenariosshouldaddresseachoftheresourcesdescribedabove.Thefollowingareexamplesofsomeofthetypesofquestionsthatcontingencyscenariosmayaddress: 122 [PDF page 138] HumanResources:Canpeoplegettowork?Arekeypersonnelwillingtocrossapicketline?Aretherecriticalskillsandknowledgepossessedbyoneperson?Canpeopleeasilygettoanalternativesite? ProcessingCapability:Arethecomputersharmed?Whathappensifsomeofthecomputersareinoperable,butnotall? AutomatedApplicationsandData:Hasdataintegritybeenaffected?Isanapplicationsabotaged?Cananapplicationrunonadifferentprocessingplatform?Computer-BasedServices:Canthecomputerscommunicate?Towhere?Canpeoplecommunicate?Areinformationservicesdown?Forhowlong? //.PreparingforContingenciesandDisasters ExamplesofSomeLessObviousContingencies 1.Acomputercenterinthebasementofabuildinghadaminorproblemwithrats.Exterminatorskilledtherats,butthebodieswerenotretrievedbecausetheywerehiddenundertheraisedflooringandinthepipeconduits.EmployeescouldonlyenterHiedatacenterwithgasmasksbecauseofthedecomposingrats. 2.AftertheWorldTradeCenterexplosionwhenpeoplereenteredthebuilding,theyturnedontheircomputersystemstocheckforproblems.Dustandsmokedamagedmanysystemswhentheywereturnedon.Ifthesystemshadbeencleaned/?rjf,therewouldnothavebeensignificantdamage. Infrastructure:Dopeoplehaveaplacetosit?Dotheyhaveequipmenttodotheirjobs?Cantheyoccupythebuilding?Documents/Paper:Canneededrecordsbefound?Aretheyreadable?11.4Step4:SelectingContingencyPlanningStrategiesThenextstepistoplanhowtorecoverneededresources.Inevaluatingalternatives,itisnecessarytoconsiderwhatcontrolsareinplacetopreventandminimizecontingencies.Sincenosetofcontrolscancost-effectivelypreventallcontingencies,itisnecessarytocoordinatepreventionandrecoveryefforts. Acontingencyplanningstrategynormallyconsistsofthreeparts:emergencyresponse,recovery,andresumption.Emergencyresponseencompassestheinitialactionstakentoprotectlivesandlimitdamage.Recoveryreferstothestepsthataretakentocontinuesupportforcriticalfunctions.Resumptionisthereturntonormaloperations.Therelationshipbetweenrecoveryandresumptionisimportant.Thelongerittakestoresumenormaloperations,thelongerthe Someorganizationsdivideacontingencystrategyintoemergencyresponse,backupoperations,andrecovery.Thedifferentterminologycanbeconfusing(especiallytheuseofconflictingdefinitionsofrecovery),althoughthebasicfiinctionsperformedarethesame.123 [PDF page 139] ///.OperationalControls organizationwillhavetooperateintherecoverymode.Theselectionofastrategyneedstobebasedonpracticalconsiderations,includingfeasibilityandcost.Thedifferentcategoriesofresourcesshouldeachbeconsidered.Riskassessmentcanbeusedtohelpestimatethecostofoptionstodecideonanoptimalstrategy.Forexample,isitmoreexpensivetopurchaseandmaintainageneratorortomoveprocessingtoanalternatesite,consideringthelikelihoodoflosingelectricalpowerforvariouslengthsoftime?Aretheconsequencesofalossofcomputer-relatedresourcessufficientlyhightowarrantthecostofvariousrecoverystrategies?Theriskassessmentshouldfocusonareaswhereitisnotclearwhichstrategyisthebest. Indevelopingcontingencyplanningstrategies,therearemanyfactorstoconsiderinaddressingeachoftheresourcesthatsupportcriticalfunctions.Someexamplesarepresentedinthesidebars.11.4.1HumanResourcesToensureanorganizationhasaccesstoworkerswiththerightskillsandknowledge,traininganddocumentation^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ofknowledgeareneeded.Duringamajorcontingency,peoplewillbeundersignificantstressandmaypanic.Ifthecontingencyisaregionaldisaster,theirfirstconcernswillprobablybetheirfamilyandproperty.Inaddition,manypeoplewillbeeitherunwillingorunabletocometowork.Additionalhiringortemporaryservicescanbeused.Theuseofadditionalpersonnelmayintroducesecurityvulnerabilities. Example7:IfthesystemadministratorforaLANhastobeoutoftheofficeforalongtime(duetoillnessoranaccident),arrangementsaremadeforthesystemadministratorofanotherLANtoperformtheduties.Anticipatingthis,theabsentadministratorshouldhavetakenstepsbeforehandtokeepdocumentationcurrentThisstrategyisinexpensive,butservicewUlprobablybesignificantlyreducedonbothLANswhichmaypromptthemanageroftheloanedadministratortopartiallyrenegeontheagreement.Example2:Anorganizationdependsonanon-lineinformationserviceprovidedbyacommercialvendor.Theorganizationisnolongerabletoobtaintheinformationmanually(e.g.,fromareferencebook)withinacceptabletimelimitsandtherearenoothercomparableservices.Inthiscase,theorganizationreliesonthecontingencyplanoftheserviceprovider.Theorganizationpaysapremiumtoobtainpriorityserviceincasetheserviceproviderhastooperateatreducedcapacity.Example#3:Alargemainframedatacenterhasacontractwithahotsitevendor,hasacontractwiththetelecommunicationscarriertoreroutecommunicationstothehotsite,hasplanstomovepeople,andstoresup-to-datecopiesofdata,applicationsandneededpaperrecordsoff-site.Thecontingencyplanisexpensive,butmanagementhasdecidedthattheexpenseisfullyjustified. Example04.Anorganizationdistributesitsprocessingamongtwomajorsites,eachofwhichincludessmalltomediumprocessors(personalcomputersandminicomputers).Ifonesiteislost,theothercancarrythecriticalloaduntilmoreequipmentispurchased.Routingofdataandvoicecommunicationscanbeperformedtransparentlytoredirecttraffic.Backupcopiesarestoredattheothersite.Thisplanre^quiresdghtcontroloverthearchitecturesusedandtypesofapplicationsthataredevelopedtoensurecompatibility.Inaddition,personnelatbothsitesmustbecross-trainedtoperformallfunctions. Contingencyplanning,especiallyforemergencyresponse,normallyplacesthehighestemphasis124 [PDF page 140] 11.PreparingforContingenciesandDisasters ontheprotectionofhumanlife. 11.4.2ProcessingCapabilityStrategiesforprocessingcapabilityarenormallygroupedintofivecategories:hotsite;coldsite;redundancy;reciprocalagreements;andhybrids.Thesetermsoriginatedwithrecoverystrategiesfordatacentersbutcanbeappliedtootherplatforms. 1.Hotsite-Abuildingalreadyequippedwithprocessingcapabilityandotherservices. 2.Coldsite-Abuildingforhousingprocessorsthatcanbeeasilyadaptedforuse. 3.Redundantsite-Asiteequippedandconfiguredexactlyliketheprimarysite.(Someorganizationsplanonhavingreducedprocessingcapabilityafteradisasterandusepartialredundancy.ThestockingofsparepersonalcomputersorLANserversalsoprovidessomeredundancy.) 4.Reciprocalagreement-Anagreementthatallowstwoorganizationstobackeachotherup.(Whilethisapproachoftensoundsdesirable,contingencyplanningexpertsnotethatthisalternativehasthegreatestchanceoffailureduetoproblemskeepingagreementsandplansup-to-dateassystemsandpersonnelchange.) 5.Hybrids-Anycombinationsoftheabovesuchasusinghavingahotsiteasabackupincasearedundantorreciprocalagreementsiteisdamagedbyaseparatecontingency.Recoverymayincludeseveralstages,perhapsmarkedbyincreasingavailabilityofprocessingcapability.Resumptionplanningmayincludecontractsortheabilitytoplacecontractstoreplaceequipment.11.4.3AutomatedApplicationsandDataNormally,theprimarycontingencystrategyforapplicationsanddataisregularbackupandsecureoffsitestorage.Importantdecisionstobeaddressedincludehowoftenthebackupisperformed,howoftenitisstoredoff-site,andhowitistransported(tostorage,toanalternateprocessingsite,ortosupporttheresumptionofnormaloperations) Hieneedforcomputersecuritydoesnotgoawaywhenanorganizationisprocessinginacontingencymode.Insomecases,theneedmayincreaseduetosharingprocessingfacilities,concentratingresourcesinfewersites,orusingadditionalcontractorsandconsuitants.Securityshouldbeanimportantconsiderationwhenselectingcontingencystrategies. 125 [PDF page 141] ///.OperationalControls 11.4.4Computer-BasedServicesServiceprovidersmayoffercontingencyservices.Voicecommunicationscarriersoftencanreroutecalls(transparentlytotheuser)toanewlocation.Datacommunicationscarrierscanalsoreroutetraffic.Hotsitesareusuallycapableofreceivingdataandvoicecommunications.Ifoneserviceproviderisdown,itmaybepossibletouseanother.However,thetypeofcommunicationscarrierlost,eitherlocalorlongdistance,isimportant.Localvoiceservicemaybecarriedoncellular.Localdatacommunications,especiallyforlargevolumes,isnormallymoredifficult.Inaddition,resumingnormaloperationsmayrequireanotherreroutingofcommunicationsservices. 11.4.5PhysicalInfrastructureHotsitesandcoldsitesmayalsoofferofficespaceinadditiontoprocessingcapabilitysupport.Othertypesofcontractualarrangementscanbemadeforofficespace,securityservices,ftirniture,andmoreintheeventofacontingency.Ifthecontingencyplancallsformovingoffsite,proceduresneedtobedevelopedtoensureasmoothtransitionbacktotheprimaryoperatingfacilityortoanewfacility.Protectionofthephysicalinfrastructureisnormallyanimportantpartoftheemergencyresponseplan,suchasuseoffireextinguishersorprotectingequipmentfromwaterdamage.11.4.6DocumentsandPapersTheprimarycontingencystrategyisusuallybackupontomagnetic,optical,microfiche,paper,orothermediumandoffsitestorage.Paperdocumentsaregenerallyhardertobackupthanelectronicones.Asupplyofformsandotherneededpaperscanbestoredoffsite. 11.5Step5:ImplementingtheContingencyStrategiesOncethecontingencyplanningstrategieshavebeenselected,itisnecessarytomakeappropriatepreparations,documentthestrategies,andtrainemployees.Manyofthesetasksareongoing.11.5.1ImplementationMuchpreparationisneededtoimplementthestrategiesforprotectingcriticalfunctionsandtheirsupportingresources.Forexample,onecommonpreparationistoestablishproceduresforbackingupfilesandapplications.Anotheristoestablishcontractsandagreements,//"thecontingencystrategycallsforthem.Existingservicecontractsmayneedtoberenegotiatedtoaddcontingencyservices.Anotherpreparationmaybetopurchaseequipment,especiallytosupportaredundantcapability. 126 [PDF page 142] 11.PreparingforContingenciesandDisasters Itisimportanttokeeppreparations,includingdocumentation,up-to-date.Computersystemschangerapidlyandsoshouldbackupservicesandredundantequipment.Contractsandagreementsmayalsoneedtoreflectthechanges.Ifadditionalequipmentisneeded,itmustbemaintainedandperiodicallyreplacedwhenitisnolongerdependableornolongerfitstheorganization'sarchitecture.Preparationshouldalsoincludeformallydesignatingpeoplewhoareresponsibleforvarioustasksintheeventofacontingency.Thesepeopleareoftenreferredtoasthecontingencyresponseteam.Thisteamisoftencomposedofpeoplewhowereapartofthecontingencyplanningteam.Therearemanyimportantimplementationissuesforanorganization.Twoofthemostimportantare1)howmanyplansshouldbedeveloped?and2)whoprepareseachplan?Bothofthesequestionsrevolvearoundtheorganization'soverallstrategyforcontingencyplanning.Theanswersshouldbedocumentedinorganizationpolicyandprocedures.HowManyPlans?Someorganizationshavejustoneplanfortheentireorganization,andothershaveaplanforeverydistinctcomputersystem,application,orotherresource.Otherapproachesrecommendaplanforeachbusinessormissionfunction,withseparateplans,asneeded,forcriticalresources. Theanswertothequestion,therefore,dependsupontheuniquecircumstancesforeachorganization.Butitiscriticaltocoordinatebetweenresourcemanagersandfunctionalmanagerswhoareresponsibleforthemissionorbusiness.WhoPreparesthePlan? Ifanorganizationdecidesonacentralizedapproachtocontingencyplanning,itmaybebesttonameacontingencyplanningcoordinator.Thecoordinatorpreparestheplansincooperationwithvariousfunctionalandresourcemanagers.Someorganizationsplaceresponsibilitydirectlywiththefunctionalandresourcemanagers. Backingupdatafilesandapplicationsisacriticalpartofvirtuallyeverycontingencyplan.Backupsareused,forexample,torestorefilesafterapersonalcomputerviruscorruptsthefilesorafterahurricanedestroysadataprocessingcenter. RelationshipBetweenContingencyPlansandComputerSecurityPlansForsmallorlesscomplexsystems,thecontingencyplanmaybeapartofthecomputersecurityplan.Forlargerormorecomplexsystems,thecomputersecurityplancouldcontainabriefsynopsisofthecontingencyplan,whichwouldbeaseparatedocument. 127 [PDF page 143] ///.OperationalControls 11.5.2DocumentingThecontingencyplanneedstobewritten,keptup-to-dateasthesystemandotherfactorschange,andstoredinasafeplace.Awrittenplaniscriticalduringacontingency,especiallyifthepersonwhodevelopedtheplanisunavailable.Itshouldclearlystateinsimplelanguagethesequenceoftaskstobeperformedintheeventofacontingencysothatsomeonewithminimalknowledgecouldimmediatelybegintoexecutetheplan.Itisgenerallyhelpfultostoreup-to-datecopiesofthecontingencyplaninseverallocations,includinganyoff-sitelocations,suchasalternateprocessingsitesorbackupdatastoragefacilities. 11.5.3TrainingAllpersonnelshouldbetrainedintheircontingency-relatedduties.Newpersonnelshouldbetrainedastheyjointheorganization,refreshertrainingmaybeneeded,andpersonnelwillneedtopracticetheirskills. Trainingisparticularlyimportantforeffectiveemployeeresponseduringemergencies.Thereisnotimetocheckamanualtodeterminecorrectproceduresifthereisafire.Dependingonthenatureoftheemergency,theremayormaynotbetimetoprotectequipmentandotherassets.Practiceisnecessaryinordertoreactcorrectly,especiallywhenhumansafetyisinvolved. 11.6Step6:TestingandRevisingAcontingencyplanshouldbetested^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^iperiodicaUybecausetherewillundoubtedlybeContingencyplanmaintenancecanbeincorporatedflawsintheplanandinitsimplementation.intoproceduresforchangemanagementsothatTheplanwillbecomedatedastimepassesandupgradestohardwareandsoftwarearereflectedintheastheresourcesusedtosupportcriticalP'^"'functionschange.Responsibilityforkeepingiii,,,,,!!!,,,,,,^,,,^,,,,^^,^^,^,^,^^thecontingencyplancurrentshouldbespecificallyassigned.Theextentandfrequencyoftestingwillvarybetweenorganizationsandamongsystems.Thereareseveraltypesoftesting,includingreviews,analyses,andsimulationsofdisasters. Areviewcanbeasimpletesttochecktheaccuracyofcontingencyplandocumentation.Forinstance,areviewercouldcheckifindividualslistedarestillintheorganizationandstillhavetheresponsibilitiesthatcausedthemtobeincludedintheplan.Thistestcancheckhomeandworktelephonenumbers,organizationalcodes,andbuildingandroomnumbers.Thereviewcandetermineiffilescanberestoredfrombackuptapesorifemployeesknowemergencyprocedures. 128 [PDF page 144] 11.PreparingforContingenciesandDisasters Ananalysismaybeperformedontheentireplanorportionsofit,suchasemergencyresponseprocedures.Itisbeneficialiftheanalysisisperformedbysomeonewhodidnothelpdevelopthecontingencyplanbuthasagoodworkingknowledgeofthecriticalfunctionandsupportingresources.Theanalyst(s)maymentallyfollowthestrategiesinthecontingencyplan,lookingforflawsinthelogicorprocessusedbytheplan'sdevelopers.Theanalystmayalsointerviewfunctionalmanagers,resourcemanagers,andtheirstafftouncovermissingorunworkablepiecesoftheplan. Organizationsmayalsoarrangedisastersimulations.Thesetestsprovidevaluableinformationaboutflawsinthecontingencyplanandprovidepracticeforarealemergency.Whiletheycanbeexpensive,thesetestscanalsoprovidecriticalinformationthatcanbeusedtoensurethecontinuityofimportantfunctions.Ingeneral,themorecriticalthefunctionsandtheresourcesaddressedinthecontingencyplan,themorecost-beneficialitistoperformadisastersimulation. 11.7InterdependenciesSinceallcontrolshelptopreventcontingencies,thereisaninterdependencywithallofthecontrolsinthehandbook.RiskManagementprovidesatoolforanalyzingthesecuritycostsandbenefitsofvariouscontingencyplanningoptions.Inaddition,ariskmanagementeffortcanbeusedtohelpidentifycriticalresourcesneededtosupporttheorganizationandthelikelythreattothoseresources.Itisnotnecessary,however,toperformariskassessmentpriortocontingencyplanning,sincetheidentificationofcriticalresourcescanbeperformedduringthecontingencyplanningprocessitself. PhysicalandEnvironmentalControlshelppreventcontingencies.Althoughmanyoftheothercontrols,suchaslogicalaccesscontrols,alsopreventcontingencies,themajorthreatsthatacontingencyplanaddressesarephysicalandenvironmentalthreats,suchasfires,lossofpower,plumbingbreaks,ornaturaldisasters. IncidentHandlingcanbeviewedasasubsetofcontingencyplanning.Itistheemergencyresponsecapabilityforvarioustechnicalthreats.Incidenthandlingcanalsohelpanorganizationpreventfutureincidents.SupportandOperationsinmostorganizationsincludestheperiodicbackingupoffiles.Italso Theresultsofa"test"oftenimpliesagradeassignedforaspecificlevelofperformance,orsimplypassorfail.However,inthecaseofcontingencyplanning,atestshouldbeusedtoimprovetheplan.Iforganizationsdonotusethisapproach,flawsintheplanmayremainhiddenanduncorrected. 129 [PDF page 145] ///.OperationalControls includesthepreventionandrecoveryfrommorecommoncontingencies,suchasadiskfailureorcorrupteddatafiles. Policyisneededtocreateanddocumenttheorganization'sapproachtocontingencyplanning.Thepolicyshouldexplicitlyassignresponsibilities. 11.8CostConsiderationsThecostofdevelopingandimplementingcontingencyplanningstrategiescanbesignificant,especiallyifthestrategyincludescontractsforbackupservicesorduplicateequipment.Therearetoomanyoptionstodiscusscostconsiderationsforeachtype.Onecontingencycostthatisoftenoverlookedisthecostoftestingaplan.Testingprovidesmanybenefitsandshouldbeperformed,althoughsomeofthelessexpensivemethods(suchasareview)maybesufficientforlesscriticalresources. ReferencesAlexander,M.ed."GuardingAgainstComputerCalamity."InfosecurityNews.4(6),1993.pp.26-37.Coleman,R."SixStepstoDisasterRecovery."SecurityManagement.37(2),1993.pp.61-62.Dykman,C,andC.Davis,eds.ControlObjectives-ControlsinanInformationSystemsEnvironment:Objectives,Guidelines,andAuditProcedures,fourthedition.CarolStream,IL:TheEDPAuditorsFoundation,Inc.,1992(especiallyChapter3.5). Fites,P.,andM.Kratz,InformationSystemsSecurity:APractitioner'sReference.NewYork,NY:VanNostrandReinhold,1993(esp.Chapter4,pp.95-112).FitzGerald,J."RiskRankingContingencyPlanAlternatives."InformationExecutive.3(4),1990.pp.61-63.Helsing,C."BusinessImpactAssessment."ISSAAccess.5(3),1992,pp.10-12. Isaac,I.GuideonSelectingADPBackupProcessAlternatives.SpecialPublication500-124.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalBureauofStandards,November1985.Kabak,I.,andT.Beam,"OntheFrequencyandScopeofBackups."InformationExecutive,4(2),1991.pp.58-62. 130 [PDF page 146] 11.PreparingforContingenciesandDisasters Kay,R."What'sHotatHotsites?"InfosecurityNews.4(5),1993.pp.48-52.Lainhart,J.,andM.Donahue.ComputerizedInformationSystems(CIS)AuditManual:AGuidelinetoCISAuditinginGovernmentalOrganizations.CarolStream,IL:TheEDPAuditorsFoundationInc.,1992.NationalBureauofStandards.GuidelinesforADPContingencyPlanning.FederalInformationProcessingStandard87.1981.Rhode,R.,andJ.Haskett."DisasterRecoveryPlanningforAcademicComputingCenters."CommunicationsoftheACM.33(6),1990.pp.652-657. 131 [PDF page 147] [PDF page 148] Chapter12COMPUTERSECURITYINCIDENTHANDLING Computersystemsaresubjecttoawiderangeofmishaps-fromcorrupteddatafiles,toviruses,tonaturaldisasters.Someofthesemishapscanbefixedthroughstandardoperatingprocedures.Forexample,frequentlyoccurringevents(e.g.,amistakenlydeletedfile)canusuallybereadilyrepaired(e.g.,byrestorationfromthebackupfile).Moreseveremishaps,suchasoutagescausedbynaturaldisasters,arenormallyaddressedinanorganization'scontingencyplan.Otherdamagingeventsresultfromdeliberatemalicioustechnicalactivity(e.g.,thecreationofvirusesorsystemhacking).Acomputersecurityincidentcanresultfromacomputervirus,othermaliciouscode,orasystemintruder,eitheraninsideroranoutsider.Itisusedinthischaptertobroadlyrefertothoseincidentsresultingfromdeliberatemalicioustechnicalactivity.^Itcanmoregenerallyrefertothoseincidentsthat,withouttechnicallyexpertresponse,couldresultinseveredamage.^'Thisdefinitionofacomputersecurityincidentissomewhatflexibleandmayvarybyorganizationandcomputingenvironment. MaliciouscodeincludevirusesaswellasTrojanhorsesandworms.Avirusisacodesegmentthatreplicatesbyattachingcopiesofitselftoexistingexecutables.ATrojanhorseisaprogramthatperformsadesiredtask,butalsoincludesunexpectedfunctions.Awormisaself-replicatingprogram. Althoughthethreatsthathackersandmaliciouscodeposetosystemsandnetworksarewellknown,theoccurrenceofsuchharmfuleventsremainsunpredictable.Securityincidentsonlargernetworks(e.g.,theInternet),suchasbreak-insandservicedisruptions,haveharmedvariousorganizations'computingcapabilities.Wheninitiallyconfrontedwithsuchincidents,mostorganizationsrespondinanadhocmanner.Howeverrecurrenceofsimilarincidentsoftenmakesitcost-beneficialtodevelopastandingcapabilityforquickdiscoveryofandresponsetosuchevents.Thisisespeciallytrue,sinceincidentscanoften"spread"whenleftuncheckedthusincreasingdamageandseriouslyharminganorganization.IncidenthandUngiscloselyrelatedtocontingencyplanningaswellassupportandoperations.Anincidenthandlingcapabilitymaybeviewedasacomponentofcontingencyplanning,becauseitprovidestheabilitytoreactquicklyandefficientlytodisruptionsinnormalprocessing.Broadlyspeaking,contingencyplanningaddresseseventswiththepotentialtointerruptsystemoperations.Incidenthandlingcanbeconsideredthatportionofcontingencyplanningthatrespondsto ^Organizationsmaywishtoexpandthistoinclude,forexample,incidentsoftheft. "Indeed,damagemayresult,despitethebesteffortstothecontrary. 133 [PDF page 149] ///.OperationalControls malicioustechnicalthreats. Thischapterdescribeshoworganizationscanaddresscomputersecurityincidents(inthecontextoftheirlargercomputersecurityprogram)bydevelopingacomputersecurityincidenthandlingcapability^Manyorganizationshandleincidentsaspartoftheirusersupportcapability(discussedinChapter14)orasapartofgeneralsystemsupport. 12.1BenefitsofanIncidentHandlingCapabilityTheprimarybenefitsofanincidenthandlingcapabilityarecontainingandrepairingdamagefromincidents,andpreventingfuturedamage.Inaddition,therearelessobvioussidebenefitsrelatedtoestablishinganincidenthandlingcapability. 12.1.1ContainingandRepairingDamageFromIncidentsWhenleftunchecked,malicioussoftwarecansignificantlyharmanorganization'scomputing,dependingonthetechnologyanditsconnectivity.Anincidenthandlingcapabilityprovidesawayforuserstoreportincidents^-^andtheappropriateresponseandassistancetobeprovidedtoaidinrecovery.Technicalcapabilities(e.g.,trainedpersonnelandvirusidentificationsoftware)areprepositioned,readytobeusedasnecessary.Moreover,theorganizationwillhavealreadymadeimportantcontactswithothersupportivesources(e.g.,legal,technical,andmanagerial)toaidincontainmentandrecoveryefforts. Withoutanincidenthandlingcapability,certainresponses-althoughwellintentioned-canactuallymakemattersworse.Insomecases,individualshaveunknowinglyinfectedanti-virussoftwarewithvirusesandthenspreadthemto ''^SeeNISTSpecialPublication800-3,EstablishinganIncidentResponseCapability,November1991.Agoodincidenthandlingcapabilityiscloselylinkedtoanorganization'strainingandawarenessprogram.Itwillhaveeducatedusersaboutsuchincidentsandwhattodowhentheyoccur.Thiscanincreasethelikelihoodthatincidentswillbereportedearly,thushelpingtominimizedamage. Someorganizationssufferrepeatedoutbreaksofvirusesbecausethevirusesarenevercompletelyeradicated.ForexamplesupposetwoLANs,PersonnelandBudget,areconnected,andavimshasspreadwithineach.TheadministratorsofeachLANdetectthevirusanddecidetoeliminateitontheirLAN.ThePersonnelLANadministratorfirsteradicatesthevirus,butsincetheBudgetLANisnotyetvirus-free,thePersonnelLANisreinfected.Somewhatlater,theBudgetLANadministratoreradicatesthevirus.However,thevirusreinfectstheBudgetLANfromthePersonnelLAN.Bothadministratorsmaythinkalliswell,butbotharereinfected.Anincidenthandlingcapabilityallowsorganizationstoaddressrecoveryandcontainmentofsuchincidentsinaskilled,coordinatedmanner. 134 [PDF page 150] 12.IncidentHandling othersystems.Whenvirusesspreadtolocalareanetworks(LANs),mostoralloftheconnectedcomputerscanbeinfectedwithinhours.Moreover,uncoordinatedeffortstoridLANsofvirusescanpreventtheireradication.ManyorganizationsuselargeLANsinternallyandalsoconnecttopublicnetworks,suchastheInternet.Bydoingso,organizationsincreasetheirexposuretothreatsfromintruderactivity,especiallyiftheorganizationhasahighprofile(e.g.,perhapsitisinvolvedinacontroversialprogram).Anincidenthandlingcapabilitycanprovideenormousbenefitsbyrespondingquicklytosuspiciousactivityandcoordinatingincidenthandlingwithresponsibleofficesandindividuals,asnecessary.Intruderactivity,whetherhackersormaliciouscode,canoftenaffectmanysystemslocatedatmanydifferentnetworksites;thus,handlingtheincidentscanbelogisticaUycomplexandcanrequireinformationfromoutsidetheorganization.Byplanningahead,suchcontactscanbepreestablishedandthespeedofresponseimproved,therebycontainingandminimizingdamage.Otherorganizationsmayhavealreadydealtwithsimilarsituationsandmayhaveveryusefulguidancetoofferinspeedingrecoveryandminimizingdamage.12.1.2PreventingFutureDamageAnincidenthandlingcapabilityalsoassistsanorganizationinpreventing(oratleastminimizing)damagefromfutureincidents.Incidentscanbestudiedinternallytogainabetterunderstandingoftheorganizations'sthreatsandvulnerabilitiessomoreeffectivesafeguardscanbeimplemented.Additionally,throughoutsidecontacts(establishedbytheincidenthandlingcapability)earlywarningsofthreatsandvulnerabilitiescanbeprovided.Mechanismswillalreadybeinplacetowarnusersoftheserisks. Theincidenthandlingcapabilityallowsanorganizationtolearnfromtheincidentsthatithasexperienced.Dataaboutpastincidents(andthecorrectivemeasurestaken)canbecollected.Thedatacanbeanalyzedforpatterns-forexample,whichvirusesaremostprevalent,whichcorrectiveactionsaremostsuccessful,andwhichsystemsandinformationarebeingtargetedbyhackers.Vulnerabilitiescanalsobeidentifiedinthisprocess-forexample,whetherdamageisoccurringtosystemswhenanewsoftwarepackageorpatchisused.Knowledgeaboutthetypesofthreatsthatareoccurringandthepresenceofvulnerabilitiescanaidinidentifyingsecuritysolutions.Thisinformationwillalsoproveusefulincreatingamoreeffectivetrainingandawarenessprogram,andthushelpreducethepotentialforlosses.Theincidenthandlingcapabilityassiststhetrainingandawarenessprogrambyprovidinginformationtousersasto(1)measuresthatcanhelpavoidincidents(e.g.,virusscanning)and(2)whatshouldbedone^^mmmmmm^^^mmmmmmmm^^^mmmmmmsmincaseanincidentdoesoccur._.. ^..,,Th&shanngofincidentdataamongorganizationscanhelpatbothth&nationalandtheinternationallevelstoOfcourse,theorganization'sattemptstopreventandrespondtobreachesofsecurityinapreventfuturelossesdoesnotoccurina timely,coordinatedmanner.vacuum.Withasoundincidenthandling^^^^^^^^^^MBi^^^^^^^^^^™^^™135 [PDF page 151] ///.OperationalControls capability,contactswillhavebeenestablishedwithcounterpartsoutsidetheorganization.Thisallowsforearlywarningofthreatsandvulnerabilitiesthattheorganizationmayhavenotyetexperienced.Earlypreventativemeasures(generallymorecost-effectivethanrepairingdamage)canthenbetakentoreducefuturelosses.Dataisalsosharedoutsidetheorganizationtoallowotherstolearnfromtheorganization'sexperiences.12.1.3SideBenefits Finally,establishinganincidenthandlingcapabilityhelpsanorganizationinperhapsunanticipatedways.Threearediscussedhere. UsesofThreatandVulnerabilityData:Incidenthandlingcangreatlyenhancetheriskassessmentprocess.Anincidenthandlingcapabilitywillalloworganizationstocollectthreatdatathatmaybeusefulintheirriskassessmentandsafeguardselectionprocesses(e.g.,indesigningnewsystems).Incidentscanbeloggedandanalyzedtodeterminewhetherthereisarecurringproblem(orifotherpatternsarepresent,asaresometimesseeninhackerattacks),whichwouldnotbenoticedifeachincidentwereonlyviewedinisolation.Statisticsonthenumbersandtypesofincidentsintheorganizationcanbeusedintheriskassessmentprocessasanindicationofvulnerabilitiesandthreats.^'* EnhancingInternalCommunicationsandOrganizationPreparedness.Organizationsoftenfindthatanincidenthandlingcapabilityenhancesinternalcommunicationsandthereadinessoftheorganizationtorespondtoanytypeofincident,notjustcomputersecurityincidents.Internalcommunicationswillbeimproved;managementwillbebetterorganizedtoreceivecommunications;andcontactswithinpublicaffairs,legalstaff,lawenforcement,andothergroupswinhavebeenpreestabUshed.Thestructuresetupforreportingincidentscanalsobeusedforotherpurposes.EnhancingtheTrainingandAwarenessProgram.Theorganization'strainingprocesscanalsobenefitfromincidenthandlingexperiences.Basedonincidentsreported,trainingpersonnelwillhaveabetterunderstandingofusers'knowledgeofsecurityissues.Trainerscanuseactualincidentstovividlyillustratetheimportanceofcomputersecurity.Trainingthatisbasedoncurrentthreatsandcontrolsrecommendedbyincidenthandlingstaffprovidesuserswithinformationmorespecificallydirectedtotheircurrentneeds-therebyreducingtheriskstotheorganizationfromincidents. Itisimportant,however,nottoassumethatsinceonlynreportsweremade,thatnisthetotalnumberofincidents;itisnotlikelythatallincidentswillbereported. 136 [PDF page 152] 12.IncidentHandling 12.2CharacteristicsofaSuccessfulIncidentHandlingCapabilityAsuccessfulincidenthandlingcapabilityhasseveralcorecharacteristics:•anunderstandingoftheconstituencyitwillserve;•aneducatedconstituency;•ameansforcentralizedcommunications;•expertiseintherequisitetechnologies;and•linkstoothergroupstoassistinincidenthandling(asneeded).12.2.1DefiningtheConstituencytoBeServedTheconstituencyincludescomputerusersandprogrammanagers.Likeanyothercustomer-vendorrelationship,theconstituencywiMtendtotakeadvantageofthecapabilityiftheservicesrenderedarevaluable.Theconstituencyisnotalwaystheentireorganization.Forexample,anorganizationmayuseseveraltypesofcomputersandnetworksbutmaydecidethatitsincidenthandlingcapabilityiscost-justifiedonlyforitspersonalcomputerusers.Indoingso,theorganizationmayhavedeterminedthatcomputervirusesposeamuchlargerriskthanothermalicioustechnicalthreatsonotherplatforms.Or,alargeorganizationcomposedofseveralsitesmaydecidethatcurrentcomputersecurityeffortsatsomesitesdonotrequireanincidenthandlingcapability,whereasothersitesdo(perhapsbecauseofthecriticalityofprocessing).12.2.2EducatedConstituencyUsersneedtoknowabout,accept,andtrusttheincidenthandlingcapabilityoritwillnotbeused.Throughtrainingandawarenessprograms,userscanbecomeknowledgeableabouttheexistenceofthecapabilityandhowtorecognizeandreportincidents.Userstrustinthevalueoftheservicewillbuildwith Thefocusofacomputersecurityincidenthandlingcapabilitymaybeexternalaswellasinternal.Anincidentthataffectsanorganizationmayalsoaffectitstradingpartners,contractors,orclients.Inaddition,anorganization'scomputersecurityincidenthandlingcapabilitymaybeabletohelpotherorganizationsand,therefore,helpprotectthecommunityasawhole. Managersneedtoknowdetailsaboutincidents,includingwhodiscoveredthemandhow,sothattheycanpreventsimilarincidentsinthefuture.Howeveruserswillnotbeforthcomingiftheyfearreprisalorthattheywillbecomescapegoats.Organizationsmayneedtoofferincentivestoemployeesforreportingincidentsandofferguaranteesagainstreprisalorotheradverseactions.Itmayalsobeusefultoconsideranonymousreporting. 137 [PDF page 153] ///.OperationalControls reliableperformance.12.2.3CentralizedReportingandCommunicationsSuccessfulincidenthandlingrequiresthatusersbeabletoreportincidentstotheincidenthandlingteaminaconvenient,straightforwardfashion;thisisreferredtoascentralizedreporting.Asuccessfulincidenthandlingcapabilitydependsontimelyreporting.Ifitisdifficultortimeconsumingtoreportincidents,theincidenthandlingcapabilitymaynotbefullyused.Usually,someformofahotline,backedupbypagers,workswell. Centralizedcommunicationsisveryusefulforaccessingordistributinginformationrelevanttotheincidenthandlingeffort.Forexample,ifusersarelinkedtogetherviaanetwork,theincidenthandlingcapabilitycanthenusethenetworktosendouttimelyannouncementsandotherinformation.Userscantakeadvantageofthenetworktoretrievesecurityinformationstoredonserversandcommunicatewiththeincidentresponseteamviae-mail.12.2.4TechnicalPlatformandCommunicationsExpertiseThetechnicalstaffmemberswhocomprisetheincidenthandlingcapabilityneedspecificknowledge,skills,andabilities.Desirablequalificationsfortechnicalstaffmembersmayincludetheabilityto: •workexpertlywithsomeoralloftheconstituency'scoretechnology;•workinagroupenvironment;•communicateeffectivelywithdifferenttypesofusers,whowillrangefromsystemadministratorstounskilleduserstomanagementtolaw-enforcementofficials; •beon-call24hoursasneeded;and•travelonshortnotice(ofcourse,thisdependsuponthephysicallocationoftheconstituencytobeserved).12.2.5LiaisonWithOtherOrganizationsDuetoincreasingcomputerconnectivity,intruderactivityonnetworkscanaffectmanyorganizations,sometimesincludingthoseinforeigncountries.Therefore,anorganization'sincidenthandlingteammayneedtoworkwithotherteamsorsecuritygroupstoeffectivelyhandleincidentsthatrangebeyonditsconstituency.Additionally,theteammayneedtopoolitsknowledgewithotherteamsatvarioustimes.Thus,itisvitaltothesuccessofanincidenthandlingcapabilitythatitestablishtiesandcontactswithotherrelatedcounterpartsand138 [PDF page 154] 12.IncidentHandling supportingorganizations.Especiallyimportanttoincidenthandlingarecontactswithinvestigativeagencies,suchasfederal(e.g.,theFBI),state,andlocallawenforcement.Lawsthataffectcomputercrimevaryamonglocalitiesandstates,andsomeactionsmaybestate(butnotfederal)crimes.Itisimportantforteamstobefamiliarwithcurrentlawsandtohaveestablishedcontactswithinlawenforcementandinvestigativeagencies.Incidentscanalsogarnermuchmediaattentionandcanreflectquitenegativelyonanorganization'simage.Anincidenthandlingcapabilitymayneedtoworkcloselywiththeorganization'spublicaffairsoffice,whichistrainedindealingwiththenewsmedia.Inpresentinginformationtothepress,itisimportantthat(1)attackersarenotgiveninformationthatwouldplacetheorganizationatgreaterriskand(2)potentiallegalevidenceisproperlyprotected. 12.3TechnicalSupportforIncidentHandlingIncidenthandlingwillbegreatlyenhancedbytechnicalmechanismsthatenablethedisseminationofinformationquicklyandconveniently.12.3.1CommunicationsforCentralizedReportingofIncidentsThetechnicalabilitytoreportincidentsisofprimaryimportance,sincewithoutknowledgeofanincident,responseisprecluded.Fortunately,suchtechnicalmechanismsarealreadyinplaceinmanyorganizations.Forrapidresponsetoconstituencyproblems,asimpletelephone"hotline"ispracticalandconvenient.Someagenciesmayalreadyhaveanumberusedforemergenciesorforobtaininghelpwithotherproblems;itmaybepractical(andcost-effective)toalsousethisnumberforincidenthandling.Itmaybenecessarytoprovide24-hourcoverageforthehotline.Thiscanbedonebystaffingtheansweringcenter,byprovidinganansweringservicefornonofficehours,orbyusingacombinationofanansweringmachineandpersonalpagers. TheForumofIncidentResponseandSecurityTeamsThe1988Internetwormincidenthighlightedtheneedforbettermethodsforrespondingtoandsharinginformationaboutincidents.Itwasalsoclearthatanysingleteamor"hotline"wouldsimplybeoverwhelmed.Outofthiswasbomtheconceptofacoalitionofresponseteams-eachwithitsownconstituency,butworkingtogethertoshareinformation,providealerts,andsupporteachotherintheresponsetoincidents.TheForumofIncidentResponseandSecurityTeams(FIRST)includesteamsfromgoverrunent,industry,computermanufacturers,andacademia.NISTservesasthesecretariatofFIRST. 139 [PDF page 155] ///.OperationalControls Ifadditionalmechanismsforcontactingtheincidenthandlingteamcanbeprovided,itmayincreaseaccessandthusbenefitincidenthandlingefforts.Acentralizede-mailaddressthatforwardsmailtostaffmemberswouldpermittheconstituencytoconvenientlyexchangeinformationwiththeteam.Providingafaxnumbertousersmayalsobehelpful. 12.3.2RapidCommunicationsFacilitiesSomeformofrapidcommunicationsisessentialforquicklycommunicatingwiththeconstituencyaswellaswithmanagementofficialsandoutsideorganizations.Theteammayneedtosendoutsecurityadvisoriesorcollectinformationquickly,thussomeconvenientformofcommunications,suchaselectronicmail,isgenerallyhighlydesirable.Withelectronicmail,theteamcaneasilydirectinformationtovarioussubgroupswithintheconstituency,suchassystemmanagersornetworkmanagers,andbroadcastgeneralalertstotheentireconstituencyasneeded.Whenconnectivityalreadyexists,e-mailhaslowoverheadandiseasytouse.(However,itispossibleforthee-mailsystemitselftobeattacked,aswasthecasewiththe1988Internetworm.)Althoughtherearesubstitutesfore-mail,theytendtoincreaseresponsetime.Anelectronicbulletinboardsystem(BBS)canworkwellfordistributinginformation,especiallyifitprovidesaconvenientuserinterfacethatencouragesitsuse.ABBSconnectedtoanetworkismoreconvenienttoaccessthanonerequiringaterminalandmodem;however,thelattermaybetheonlyalternativefororganizationswithoutsufficientnetworkconnectivity.Inaddition,telephones,physicalbulletinboards,andflyerscanbeused.12.3.3SecureCommunicationsFacilitiesIncidentscanrangefromthetrivialtothoseinvolvingnationalsecurity.Oftenwhenexchanginginformationaboutincidents,usingencryptedcommunicationsmaybeadvisable.Thiswillhelppreventtheunintendeddistributionofincident-relatedinformation.Encryptiontechnologyisavailableforvoice,fax,ande-mailcommunications.12.4InterdependenciesAnincidenthandlingcapabilitygenerallydependsuponothersafeguardspresentedinthishandbook.Themostobviousisthestronglinktoothercomponentsofthecontingencyplan.Thefollowingparagraphsdetailthemostimportantoftheseinterdependencies. Onewaytoestablishacentralizedreportingandincidentresponsecapabiiity,whileminimizingexpenditures,istouseanexistingHelpDesk.ManyagenciesalreadyhavecentralHelpDesksforfieldingcallsaboutcommonlyused^plications,troubleshootingsystemproblems,andprovidinghelpindetectinganderac'catingcomputerviruses.ByexpandingthecapabilitiesofAeHelpDeskandpublicizingitstelephonenumber(ore-mailaddress),anagencymaybeabletosignijficantlyimproveitsabilitytohandlemanydifferenttypesofincidentsatminimalcost. 140 [PDF page 156] 12.IncidentHandling ContingencyPlanning.Asdiscussedintheintroductiontothischapter,anincidenthandlingcapabilitycanbeviewedasthecomponentofcontingencyplanningthatdealswithrespondingtotechnicalthreats,suchasvirusesorhackers.Closecoordinationisnecessarywithothercontingencyplanningefforts,particularlywhenplanningforcontingencyprocessingintheeventofaseriousunavailabilityofsystemresources.SupportandOperations.Incidenthandlingisalsocloselylinkedtosupportandoperations,especiallyusersupportandbackups.Forexample,forpurposesofefficiencyandcostsavings,theincidenthandlingcapabilityisoftenco-operatedwithauser"helpdesk."Also,backupsofsystemresourcesmayneedtobeusedwhenrecoveringfromanincident. TrainingandAwareness.Thetrainingandawarenessprogramcanbenefitfromlessonslearnedduringincidenthandling.Incidenthandlingstaffwillbeabletohelpassessthelevelofuserawarenessaboutcurrentthreatsandvulnerabilities.Staffmembersmaybeabletohelptrainsystemadministrators,systemoperators,andotherusersandsystemspersonnel.Knowledgeofsecurityprecautions(resultingfromsuchtraining)helpsreduceftitureincidents.Itisalsoimportantthatusersaretrainedwhattoreportandhowtoreportit. RiskManagement.TheriskanalysisprocesswiUbenefitfromstatisticsandlogsshowingthenumbersandtypesofincidentsthathaveoccurredandthetypesofcontrolsthatareeffectiveinpreventingincidents.Thisinformationcanbeusedtohelpselectappropriatesecuritycontrolsandpractices. 12.5CostConsiderationsThereareanumberofstart-upcostsandfundingissuestoconsiderwhenplanninganincidenthandlingcapability.Becausethesuccessofanincidenthandlingcapabilityreliessoheavilyonusers'perceptionsofitsworthandwhethertheyuseit,itisveryimportantthatthecapabilitybeabletomeetusers'requirements.Twoimportantfundingissuesare: Personnel.Anincidenthandlingcapabilityplanmightcallforatleastonemanagerandoneormoretechnicalstaffmembers(ortheirequivalent)toaccomplishprogramobjectives.Dependingonthescopeoftheeffort,however,full-timestaffmembersmaynotberequired.Insomesituations,somestaffmaybeneededpart-timeoronanon-callbasis.Staffmaybeperformingincidenthandlingdutiesasanadjunctresponsibilitytotheirnormalassignments.EducationandTraining.Incidenthandlingstaffwillneedtokeepcurrentwithcomputersystemandsecuritydevelopments.BudgetaDowancesneedtobemade,therefore,forattendingconferences,securityseminars,andothercontinuing-educationevents.Ifanorganizationislocatedinmorethanonegeographicareas,fundswillprobablybeneededfortraveltoothersitesforhandlingincidents. 141 [PDF page 157] ///.OperationalControls ReferencesBrand,RussellL.CopingWiththeThreatofComputerSecurityIncidents:APrimerfromPreventionThroughRecovery.July1989. Fedeli,Alan."OrganizingaCorporateAnti-VirusEffort."ProceedingsoftheThirdAnnualComputerVIRUSClinic,NationwideComputerCorp.March1990.Holbrook,P.,andJ.Reynolds,eds.SiteSecurityHandbook.RFC1244preparedfortheInternetEngineeringTaskForce,1991.FTPfromcsrc.nist.gov:/put/secplcy/rfc1244.txt.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology."EstablishingaComputerSecurityIncidentResponseCapability."ComputerSystemsLaboratoryBulletin.Gaithersburg,MD.February1992.Padgett,K.EstablishingandOperatinganIncidentResponseTeam.LosAlamos,NM:LosAlamosNationalLaboratory,1992.Pethia,Rich,andKennethvanWyk.ComputerEmergencyResponse-AnInternationalProblem.1990.Quarterman,John.TheMatrix-ComputerNetworksandConferencingSystemsWorldwide.DigitalPress,1990. Scherlis,William,S.Squires,andR.Pethia.ComputerEmergencyResponse.1989.Schultz,E.,D.Brown,andT.Longstaff.RespondingtoComputerSecurityIncidents:GuidelinesforIncidentHandling.UniversityofCaliforniaTechnicalReportUCRL-104689,1990.ProceedingsoftheThirdInvitationalWorkshoponComputerSecurityIncidentResponse.August1991.Wack,John.EstablishinganIncidentResponseCapability.SpecialPublication800-3.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.November1991. 142 [PDF page 158] Chapter13AWARENESS,TRAINING,ANDEDUCATION People,whoareaUfallible,areusuallyrecognizedasoneoftheweakestlinksinsecuringsystems.Thepurposeofcomputersecurityawareness,training,andeducationistoenhancesecurityby:•improvingawarenessoftheneedtoprotectsystemresources;•developingskillsandknowledgesocomputeruserscanperformtheirjobsmoresecurely;and•buildingin-depthknowledge,asneeded,todesign,implement,oroperatesecurityprogramsfororganizationsandsystems.Makingcomputersystemusersawareoftheirsecurityresponsibilitiesandteachingthemcorrectpracticeshelpsuserschangetheirbehavior.^^Italsosupportsindividualaccountability,whichisoneofthemostimportantwaystoimprovecomputersecurity.Withoutknowingthenecessarysecuritymeasures(andtohowtousethem),userscannotbetrulyaccountablefortheiractions.TheimportanceofthistrainingisemphasizedintheComputerSecurityAct,whichrequirestrainingforthoseinvolvedwiththemanagement,use,andoperationoffederalcomputersystems.Thischapterfirstdiscussesthetwooverridingbenefitsofawareness,training,andeducation,namely:(1)improvingemployeebehaviorand(2)increasingtheabilitytoholdemployeesaccountablefortheiractions.Next,awareness,training,andeducationarediscussedseparately,withtechniquesusedforeach.Finally,thechapterpresentsoneapproachfordevelopingacomputersecurityawarenessandtrainingprogram.13.1BehaviorPeopleareacrucialfactorinensuringthesecurityofcomputersystemsandvaluableinformationresources.Humanactionsaccountforafargreaterdegreeofcomputer-relatedlossthanallothersourcescombined.Ofsuchlosses,theactionsofanorganization'sinsidersnormallycausefarmoreharmthantheactionsofoutsiders.(Chapter4discussesthemajorsourcesofcomputer-relatedloss.) "Oneoften-citedgoaloftrainingischangingpeople'sattitudes.Thischapterviewschangingattitudesasjustonesteptowardchangingbehavior.^Thischapterdoesnotdiscussthespecificcontentsoftrainingprograms.Seethereferencesfordetailsofsuggestedcoursecontents. 143 [PDF page 159] ///.OperationalControls Themajorcausesoflossduetoanorganization'sownemployeesare:errorsandomissions,fraud,andactionsbydisgruntledemployees.Oneprincipalpurposeofsecurityawareness,training,andeducationistoreduceerrorsandomissions.However,itcanalsoreducefraudandunauthorizedactivitybydisgruntledemployeesbyincreasingemployees'knowledgeoftheiraccountabilityandthepenaltiesassociatedwithsuchactions. Managementsetstheexampleforbehaviorwithinanorganization.Ifemployeesknowthatmanagementdoesnotcareaboutsecurity,notrainingclassteachingtheimportanceofsecurityandimpartingvaluableskillscanbetrulyeffective.This"tonefromthetop"hasmyriadeffectsanorganization'ssecurityprogram.13.2AccountabilityOneofthekeystoasuccessfulcomputersecurityBoththedisseminationandtheenforcementP^^^^^^"^'^awarenessandd-aining.If-,. • , emploj^esarenotiMorniedofappucableOfpohcyarecriticalissuesthatareorganizationalpoliciesandprocedures,theycannotimplementedandstrengthenedthroughbeexpectedtoacteffectiveiytosecurecomputertrainingprograms.Employeescannotberesources,expectedtofollowpoliciesandproceduresofwhichtheyareunaware.Inaddition,enforcingpenaltiesmaybedifficultifuserscanclaimignorancewhencaughtdoingsomethingwrong.Trainingemployeesmayalsobenecessarytoshowthatastandardofduecarehasbeentakeninprotectinginformation.Simplyissuingpolicy,withnofoUow-uptoimplementthatpolicy,maynotsuffice. Manyorganizationsuseacknowledgmentstatementswhichstatethatemployeeshavereadandunderstandcomputersecurityrequirements.(AnexampleisprovidedinChapter10.) 13.3AwarenessAwarenessstimulatesandmotivatesthosebeingtrainedtocareaboutsecurityandtoremindthemofimportantsecuritypractices.Explainingwhathappenstoanorganization,itsmission,customers,andemployeesifsecurityfailsmotivatespeopletotakesecurityseriously. Securityawarenessprograms:(1)setthestagefortrainingbychangingorganizationalattitudestorealizetheimportanceofsecurityandtheadverseconsequencesofitsfailure;and(2)remindusersoftheprocedurestobefollowed. Awarenesscantakeondifferentformsforparticularaudiences.Appropriateawarenessformanagementofficialsmightstressmanagement'spivotalroleinestablishingorganizational 144 [PDF page 160] 13.Awareness,Training,andEducation attitudestowardsecurity.Appropriateawarenessforothergroups,suchassystemprogrammersorinformationanalysts,shouldaddresstheneedforsecurityasitrelatestotheirjob.Intoday'ssystemsenvironment,almosteveryoneinanorganizationmayhaveaccesstosystemresources-andthereforemayhavethepotentialtocauseharm. ComparativeFrameworkAWARENESSTRAININGEDUCATIONAttribute:"What""How""Why"Level:InformationKnowledgeInsightObjective:RecognitionSkillUnderstandingTeachingMethod:MediaPracticalInstructionTheoreticalInstruction -Videos-Newsletters-Posters,etc. -Lecture-Casestudyworkshop-Hands-onpractice -DiscussionSeminar-Backgroundreading TestMeasure:True/FalseMultipleChoice(identifylearning)ProblemSolving(applylearning)Eassay(interpretlearning) ImpactTimeframe:Short-termIntermediateLong-term Figure13.1comparessomeofthedifferencesinawareness,training,andeducation. Awarenessisusedtoreinforcethefactthatsecuritysupportsthemissionoftheorganizationbyprotectingvaluableresources.Ifemployeesviewsecurityasjustbothersomerulesandprocedures,theyaremorelikelytoignorethem.Inaddition,theymaynotmakeneededsuggestionsaboutimprovingsecuritynorrecognizeandreportsecuritythreatsandvulnerabilities. Awarenessalsoisusedtoremindpeopleofbasicsecuritypractices,suchasloggingoffacomputersystemorlockingdoors.Techniques.Asecurityawarenessprogramcanusemanyteachingmethods,includingvideo 145 [PDF page 161] ///.OperationalControls tapes,newsletters,posters,bulletinboards,flyers,demonstrations,briefings,shortremindernoticesatlog-on,talks,orlectures.Awarenessisoftenincorporatedintobasicsecuritytrainingandcanuseanymethodthatcanchangeemployees'attitudes. Effectivesecurityawarenessprogramsneedtobedesignedwiththerecognitionthatpeopletendtopracticeatuningoutprocess(alsoknownasacclimation).Forexample,afterawhile,asecurityposter,nomatterhowwelldesigned,willbeignored;itwill,ineffect,simplyblendintotheenvironment.Forthisreason,awarenesstechniquesshouldbecreativeandfrequentlychanged.13.4TrainingThepurposeoftrainingistoteachpeopletheskillsthatwillenablethemtoperformtheirjobsmoresecurely.Thisincludesteachingpeoplewhattheyshoulddoandhowtheyshould(orcan)doit.Trainingcanaddressmanylevels,frombasicsecuritypracticestomoreadvancedorspecializedskills.ItcanbespecifictoonecomputersystemorgenericenoughtoaddressaUsystems.Trainingismosteffectivewhentargetedtoaspecificaudience.Thisenablesthetrainingtofocusonsecurity-relatedjobskillsandknowledgethatpeopleneedperformingtheirduties.Twotypesofaudiencesaregeneralusersandthosewhorequirespecializedoradvancedskills. GeneralUsers.Mostusersneedtounderstandgoodcomputersecuritypractices,suchas: •protectingthephysicalareaandequipment(e.g.,lockingdoors,caringforfloppydiskettes);•protectingpasswords(ifused)orotherauthenticationdataortokens(e.g.,neverdivulgePINs);and•reportingsecurityviolationsorincidents(e.g.,whomtocallifavirusissuspected).Inaddition,generalusersshouldbetaughttheorganization'spoliciesforprotectinginformationandcomputersystemsandtherolesandresponsibilitiesofvariousorganizationalunitswithwhichtheymayhavetointeract. Employeesoftenregardcomputersecurityasanobstacletoproductivity.Acommonfeelingisthattheyarepaidtoproduce,nottoprotectTohelpmotivateemployees,awarenessshouldemphasizehowsecurity,fromabroaderperspective,contributestoproductivity.Theconsequencesofpoorsecurityshouldbeexplained,whileavoidingthefearandintimidationthatemployeesoftenassociatewithsecurity. 146 [PDF page 162] 13.Awareness,Training,andEducation Inteachinggeneralusers,careshouldbetakennottooverburdenthemwithunneededdetails.Thesepeoplearethetargetofmultipletrainingprograms,suchasthoseaddressingsafety,sexualharassment,andAIDSintheworkplace.Thetrainingshouldbemadeusefulbyaddressingsecurityissuesthatdirectlyaffecttheusers.Thegoalistoimprovebasicsecuritypractices,nottomakeeveryoneliterateinallthejargonorphilosophyofsecurity. SpecializedorAdvancedTraining.Manygroupsneedmoreadvancedormorespecializedtrainingthanjustbasicsecuritypractices.Forexample,managersmayneedtounderstandsecurityconsequencesandcostssotheycanfactorsecurityintotheirdecisions,orsystemadministratorsmayneedtoknowhowtoimplementandusespecificaccesscontrolproducts.Therearemanydifferentwaystoidentifyindividualsorgroupswhoneedspecializedoradvancedtraining.Onemethodistolookatjobcategories,suchasexecutives,functionalmanagers,ortechnologyproviders.Anothermethodistolookatjobfunctions,suchassystemdesign,systemoperation,orsystemuse.Athirdmethodistolookatthespecifictechnologyandproductsused,especiallyforadvancedtrainingforusergroupsandtrainingforanewsystem.Thisisfurtherdiscussedinthesection13.6ofthischapter.Techniques.Asecuritytrainingprogramnormallyincludestrainingclasses,eitherstrictlydevotedtosecurityorasaddedspecialsectionsormoduleswithinexistingtrainingclasses.Trainingmaybecomputer-orlecture-based(orboth),andmayincludehands-onpracticeandcasestudies.Training,likeawareness,alsohappensonthejob. 13.5EducationSecurityeducationismorein-depththansecuritytrainingandistargetedforsecurityprofessionalsandthosewhosejobsrequireexpertiseinsecurity. Techniques.Securityeducationisnormallyoutsidethescopeofmostorganizationawarenessandtrainingprograms.Itismoreappropriatelyapartofemployeecareerdevelopment.Securityeducationisobtainedthroughcollegeorgraduateclassesorthroughspecializedtrainingprograms.Becauseofthis,mostcomputersecurityprogramsfocusprimarilyonawarenessand Onegroupthathasbeentargetedforspeciahzedtrainingisexecutivesandfiinctionalmanagers.Thetrainingformanagementpersonnelisspecialized(ratherthanadvanced)becausemanagersdonot(asageneralrule)needtounderstandthetechnicaldetailsofsecurity.However,theydoneedtounderstandhowtoorganize,direct,andevaluatesecuritymeasuresandprograms.Theyalsoneedtounderstandriskacceptance. 147 [PDF page 163] ///.OperationalControls training,asdoestheremainderofthischapter. 13.6Implementation^^Aneffectivecomputersecurityawarenessandtraining(CSAT)programrequiresproperplanning,implementation,maintenance,andperiodicevaluation.ThefollowingsevenstepsconstituteoneapproachfordevelopingaCSATprogram.Step1: IdentifyProgramScope,Goals,andObjectives.Step2:IdentifyTrainingStaff. Step3:IdentifyTargetAudiences.Step4:MotivateManagementandEmployees.Step5:AdministertheProgram.Step6:MaintaintheProgram.Step7:EvaluatetheProgram.13.6.1IdentifyProgramScope,Goals,andObjectivesThefirststepindevelopingaCSATprogramistodeterminetheprogram'sscope,goals,andobjectives.ThescopeoftheCSATprogramshouldprovidetrainingtoalltypesofpeoplewhointeractwithcomputersystems.Thescopeoftheprogramcanbeanentireorganizationorasubunit.Sinceusersneedtrainingwhichrelatesdirectlytotheiruseof TheComputerSecurityActof1987requiresfederalagenciesto"provideforthemandatoryperiodictrainingincomputersecurityawarenessandacceptedcomputerpracticesofallemployeeswhoareinvolvedwiththemanagement,use,oroperationofeachfederalcomputersystemwithinorunderthesupervisionofthatagency."Thescopeandgoalsoffederalcomputersecurityawarenessandtrainingprogramsmustimplementthisbroadmandate.(Otherfederalrequirementsforcomputersecuritytrainingarecontainedin0MBCircularA-130,AppendixlU,and0PMregulations.) Unfortunately,collegeandgraduatesecuritycoursesarenotwidelyavailable.Inaddition,thecoursesmayonlyaddressgeneralsecurity. ThissectionisbasedonmaterialpreparedbytheDepartmentofEnergy'sOfficeofInformationManagementforitsunclassifiedsecurityprogram.'^Thisapproachispresentedtofamiliarizethereaderwithsomeoftheimportantimplementationissues.Itisnottheonlyapproachtoimplementinganawarenessandtrainingprogram.148 [PDF page 164] 13.Awareness,Training,andEducation particularsystems,alargeorganizationwideprogrammayneedtobesupplementedbymorespecificprograms.Inaddition,theorganizationshouldspecificallyaddresswhethertheprogramappliestoemployeesonlyoralsotootherusersoforganizationalsystems.Generally,theoverallgoalofaCSATprogramistosustainanappropriatelevelofprotectionforcomputerresourcesbyincreasingemployeeawarenessoftheircomputersecurityresponsibilitiesandthewaystofulfillthem.Morespecificgoalsmayneedtobeestablished.Objectivesshouldbedefinedtomeettheorganization'sspecificgoals.13.6.2IdentifyTrainingStaffTherearemanypossiblecandidatesforconductingthetrainingincludinginternaltrainingdepartments,computersecuritystaff,orcontractservices.Regardlessofwhoischosen,itisimportantthattrainershavesufficientknowledgeofcomputersecurityissues,principles,andtechniques.Itisalsovitalthattheyknowhowtocommunicateinformationandideaseffectively. 13.6.3IdentifyTargetAudiencesNoteveryoneneedsthesamedegreeortypeofcomputersecurityinformationtodotheirjobs.ACSATprogramthatdistinguishesbetweengroupsofpeople,presentsonlytheinformationneededbytheparticularaudience,andomitsirrelevantinformationwillhavethebestresults.Segmentingaudiences(e.g.,bytheirfunctionorfamiliaritywiththesystem)canalsoimprovetheeffectivenessofaCSATprogram.Forlargerorganizations,someindividualswillfitintomorethanonegroup.Forsmallerorganizations,segmentingmaynotbeneeded.Thefollowingmethodsaresomeexamplesofwaystodothis. Segmentaccordingtolevelofawareness.Individualsmaybeseparatedintogroupsaccordingtotheircurrentlevelofawareness.Thismayrequireresearchtodeterminehowwellemployeesfollowcomputersecurityproceduresorunderstandhowcomputersecurityfitsintotheirjobs.Segmentaccordingtogeneraljobtaskorfunction.Individualsmaybegroupedasdataproviders,dataprocessors,ordatausers.Segmentaccordingtospecificjobcategory.Manyorganizationsassignindividualstojobcategories.Sinceeachjobcategorygenerallyhasdifferentjobresponsibilities,trainingforeachwillbedifferent.Examplesofjobcategoriescouldbegeneralmanagement,technologymanagement,applicationsdevelopment,orsecurity. Segmentaccordingtolevelofcomputerknowledge.Computerexpertsmaybeexpectedtofindaprogramcontaininghighlytechnicalinformationmorevaluablethanonecoveringthemanagementissuesincomputersecurity.Similarly,acomputernovicewouldbenefitmorefromatrainingprogramthatpresentsintroductoryfundamentals.149 [PDF page 165] ///.OperationalControls Segmentaccordingtotypesoftechnologyorsystemsused.Securitytechniquesusedforeachoff-the-shelfproductorapplicationsystemwillusuallyvary.Theusersofmajorapplicationswillnormallyrequiretrainingspecifictothatapplication. 13.6.4MotivateManagementandEmployeesTosuccessfullyimplementanawarenessandtrainingprogram,itisimportanttogainthesupportofmanagementandemployees.ConsiderationshouldbegiventousingmotivationaltechniquestoshowmanagementandemployeeshowtheirparticipationintheCSATprogramwillbenefittheorganization.Management.Motivatingmanagementnormallyreliesuponincreasingawareness.Managementneedstobeawareofthelossesthatcomputersecuritycanreduceandtheroleoftrainingincomputersecurity.Managementcommitmentisnecessarybecauseoftheresourcesusedindevelopingandimplementingtheprogramandalsobecausetheprogramaffectstheirstaff. EmployeesandmanagersshouldbesolicitedtoprovideinputtotheCSATprogram.Individualsaremorelikelytosupportaprogramwhentheyhaveactivelyparticipatedinitsdevelopment. Someawarenesstechniqueswerediscussedabove.Regardlessofthetechniquesthatareused,employeesshouldfeelthattheircooperationwillhaveabeneficialimpactontheorganization'sfuture(and,consequently,theirown).13.6.5AdministertheProgramThereareseveralimportantconsiderationsforadministeringtheCSATprogram. Visibility.ThevisibilityofaCSATprogramplaysakeyroleinitssuccess.EffortstoachievehighvisibilityshouldbeginduringtheearlystagesofCSATprogramdevelopment.However,careshouldbegivenottopromisewhatcannotbedelivered.TrainingMethods.ThemethodsusedintheCSATprogramshouldbeconsistentwiththematerialpresentedandtailoredtotheaudience'sneeds.Sometrainingandawarenessmethodsandtechniquesarelisted Employees.Motivationofmanagersaloneisnotenough.Employeesoftenneedtobeconvincedofthemeritsofcomputersecurityandhowitrelatestotheirjobs.Withoutappropriatetraining,manyemployeeswillnotfullycomprehendthevalueofthesystemresourceswithwhichtheywork. TTieFederalInformationSystemsSecurityEducators'AssociationandNISTComputerSecurityProgramManagers'Forumprovidetwomeansforfederalgovernmentcomputersecurityprogrammanagersandtrainingofficerstosharetrainingideasandmaterials. 150 [PDF page 166] 13.Awareness,Training,andEducation above(intheTechniquessections).Computersecurityawarenessandtrainingcanbeaddedtoexistingcoursesandpresentationsortaughtseparately.On-the-jobtrainingshouldalsobeconsidered.TrainingTopics.Therearemoretopicsincomputersecuritythancanbetaughtinanyonecourse.Topicsshouldbeselectedbasedontheaudience'srequirements.TrainingMaterials.Ingeneral,higher-qualitytrainingmaterialsaremorefavorablyreceivedandaremoreexpensive.Costs,however,canbeminimizedsincetrainingmaterialscanoftenbeobtainedfromotherorganizations.Thecostofmodifyingmaterialsisnormallylessthandevelopingtrainingmaterialsfromscratch.TrainingPresentation.Considerationshouldbegiventothefrequencyoftraining(e.g.,annuallyorasneeded),thelengthoftrainingpresentations(e.g.,20minutesforgeneralpresentations,onehourforupdatesoroneweekforanoff-siteclass),andthestyleoftrainingpresentation(e.g.,formalpresentation,informaldiscussion,computer-basedtraining,humorous).13.6.6MaintaintheProgramComputertechnologyisanever-changingfield.Effortsshouldbemadetokeepabreastofchangesincomputertechnologyandsecurityrequirements.Atrainingprogramthatmeetsanorganization'sneedstodaymaybecomeineffectivewhentheorganizationstartstouseanewapplicationorchangesitsenvironment,suchasbyconnectingtotheInternet.Likewise,anawarenessprogramcanbecomeobsoleteiflawsororganizationpolicieschange.Forexample,theawarenessprogramshouldmakeemployeesawareofanewpolicyone-mailusage.EmployeesmaydiscounttheCSATprogram,andbyassociationtheimportanceofcomputersecurity,iftheprogramdoesnotprovidecurrentinformation.13.6.7EvaluatetheProgram Itisoftendifficulttomeasuretheeffectivenessofanawarenessortrainingprogram.Nevertheless,anevaluationshouldattempttoascertainhowmuchinformationisretained,towhatextentcomputersecurityproceduresarebeingfollowed,andgeneralattitudestowardcomputersecurity.Theresultsofsuchanevaluationshouldhelpidentifyandcorrectproblems.Someevaluationmethods(whichcanbeusedinconjunctionwithoneanother)are: •Usestudentevaluations.•Observehowwellemployeesfollowrecommendedsecurityprocedures.•Testemployeesonmaterialcovered. 151 [PDF page 167] ///.OperationalControls •Monitorthenumberandkindofcomputersecurityincidentsreportedbeforeandaftertheprogramisimplemented.13.7InterdependenciesTrainingcan,andinmostcasesshould,beusedtosupporteverycontrolinthehandbook.Allcontrolsaremoreeffectiveifdesigners,implementers,andusersarethoroughlytrained. Policy.Trainingisacriticalmeansofinformingemployeesofthecontentsofandreasonsfortheorganization'spolicies. SecurityProgramManagement.Federalagenciesneedtoensurethatappropriatecomputersecurityawarenessandtrainingisprovided,asrequiredundertheComputerSecurityActof1987.Asecurityprogramshouldensurethatanorganizationismeetingallapplicablelawsandregulations.Personnel/UserIssues.Awareness,training,andeducationareoftenincludedwithotherpersonnel/userissues.Trainingisoftenrequiredbeforeaccessisgrantedtoacomputersystem.13.8CostConsiderationsThemajorcostconsiderationsinawareness,training,andeducationprogramsare: •thecostofpreparingandupdatingmaterials,includingthetimeofthepreparer;•thecostofthoseprovidingtheinstruction;•employeetimeattendingcoursesandlecturesorwatchingvideos;and•thecostofoutsidecoursesandconsultants(bothofwhichmayincludingtravelexpenses),includingcoursemaintenance.ReferencesAlexander,M.ed."MultimediaMeansGreaterAwareness."InfosecurityNews.4(6),1993.pp.90-94. Thenumberofincidentswillnotnecessarilygodown.Forexample,virus-relatedlossesmaydecreasewhenusersknowtheproperprocedurestoavoidinfection.Ontheotherhand,reportsofincidentsmaygoupasusersemployvirusscannersandfindmoreviruses.Inaddition,userswillnowknowthatvirusincidentsshouldbereportedandtowhomthereportsshouldbesent. 152 [PDF page 168] 13.Awareness,Training,andEducation Bums,G.M."ARecipeforaDecentralizedSecurityAwarenessProgram."ISSAAccess.Vol.3,Issue2,2ndQuarter1990.pp.12-54.CodeofFederalRegulations.5CFR930.ComputerSecurityTrainingRegulation.Flanders,D."SecurityAwareness-A70%Solution."FourthWorkshoponComputerSecurityIncidentHandling,August1992.Isaacson,G."SecurityAwareness:MakingItWork."ISSAAccess.3(4),1990.pp.22-24.NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration.GuidelinesforDevelopmentofComputerSecurityAwarenessandTraining(CSAT)Programs.Washington,DC.NASAGuide2410.1.March1990.Maconachy,V."ComputerSecurityEducation,Training,andAwareness:TurningaPhilosophicalOrientationIntoPracticalReality."Proceedingsofthe12thNationalComputerSecurityConference.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyandNationalComputerSecurityCenter.Washington,DC.October1989.Maconachy,V."Panel:FederalInformationSystemsSecurityEducators'Association(FISSEA)."Proceedingofthe15thNationalComputerSecurityConference.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyandNationalComputerSecurityCenter.Baltimore,MD.October1992.Suchinsky,A."DeterminingYourTrainingNeeds."Proceedingsofthe13thNationalComputerSecurityConference.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyandNationalComputerSecurityCenter.Washington,DC.October1990.Todd,M.A.andGuitianC."ComputerSecurityTrainingGuidelines."SpecialPublication500-172.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.November1989.U.S.DepartmentofEnergy.ComputerSecurityAwarenessandTrainingGuideline(Vol.1).Washington,DC.DOE/MA-0320.February1988.Wells,R.O."SecurityAwarenessfortheNon-Believers."ISSAAccess.Vol.3,Issue2,2ndQuarter1990.pp.10-61. 153 [PDF page 169] [PDF page 170] Chapter14SECURITYCONSIDERATIONSINCOMPUTERSUPPORTANDOPERATIONS Computersupportandoperationsreferstoeverythingdonetorunacomputersystem.Thisincludesbothsystemadministrationandtasksexternaltothesystemthatsupportitsoperation(e.g.,maintainingdocumentation).ItdoesnotincludesystemplanningordesignThesupportandoperationofanycomputersystem,fromathree-personlocalareanetworktoaworldwideapplicationservingthousandsofusers,iscriticaltomaintainingthesecurityofasystem.Supportandoperationsareroutineactivitiesthatenablecomputersystemstofunctioncorrectly.Theseincludefixingsoftwareorhardwareproblems,loadingandmaintainingsoftware,andhelpingusersresolveproblems.Thefailuretoconsidersecurityaspartofthesupportandoperationsofcomputersystemsis,formanyorganizations,theirAchillesheel.Computersecuritysystemliteratureincludesmanyexamplesofhoworganizationsunderminedtheiroftenexpensivesecuritymeasuresbecauseofpoordocumentation,olduseraccounts,conflictingsoftware,orpoorcontrolofmaintenanceaccounts.Also,anorganization'spoliciesandproceduresoftenfailtoaddressmanyoftheseimportantissues. Systemmanagementandadministrationstaffgenerallyperformsupportandoperationstasksaltlioughsometimesusersdo.Largersystemsmayhavefuli-timeoperators,systemprogrammers,andsupportstaffperformingthesetasks.Smallersystemsmayhaveapart-timeadministrator. Theimportantsecurityconsiderationswithinsomeofthemajorcategoriesofsupportandoperationsare: usersupport,softwaresupport,configurationmanagement,backups,mediacontrols,documentation,andmaintenance. Ttieprimarygoalofcomputersupportandoperationsisthecontinuedandcorrectoperationofacomputersystem.Oneofthegoalsofcomputersecurityistheavailabilityandintegrityofsystems.Thesegoalsareverycloselylinked. 155 [PDF page 171] ///.OperationalControls Somespecialconsiderationsarenotedforlargerorsmallersystems.Thischapteraddressesthesupportandoperationsactivitiesdirectlyrelatedtosecurity.Everycontroldiscussedinthishandbookrelies,inonewayoranothfer,oncomputersystemsupportandoperations.Thischapter,however,focusesonareasnotcoveredinotherchapters.Forexample,operationspersonnelnormallycreateuseraccountsonthesystem.ThistopiciscoveredintheIdentificationandAuthenticationchapter,soitisnotdiscussedhere.Similarly,theinputfromsupportandoperationsstafftothesecurityawarenessandtrainingprogramiscoveredintheSecurityAwareness,Training,andEducationchapter. 14.1UserSupportInmanyorganizations,usersupporttakesplacethroughaHelpDesk.HelpDeskscansupportanentireorganization,asubunit,aspecificsystem,oracombinationofthese.Forsmallersystems,thesystemadministratornormallyprovidesdirectusersupport.Experiencedusersprovideinformalusersupportonmostsystems.AnimportantsecurityconsiderationforusersupportpersonnelisbeingabletorecognizeUsersupportshouldbecloselylinkedtothewhichproblems(broughttotheirattentionbyorganization'sincidenthandlingcapability.Inmanyusers)aresecurity-related.Forexample,^a^^^'^"^^personnelperformtheseftmctions.users'inabilitytologontoacom.putersystem^^i^ammmi^mmm^^^^^^^K^m^mmmmt^mayresultfromthedisablingoftheiraccountsduetotoomanyfailedaccessattempts.Thiscouldindicatethepresenceofhackerstryingtoguessusers'passwords.Ingeneral,systemsupportandoperationsstaffneedtobeabletoidentifysecurityproblems,respondappropriately,andinformappropriateindividuals.Awiderangeofpossiblesecurityproblemsexist.Somewillbeinternaltocustomapplications,whileothersapplytooff-the-shelfproducts.Additionally,problemscanbesoftware-orhardware-based.Themoreresponsiveandknowledgeablesystemsupportandoperationstaffpersonnelare,thelessusersupportwillbeprovidedinformally.Thesupportotherusersprovideisimportant,buttheymaynotbeawareofthe"wholepicture." SmaUsystemsareespeciallysusceptibletoviruses,whilenetworksareparticularlysusceptibletohackerattacks,whichcanbetargetedatmultiplesystems.Systemsupportpersonnelshouldbeabletorecognizeattacksandknowhowtorespond. Ingeneral,largersystemsincludemainframes,largeminicomputers,andWANs.SmallersystemsincludePCsandLANs.156 [PDF page 172] 14.SecurityConsiderationsinComputerSupportandOperations 14.2SoftwareSupportSoftwareistheheartofanorganization'scomputeroperations,whateverthesizeandcomplexityofthesystem.Therefore,itisessentialthatsoftwarefunctioncorrectlyandbeprotectedfromcorruption.Therearemanyelementsofsoftwaresupport.Oneiscontrollingwhatsoftwareisusedonasystem.Ifusersorsystemspersonnelcanloadandexecuteanysoftwareonasystem,thesystemismorevulnerabletoviruses,tounexpectedsoftwareinteractions,andtosoftwarethatmaysubvertorbypasssecuritycontrols.Onemethodofcontrollingsoftwareistoinspectortestsoftwarebeforeitisloaded(e.g.,todeterminecompatibilitywithcustomapplicationsoridentifyotherunforeseeninteractions).Thiscanapplytonewsoftwarepackages,toupgrades,tooff-the-shelfproducts,ortocustomsoftware,asdeemedappropriate.Inadditiontocontrollingtheloadingandexecutionofnewsoftware,organizationsshouldalsogivecaretotheconfigurationanduseofpowerfulsystemutilities.Systemutilitiescancompromisetheintegrityofoperatingsystemsandlogicalaccesscontrols.Asecondelementinsoftwaresupportcanbetoensurethatsoftwarehasnotbeenmodifiedwithoutproperauthorization.Thisinvolvestheprotectionofsoftwareandbackupcopies.Thiscanbedonewithacombinationoflogicalandphysicalaccesscontrols.Manyorganizationsalsoincludeaprogramtoensurethatsoftwareisproperlylicensed,asrequired.Forexample,anorganizationmayauditsystemsforillegalcopiesofcopyrightedsoftware.ThisproblemisprimarilyassociatedwithPCsandLANs,butcanapplytoanytypeofsystem.14.3ConfigurationManagementCloselyrelatedtosoftwaresupportisconfigurationmanagement-theprocessofkeepingtrackofchangestothesystemand,ifneeded,approvingthem.'°^Configurationmanagementnormallyaddresseshardware,software,networking,andotherchanges;itcanbeformalorinformal.Theprimarysecuritygoalofconfigurationmanagementisensuringthatchangestothesystemdonotunintentionallyorunknowinglydiminishsecurity.Someofthemethodsdiscussedundersoftware Thischapteronlyaddressesconfigurationmanagementduringtheoperationalphase.Configurationmanagementcanhaveextremelyimportantsecurityconsequencesduringthedevelopmentphaseofasystem. Virusestakeadvantageoftheweaksoftwarecontrolsinpersonalcomputers.Also,therearepowerfulutilitiesavailableforPCsthatcanrestoredeletedfiles,findhiddenfiles,andinterfacedirectlywithPChardware,bypassingtheoperatingsystem.Someorganizationsusepersonalcomputerswithoutfloppydrivesinordertohavebettercontroloverthesystem.Thereareseveralwidelyavailableutilitiesthatlookforsecurityproblemsinbothnetworksandthesystemsattachedtothem.Someutilitieslookforandtrytoexploitsecurityvulnerabilities.(TTiistypeofsoftwareisfurtherdiscussedinChapter9.) 157 [PDF page 173] ///.OperationalControls support,suchasinspectingandtestingsoftwarechanges,canbeused.Chapter9discussesothermethods.Notethatthesecuritygoalistoknowwhatchangesoccur,nottopreventsecurityfrombeingchanged.Theremaybecircumstanceswhensecuritywillbereduced.However,thedecreaseinsecurityshouldbetheresultofadecisionbasedonallappropriatefactors. Asecondsecuritygoalofconfigurationmanagementisensuringthatchangestothesystemarereflectedinotherdocumentation,suchasthecontingencyplan.Ifthechangeismajor,itmaybenecessarytoreanalyzesomeorallofthesecurityofthesystem.ThisisdiscussedinChapter8. 14.4BackupsSupportandoperationspersonnelandsometimesusersbackupsoftwareanddata.Thisfunctioniscriticaltocontingencyplanning.Frequencyofbackupswilldependuponhowoftendatachangesandhowimportantthosechangesare.Programmanagersshouldbeconsultedtodeterminewhatbackupscheduleisappropriate.Also,asasafetymeasure,itisusefultotestthatbackupcopiesareactuallyusable.Finally,backupsshouldbestoredsecurely,asappropriate(discussedbelow).14.5MediaControlsMediacontrolsincludeavarietyofmeasurestoprovidephysicalandenvironmentalprotectionandaccountabilityfortapes,diskettes,printouts,andothermedia.Fromasecurityperspective,mediacontrolsshouldbedesignedtopreventthelossofconfidentiality,integrity,oravailabilityofinformation,includingdataorsoftware,whenstoredoutsidethesystem.Thiscanincludestorageofinformationbeforeitisinputtothesystemandafteritisoutput.Theextentofmediacontroldependsuponmanyfactors,includingthetypeofdata,thequantityofmedia,andthenatureoftheuserenvironment.Physicalandenvironmentalprotectionisusedtopreventunauthorizedindividualsfromaccessingthemedia.Italsoprotectsagainstsuchfactorsasheat,cold,orharmfulmagneticfields.Whennecessary,loggingtheuseofindividual Fornetworkedsystems,configurationmanagementshouldincludeexternalconnections.Isthecomputersystemconnected?Towhatothersystennts?Inturn,towhatsystemsarethesesystemsandorganizationsconnected? Usersofsmallersystemsareoftenresponsiblefortheirownbackups.However,inrealitytheydonotalwaysperformbackupsregularly.Someorganizations,therefore,tasksupportpersonnelwithmakingbackupsperiodicallyforsmallersystems,eitherautomatically(throughserversoftware)ormanually(byvisitingeachmachine). 158 [PDF page 174] 14.SecurityConsiderationsinComputerSupportandOperations media(e.g.,atapecartridge)providesdetailedaccountability-toholdauthorizedpeopleresponsiblefortheiractions. 14.5.1MarkingControllingmediamayrequiresomeformofphysicallabeling.Thelabelscanbeusedtoidentifymediawithspecialhandlinginstructions,tolocateneededinformation,ortologmedia(e.g.,withserial/controlnumbersorbarcodes)tosupportaccountability.Identificationisoftenbycoloredlabelsondiskettesortapesorbannerpagesonprintouts. Iflabelingisusedforspecialhandlinginstructions,itiscriticalthatpeoplebeappropriatelytrained.ThemarkingofPCinputandoutputisgenerallytheresponsibilityoftheuser,notthesystemsupportstaff.Markingbackupdiskettescanhelppreventthemfrombeingaccidentallyoverwritten.14.5.2LoggingTheloggingofmediaisusedtosupportaccountability.Logscanincludecontrolnumbers(orothertrackingdata),thetimesanddatesoftransfers,namesandsignaturesofindividualsinvolved,andotherrelevantinformation.Periodicspotchecksorauditsmaybeconductedtodeterminethatnocontrolleditemshavebeenlostandthatallareinthecustodyofindividualsnamedincontrollogs.Automatedmediatrackingsystemsmaybehelpfulformaintaininginventoriesoftapeanddisklibraries. 14.5.3IntegrityVerificationWhenelectronicallystoredinformationisreadintoacomputersystem,itmaybenecessarytodeterminewhetherithasbeenreadcorrectlyorsubjecttoanymodification.Theintegrityofelectronicinformationcanbeverifiedusingerrordetectionandcorrectionor,ifintentionalmodificationsareathreat,cryptographic-basedtechnologies.(SeeChapter19.) 14.5.4PhysicalAccessProtectionMediacanbestolen,destroyed,replacedwithalook-alikecopy,orlost.Physicalaccesscontrols,whichcanlimittheseproblems,includelockeddoors,desks,filecabinets,orsafes. Ifthemediarequiresprotectionatalltimes,itm^ybenecessarytoactuallyoutputdatatothemediainasecurelocation(e.g.,printingtoaprinterinalockedroominsteadoftoageneral-purposeprinterinacommonarea). Typicalmarkingsformediacouldinclude:PrivacyActInformation,CompanyProprietary,orJoe'sBackupTape.Ineachcase,theindividualshandlingthemediamustknowtheapplicablehandlinginstructions.Forexample,attheAcmePatentResearchFirm,proprietaryinformationmaynotleavethebuildingexceptunderthecareofasecurityofficer.Also,Joe'sBackupTapeshouldbeeasytofindincasesomethinghappenstoJoe'ssystem. 159 [PDF page 175] ///.OperationalControls Physicalprotectionofmediashouldbeextendedtobackupcopiesstoredoffsite.Theygenerallyshouldbeaccordedanequivalentlevelofprotectiontomediacontainingthesameinformationstoredonsite.(Equivalentprotectiondoesnotmeanthatthesecuritymeasuresneedtobeexactlythesame.Thecontrolsattheoff-sitelocationarequitelikelytobedifferentfromthecontrolsattheregularsite.)PhysicalaccessisdiscussedinChapter15. 14.5.5EnvironmentalProtectionMagneticmedia,suchasdiskettesormagnetictape,requireenvironmentalprotection,sincetheyaresensitivetotemperature,liquids,magnetism,smoke,anddust.Othermedia(e.g.,paperandopticalstorage)mayhavedifferentsensitivitiestoenvironmentalfactors. 14.5.6TransmittalMediacontrolmaybetransferredbothwithintheorganizationandtooutsideelements.Possibilitiesforsecuringsuchtransmittalincludesealedandmarkedenvelopes,authorizedmessengerorcourier,orU.S.certifiedorregisteredmail. 14.5.7DispositionWhenmediaisdisposedof,itmaybeimportanttoensurethatinformationisnotimproperlydisclosed.Thisappliesbothtomediathatisexternaltoacomputersystem(suchasadiskette)andtomediainsideacomputersystem,suchasaharddisk.Theprocessofremovinginformationfrommediaiscalledsanitization.Threetechniquesarecommonlyusedformediasanitization:overwriting,degaussing,anddestruction.Overwritingisaneffectivemethodforclearingdatafrommagneticmedia.Asthenameimplies,overwritingusesaprogramtowrite(1s,Os,oracombination)ontothemedia.Commonpracticeistooverwritethemediathreetimes.Overwritingshouldnotbeconftisedwithmerelydeletingthepointertoafile(whichtypicallyhappenswhenadeletecommandisused).Overwritingrequiresthatthemediabeinworkingorder.Degaussingisamethodtomagneticallyerasedatafrommagneticmedia.Twotypesofdegausserexist:strongpermanentmagnetsandelectricdegaussers.Thefinalmethodofsanitizationisdestructionofthemediabyshreddingorburning. Manypeoplethrowawayolddiskettes,believingthaterasingthefilesonthediskettehasnnadethedataunretrievable.Inreality,however,erasingafilesimplyremovesthepointertothatfile.Thepointertellsthecomputerwherethefileisphysicallystored.Withoutthispointer,thefileswillnotappearonadirectorylisting.Thisdoesnotn^anthatthefilewasremoved.Commonlyavailableutilityprogramscanoftenretrieveinformationthatispresumeddeleted. 160 [PDF page 176] 14.SecurityConsiderationsinComputerSupportandOperations 14.6DocumentationDocumentationofallaspectsofcomputersupportandoperationsisimportanttoensurecontinuityandconsistency.Formalizingoperationalpracticesandprocedureswithsufficientdetailhelpstoeliminatesecuritylapsesandoversights,givesnewpersonnelsufficientlydetailedinstructions,andprovidesaqualityassurancefunctiontohelpensurethatoperationswillbeperformedcorrectlyandefficiently. Thesecurityofasystemalsoneedstobedocumented.Thisincludesmanytypesofdocumentation,suchassecurityplans,contingencyplans,riskanalyses,andsecuritypoliciesandprocedures.Muchofthisinformation,particularlyriskandthreatanalyses,hastobeprotectedagainstunauthorizeddisclosure.Securitydocumentationalsoneedstobebothcurrentandaccessible.Accessibilityshouldtakespecialfactorsintoaccount(suchastheneedtofindthecontingencyplanduringadisaster). Securitydocumentationshouldbedesignedtofulfilltheneedsofthedifferenttypesofpeoplewhouseit.Forthisreason,manyorganizationsseparatedocumentationintopolicydLndprocedures.Asecurityproceduresmanualshouldbewrittentoinformvarioussystemusershowtodotheirjobssecurely.Asecurityproceduresmanualforsystemsoperationsandsupportstaffmayaddressawidevarietyoftechnicalandoperationalconcernsinconsiderabledetail. 14.7MaintenanceSystemmaintenancerequireseitherphysicalorlogicalaccesstothesystem.Supportandoperationsstaff,hardwareorsoftwarevendors,orthird-partyserviceprovidersmaymaintainasystem.Maintenancemaybeperformedonsite,oritmaybenecessarytomoveequipmenttoarepairsite.Maintenancemayalsobeperformedremotelyviacommunicationsconnections.Ifsomeonewhodoesnotnormallyhaveaccesstothesystemperformsmaintenance,thenasecurityvulnerabilityisintroduced.Insomecircumstances,itmaybenecessarytotakeadditionalprecautions,suchasconductingbackgroundinvestigationsofservicepersonnel.Supervisionofmaintenancepersonnelmaypreventsomeproblems,suchas"snoopingaround"thephysicalarea.However,oncesomeonehasaccesstothesystem,itisverydifficultforsupervisiontopreventdamagedonethroughthemaintenanceprocess.Manycomputersystemsprovidemaintenanceaccounts.Thesespeciallog-inaccountsareOneofthemostcommonmethodshackersusetonormallypreconfiguredatthefactorywithbreakintosystemsisthroughmaintenanceaccountspre-set,widelyknownpasswords.Itis^^atstUIhavefectory-setoreasUyguessedpasswords.criticaltochangethesepasswordsor^^^^^^i^^ii^^^^^^iiii^ii^iiiii^igiiiiii^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 161 [PDF page 177] ///.OperationalControls otherwisedisabletheaccountsuntiltheyareneeded.Proceduresshouldbedevelopedtoensurethatonlyauthorizedmaintenancepersonnelcanusetheseaccounts.Iftheaccountistobeusedremotely,authenticationofthemaintenanceprovidercanbeperformedusingcall-backconfirmation.Thishelpsensurethatremotediagnosticactivitiesactuallyoriginatefromanestablishedphonenumberatthevendor'ssite.Othertechniquescanalsohelp,includingencryptionanddecryptionofdiagnosticcommunications;strongidentificationandauthenticationtechniques,suchastokens;andremotedisconnectverification. Largersystemsmayhavediagnosticports.Inaddition,manufacturersoflargersystemsandthird-partyprovidersmayoffermorediagnosticandsupportservices.Itiscriticaltoensurethattheseportsareonlyusedbyauthorizedpersonnelandcannotbeaccessedbyhackers. 14.8InterdependenciesTherearesupportandoperationscomponentsinmostofthecontrolsdiscussedinthishandbook.Personnel.Mostsupportandoperationsstaffhavespecialaccesstothesystem.Someorganizationsconductbackgroundchecksonindividualsfillingthesepositionstoscreenoutpossiblyuntrustworthyindividuals.IncidentHandling.Supportandoperationsmayincludeanorganization'sincidenthandlingstaff.Eveniftheyareseparateorganizations,theyneedtoworktogethertorecognizeandrespondtoincidents.ContingencyPlanning.Supportandoperationsnormallyprovidestechnicalinputtocontingencyplanningandcarriesouttheactivitiesofmakingbackups,updatingdocumentation,andpracticingrespondingtocontingencies.SecurityAwareness,Training,andEducation.Supportandoperationsstaffshouldbetrainedinsecurityproceduresandshouldbeawareoftheimportanceofsecurity.Inaddition,theyprovidetechnicalexpertiseneededtoteachusershowtosecuretheirsystems.PhysicalandEnvironmental.Supportandoperationsstaffoftencontroltheimmediatephysicalareaaroundthecomputersystem.TechnicalControls.Thetechnicalcontrolsareinstalled,maintained,andusedbysupportandoperationsstaff.Theycreatetheuseraccounts,adduserstoaccesscontrollists,reviewauditlogsforunusualactivity,controlbulkencryptionovertelecommunicationslinks,andperformthecountlessoperationaltasksneededtousetechnicalcontrolseffectively.Inaddition,supportandoperationsstaffprovideneededinputtotheselectionofcontrolsbasedontheirknowledgeofsystemcapabilitiesandoperationalconstraints. 162 [PDF page 178] 14.SecurityConsiderationsinComputerSupportandOperations Assurance.Supportandoperationsstaffensurethatchangestoasystemdonotintroducesecurityvulnerabilitiesbyusingassurancemethodstoevaluateortestthechangesandtheireffectonthesystem.Operationalassuranceisnormallyperformedbysupportandoperationsstaff. 14.9CostConsiderationsThecostofensuringadequatesecurityinday-to-daysupportandoperationsislargelydependentuponthesizeandcharacteristicsoftheoperatingenvironmentandthenatureoftheprocessingbeingperformed.Ifsufficientsupportpersonnelarealreadyavailable,itisimportantthattheybetrainedinthesecurityaspectsoftheirassignedjobs;itisusuallynotnecessarytohireadditionalsupportandoperationssecurityspecialists.Training,bothinitialandongoing,isacostofsuccessfullyincorporatingsecuritymeasuresintosupportandoperationsactivities. Anothercostisthatassociatedwithcreatingandupdatingdocumentationtoensurethatsecurityconcernsareappropriatelyreflectedinsupportandoperationspolicies,procedures,andduties. ReferencesBicknell,Paul."DataSecurityforPersonalComputers."Proceedingsofthe15thNationalComputerSecurityConference.Vol.I.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyandNationalComputerSecurityCenter.Baltimore,MD.October1992. Caelli,William,DennisLx)ngley,andMichaelShain.InformationSecurityHandbook.NewYork,NY:StocktonPress,1991.Carnahan,LisaJ."ALocalAreaNetworkSecurityArchitecture."Proceedingsofthe15thNationalComputerSecurityConference.Vol.I.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyandNationalComputerSecurityCenter.Baltimore,MD.1992. Carroll,J.M.ManagingRisk:AComputer-AidedStrategy.Boston,MA:Butterworths,1984.Chapman,D.Brent."Network(In)SecurityThroughIPPacketFiltering."Proceedingsofthe3rdUSENIXUNIXSecuritySymposium,1992.Curry,DavidA.UNIXSystemSecurity:AGuideforUsersandSystemAdministrators.Reading,MA:Addison-WesleyPublishingCo.,Inc.,1992.Garfinkel,Simson,andGeneSpafford.PracticalUNIXSecurity.Sebastopol,CA:O'Reilly&Associates,1991.Holbrook,Paul,andJoyceReynolds,eds.SiteSecurityHandbook.Availablebyanonymousftp 163 [PDF page 179] ///.OperationalControls fromnic.ddn.mil(inrfcdirectory).InternetSecurityforSystem&NetworkAdministrators.ComputerEmergencyResponseTeamSecuritySeminars,CERTCoordinationCenter,1993.Murray,W.H."SecurityConsiderationsforPersonalComputers."Tutorial:ComputerandNetworkSecurity.Oakland,CA:IEEEComputerSocietyPress,1986.Parker,DonnaB.ManagersGuidetoComputerSecurity.Reston,VA:RestonPublishing,Inc.,1981.Pfleeger,CharlesP.SecurityinComputing.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall,Inc.,1989. 164 [PDF page 180] Chapter15PHYSICALANDENVIRONMENTALSECURITY Thetermphysicalandenvironmentalsecurity,asusedinthischapter,referstomeasurestakentoprotectsystems,buildings,andrelatedsupportinginfrastructureagainstthreatsassociatedwiththeirphysicalenvironment.Physicalandenvironmentalsecuritycontrolsincludethefollowingthreebroadareas: Physicalandenvironmentalsecuritycontrolsareimplementedtoprotectthefacilityhousingsystemresources,thesystemresourcesthemselves,andthefacilitiesusedtosupporttheiroperation. 1.Thephysicalfacilityisusuallythebuilding,otherstructure,orvehiclehousingthesystemandnetworkcomponents.Systemscanbecharacterized,basedupontheiroperatinglocation,asstatic,mobile,orportable.Staticsystemsareinstalledinstructuresatfixedlocations.Mobilesystemsareinstalledinvehiclesthatperformthefunctionofastructure,butnotatafixedlocation.Portablesystemsarenotinstalledinfixedoperatinglocations.Theymaybeoperatedinwidevarietyoflocations,includingbuildingsorvehicles,orintheopen.Thephysicalcharacteristicsofthesestructuresandvehiclesdeterminethelevelofsuchphysicalthreatsasfire,roofleaks,orunauthorizedaccess. 2.Thefacility'sgeneralgeographicoperatinglocationdeterminesthecharacteristicsofnaturalthreats,whichincludeearthquakesandflooding;man-madethreatssuchasburglary,civildisorders,orinterceptionoftransmissionsandemanations;anddamagingnearbyactivities,includingtoxicchemicalspills,explosions,fires,andelectromagneticinterferencefromemitters,suchasradars. 3.Supportingfacilitiesarethoseservices(bothtechnicalandhuman)thatunderpintheoperationofthesystem.Thesystem'soperationusuallydependsonsupportingfacilitiessuchaselectricpower,heatingandairconditioning,andtelecommunications.Thefailureorsubstandardperformanceofthesefacilitiesmayinterruptoperationofthesystemandmaycausephysicaldamagetosystemhardwareorstoreddata. Thischapterfirstdiscussesthebenefitsofphysicalsecuritymeasures,andthenpresentsanoverviewofcommonphysicalandenvironmentalsecuritycontrols.Physicalandenvironmentalsecuritymeasuresresultinmanybenefits,suchasprotectingemployees.Thischapterfocusesontheprotectionofcomputersystemsfromthefollowing: ThischapterdrawsuponworkbyRobertV.Jacobson,InternationalSecurityTechnology,Inc.,fundedbytheTennesseeValleyAuthority. 165 [PDF page 181] ///.OperationalControls InterruptionsinProvidingComputerServices.Anexternalthreatmayinterruptthescheduledoperationofasystem.Themagnitudeofthelossesdependsonthedurationandtimingoftheserviceinterruptionandthecharacteristicsoftheoperationsendusersperform.PhysicalDamage.Ifasystem'shardwareisdamagedordestroyed,itusuallyhastoberepairedorreplaced.Datamaybedestroyedasanactofsabotagebyaphysicalattackondatastoragemedia(e.g.,renderingthedataunreadableoronlypartlyreadable).Ifdatastoredbyasystemforoperationaluseisdestroyedorcorrupted,thedataneedstoberestoredfromback-upcopiesorfromtheoriginalsourcesbeforethesystemcanbeused.Themagnitudeoflossfromphysicaldamagedependsonthecosttorepairorreplacethedamagedhardwareanddata,aswellascostsarisingfromserviceinterruptions.UnauthorizedDisclosureofInformation.Thephysicalcharacteristicsofthefacilityhousingasystemmaypermitanintrudertogainaccessbothtomediaexternaltosystemhardware(suchasdiskettes,tapesandprintouts)andtomediawithinsystemcomponents(suchasfrxeddisks),transmissionlinesordisplayscreens.Allmayresultinlossofdisclosure-sensitiveinformation.LossofControloverSystemIntegrity.Ifanintrudergainsaccesstothecentralprocessingunit,itisusuallypossibletorebootthesystemandbypasslogicalaccesscontrols.Thiscanleadtoinformationdisclosure,fraud,replacementofsystemandapplicationsoftware,introductionofaTrojanhorse,andmore.Moreover,ifsuchaccessisgained,itmaybeverydifficulttodeterminewhathasbeenmodified,lost,orcorrupted.PhysicalTheft.Systemhardwaremaybestolen.Themagnitudeofthelossisdeterminedbythecoststoreplacethestolenhardwareandrestoredatastoredonstolenmedia.Theftmayalsoresultinserviceinterruptions.Thischapterdiscussessevenmajorareasofphysicalandenvironmentalsecuritycontrols:•physicalaccesscontrols,•firesafety,•supportingutilities,•structuralcollapse,•plumbingleaks,•interceptionofdata,and•mobileandportablesystems. 166 [PDF page 182] 15.PhysicalandEnvironmentalSecurity 15.1PhysicalAccessControlsPhysicalaccesscontrolsrestricttheentryandexitofpersonnel(andoftenequipmentandmedia)fromanarea,suchasanofficebuUding,suite,datacenter,orroomcontainingaLANserver. Thecontrolsoverphysicalaccesstotheelementsofasystemcanincludecontrolledareas,barriersthatisolateeacharea,entrypointsinthebarriers,andscreeningmeasuresateachoftheentrypoints.Inaddition,staffmemberswhoworkinarestrictedareaserveanimportantroleinprovidingphysicalsecurity,astheycanbetrainedtochallengepeopletheydonotrecognize.Physicalaccesscontrolsshouldaddressnotonlytheareacontainingsystemhardware,butalsolocationsofwiringusedtoconnectelementsofthesystem,theelectricpowerservice,theairconditioningandheatingplant,telephoneanddataUnes,backupmediaandsourcedocuments,andanyotherelementsrequiredsystem'soperation.Thismeansthatalltheareasinthebuilding(s)thatcontainsystemelementsmustbeidentified. Itisalsoimportanttoreviewtheeffectivenessofphysicalaccesscontrolsineacharea,bothTherearemanytypesofphysicalaccesscontrols,duringnormalbusinesshours,andatotherincludingbadges,memorycards,guards,keys,true-times-particularlywhenanareamaybefloor-to-true-ceilingwallconstruction,fences,andunoccupied.Effectivenessdependsonboththecharacteristicsofthecontroldevicesusedmmmmm^^^^^^^^m^^^^^^^^^^^^^(e.g.,keycard-controlleddoors)andtheimplementationandoperation.Statementstotheeffectthat"onlyauthorizedpersonsmayenterthisarea"arenotparticularlyeffective.Organizationsshoulddeterminewhetherintruderscaneasilydefeatthecontrols,theextenttowhichstrangersarechallenged,andtheeffectivenessofothercontrolprocedures.Factorslikethesemodifytheeffectivenessofphysicalcontrols. Thefeasibilityofsurreptitiousentryalsoneedstobeconsidered.Forexample,itmaybepossibletogooverthetopofapartitionthatstopsattheundersideofasuspendedceilingortocutaholeinaplasterboardpartitioninalocationhiddenbyfijrniture.Ifadooriscontrolledbya LifeSafety Itisimportanttounderstandthattheobjectivesofphysicalaccesscontrolsmaybeinconflictwiththoseoflifesafety.Simplystated,lifesafetyfocusesonprovidingeasyexitfromafacility,particularlyinanemergency,whilephysicalsecuritystrivestocontrolentry.Ingeneral,lifesafetymustbegiven&stconsideration,butitisusuallypossibletoachieveaneffectivebalancebetweenthetwogoals.Forexample,itisoftenpossibletoequipemergencyexitdoorswithatimedelay.Whenonepushesonthepanicbar,aloudalarmsounds,andthedoorisreleasedafterabriefdelay.Theexpectationisthatpeoplewillbedeterredfromusingsuchexitsimproperly,butwillnotbesipificantlyendangeredduringanemergencyevacuation. 167 [PDF page 183] ///.OperationalControls combinationlock,itmaybepossibletoobserveanauthorizedpersonenteringthelockcombination.Ifkeycardsarenotcarefullycontrolled,anintrudermaybeabletostealacardleftonadeskoruseacardpassedbackbyanaccomplice.Correctiveactionscanaddressanyofthefactorslistedreducestherisktotheareasbehindthebarrier.Enhancingthescreeningatanentrypointcanreducethenumberofpenetrations.Forexample,aguardmayprovideahigherlevelofscreeningthanakeycard-controUeddoor,orananti-passbackfeaturecanbeadded.Reorganizingtrafficpatterns,workflow,andworkareasmayreducethenumberofpeoplewhoneedaccesstoarestrictedarea.Physicalmodificationstobarrierscanreducethevulnerabilitytosurreptitiousentry.Intrusiondetectors,suchasclosed-circuittelevisioncameras,motiondetectors,andotherdevices,candetectintrudersinunoccupiedspaces. 15.2FireSafetyFactorsBuildingfiresareaparticularlyimportantsecuritythreatbecauseofthepotentialforcompletedestructionofbothhardwareanddata,therisktohumanlife,andthepervasivenessofthedamage.Smoke,corrosivegases,andhighhumidityfromalocalizedfirecandamagesystemsthroughoutanentirebuilding.Consequently,itisimportanttoevaluatethefiresafetyofbuildingsthathousesystems.Followingareimportantfactorsindeterminingtherisksfromfire. IgnitionSources.Firesbeginbecausesomethingsuppliesenoughheattocauseothermaterialstoburn.Typicalignitionsourcesarefailuresofelectricdevicesandwiring,carelesslydiscardedcigarettes,improperstorageofmaterialssubjecttospontaneouscombustion,improperoperationofheatingdevices,and,ofcourse,arson.FuelSources.Ifafireistogrow,itmusthavea above.Addinganadditionalbarrier TypesofBuildingConstructionTherearefourbasickindsofbuildingconstruction:(a)lightfirame,(b)heavytimber,(c)incombustible,and(d)fireresistantNotethatthewanfireproof\¬usedbecausenostructurecanresistafireindefinitely.Mosthousesarelightframe,andcannotsurvivemorethanaboutthirtyminutesinafire.Heavytimbermeansthatthebasicstructuralelementshaveaminimumthicknessoffourinches.Whensuchstructuresbum,thecharthatformstendstoinsulatetlieinteriorofthetimberandthestructuremaysurviveforanhourormoredependingonthedetails.Incombustiblemeansthatthestructurememberswillnotburn.Thisalmostalwaysmeansthatthemembersaresteel.Note,however,thatsteellosesitstrengthathightemperatures,atwhichpointthestructurecollapses.Fireresistantmeansthatthestructuralmembersareincombustibleandareinsulated.Typically,theinsulationiseitherconcretethatencasessteelmembers,orisamineralwoolthatissprayedontothemembers.Ofcourse,theheaviertheinsulation,thelongerthestructurewillresistafire. Notethatabuildingconstructedofreinforcedconcretecanstillbedestroyedinafireifthereissufficientfuelpresentandfirefightingisineffective.Theprolongedheatofafirecancausedifferentialexpansionoftheconcretewhichcausesspalling.Portionsoftheconcretesplitoff,exposingthereinforcing,andtheinterioroftheconcreteissubjecttoadditionalspalling.Furthermore,asheatedfloorslabsexpandoutward,theydeformsupportingcolunms.Thus,areinforcedconcreteparkinggaragewithopenexteriorwallsandarelativelylowfireloadhasalowfirerisk,butasimilararchivalrecordstoragefacilitywithclosedexteriorwallsandahighfiireloadhasahigherriskeventhoughthebasicbuildingmaterialisincombustible. 168 [PDF page 184] 15.PhysicalandEnvironmentalSecurity supplyoffiiel,materialthatwillburntosupportitsgrowth,andanadequatesupplyofoxygen.Onceafirebecomesestablished,itdependsonthecombustiblematerialsinthebuilding(referredtoasthefireload)tosupportitsfurthergrowth.Themorefuelpersquaremeter,themoreintensethefirewillbe.BuildingOperation.Ifabuildingiswellmaintainedandoperatedsoastominimizetheaccumulationoffuel(suchasmaintainingtheintegrityoffirebarriers),thefireriskwiUbeminimized.BuildingOccupancy.Someoccupanciesareinherentlymoredangerousthanothersbecauseofanabove-averagenumberofpotentialignitionsources.Forexample,achemicalwarehousemaycontainanabove-averagefuelload.FireDetection.Themorequicklyafireisdetected,allotherthingsbeingequal,themoreeasilyitcanbeextinguished,minimizingdamage.Itisalsoimportanttoaccuratelypinpointthelocationofthefire. FireExtinguishment.Afirewillburnuntilitconsumesallofthefuelinthebuildingoruntilitisextinguished.Fireextinguishmentmaybeautomatic,aswithanautomaticsprinklersystemoraHALONdischargesystem,oritmaybeperformedbypeopleusingportableextinguishers,coolingthefiresitewithastreamofwater,bylimitingthesupplyofoxygenwithablanketoffoamorpowder,orbybreakingthecombustionchemicalreactionchain.Whenproperlyinstalled,maintained,andprovidedwithanadequatesupplyofwater,automaticsprinklersystemsarehighlyeffectiveinprotectingbuildingsandtheircontents.'^Nonetheless,oneoftenhearsuninformedpersonsspeakofthewaterdamagedonebysprinklersystemsasadisadvantage.Firesthattriggersprinklersystemscausethewaterdamage.Inshort,sprinklersystemsreducefiredamage,protectthelivesofbuildingoccupants,andlimitthefiredamagetothebuildingitself.Allthesefactorscontributetomorerapidrecoveryofsystems Asdiscussedinthissection,manyvariablesaffectfiresafetyandshouldbetakenintoaccountinselectingafireextinguishmentsystem.Whileautomaticsprinklerscanbeveryeffective,selectionofafireextinguishmentsystemforaparticularbuildingshouldtakeintoaccounttheparticularfireriskfactors.Otherfactorsmayincluderatechangesfromeitherafireinsurancecarrierorabusinessinterruptioninsurancecarrier.Professionaladviceisrequired. Occurrencesofaccidentaldischargeareextremelyrare,and,inafire,onlythesprinklerheadsintheimmediateareaofthefireopenanddischargewater. HalonshavebeenidentifiedasharmfultotheEarth'sprotectiveozonelayer.So,underaninternationalagreement(knownastheMontrealProtocol),productionofhalonsendedJanuary1,1994.InSeptember1992,theGeneralServicesAdministrationissuedamoratoriumonhalonusebyfederalagencies. 169 [PDF page 185] ///.OperationalControls followingafire. Eachofthesefactorsisimportantwhenestimatingtheoccurrencerateoffiresandtheamountofdamagethatwillresult.Theobjectiveofafire-safetyprogramistooptimizethesefactorstominimizetheriskoffire. 15.3FailureofSupportingUtilitiesSystemsandthepeoplewhooperatethemneedtohaveareasonablywell-controlledoperatingenvironment.Consequently,failuresofheatingandair-conditioningsystemswillusuallycauseaserviceinterruptionandmaydamagehardware.Theseutilitiesarecomposedofmanyelements,eachofwhichmustfunctionproperly.Forexample,thetypicalair-conditioningsystemconsistsof(1)airhandlersthatcoolandhumidifyroomair,(2)circulatingpumpsthatsendchilledwatertotheairhandlers,(3)chillersthatextractheatfromthewater,and(4)coolingtowersthatdischargetheheattotheoutsideair.Eachoftheseelementshasamean-time-between-failures(MTBF)andamean-time-to-repair(MTTR).UsingtheMTBFandMTTRvaluesforeachoftheelementsofasystem,onecanestimatetheoccurrencerateofsystemfailuresandtherangeofresultingserviceinterruptions.Thissamelineofreasoningappliestoelectricpowerdistribution,heatingplants,water,sewage,andotherutilitiesrequiredforsystemoperationorstaffcomfort.ByidentifyingthefailuremodesofeachutilityandestimatingtheMTBFandMTTR,necessaryfailurethreatparameterscanbedevelopedtocalculatetheresultingrisk.TheriskofutilityfailurecanbereducedbysubstitutingunitswithlowerMTBFvalues.MTTRcanbereducedbystockingsparepartsonsiteandtrainingmaintenancepersonnel.AndtheoutagesresultingfromagivenMTBFcanbereducedbyinstallingredundantunitsundertheassumptionthatfailuresaredistributedrandomlyintime.Eachofthesestrategiescanbeevaluatedbycomparingthereductioninriskwiththecosttoachieveit. 15.4StructuralCollapseAbuildingmaybesubjectedtoaloadgreaterthanitcansupport.Mostcommonlythisisaresultofanearthquake,asnowloadontheroofbeyonddesigncriteria,anexplosionthatdisplacesorcutsstructuralmembers,orafirethatweakensstructuralmembers.Evenifthestructureisnotcompletelydemolished,theauthoritiesmaydecidetobanitsfurtheruse,sometimesevenbanningentrytoremovematerials.Thisthreatappliesprimarilytohigh-risebuildingsandthosewithlargeinteriorspaceswithoutsupportingcolumns. 170 [PDF page 186] 15.PhysicalandEnvironmentalSecurity 15.5PlumbingLeaksWhileplumbingleaksdonotoccureveryday,theycanbeseriouslydisruptive.Thebuilding'splumbingdrawingscanhelplocateplumbinglinesthatmightendangersystemhardware.Theselinesincludehotandcoldwater,chilledwatersupplyandreturnlines,steamlines,automaticsprinklerlines,firehosestandpipes,anddrains.Ifabuildingincludesalaboratoryormanufacturingspaces,theremaybeotherlinesthatconductwater,corrosiveortoxicchemicals,orgases.Asarule,analysisoftenshowsthatthecosttorelocatethreateninglinesisdifficulttojustify.However,thelocationofshutoffvalvesandproceduresthatshouldbefollowedintheeventofafailuremustbespecified.Operatingandsecuritypersonnelshouldhavethisinformationimmediatelyavailableforuseinanemergency.Insomecases,itmaybepossibletorelocatesystemhardware,particularlydistributedLANhardware.15.6InterceptionofDataDependingonthetypeofdataasystemprocesses,theremaybeasignificantriskifthedataisintercepted.Therearethreeroutesofdatainterception:directobservation,interceptionofdatatransmission,andelectromagneticinterception.DirectObservation.Systemterminalandworkstationdisplayscreensmaybeobservedbyunauthorizedpersons.Inmostcases,itisrelativelyeasytorelocatethedisplaytoeliminatetheexposure.InterceptionofDataTransmissions.Ifaninterceptorcangainaccesstodatatransmissionlines,itmaybefeasibletotapintothelinesandreadthedatabeingtransmitted.Networkmonitoringtoolscanbeusedtocapturedatapackets.Ofcourse,theinterceptorcannotcontrolwhatistransmitted,andsomaynotbeabletoimmediatelyobservedataofinterest.However,overaperiodoftimetheremaybeaseriouslevelofdisclosure.Localareanetworkstypicallybroadcastmessages."^Consequently,alltraffic,includingpasswords,couldberetrieved.Interceptorscouldalsotransmitspuriousdataontappedlines,eitherforpurposesofdisruptionorforfraud. ElectromagneticInterception.Systemsroutinelyradiateelectromagneticenergythatcanbedetectedwithspecial-purposeradioreceivers.Successfulinterceptionwilldependonthesignalstrengthatthereceiverlocation;thegreatertheseparationbetweenthesystemandthereceiver,thelowerthesuccessrate.TEMPESTshielding,ofeitherequipmentorrooms,canbeusedtominimizethespreadofelectromagneticsignals.Thesignal-to-noiseratioatthereceiver. Aninsidermaybeabletoeasilycollectdatabyconfiguringtheirethernetnetworkinterfacetoreceiveallnetworktraffic,ratherthanjustnetworktrafficintendedforthisnode.Thisiscalledthepromiscuousmode.171 [PDF page 187] III.OperationalControls determinedinpartbythenumberofcompetingemitterswillalsoaffectthesuccessrate.Themoreworkstationsofthesametypeinthesamelocationperforming"random"activity,themoredifficultitistointerceptagivenworkstation'sradiation.Ontheotherhand,thetrendtowardwireless(i.e.,deliberateradiation)LANconnectionsmayincreasethelikelihoodofsuccessfulinterception. 15.7MobileandPortableSystemsTheanalysisandmanagementofriskusuallyhastobemodifiedifasystemisinstalledinavehicleorisportable,suchasalaptopcomputer.Thesysteminavehiclewillsharetherisksofthevehicle,includingaccidentsandtheft,aswellasregionalandlocalrisks. Portableandmobilesystemsshareanincreasedriskoftheftandphysicaldamage.Inaddition,portablesystemscanbe"misplaced"orleftunattendedbycarelessusers.Securestorageoflaptopcomputersisoftenrequiredwhentheyarenotinuse. Ifamobileorportablesystemusesparticularlyvaluableorimportantdata,itmaybeappropriatetoeitherstoreitsdataonamediumthatcanberemovedfromthesystemwhenitisunattendedortoencryptthedata.Inanycase,theissueofhowcustodyofmobileandportablecomputersaretobecontrolledshouldbeaddressed.Dependingonthesensitivityofthesystemanditsapplication,itmaybeappropriatetorequirebriefingsofusersandsignedbriefingacknowledgments.(SeeChapter10foranexample.)15.8ApproachtoImplementationLikeothersecuritymeasures,physicalandenvironmentalsecuritycontrolsareselectedbecausetheyarecost-beneficial.Thisdoesnotmeanthatausermustconductadetailedcost-benefitanalysisfortheselectionofeverycontrol.Therearefourgeneralwaystojustifytheselectionofcontrols: 1.Theyarerequiredbylaworregulation.Fireexitdoorswithpanicbarsandexitlightsareexamplesofsecuritymeasuresrequiredbylaworregulation.Presumably,theregulatoryauthorityhasconsideredthecostsandbenefitsandhasdeterminedthatitisinthepublicinteresttorequirethesecuritymeasure.Alawfullyconductedorganizationhasnooptionbuttoimplementallrequiredsecuritymeasures. 2.Thecostisinsignificant,butthebenefitismaterial.Agoodexampleofthisisafacilitywithakey-lockedlow-trafficdoortoarestrictedaccess.Thecostofkeepingthedoor Encryptionofdatafilesonstoredmediamayalsobeacost-eifectiveprecautionagainstdisclosureofconfidentialinformationifalaptopcomputerislostorstolen. 172 [PDF page 188] 15.PhysicalandEnvironmentalSecurity lockedisminimal,butthereisasignificantbenefit.Onceasignificantbenefit/minimalcostsecuritymeasurehasbeenidentified,nofurtheranalysisisrequiredtojustifyitsimplementation. 3.Thesecuritymeasureaddressesapotentially"fatal"securityexposurebuthasareasonablecost.Backingupsystemsoftwareanddataisanexampleofthisjustification. Formostsystems,thecostofmakingregularbackupcopiesismodest(comparedtothecostsofoperatingthesystem),theorganizationwouldnotbeabletofunctionifthestoreddatawerelost,andthecostimpactofthefailurewouldbematerial.Insuchcases,itwouldnotbenecessarytodevelopanyfurthercostjustificationforthebackupofsoftwareanddata.However,thisjustificationdependsonwhatconstitutesamodestcost,anditdoesnotidentifytheoptimumbackupschedule.Broadlyspeaking,acostthatdoesnotrequirebudgetingofadditionalfundswouldqualify. 4.Thesecuritymeasureisestimatedtobecost-beneficial.Ifthecostofapotentialsecuritymeasureissignificant,anditcannotbejustifiedbyanyofthefirstthreereasonslistedabove,thenitscost(bothimplementationandongoingoperation)anditsbenefit(reductioninfutureexpectedlosses)needtobeanalyzedtodetermineifitiscost-beneficial.Inthiscontext,cost-beneficialmeansthatthereductioninexpectedlossissignificantlygreaterthanthecostofimplementingthesecuritymeasure.Arrivingatthefourthjustificationrequiresadetailedanalysis.Simplerulesofthumbdonotapply.Consider,forexample,thethreatofelectricpowerfailureandthesecuritymeasuresthatcanprotectagainstsuchanevent.Thethreatparameters,rateofoccurrence,andrangeofoutagedurationsdependonthelocationofthesystem,thedetailsofitsconnectiontothelocalelectricpowerutility,thedetailsoftheinternalpowerdistributionsystem,andthecharacterofotheractivitiesinthebuildingthatuseelectricpower.Thesystem'spotentiallossesfi^omserviceinterruptiondependsonthedetailsofthefunctionsitperforms.Twosystemsthatareotherwiseidenticalcansupportfunctionsthathavequitedifferentdegreesofurgency.Thus,twosystemsmayhavethesameelectricpowerfailurethreatandvulnerabilityparameters,yetentirelydifferentlosspotentialparameters.Furthermore,anumberofdifferentsecuritymeasuresareavailabletoaddresselectricpowerfailures.Thesemeasuresdifferinbothcostandperformance.Forexample,thecostofanuninterruptiblepowersupply(UPS)dependsonthesizeoftheelectricloaditcansupport,thenumberofminutesitcansupporttheload,andthespeedwithwhichitassumestheloadwhentheprimarypowersourcefails.Anon-sitepowergeneratorcouldalsobeinstalledeitherinplaceofaUPS(acceptingthefactthatapowerfailurewillcauseabriefserviceinterruption)orinordertoprovidelong-termbackuptoaUPSsystem.Designdecisionsincludethemagnitudeoftheloadthegeneratorwillsupport,thesizeoftheon-sitefuelsupply,andthedetailsofthefacilitiestoswitchtheloadfromtheprimarysourceortheUPStotheon-sitegenerator. 173 [PDF page 189] ///.OperationalControls Thisexampleshowssystemswithawiderangeofrisksandawiderangeofavailablesecuritymeasures(including,ofcourse,noaction),eachwithitsowncostfactorsandperformanceparameters.15.9InterdependenciesPhysicalandenvironmentalsecuritymeasuresrelyonandsupporttheproperfunctioningofmanyoftheotherareasdiscussedinthishandbook.Amongthemostimportantarethefollowing:LogicalAccessControls.Physicalsecuritycontrolsaugmenttechnicalmeansforcontrollingaccesstoinformationandprocessing.Evenifthemostadvancedandbest-implementedlogicalaccesscontrolsareinplace,ifphysicalsecuritymeasuresareinadequate,logicalaccesscontrolsmaybecircumventedbydirectlyaccessingthehardwareandstoragemedia.Forexample,acomputersystemmayberebootedusingdifferentsoftware.ContingencyPlanning.Alargeportionofthecontingencyplanningprocessinvolvesthefailureofphysicalandenvironmentalcontrols.Havingsoundcontrols,therefore,canhelpminimizelossesfromsuchcontingencies.IdentificationandAuthentication(I&A).Manyphysicalaccesscontrolsystemsrequirethatpeoplebeidentifiedandauthenticated.AutomatedphysicalsecurityaccesscontrolscanusethesametypesofI&Aasothercomputersystems.Inaddition,itispossibletousethesametokens(e.g.,badges)asthoseusedforothercomputer-basedI&A.Other.Physicalandenvironmentalcontrolsarealsocloselylinkedtotheactivitiesofthelocalguardforce,firehouse,lifesafetyoffice,andmedicaloffice.Theseorganizationsshouldbeconsultedfortheirexpertiseinplanningcontrolsforthesystemsenvironment.15.10CostConsiderationsCostsassociatedwithphysicalsecuritymeasuresrangegreatly.Usefulgeneralizationsaboutcosts,therefore,aredifficultmake.Somemeasures,suchaskeepingadoorlocked,maybeatrivialexpense.Otherfeatures,suchasfire-detectionand-suppressionsystems,canbefarmorecostly.Costconsiderationsshouldincludeoperation.Forexample,addingcontrolled-entrydoorsrequirespersonsusingthedoortostopandunlockit.Locksalsorequirephysicalkeymanagementandaccounting(andrekeyingwhenkeysarelostorstolen).Oftentheseeffectswillbeinconsequential,buttheyshouldbefullyconsidered.Aswithothersecuritymeasures,theobjectiveistoselectthosethatarecost-beneficial. 174 [PDF page 190] 15.PhysicalandEnvironmentalSecurity ReferencesAlexander,M.,ed."SecureYourComputersandLx)ckYourDoors."InfosecurityNews.4(6),1993.pp.80-85.Archer,R."Testing:FollowingStrictCriteria."SecurityDealer.15(5),1993.pp.32-35.Breese,H.,ed.TheHandbookofPropertyConservation.Norwood,MA:FactoryMutualEngineeringCorp.Chanaud,R."KeepingConversationsConfidential."SecurityManagement.37(3),1993.pp.43-48.Miehl,F."TheInsandOutsofDoorLocks."SecurityManagement.37(2),1993.pp.48-53.NationalBureauofStandards.GuidelinesforADPPhysicalSecurityandRiskManagement.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication31.June1974.Peterson,P."InfosecurityandShrinkingMedia."ISSAAccess.5(2),1992.pp.19-22.Roenne,G."DevisingaStrategyKeyedtoLocks."SecurityManagement.38(4),1994.pp.55-56.Zimmerman,J."UsingSmartCards-ASmartMove."SecurityManagement.36(1),1992.pp.32-36. 175 [PDF page 191] [PDF page 192] IV.TECHNICALCONTROLS 177 [PDF page 193] [PDF page 194] Chapter16IDENTIFICATIONANDAUTHENTICATION Formostsystems,identificationandauthentication(I&A)isthefirstlineofdefense.I&Aisatechnicalmeasurethatpreventsunauthorizedpeople(orunauthorizedprocesses)fromenteringacomputersystem.I&Aisacriticalbuildingblockofcomputersecuritysinceitisthebasisformosttypesofaccesscontrolandforestablishinguseraccountability.Accesscontroloftenrequiresthatthesystembeabletoidentifyanddifferentiateamongusers.Forexample,accesscontrolisoftenbasedonleastprivilege,whichreferstothegrantingtousersofonlythoseaccessesrequiredtoperformtheirduties.Useraccountabilityrequiresthelinkingofactivitiesonacomputersystemtospecificindividualsand,therefore,requiresthesystemtoidentifyusers. Identificationisthemeansbywhichauserprovidesaclaimedidentitytothesystem.Authentication^^^isthemeansofestablishingthevalidityofthisclaim.Thischapterdiscussesthebasicmeansofidentificationandauthentication,thecurrenttechnologyusedtoprovideI&A,andsomeimportantimplementationissues. Computersystemsrecognizepeoplebasedontheauthenticationdatathesystemsreceive.Authenticationpresentsseveralchallenges:collectingauthenticationdata,transmittingthedatasecurely,andknowingwhetherthepersonwhowasoriginallyauthenticatedisstillthepersonusingthecomputersystem.Forexample,ausermaywalkawayfromaterminalwhilestillloggedon,andanotherpersonmaystartusingit. Therearethreemeansofauthenticatingauser'sidentitywhichcanbeusedaloneorincombination:•somethingtheindividualknows(asecret-e.g.,apassword,PersonalIdentificationNumber(PIN),orcryptographickey); Notalltypesofaccesscontrolrequireidentificationandauthentication. Computersalsouseauthenticationtoverilythatamessageorfilehasnotbeenalteredandtoverifythatamessageoriginatedwithacertainperson.Thischapteronlyaddressesuserauthentication.TheotherformsofauthenticationareaddressedintheChapter19. AtypicaluseridentificationcouldbeJSMITH(forJaneSmith).Thisinformationcanbeknownbysystemadministratorsandothersystemusers.AtypicaluserauthenticationcouldbeJaneSmith'spassword,whichiskeptsecret.ThiswaysystemadministratorscansetupJane'saccessandseeheractivityontheaudittrail,andsystemuserscansendhere-mail,butnoonecanpretendtobeJane. 179 [PDF page 195] IV.TechnicalControls •somethingtheindividualpossesses(atoken-e.g.,anATMcardorasmartcard);and•somethingtheindividualis(abiometric-e.g.,suchcharacteristicsasavoicepattern,handwritingdynamics,orafingerprint). Whileitmayappearthatanyofthesemeanscouldprovidestrongauthentication,thereareFormostapplications,trade-offswillhavetobemadeproblemsassociatedwitheach.Ifpeopleamongsecurity,easeofuse,andeaseofwantedtopretendtobesomeoneelseonaadministration,especiallyinmodernnetworked , , , environments,computersystem,theycanguessorlearnthatindividual'spassword;theycanalsostealorfabricatetokens.Eachmethodalsohasdrawbacksforlegitimateusersandsystemadministrators:usersforgetpasswordsandmaylosetokens,andadministrativeoverheadforkeepingtrackofI&Adataandtokenscanbesubstantial.Biometricsystemshavesignificanttechnical,useracceptance,andcostproblemsaswell. ThissectionexplainscurrentI&Atechnologiesandtheirbenefitsanddrawbacksastheyrelatetothethreemeansofauthentication.Althoughsomeofthetechnologiesmakeuseofcryptographybecauseitcansignificantlystrengthenauthentication,theexplanationsofcryptographyappearinChapter19,ratherthaninthischapter. 16.1I&ABasedonSomethingtheUserKnowsThemostcommonformofI&AisauserIDcoupledwithapassword.Thistechniqueisbasedsolelyonsomethingtheuserknows.Thereareothertechniquesbesidesconventionalpasswordsthatarebasedonknowledge,suchasknowledgeofacryptographickey.16.1.1PasswordsIngeneral,passwordsystemsworkbyrequiringtheusertoenterauserIDandpassword(orpassphraseorpersonalidentificationnumber).ThesystemcomparesthepasswordtoapreviouslystoredpasswordforthatuserID.Ifthereisamatch,theuserisauthenticatedandgrantedaccess.BenefitsofPasswords.Passwordshavebeensuccessfullyprovidingsecurityforcomputersystemsforalongtime.Theyareintegratedintomanyoperatingsystems,andusersandsystemadministratorsarefamiliarwiththem.Whenproperlymanagedinacontrolledenvironment,theycanprovideeffectivesecurity.ProblemsWithPasswords.Thesecurityofapasswordsystemisdependentuponkeepingpasswordssecret.Unfortunately,therearemanywaysthatthesecretmaybedivulged.Allofthe 180 [PDF page 196] 16.IdentificationandAuthentication problemsdiscussedbelowcanbesignificantlyediscussedinthesidebar.However,thereisnoexcepttousemoreadvancedauthentication(e. 1.Guessingorfindingpasswords.Ifusersselecttheirownpasswords,theytendtomakethemeasytoremember.Thatoftenmakesthemeasytoguess.Thenamesofpeople'schildren,pets,orfavoritesportsteamsarecommonexamples.Ontheotherhand,assignedpasswordsmaybedifficulttoremember,sousersaremorelikelytowritethemdown.Manycomputersystemsareshippedwithadministrativeaccountsthathavepresetpasswords.Becausethesepasswordsarestandard,theyareeasily"guessed."Althoughsecuritypractitionershavebeenwarningaboutthisproblemforyears,manysystemadministratorsstilldonotchangedefaultpasswords.AnothermethodoflearningpasswordsistoobservesomeoneenteringapasswordorPIN.Theobservationcanbedonebysomeoneinthesameroomorbysomeonesomedistanceawayusingbinoculars.Thisisoftenreferredtoasshouldersurfing. 2.Givingpasswordsaway.Usersmaysharetheirpasswords.Theymaygivetheirpasswordtoaco-workerinordertosharefiles.Inaddition,peoplecanbetrickedintodivulgingtheirpasswords.Thisprocessisreferredtoassocialengineering. tigatedbyimprovingpasswordsecurity,asifortheproblemofelectronicmonitoring, ,basedoncryptographictechniquesortokens). ImprovingPasswordSecurityPasswordgenerators.Ifusersarenotallowedtogeneratetheirownpasswords,theycannotpickeasy-to-guesspasswords.Somegeneratorscreateonlypronounceablenonwordstohelpusersrememberthem.However,userstendtowritedownhard-to-rememberpasswords.Limitsonlog-inattempts.ManyoperatingsystemscanbeconfiguredtolockauserIDafterasetnumberoffailedlog-inattempts.Thishelpstopreventguessingofpasswords.Passwordattributes.Userscanbeinstructed,orthesystemcanforcethem,toselectpasswords(1)withacertainminimumlength,(2)withspecialcharacters,(3)thatareunrelatedtotheiruserID,or(4)topickpasswordswhicharenotinanon-linedictionary.Thismakespasswordsmoredifficulttoguess(butmorelikelytobewrittendown).Changingpasswords.Periodicchangingofpasswordscanreducethedamagedonebystolenpasswordsandcanmakebrute-forceattemptstobreakintosystemsmoredifficult.Toofrequentchanges,however,canbeirritatingtousers. Technicalprotectionofthepasswordfile.Accesscontrolandone-wayencryptioncanbeusedtoprotectthepasswordfileitself. Note:ManyofthesetechniquesarediscussedinFIPS112,PasswordUsageandFIPS181,AutomatedPasswordGenerator. 3.Electronicmonitoring.Whenpasswordsaretransmittedtoacomputersystem,theycanbeelectronicallymonitored.ThiscanhappenonthenetworkusedtotransmitthepasswordoronthecomputersystemitselfSimpleencryptionofapasswordthatwiUbeusedagaindoesnotsolvethisproblembecauseencryptingthesamepasswordwillcreatethesameciphertext;theciphertextbecomesthepassword.181 [PDF page 197] IV.TechnicalControls 4.Accessingthepasswordfile.Ifthepasswordfileisnotprotectedbystrongaccesscontrols,thefilecanbedownloaded.Passwordfilesareoftenprotectedwithone-wayencryption'"^sothatplain-textpasswordsarenotavailabletosystemadministratorsorhackers(iftheysuccessfullybypassaccesscontrols).Evenifthefileisencrypted,bruteforcecanbeusedtolearnpasswordsifthefileisdownloaded(e.g.,byencryptingEnglishwordsandcomparingthemtothefile). PasswordsUsedasAccessControl.SomemainframeoperatingsystemsandmanyPCapplicationsusepasswordsasameansofrestrictingaccesstospecificresourceswithinasystem.Insteadofusingmechanismssuchasaccesscontrollists(seeChapter17),accessisgrantedbyenteringapassword.Theresultisaproliferationofpasswordsthatcanreducetheoverallsecurityofasystem.Whiletheuseofpasswordsasameansofaccesscontroliscommon,itisanapproachthatisoftenlessthanoptimalandnotcost-effective.16.1.2CryptographicKeysAlthoughtheauthenticationderivedfromtheknowledgeofacryptographickeymaybebasedentirelyonsomethingtheuserknows,itisnecessaryfortheusertoalsopossess(orhaveaccessto)somethingthatcanperformthecryptographiccomputations,suchasaPCorasmartcard.Forthisreason,theprotocolsusedarediscussedintheSmartTokenssectionofthischapter.However,itispossibletoimplementthesetypesofprotocolswithoutusingasmarttoken.AdditionaldiscussionisalsoprovidedundertheSingleLog-insection. 16.2I&ABasedonSomethingtheUserPossessesAlthoughsometechniquesarebasedsolelyonsomethingtheuserpossesses,mostofthetechniquesdescribedinthissectionarecombinedwithsomethingtheuserknows.Thiscombinationcanprovidesignificantlystrongersecuritythaneithersomethingtheuserknowsorpossessesalone."° ObjectsthatauserpossessesforthepurposeofI&Aarecalledtokens.Thissectiondividestokensintotwocategories:memorytokensandsmarttokens. One-wayencryptionalgorithmsonlyprovidefortheencryptionofdata.Theresultingciphertextcannotbedecrypted.Whenpasswordsareenteredintothesystem,theyareone-wayencrypted,andtheresultiscomparedwiththestoredciphertext.(SeetheChapter19.)"°Forthepurposeofunderstandinghowpossession-basedI&Aworks,itisnotnecessarytodistinguishwhetherpossessionofatokeninvarioussystemsisidentificationorauthentication. 182 [PDF page 198] 16.IdentificationandAuthentication 16.2.1MemoryTokensMemorytokensstore,butdonotprocess,information.Specialreader/writerdevicescontrolthewritingandreadingofdatatoandfromthetokens.Themostcommontypeofmemorytokenisamagneticstripedcard,inwhichathinstripeofmagneticmaterialisaffixedtothesurfaceofacard(e.g.,asonthebackofcreditcards).Acommonapplicationofmemorytokensforauthenticationtocomputersystemsistheautomatictellermachine(ATM)card.Thisusesacombinationofsomethingtheuserpossesses(thecard)withsomethingtheuserknows(thePIN).Somecomputersystemsauthenticationtechnologiesarebasedsolelyonpossessionofatoken,buttheyarelesscommon.Token-onlysystemsaremorelikelytobeusedinotherapplications,suchasforphysicalaccess.(SeeChapter15.) BenefitsofMemoryTokenSystems.MemorytokenswhenusedwithPINsprovidesignificantlymoresecuritythanpasswords.Inaddition,memorycardsareinexpensivetoproduce.Forahackerorotherwould-bemasqueradertopretendtobesomeoneelse,thehackermusthavebothavalidtokenandthecorrespondingPIN.ThisismuchmoredifficultthanobtainingavalidpasswordanduserIDcombination(especiallysincemostuserIDsarecommonknowledge).AnotherbenefitoftokensisthattheycanbeusedinsupportofloggenerationwithouttheneedfortheemployeetokeyinauserIDforeachtransactionorotherloggedeventsincethetokencanbescannedrepeatedly.Ifthetokenisrequiredforphysicalentryandexit,thenpeoplewillbeforcedtoremovethetokenwhentheyleavethecomputer.Thiscanhelpmaintainauthentication.ProblemsWithMemoryTokenSystems.Althoughsophisticatedtechnicalattacksarepossibleagainstmemorytokensystems,mostoftheproblemsassociatedwiththemrelatetotheircost,administration,tokenloss,userdissatisfaction,andthecompromiseofPINs.MostofthetechniquesforincreasingthesecurityofmemorytokensystemsrelatetotheprotectionofPINs.ManyofthetechniquesdiscussedinthesidebaronImprovingPasswordSecurityapplytoPINs. 1.Requiresspecialreader.Theneedforaspecialreaderincreasesthecostofusingmemorytokens.Thereadersusedformemorytokensmustincludeboththephysicalunitthatreadsthecardandaprocessorthatdetermineswhetherthecardand/orthePINenteredwiththecardisvalid.IfthePINortokenisvalidatedbyaprocessorthatisnotphysicallylocatedwiththereader,thentheauthenticationdataisvulnerabletoelectronicmonitoring(althoughcryptographycanbeusedtosolvethisproblem). 2.Tokenloss.Alosttokenmayprevent Attacksonmemory-cardsystemshavesometimesbeenquitecreative.OnegroupstoleanATMmachinethattheyinstalledatalocalshoppingmall.HiemachinecollectedvalidaccountnumbersandcorrespondingPINs,whichthethievesusedtoforgecards.TheforgedcardswerethenusedtowithdrawmoneyfromlegitimateATMs. 183 [PDF page 199] IV.TechnicalControls theuserfrombeingabletologinuntilareplacementisprovided.Thiscanincreaseadministrativeoverheadcosts. Thelosttokencouldbefoundbysomeonewhowantstobreakintothesystem,orcouldbestolenorforged.IfthetokenisalsousedwithaPIN,anyofthemethodsdescribedaboveinpasswordproblemscanbeusedtoobtainthePIN.CommonmethodsarefindingthePINtapedtothecardorobservingthePINbeingenteredbythelegitimateuser.Inaddition,anyinformationstoredonthemagneticstripethathasnotbeenencryptedcanberead. 3.UserDissatisfaction.Ingeneral,userswantcomputerstobeeasytouse.Manyusersfinditinconvenienttocarryandpresentatoken.However,theirdissatisfactionmaybereducediftheyseetheneedforincreasedsecurity. 16.2.2SmartTokensAsmarttokenexpandsthefunctionalityofamemorytokenbyincorporatingoneormoreintegratedcircuitsintothetokenitself.Whenusedforauthentication,asmarttokenisanotherexampleofauthenticationbasedonsomethingauserpossesses(i.e.,thetokenitself).Asmarttokentypicallyrequiresauseralsotoprovidesomethingtheuserknows(i.e.,aPINorpassword)inorderto"unlock"thesmarttokenforuse.Therearemanydifferenttypesofsmarttokens.Ingeneral,smarttokenscanbedividedthreedifferentwaysbasedonphysicalcharacteristics,interface,andprotocolsused.Thesethreedivisionsarenotmutuallyexclusive.PhysicalCharacteristics.Smarttokenscanbedividedintotwogroups:smartcardsandothertypesoftokens.Asmartcardlookslikeacreditcard,butincorporatesanembeddedmicroprocessor.SmartcardsaredefinedbyanInternationalStandardsOrganization(ISO)standard.Smarttokensthatarenotsmartcardscanlooklikecalculators,keys,orothersmallportableobjects.Interface.Smarttokenshaveeitheramanualoranelectronicinterface.Manualorhumaninterfacetokenshavedisplaysand/orkeypadstoallowhumanstocommunicatewiththecard.Smarttokenswithelectronicinterfacesmustbereadbyspecialreader/writers.Smartcards,describedabove,haveanelectronicinterface.Smarttokensthatlooklikecalculatorsusuallyhaveamanualinterface. Protocol.Therearemanypossibleprotocolsasmarttokencanuseforauthentication.Ingeneral,theycanbedividedintothreecategories:staticpasswordexchange,dynamicpasswordgenerators,andchallenge-response.•Statictokensworksimilarlytomemorytokens,exceptthattheusersauthenticatethemselves184 [PDF page 200] 16.IdentificationandAuthentication tothetokenandthenthetokenauthenticatestheusertothecomputer.•Atokenthatusesadynamicpasswordgeneratorprotocolcreatesauniquevalue,forexample,aneight-digitnumber,thatchangesperiodically(e.g.,everyminute).Ifthetokenhasamanualinterface,theusersimplyreadsthecurrentvalueandthentypesitintothecomputersystemforauthentication.Ifthetokenhasanelectronicinterface,thetransferisdoneautomatically.Ifthecorrectvalueisprovided,thelog-inispermitted,andtheuserisgrantedaccesstothesystem.•Tokensthatuseachallenge-responseprotocolworkbyhavingthecomputergenerateachallenge,suchasarandomstringofnumbers.Thesmarttokenthengeneratesaresponsebasedonthechallenge.Thisissentbacktothecomputer,whichauthenticatestheuserbasedontheresponse.Thechallenge-responseprotocolisbasedoncryptography.Challenge-responsetokenscanuseeitherelectronicormanualinterfaces. Thereareothertypesofprotocols,somemoresophisticatedandsomelessso.Thethreetypesdescribedabovearethemostcommon.BenefitsofSmartTokensSmarttokensoffergreatflexibilityandcanbeusedtosolvemanyauthenticationproblems.Thebenefitsofsmarttokensvary,dependingonthetypeused.Ingeneral,theyprovidegreatersecuritythanmemorycards.Smarttokenscansolvetheproblemofelectronicmonitoringeveniftheauthenticationisdoneacrossanopennetworkbyusingone-timepasswords. 1.One-timepasswords.Smarttokensthatuseeitherdynamicpasswordgenerationorchallenge-responseprotocolscancreateone-timepasswords.Electronicmonitoringisnotaproblemwithone-timepasswordsbecauseeachtimetheuserisauthenticatedtothecomputer,adifferent"password"isused.(Ahackercouldlearntheone-timepasswordthroughelectronicmonitoring,butwouldbeofnovalue.) 2.Reducedriskofforgery.Generally,thememoryonasmarttokenisnotreadableunlessthePINisentered.Inaddition,thetokensaremorecomplexand,therefore,moredifficulttoforge. 3.Multi-application.Smarttokenswithelectronicinterfaces,suchassmartcards,provideawayforuserstoaccessmanycomputersusingmanynetworkswithonlyonelog-in.ThisisfurtherdiscussedintheSingleLog-insectionofthischapter.Inaddition,asinglesmartcardcanbeusedformultiplefunctions,suchasphysicalaccessorasadebitcard. 185 [PDF page 201] IV.TechnicalControls ProblemswithSmartTokensLikememorytokens,mostoftheproblemsassociatedwithsmarttokensrelatetotheircost,theadministrationofthesystem,anduserdissatisfaction.SmarttokensaregenerallylessvulnerabletothecompromiseofPINsbecauseauthenticationusuallytakesplaceonthecard.(Itispossible,ofcourse,forsomeonetowatchaPINbeingenteredandstealthatcard.)Smarttokenscostmorethanmemorycardsbecausetheyaremorecomplex,particularlychallenge-responsecalculators. 1.Needreader/writersorhumanintervention.SmarttokenscanuseeitherElectronicreader/writerscantakemanyforms,suchanelectronicorahumaninterface.AnasaslotinaPCoraseparateexternaldevice.Mostelectronicinterfacerequiresareader,^umaninterfacesconsistofakeypadanddisplay,whichcreatesadditionalexpense.iBBHBBBBHaHaHHH^^Humaninterfacesrequiremoreactionsfromtheuser.Thisisespeciallytrueforchallenge-responsetokenswithamanualinterface,whichrequiretheusertotypethechallengeintothesmarttokenandtheresponseintothecomputer.Thiscanincreaseuserdissatisfaction. 2.SubstantialAdministration.Smarttokens,likepasswordsandmemorytokens,requirestrongadministration.Fortokensthatusecryptography,thisincludeskeymanagement.(SeeChapter19.) 16.3I&ABasedonSomethingtheUserIsBiometricauthenticationtechnologiesusetheuniquecharacteristics(orattributes)ofanindividualtoauthenticatethatperson'sidentity.Theseincludephysiologicalattributes(suchasfingerprints,handgeometry,orretinapatterns)orbehavioralattributes(suchasvoicepatternsandhand-writtensignatures).Biometricauthenticationtechnologiesbasedupontheseattributeshavebeendevelopedforcomputerlog-inapplications.Biometricauthenticationistechnicallycomplexandexpensive,anduseracceptancecanbedifficult.However,advancescontinuetobemadetomakethetechnologymorereliable,lesscostly,andmoreuser-friendly. Biometricauthenticationgenerallyoperatesinthefollowingmanner:Beforeanyauthenticationattempts,auseris"enrolled"bycreatingareferenceprofile{ortemplate)basedonthedesiredphysicalattribute.Theresultingtemplateisassociatedwiththeidentityoftheuserandstoredforlateruse.Whenattemptingauthentication,theuser'sbiometricattributeismeasured.Thepreviouslystoredreferenceprofileofthebiometricattributeiscomparedwiththemeasuredprofileoftheattributetakenfi^omtheuser.Theresultofthecomparisonisthenusedtoeitheracceptorrejecttheuser. 186 [PDF page 202] 16.IdentificationandAuthentication Biometricsystemscanprovideanincreasedlevelofsecurityforcomputersystems,butthetechnologyisstilllessmaturethanthatofmemorytokensorsmarttokens.Imperfectionsinbiometricauthenticationdevicesarisefromtechnicaldifficultiesinmeasuringandprofilingphysicalattributesaswellasfromthesomewhatvariablenatureofphysicalattributes.Thesemaychange,dependingonvariousconditions.Forexample,aperson'sspeechpatternmaychangeunderstressfulconditionsorwhensufferingfromasorethroatorcold.Duetotheirrelativelyhighcost,biometricsystemsaretypicallyusedwithotherauthenticationmeansinenvironmentsrequiringhighsecurity. 16.4ImplementingI&ASystemsSomeoftheimportantimplementationissuesforI&Asystemsincludeadministration,maintainingauthentication,andsinglelog-in. 16.4.1AdministrationAdministrationofauthenticationdataisacriticalelementforaUtypesofauthenticationsystems.TheadministrativeoverheadassociatedwithI&Acanbesignificant.I&Asystemsneedtocreate,distribute,andstoreauthenticationdata.Forpasswords,thisincludescreatingpasswords,issuingthemtousers,andmaintainingapasswordfile.Tokensystemsinvolvethecreationanddistributionoftokens/PENsanddatathattellthecomputerhowtorecognizevalidtokens/PINs.Forbiometricsystems,thisincludescreatingandstoringprofiles. Theadministrativetasksofcreatinganddistributingauthenticationdataandtokenscanbeasubstantial.Identificationdatahastobekeptcurrentbyaddingnewusersanddeletingformerusers.Ifthedistributionofpasswordsortokensisnotcontrolled,systemadministratorswillnotknowiftheyhavebeengiventosomeoneotherthanthelegitimateuser.Itiscriticalthatthedistributionsystemensurethatauthenticationdataisfirmlylinkedwithagivenindividual.SomeoftheseissuesarediscussedinChapter10underUserAdministration.Inaddition,I&Aadministrativetasksshouldaddresslostorstolenpasswordsortokens.ItOnemethodoflookingforimproperlyusedaccountsisoftennecessarytomonitorsystemstolookisforthecomputertoinformuserswhentheylastforstolenorsharedaccounts.^'^^™^^^^^^^""^^^^^^^'^"'"^"^usedtheiraccount.Authenticationdataneedstobestored^^^^mm^^^^^mm^^^^^^^mmmmmmmmmsecurely,asdiscussedwithregardtoaccessingpasswordfiles.Thevalueofauthenticationdataliesinthedata'sconfidentiality,integrity,andavailability.Ifconfidentialityiscompromised,someonemaybeabletousetheinformationtomasqueradeasalegitimateuser.Ifsystemadministratorscanreadtheauthenticationfile,they 187 [PDF page 203] IV.TechnicalControls canmasqueradeasanotheruser.Manysystemsuseencryptiontohidetheauthenticationdatafromthesystemadministrators.'"Ifintegrityiscompromised,authenticationdatacanbeaddedorthesystemcanbedisrupted.Ifavailabilityiscompromised,thesystemcannotauthenticateusers,andtheusersmaynotbeabletowork.16.4.2MaintainingAuthenticationSofar,thischapterhasdiscussedinitialauthenticationonly.Itisalsopossibleforsomeonetousealegitimateuser'saccountafterlog-in."^Manycomputersystemshandlethisproblembyloggingauseroutorlockingtheirdisplayorsessionafteracertainperiodofinactivity.However,thesemethodscanaffectproductivityandcanmakethecomputerlessuser-friendly. 16.4.3SingleLog-inFromanefficiencyviewpoint,itisdesirableforuserstoauthenticatethemselvesonlyonceandthentobeabletoaccessawidevarietyofapplicationsanddataavailableonlocalandremotesystems,evenifthosesystemsrequireuserstoauthenticatethemselves.Thisisknownassinglelog-in}^^Iftheaccessiswithinthesamehostcomputer,thentheuseofamodernaccesscontrolsystem(suchasanaccesscontrollist)shouldallowforasinglelog-in.Iftheaccessisacrossmultipleplatforms,thentheissueismorecomplicated,asdiscussedbelow.Therearethreemaintechniquesthatcanprovidesinglelog-inacrossmultiplecomputers:host-to-hostauthentication,authenticationservers,anduser-to-hostauthentication.Host-to-HostAuthentication.Underahost-to-hostauthenticationapproach,usersauthenticatethemselvesoncetoahostcomputer.Thatcomputerthenauthenticatesitselftoothercomputersandvouchesforthespecificuser.Host-to-hostauthenticationcanbedonebypassinganidentification,apassword,orbyachallenge-responsemechanismorotherone-timepasswordscheme.Underthisapproach,itisnecessaryforthecomputerstorecognizeeachotherandtotrusteachother.AuthenticationServers.Whenusingauthenticationserver,theusersauthenticatethemselvestoaspecialhostcomputer(theauthenticationserver).Thiscomputerthenauthenticatestheuserto '''Masqueradingbysystemadministratorscannotbepreventedentirely.However,controlscanbesetupsothatimproperactionsbythesystemadministratorcanbedetectedinauditrecords.Afterausersignson,thecomputertreatsallcommandsoriginatingfromtheuser'sphysicaldevice(suchasaPCorterminal)asbeingfromthatuser. Singlelog-inissomewhatofamisnomer.Itiscurrentlynotfeasibletohaveonesign-onforeverycomputersystemausermightwishtoaccess.Thetypesofsinglelog-indescribedapplymainlytogroupsofsystems(e.g.,withinanorganizationoraconsortium).188 [PDF page 204] 16.IdentificationandAuthentication otherhostcomputerstheuserwantstoaccess.Underthisapproach,itisnecessaryKerberosandSPXareexamplesofnetworkforthecomputerstotrusttheauthenticationauthenticationserverprotocols.Theybothuseserver.(Theauthenticationserverneednotbecryptographytoauthenticateuserstocomputersonaseparatecomputer,althoughinsomenetworks,environmentsthismaybeacost-effectivewaybbbbbbbmbbbbbbmbbbb^b^toincreasethesecurityoftheserver.)Authenticationserverscanbedistributedgeographicallyorlogically,asneeded,toreduceworkload.User-to-Host.Auser-to-hostauthenticationapproachrequirestheusertolog-intoeachhostcomputer.However,asmarttoken(suchasasmartcard)cancontainallauthenticationdataandperformthatservicefortheuser.Tousers,itlooksasthoughtheywereonlyauthenticatedonce.16.5InterdependenciesTherearemanyinterdependenciesamongI&Aandothercontrols.Severalofthemhavebeendiscussedinthechapter.LogicalAccessControls.Accesscontrolsareneededtoprotecttheauthenticationdatabase.I&Aisoftenthebasisforaccesscontrols.Dial-backmodemsandfirewalls,discussedinChapter17,canhelppreventhackersfromtryingtolog-in. Audit.I&Aisnecessaryifanauditlogisgoingtobeusedforindividualaccountability.Cryptography.CryptographyprovidestwobasicservicestoI&A:itprotectstheconfidentialityofauthenticationdata,anditprovidesprotocolsforprovingknowledgeand/orpossessionofatokenwithouthavingtotransmitdatathatcouldbereplayedtogainaccesstoacomputersystem.16.6CostConsiderationsIngeneral,passwordsaretheleastexpensiveauthenticationtechniqueandgenerallytheleastsecure.Theyarealreadyembeddedinmanysystems.Memorytokensarelessexpensivethansmarttokens,buthavelessfunctionality.Smarttokenswithahumaninterfacedonotrequirereaders,butaremoreinconvenienttouse.Biometricstendtobethemostexpensive.ForI&Asystems,thecostofadministrationisoftenunderestimated.Justbecauseasystemcomeswithapasswordsystemdoesnotmeanthatusingitisfree.Forexample,thereissignificantoverheadtoadministeringtheI&Asystem. 189 [PDF page 205] IV.TechnicalControls ReferencesAlexander,M.,ed."KeepingtheBadGuysOff-Line."InfosecurityNews.4(6),1993.pp.54-65.AmericanBankersAssociation.AmericanNationalStandardforFinancialInstitutionSign-OnAuthenticationforWholesaleFinancialTransactions.ANSIX9.26-1990.Washington,DC,February28,1990.CCITTRecommendationX.509.TheDirectory-AuthenticationFramework.November1988(Developedincollaboration,andtechnicallyaligned,withISO9594-8).DepartmentofDefense.PasswordManagementGuideline.CSC-STD-002-85.April12,1985.Feldmeier,DavidC,andPhilipR.Kam."UNIXPasswordSecurity-TenYearsLater."Crypto'89Abstracts.SantaBarbara,CA:Crypto'89Conference,August20-24,1989.Haykin,MarthaE.,andRobertB.J.Warnar.SmartCardTechnology:NewMethodsforComputerAccessControl.SpecialPublication500-157.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,September1988.Kay,R."WhateverHappenedtoBiometrics?"InfosecurityNews.4(5),1993.pp.60-62.NationalBureauofStandards.PasswordUsage.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPubUcation112.May30,1985.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.AutomatedPasswordGenerator.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication181.October,1993.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.GuidelinefortheUseofAdvancedAuthenticationTechnologyAlternatives.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication190.October,1994.Salamone,S."InternetworkSecurity:UnsafeatAnyNode?"DataCommunications.22(12),1993.pp.61-68.Sherman,R."BiometricFutures."ComputersandSecurity.11(2),1992.pp.128-133.Smid,Miles,JamesDray,andRobertB.J.Warnar."AToken-BasedAccessControlSystemforComputerNetworks."Proceedingsofthe12thNationalCommuterSecurityConference.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,October1989. 190 [PDF page 206] 16.IdentificationandAuthentication Steiner,J.O.,C.Neuman,andJ.Schiller."Kerberos:AnAuthenticationServiceforOpenNetworkSystems."ProceedingsWinterUSENIX.Dallas,Texas,February1988.pp.191-202.Troy,EugeneF.SecurityforDial-UpLines.SpecialPublication500-137,Gaithersburg,MD:NationalBureauofStandards,May1986. 191 [PDF page 207] [PDF page 208] Chapter17LOGICALACCESSCONTROLOnmanymultiusersystems,requirementsforusing(andprohibitionsagainsttheuseof)Logicalaccesscontrolsprovideatechnicalnnteansofvariouscomputerresources"'*varycontrollingwhatinformationuserscanutilize,theconsiderably.Typically,forexample,someprogramstheycanrun,andthemodificationstheycaninformationmustbeaccessibletoallusers,"^somemaybeneededbyseveralgroupsordepartments,andsomeshouldbeaccessedbyonlyafewindividuals.Whileitisobviousthatusersmusthaveaccesstotheinformationtheyneedtodotheirjobs,itmayalsoberequiredtodenyaccesstonon-job-relatedinformation.Itmayalsobeimportanttocontrolthekindofaccessthatisafforded(e.g.,theabilityfortheaverageusertoexecute,butnotchange,systemprograms).Thesetypesofaccessrestrictionsenforcepolicyandhelpensurethatunauthorizedactionsarenottaken.Accessistheabilitytodosomethingwithacomputerresource(e.g.,use,change,orview).Accesscontrolisthemeansbywhichtheabilityisexplicitlyenabledorrestrictedinsomeway(usuallythroughphysicalandsystem-basedcontrols).Computer-basedaccesscontrolsarecalledlogicalaccesscontrols.Logicalaccesscontrolscanprescribenotonlywhoorwhat(e.g.,inthecaseofaprocess)istohaveaccesstoaspecificsystemresourcebutalsothetypeofaccessthatispermitted.Thesecontrolsmaybebuiltintotheoperatingsystem,maybeincorporatedintoapplicationsprogramsormajorutilities(e.g.,databasemanagementsystemsorcommunicationssystems),ormaybeimplementedthroughadd-onsecuritypackages.Logicalaccesscontrolsmaybeimplementedinternallytothecomputersystembeingprotectedormaybeimplementedinexternaldevices. Thetermaccessisoftenconfusedwithauthorizationandauthentication.Accessistheabilitytodosomethingwithacomputerresource.Thisusuallyreferstoatechnicalability(e.g.,read,create,modify,ordeleteafde,executeaprogram,oruseanexternalconnection).Authorizationisthepermissiontouseacomputerresource.Permissionisgranted,directlyorindirectly,bytheapplicationorsystemowner.Authenticationisproving(tosomereasonabledegree)thatusersarewhotheyclaimtobe. Thetermcomputerresourcesincludesinformationaswellassystemresources,suchasprograms,subroutines,andhardware(e.g.,modems,communicationslines). Usersneednotbeactualhumanusers.Theycouldinclude,forexample,aprogramoranothercomputerrequestinguseofasystemresource. 193 [PDF page 209] IV.TechnicalControls Logicalaccesscontrolscanhelpprotect:•operatingsystemsandothersystemsoftwarefromunauthorizedmodificationormanipulation(andtherebyhelpensurethesystem'sintegrityandavailability); •theintegrityandavailabilityofinformationbyrestrictingthenumberofusersandprocesseswithaccess;and•confidentialinformationfrombeingdisclosedtounauthorizedindividuals. Thischapterfirstdiscussesbasiccriteriathatcanbeusedtodecidewhetheraparticularusershouldbegrantedaccesstoaparticularsystemresource.Itthenreviewstheuseofthesecriteriabythosewhosetpolicy(usuallysystem-specificpolicy),commonlyusedtechnicalmechanismsforimplementinglogicalaccesscontrol,andissuesrelatedtoadministrationofaccesscontrols. 17.1AccessCriteriaIndecidingwhethertopermitsomeonetouseasystemresourcelogicalaccesscontrolsexaminewhethertheuserisauthorizedforthetypeofaccessrequested.(Notethatthisinquiryisusuallydistinctfromthequestionofwhethertheuserisauthorizedtousethesystematall,whichisusuallyaddressedinanidentificationandauthenticationprocess.)Thesystemusesvariouscriteriatodetermineifarequestforaccesswillbegranted.Theyaretypicallyusedinsomecombination.Manyoftheadvantagesandcomplexitiesinvolvedinimplementingandmanagingaccesscontrolarerelatedtothedifferentkindsofuseraccessessupported.17.1.1Identity Itisprobablyfairtosaythatthemajorityofaccesscontrolsarebasedupontheidentityoftheuser 194 Controllingaccessisnormallythoughtofasapplyingtohumanusers(e.g.,willtechnicalaccessbeprovidedforuserJSMITHtothefile"payroll.dat")butaccesscanbeprovidedtoothercomputersystems.Also,accesscontrolsareoftenincorrectlythoughtofasonlyapplyingtofiles.However,theyalsoprotectothersystemresourcessuchastheabiUtytoplaceanoutgoinglong-distancephonecallthoughasystemmodem(aswellas,perhaps,theinformationthatcanbesentoversuchacall).Accesscontrolscanalsoapplytospecificfimcfionswithinanapplicationandtospecificfieldsofafile. Whendeterminingwhatkindoftechnicalaccesstoallowtospecificdata,programs,devices,andresources,itisimportanttoconsiderwhowillhaveaccessandwhatkindofaccesstheywillbeallowed.Itmaybedesirableforeveryoneintheorganizationtohaveaccesstosomeinformationonthesystem,suchasthedatadisplayedonanorganization'sdailycalendarofnonconfidentialmeetings.Theprogramthatformatsanddisplaysthecalendar,however,mightbemodifiablebyonlyaveryfewsystemadministrators,whiletheoperatingsystemcontrollingthatprogrammightbedirectlyaccessiblebystillfewer. [PDF page 210] 17.LogicalAccessControls (eitherhumanorprocess),whichisusuallyobtainedthroughidentificationandauthentication(I&A).(SeeChapter16.)Theidentityisusuallyunique,tosupportindividualaccountability,butcanbeagroupidentificationorcanevenbeanonymous.Forexample,publicinformationdisseminationsystemsmayservealargegroupcalled"researchers"inwhichtheindividualresearchersarenotknown,17.1.2RolesAccesstoinformationmayalsobecontrolledbythejobassignmentorfunction(i.e.,therole)oftheuserwhoisseekingaccess.Examplesofrolesincludedataentryclerk,purchaseofficer,projectleader,programmer,andtechnicaleditor.Accessrightsaregroupedbyrolename,andtheuseofresourcesisrestrictedtoindividualsauthorizedtoassumetheassociatedrole.Anindividualmaybeauthorizedformorethanonerole,butmayberequiredtoactinonlyasingleroleatatime.Changingrolesmayrequireloggingoutandtheninagain,orenteringarole-changingcommand.Notethatuseofrolesisnotthesameasshared-useaccounts.Anindividualmaybeassignedastandardsetofrightsofashippingdepartmentdataentryclerk,forexample,buttheaccountwouldstillbetiedtothatindividual'sidentitytoallowforauditing.(SeeChapter18.) Theuseofrolescanbeaveryeffectivewayofprovidingaccesscontrol.Theprocessofdefiningrolesshouldbebasedonathoroughanalysisofhowanorganizationoperatesandshouldincludeinputfromawidespectrumofusersinanorganization.17.1.3LocationAccesstoparticularsystemresourcesmayalsobebaseduponphysicalorlogicallocation.Forexample,inaprison,allusersinareastowhichprisonersarephysicallypermittedmaybelimitedtoread-onlyaccess.Changingordeletingislimitedtoareastowhichprisonersaredeniedphysicalaccess.Thesameauthorizedusers(e.g.,prisonguards)wouldoperateundersignificantlydifferentlogicalaccesscontrols,dependingupontheirphysicallocation.Similarly,userscanberestrictedbaseduponnetworkaddresses(e.g.,usersfromsiteswithinagivenorganizationmaybepermittedgreateraccessthanthosefromoutside). Manysystemsalreadysupportasmallnumberofspecial-purposeroles,suchasSystemAdministratororOperator.Forexample,anindividualwhoisloggedonintheroleofaSystemAdministratorcanperformoperationsthatwouldbedeniedtothesameindividualactingintheroleofanordinaryuser. Recently,theuseofroleshasbeenexpandedbeyondsystemtaskstoapplication-orientedactivities.Forexample,auserinacompanycouldhaveanOrderTakingrole,andwouldbeabletocollectandentercustomerbillinginformation,checkonavailabilityofparticularitems,requestshipmentofitems,andissueinvoices.Inaddition,therecouldbeanAccountsReceivablerole,whichwouldreceivepaymentsandcreditthemtoparticularinvoices.AShippingrole,couldthenberesponsibleforshippingproductsandupdatingtheinventory.Toprovideadditionalsecurity,constraintscouldbeimposedsoasingleuserwouldneverbesimultaneouslyauthorizedtoassumeallthreeroles.Constraintsofthiskindaresometimesreferredtoasseparationofdutyconstraints. 195 [PDF page 211] IV.TechnicalControls 17.1.4TimeTime-of-dayorday-of-weekrestrictionsarecommonlimitationsonaccess.Forexample,useofconfidentialpersonnelfilesmaybeallowedonlyduringnormalworkinghours-andmaybedeniedbefore8:00a.m.andafter6:00p.m.andalldayduringweekendsandholidays.17.1.5TransactionAnotherapproachtoaccesscontrolcanbeusedbyorganizationshandlingtransactions(e.g.,accountinquiries).PhonecallsmayfirstbeansweredbyacomputerthatrequeststhatcallerskeyintheiraccountnumberandperhapsaPIN.Someroutinetransactionscanthenbemadedirectly,butmorecomplexonesmayrequirehumanintervention.Insuchcases,thecomputer,whichalreadyknowstheaccountnumber,cangrantaclerk,forexample,accesstoaparticularaccountforthedurationofthetransaction.Whencompleted,theaccessauthorizationisterminated.Thismeansthatusershavenochoiceinwhichaccountstheyhaveaccessto,andcanreducethepotentialformischiefItalsoeliminatesemployeebrowsingofaccounts(e.g.,thoseofcelebritiesortheirneighbors)andcantherebyheightenprivacy.17.1.6ServiceConstraintsServiceconstraintsrefertothoserestrictionsthatdependupontheparametersthatmayariseduringuseoftheapplicationorthatarepreestablishedbytheresourceowner/manager.Forexample,aparticularsoftwarepackagemayonlybelicensedbytheorganizationforfiveusersatatime.Accesswouldbedeniedforasixthuser,eveniftheuserwereotherwiseauthorizedtousetheapplication.Anothertypeofserviceconstraintisbaseduponapplicationcontentornumericalthresholds.Forexample,anATMmachinemayrestricttransfersofmoneybetweenaccountstocertaindollarlimitsormaylimitmaximumATMwithdrawalsto$500perday.Accessmayalsobeselectivelypermittedbasedonthetypeofservicerequested.Forexample,usersofcomputersonanetworkmaybepermittedtoexchangeelectronicmailbutmaynotbeallowedtologintoeachothers'computers.17.1.7CommonAccessModesInadditiontoconsideringcriteriaforwhenaccessshouldoccur,itisalsonecessarytoconsiderthetypesofaccess,oraccessmodes.Theconceptofaccessmodesisfundamentaltoaccesscontrol.Commonaccessmodes,whichcanbeusedinbothoperatingorapplicationsystems,includethefollowing:"^ Theseaccessmodesaredescribedgenerically;exactdefinitionsandcapabilitieswillvaryfromimplementationtoimplementation.Readersareadvisedtoconsulttheirsystemandapplicationdocumentation.196 [PDF page 212] 17.LogicalAccessControls Readaccessprovidesuserswiththecapabilitytoviewinformationinasystemresource(suchasafile,certainrecords,certainfields,orsomecombinationthereof),butnottoalterit,suchasdeletefrom,addto,ormodifyinanyway.Onemustassumethatinformationcanbecopiedandprintedifitcanberead(althoughperhapsonlymanually,suchasbyusingaprintscreenfunctionandretypingtheinformationintoanotherfile). Writeaccessallowsuserstoaddto,modify,ordeleteinformationinsystemresources(e.g.,files,records,programs).Normallyuserhavereadaccesstoanythingtheyhavewriteaccessto. Executeprivilegeallowsuserstorunprograms.Deleteaccessallowsuserstoerasesystemresources(e.g.,files,records,fields,programs)."^Notethatifusershavewriteaccessbutnotdeleteaccess,theycouldoverwritethefieldorfilewithgibberishorotherwiseinaccurateinformationand,ineffect,deletetheinformation.Otherspecializedaccessmodes(moreoftenfoundinapplications)include:Createaccessallowsuserstocreatenewfiles,records,orfields. Searchaccessallowsuserstolistthefilesinadirectory.Ofcourse,thesecriteriacanbeusedinconjunctionwithoneanother.Forexample,anorganizationmaygiveauthorizedindividualswriteaccesstoanapplicationatanytimefromwithintheofficebutonlyreadaccessduringnormalworkinghoursiftheydial-in. Dependinguponthetechnicalmechanismsavailabletoimplementlogicalaccesscontrol,awidevarietyofaccesspermissionsandrestrictionsarepossible.Nodiscussioncanpresentallpossibilities. 17.2Policy:TheImpetusforAccessControlsLogicalaccesscontrolsareatechnicalmeansofimplementingpolicydecisions.Policyismadebyamanagementofficialresponsibleforaparticularsystem,application,subsystem,orgroupofsystems.Thedevelopmentofanaccesscontrolpolicymaynotbeaneasyendeavor.Itrequiresbalancingtheoften-competinginterestsofsecurity,operationalrequirements,anduser-friendliness.Inaddition,technicalconstraintshavetobeconsidered. "Deleting"informationdoesnotnecessarilyphysicallyremovethedatafromthestoragemedia.Thiscanhaveseriousimplicationsforinformationthatmustbekeptconfidential.See"DispositionofSensitiveAutomatedInformation,"CSLBulletin,NIST,October1992.197 [PDF page 213] IV.TechnicalControls Thischapterdiscussesissuesrelatingtothetechnicalimplementationoflogicalaccesscontrols-nottheactualpolicydecisionsastowhoshouldhavewhattypeofaccess.Thesedecisionsaretypicallyincludedinsystem-specificpolicy,asdiscussedinChapters5and10. Oncethesepolicydecisionshavebeenmade,theywillbeimplemented(orenforced)throughlogicalaccesscontrols.Indoingso,itisimportanttorealizethatthecapabilitiesofvarioustypesoftechnicalmechanisms(forlogicalaccesscontrol)varygreatly."^ 17.3TechnicalImplementationMechanismsManymechanismshavebeendevelopedtoprovideinternalandexternalaccesscontrols,andtheyvarysignificantlyintermsofprecision,sophistication,andcost.Thesemethodsarenotmutuallyexclusiveandareoftenemployedincombination.Managersneedtoanalyzetheirorganization'sprotectionrequirementstoselectthemostappropriate,cost-effectivelogicalaccesscontrols.17.3.1InternalAccessControlsInternalaccesscontrolsarealogicalmeansofseparatingwhatdefmedusers(orusergroups)canorcannotdowithsystemresources.Fivemethodsofinternalaccesscontrolarediscussedinthissection:passwords,encryption,accesscontrollists,constraineduserinterfaces,andlabels. 17.3.1.1PasswordsPasswordsaremostoftenassociatedwithuserauthentication.(SeeChapter16.)However,theyarealsousedtoprotectdataandapplicationsonmanysystems,includingPCs.Forinstance,anaccountingapplicationmayrequireapasswordtoaccesscertainfinancialdataortoinvokea Afewsimpleexamplesofspecificpolicyissuesareprovidedbelow;kisimportanttorecognize,however,thatcomprehensivesystem-specificpolicyissignificantlymorecomplex. 1.Thedirectorofanorganization'spersonnelofficecoulddecidethatallclerkscanupdateallfiles,toincreasetheefficiencyoftheoffice.Orthedirectorcoulddecidethatclerkscanonlyviewandupdatespecificfiles,tohelppreventinformationbrowsing. 2.Inadisbursingoffice,asingleindividualisusuallyprohibitedfrombothrequestingandauthorizingthataparticularpaymentbemade.Thisisapolicydecisiontakentoreducethelikelihoodofembezzlementandfraud. 3.Decisionsmayalsobemaderegardingaccesstothesystemitself.Inthegovernment,forexample,theseniorinformationresourcesmanagementofficialmaydecidethatagencysystemsthatprocessinformationprotectedbythePrivacyActmaynotbeusedtoprocesspublic-accessdatabaseapplications. Somepoliciesmaynotbetechnicallyimplementable;appropriatetechnicalcontrolsmaysimplynotexist. 198 [PDF page 214] 17.LogicalAccessControls restrictedapplication(orfunctionofanapplication)."^Password-basedaccesscontrolisofteninexpensivebecauseitisalreadyincludedinaTheuseofpasswordsasameansofaccesscontrollargevarietyofapplications.However,userscanresultinaproliferationofpasswordsthatcanmayfinditdifficulttorememberadditional'"^"'^^^^^J"^'^^""^y-applicationpasswords,which,ifwrittendownorpoorlychosen,canleadtotheircompromise.Password-basedaccesscontrolsforPCapplicationsareofteneasytocircumventiftheuserhasaccesstotheoperatingsystem(andknowledgeofwhattodo).AsdiscussedinChapter16,thereareotherdisadvantagestousingpasswords.17.3.1.2EncryptionAnothermechanismthatcanbeusedforlogicalaccesscontrolisencryption.Encryptedinformationcanonlybedecryptedbythosepossessingtheappropriatecryptographickey.Thisisespeciallyusefulifstrongphysicalaccesscontrolscannotbeprovided,suchasforlaptopsorfloppydiskettes.Thus,forexample,ifinformationisencryptedonalaptopcomputer,andthelaptopisstolen,theinformationcannotbeaccessed.Whileencryptioncanprovidestrongaccesscontrol,itisaccompaniedbytheneedforstrongkeymanagement.Useofencryptionmayalsoaffectavailability.Forexample,lostorstolenkeysorread/writeerrorsmaypreventthedecryptionoftheinformation.(Seethecryptographychapter.)17.3.1.3AccessControlListsAccessControlLists(ACLs)refertoaregisterof:(1)users(includinggroups,machines,processes)whohavebeengivenpermissiontouseaparticularsystemresource,and(2)thetypesofaccesstheyhavebeenpermitted.ACLsvaryconsiderablyintheircapabilityandflexibility.Someonlyallowspecificationsforcertainpre-setgroups(e.g.,owner,group,andworld)whilemoreadvancedACLsallowmuchmoreflexibility,suchasuser-definedgroups.Also,moreadvancedACLscanbeusedtoexplicitlydenyaccesstoaparticularindividualorgroup.WithmoreadvancedACLs,accesscanbeatthediscretionofthepolicymaker(andimplementedbythesecurityadministrator)orindividualuser,dependinguponhowthecontrolsaretechnicallyimplemented.ElementaryACLs.ElementaryACLs(e.g.,"permissionbits")areawidelyavailablemeansofprovidingaccesscontrolonmukiusersystems.Inthisscheme,ashort,predefinedlistoftheaccessrightstofliesorothersystemresourcesismaintained. ^Notethatthispasswordisnormallyinadditiontotheonesuppliedinitiallytologontothesystem. 199 [PDF page 215] IV.TechnicalControls ElementaryACLsaretypicallybasedontheconceptsofowner,group,andworld.Foreachofthese,asetofaccessmodes(typicallychosenfromread,write,execute,anddelete)isspecifiedbytheowner(orcustodian)oftheresource.Theownerisusuallyitscreator,thoughinsomecases,ownershipofresourcesmaybeautomaticallyassignedtoprojectadministrators,regardlessoftheidentityofthecreator.Fileownersoftenhaveallprivilegesfortheirresources. ExampleofElementaryACLforthefile"payroll": Owner:PAYMANAGERAccess:Read,Write,Execute,DeleteGroup:COMPENSAHON-OFHCEAccess:Read,Write,Execute,Delete'World-Access:None Inadditiontotheprivilegesassignedtotheowner,eachresourceisassociatedwithanamedgroupofusers.Userswhoaremembersofthegroupcanbegrantedmodesofaccessdistinctfromnonmembers,whobelongtotherestofthe"world"thatincludesallofthesystem'susers.Usergroupsmaybearrangedaccordingtodepartments,projects,orotherwaysappropriatefortheparticularorganization.Forexample,groupsmaybeestablishedformembersofthePersonnelandAccountingdepartments.Thesystemadministratorisnormallyresponsiblefortechnicallymaintainingandchangingthemembershipofagroup,baseduponinputfromtheowners/custodiansoftheparticularresourcestowhichthegroupsmaybegrantedaccess.Asthenameimplies,however,thetechnologyisnotparticularlyflexible.Itmaynotbepossibletoexplicitlydenyaccesstoanindividualwhoisamemberofthefile'sgroup.Also,itmaynotbepossiblefortwogroupstoeasilyshareinformation(withoutexposingittothe"world"),sincetheUstispredefinedtoonlyincludeonegroup.Iftwogroupswishtoshareinformation,anownermaymakethefileavailabletobereadby"world."Thismaydiscloseinformationthatshouldberestricted.Unfortunately,elementaryACLshavenomechanismtoeasilypermitsuchsharing.AdvancedACLs.LikeelementaryACLs,advancedACLsprovideaformofaccesscontrolbaseduponalogicalregistry.Theydo,however,provide/merprecisionincontrol. Sinceonewouldpresumethatnoonewouldhaveaccesswithoutbeinggrantedaccess,whywoulditbedesirabletoexplicitlydenyaccess?Considerasituationinwhichagroupnamehasalreadybeenestablishedfor50employees.Ifitweredesiredtoexcludefiveoftheindividualsfromthatgroup,itwouldbeeasierfortheaccesscontroladministratortosimplygrantaccesstothatgroupandtakeitawayfromthefiveratherthangrantaccessto45people.Or,considerthecaseofacomplexapplicationinwhichmanygroupsofusersaredefined.Itmaybedesired,forsomereason,toprohibitMs.Xfromgeneratingaparticularreport(perhapssheisunderinvestigation).Inasituationinwhichgroupnamesareused(andperhapsmodifiedbyothers),thisexplicitdenialmaybeasafetychecktorestrictMs.X'saccess~incasesomeoneweretoredefineagroup(withaccesstothereportgenerationfianction)toincludeMs.X.Shewouldstillbedeniedaccess. 200 [PDF page 216] 17.LogicalAccessControls AdvancedACLscanbeveryusefulinmanycomplexinformationsharingsituations.Theyprovideagreatdealofflexibilityinimplementingsystem-specificpolicyandallowforcustomizationtomeetthesecurityrequirementsoffunctionalmanagers.Theirflexibilityalsomakesthemmoreofachallengetomanage.TherulesfordeterminingaccessinthefaceofapparentlyconflictingACLentriesarenotuniformacrossallimplementationsandcanbeconfusingtosecurityadministrators.Whensuchsystemsareintroduced,theyshouldbecoupledwithtrainingtoensuretheircorrectuse. ExampleofAdvancedACLforthefile"payroll"paymgr:R,W,E,DJ.Anderson:R,W,E,-L.Carnahan:B.Guttman:R,W,E,-E.Roback:R,W,E,-H.Smith:R,-,-,-pay-office:R,-world: 17.3.1.4ConstrainedUserInterfacesOftenusedinconjunctionwithACLsareconstraineduserinterfaces,whichrestrictusers'accesstospecificfunctionsbyneverallowingthemtorequesttheuseofinformation,functions,orotherspecificsystemresourcesforwhichtheydonothaveaccess.Threemajortypesexist:(1)menus,(2)databaseviews,and(3)physicallyconstraineduserinterfaces.ConstraineduserinterfacescanprovideaformofaccesscontrolthatcloselymodelsMenu-drivensystemsareacommonconstraineduserhowanorganizationoperates.Manysystemsinterface,wheredifferentusersareprovideddifferentallowadministratorstorestrictusers'abilityto'"^"'^^^^"^^y^^^^-usetheoperatingsystemorapplicationsystemwmmmmmm^^^^^^mtm^^^^^m^^^^^mmmmdirectly.Userscanonlyexecutecommandsthatareprovidedbytheadministrator,typicallyintheformofamenu.Anothermeansofrestrictingusersisthroughrestrictedshellswhichlimitthesystemcommandstheusercaninvoke.Theuseofmenusandshellscanoftenmakethesystemeasiertouseandcanhelpreduceerrors. Databaseviewsisamechanismforrestrictinguseraccesstodatacontainedinadatabase.Itmaybenecessarytoallowausertoaccessadatabase,butthatusermaynotneedaccesstoallthedatainthedatabase(e.g.,notallfieldsofarecordnorallrecordsinthedatabase).Viewscanbeusedtoenforcecomplexaccessrequirementsthatareoftenneededindatabasesituations,suchasthosebasedonthecontentofafield.Forexample,considerthesituationwhereclerksmaintainpersonnelrecordsinadatabase.Clerksareassignedarangeofclientsbaseduponlastname(e.g.,A-C,D-G).Insteadofgrantingauseraccesstoallrecords,theviewcangranttheuseraccesstotherecordbaseduponthefirstletterofthelastnamefield. Physicallyconstraineduserinterfacescanalsolimitauser'sabilities.AcommonexampleisanATMmachine,whichprovidesonlyalimitednumberofphysicalbuttonstoselectoptions;no201 [PDF page 217] IV.TechnicalControls alphabetickeyboardisusuallypresent.17.3.1.5SecurityLabelsAsecuritylabelisadesignationassignedtoaresource(suchasafile).Labelscanbeusedforavarietyofpurposes,includingcontrollingaccess,specifyingprotectivemeasures,orindicatingadditionalhandlinginstructions.Inmanyimplementations,oncethisdesignatorhasbeenset,itcannotbechanged(exceptperhapsundercarefullycontrolledconditionsthataresubjecttoauditing).Whenusedforaccesscontrol,labelsarealsoassignedtousersessions.Usersarepermittedtoinitiatesessionswithspecificlabelsonly.Forexample,afilebearingthelabel"OrganizationProprietaryInformation"wouldnotbeaccessible(readable)exceptduringusersessionswiththecorrespondinglabel.Moreover,onlyarestrictedsetofuserswouldbeabletoinitiatesuchsessions.Thelabelsofthesessionandthoseofthefilesaccessedduringthesessionareused,inturn,tolabeloutputfromthesession.Thisensuresthatinformationisuniformlyprotectedthroughoutitslifeonthesystem.Labelsareaverystrongformofaccesscontrol;however,theyareofteninflexibleandForsystemswithstringentsecurityrequirementscanbeexpensivetoadminister.Unlike(suchasthoseprocessingnationalsecuritypermissionbitsoraccesscontrolUsts,labelsixrformation),labelsmaybeusefiilinaccesscontrol,cannotordinarilybechanged.Sincelabelsare^^permanentlylinkedtospecificinformation,datacannotbedisclosedbyausercopyinginformationandchangingtheaccesstothatfilesothattheinformationismoreaccessiblethantheoriginalownerintended.Byremovingusers'abilitytoarbitrarilydesignatetheaccessibilityoffilestheyown,opportunitiesforcertainkindsofhumanerrorsandmalicioussoftwareproblemsareeliminated.Intheexampleabove,itwouldnotbepossibletocopyOrganizationProprietaryInformationintoafilewithadifferentlabel.Thispreventsinappropriatedisclosure,butcaninterferewithlegitimateextractionofsomeinformation.Labelsarewellsuitedforconsistentlyanduniformlyenforcingaccessrestrictions,althoughtheiradministrationandinflexibilitycanbeasignificantdeterrenttotheiruse. DataCategorizationOnetoo!thatisusedtoincreasetheeaseofsecuritylabellingiscategorizingdatabysimilarprotectionrequirements.Forexample,alabelcouldbedevelopedfor"organizationproprietarydata."Thislabelwouldmarkinformationthatcanbedisclosedonlytotheorganization'semployees.Anotherlabel,"publicdata"couldbeusedtomarkinformationthatisavailabletoanyone. 202 [PDF page 218] 17.LogicalAccessControls 17.3.2ExternalAccessControlsExternalaccesscontrolsareameansofcontrollinginteractionsbetweenthesystemandoutsidepeople,systems,andservices.Externalaccesscontrolsuseawidevarietyofmethods,oftenincludingaseparatephysicaldevice(e.g.,acomputer)thatisbetweenthesystembeingprotectedandanetwork.17.3.2.1PortProtectionDevicesFittedtoacommunicationsportofahostcomputer,aportprotectiondevice(PPD)authorizesaccesstotheportitself,priortoandindependentofthecomputer'sownaccesscontrolfunctions.APPDcanbeaseparatedeviceinthecommunicationsstream,oritmaybeincorporatedintoacommunicationsdevice(e.g.,amodem).PPDstypicallyrequireaseparateauthenticator,suchasapassword,inordertoaccessthecommunicationsport.17.3.2.2SecureGateways/FirewallsOftencalled//revva//^,securegatewaysblockorfilteraccessbetweentwonetworks,oftenbetweenaprivate'^'networkandalarger,morepublicnetworksuchastheInternet,whichattractmalicioushackers.Securegatewaysallowinternaluserstoconnecttoexternalnetworksandatthesametimepreventmalicioushackersfi^omcompromisingtheinternalsystems.'^^ Somesecuregatewaysaresetuptoallowalltraffictopassthroughexceptforspecifictrafficwhichhasknownorsuspectedvulnerabilitiesorsecurityproblems,suchasremotelog-inservices.Othersecuregatewaysaresetuptodisallowalltrafficexceptforspecifictypes,suchase-mail.Somesecuregatewayscanmakeaccess-controldecisionsbasedonthelocationoftherequester.Thereareseveraltechnicalapproachesandmechanismsusedtosupportsecuregateways. OneofthemostcommonPPDsistoedial-backmodem.Atypicaldial-backmodemsequencefollows:ausercallsthedial-backmodemandentersapassword.Themodemhangsupontheuserandperformsatablelookupforthepasswordprovided.Ifthepasswordisfound,themodemplacesareturncalltotheuser(atapreviouslyspecifiednumber)toinitiatethesession.Thereturncallitselfalsohelpstoprotectagainsttheuseoflostorcompromisedaccounts.Thisis,however,notalwaysthecase.Malicioushackerscanusesuchadvancefunctionsascallforwardingtoreroutecalls. '^^TypicallyPPDsarefoundonlyinserialcommunicationsstreams.Privatenetworkissomewhatofamisnomer.Privatedoesnotmeanthattheorganization'snetworkistotallyinaccessibletooutsidersorprohibitsuseoftheoutsidenetworkfrominsiders(orthenetworkwouldbedisconnected).Italsodoesnotmeanthatalltheinformationonthenetworkrequiresconfidentialityprotection.Itdoesmeanthatanetwork(orpartofanetwork)is,insomeway,separatedfromanothernetwork.Questionsfrequentlyariseastowhethersecuregatewayshelppreventthespreadofviruses.Ingeneral,havingagatewayscanu-ansmittedfilesforvirusesrequiresmoresystemoverheadthanispractical,especiallysmcethescanningwouldhavetohandlemanydifferentfileformats.However,securegatewaysmayreducethespreadofnetworkworms.203 [PDF page 219] IV.TechnicalControls Becausegatewaysprovidesecuritybyrestrictingservicesortraffic,theycanaffectasystem'susage.Forthisreason,firewallexpertsalwaysemphasizetheneedforpolicy,sothatappropriateofficialsdecidehowtheorganizationwillbalanceoperationalneedsandsecurity. Inadditiontoreducingtherisksfrommalicioushackers,securegatewayshaveseveralotherbenefits.Theycanreduceinternalsystemsecurityoverhead,sincetheyallowanorganizationtoconcentratesecurityeffortsonalimitednumberofmachines.(Thisissimilartoputtingaguardonthefirstfloorofabuildinginsteadofneedingaguardoneveryfloor.) TypesofSecureGatewaysHierearemanytypesofsecuregateways.Someofthemostcommonarepacketfiltering(orscreening)routers,proxyhosts,bastionhosts,dual-homedgateways,andscreened-hoslgateways. Asecondbenefitisthecentralizationofservices.Asecuregatewaycanbeusedtoprovideacentralmanagementpointforvariousservices,suchasadvancedauthentication(discussedinChapter16),e-mail,orpublicdisseminationofinformation.Havingacentralmanagementpointcanreducesystemoverheadandimproveservice. 17.3.2.3Host-BasedAuthentication Anexampleofhost-basedauthenticationistheNetworkFileSystem(NFS)whichallowsaservertomakefilesystems/directoriesavailabletospecificmachines. Host-basedauthenticationgrantsaccessbasedupontheidentityofthehostoriginatingtherequest,insteadoftheidentityoftheusermakingtherequest.Manynetworkapplicationsinusetodayusehost-basedauthenticationtodeterminewhetheraccessis^gggg^ggggggggggggg^^allowed.Undercertaincircumstancesitisfairlyeasytomasqueradeasthelegitimatehost,especiallyifthemasqueradinghostisphysicallylocatedclosetothehostbeingimpersonated.Securitymeasurestoprotectagainstmisuseofsomehost-basedauthenticationsystemsareavailable(e.g..SecureRPC'^^usesDEStoprovideamoresecureidentificationoftheclienthost). 17.4AdministrationofAccessControlsOneofthemostcomplexandchallengingaspectsofaccesscontrol,administrationinvolvesimplementing,monitoring,modifying,testing,andterminatinguseraccessesonthesystem.Thesecanbedemandingtasks,eventhoughtheytypicallydonotincludemakingtheactualdecisionsas RPC,orRemoteProcedureCall,istheserviceusedtoimplementNFS.204 [PDF page 220] 17.LogicalAccessControls tothetypeofaccesseachusermayhave.'^'*Decisionsregardingaccessesshouldbeguidedbyorganizationalpolicy,employeejobdescriptionsandtasks,informationsensitivity,user"need-to-know"determinations,andmanyotherfactors. Therearethreebasicapproachestoadministeringaccesscontrols:centralized,decentralized,oracombinationofthese.Eachhasrelativeadvantagesanddisadvantages.Whichismostappropriateinagivensituationwilldependupontheparticularorganizationanditscircumstances.17.4.1CentralizedAdministrationUsingcentralizedadministration,oneofficeorindividualisresponsibleforconfiguringaccesscontrols.Asusers'informationprocessingneedschange,theiraccessescanbemodifiedonlythroughthecentraloffice,usuallyafterrequestshavebeenapprovedbytheappropriateofficial.Thisallowsverystrictcontroloverinformation,becausetheabilitytomakechangesresideswithveryfewindividuals.Eachuser'saccountcanbecentrallymonitored,andclosingallaccessesforanyusercanbeeasilyaccomplishedifthatindividualleavestheorganization.Sincerelativelyfewindividualsoverseetheprocess,consistentanduniformproceduresandcriteriaareusuallynotdifficulttoenforce.However,whenchangesareneededquickly,goingthroughacentraladministrationofficecanbefrustratingandtime-consuming.17.4.2DecentralizedAdministrationIndecentralizedadministration,accessisdirectlycontrolledbytheownersorcreatorsofthefiles,oftenthefunctionalmanager.Thiskeepscontrolinthehandsofthosemostaccountablefortheinformation,mostfamiliarwithitanditsuses,andbestabletojudgewhoneedswhatkindof Asdiscussedinthepolicysectionearlierinthischapter,thosedecisionsareusuallytheresponsibilityoftheapplicableapplicationmanagerorcognizantmanagementofficial.Seealsothediscussionofsystem-specificpolicyinChapters5and10. SystemandSecurityAdministrationTheadministrationofsystemsandsecurityrequiresaccesstoadvancedfunctions(suchassettingupauseraccount).Theindividualswhotechnicallysetupandmodifywhohasaccesstowhatareverypowerfulusersonthesystem;theyareoftencalledsystemorsecurityadministrators.Onsomesystems,theseusersarereferredtoashavingprivilegedaccounts.Thetypeofaccessoftheseaccountsvariesconsiderably.Someadministratorprivileges,forexample,mayallowanindividualtoadministeronlyoneapplicationorsubsystem,whileahigherlevelofprivilegesmayallowforoversightandestablishmentofsubsystemadministrators.Normally,userswhoaresecurityadministratorshavetwoaccounts:oneforregularuseandoneforsecurityuse.Thiscanhelpprotectthesecurityaccountfromcompromise.Furthermore,additionalI&Aprecautions,suchasensuringthatadministratorpasswordsarerobustandchangedregularly,areimportanttomdnimizeopportunitiesforunauthorizedindividualstogainaccesstothesefunctions. 205 [PDF page 221] IV.TechnicalControls access.Thismaylead,however,toalackofconsistencyamongowners/creatorsastoproceduresandcriteriaforgrantinguseraccessesandcapabilities.Also,whenrequestsarenotprocessedcentrally,itmaybemuchmoredifficulttoformasystemwidecompositeviewofalluseraccessesonthesystematanygiventime.Differentapplicationordataownersmayinadvertentlyimplementcombinationsofaccessesthatintroduceconflictsofinterestorthatareinsomeotherwaynotintheorganization'sbestinterest.'"Itmayalsobedifficulttoensurethatallaccessesareproperlyterminatedwhenanemployeetransfersinternallyorleavesanorganization.17.4.3HybridApproachAhybridapproachcombinescentralizedanddecentralizedadministration.Onetypicalarrangementisthatcentraladministrationisresponsibleforthebroadestandmostbasicaccesses,andtheowners/creatorsoffilescontroltypesofaccessesorchangesinusers'abilitiesforthefilesundertheircontrol.Themaindisadvantagetoahybridapproachisadequatelydefiningwhichaccessesshouldbeassignablelocallyandwhichshouldbeassignablecentrally. 17.5CoordinatingAccessControls Itisvitalthataccesscontrolsprotectingasystemworktogether.Ataminimum,threebasictypesofaccesscontrolsshouldbeconsidered:physical,operatingsystem,andapplication.Ingeneral,accesscontrolswithinanapplicationarethemostspecific.However,forapplicationaccesscontrolstobefullyeffectivetheyneedtobesupportedbyoperatingsystemaccesscontrols.Otherwiseaccesscanbemadetoapplicationresourceswithoutgoingthroughtheapplication.'^^Operatingsystemandapplicationaccesscontrolsneedtobesupportedbyphysicalaccesscontrols. 17.6InterdependenciesLogicalaccesscontrolsarecloselyrelatedtomanyothercontrols.Severalofthemhavebeendiscussedinthechapter.PolicyandPersonnel.Themostfundamentalinterdependenciesoflogicalaccesscontrolarewithpolicyandpersonnel.Logicalaccesscontrolsarethetechnicalimplementationofsystem-specificandorganizationalpolicy,whichstipulateswhoshouldbeabletoaccesswhatkindsofinformation,applications,andfunctions.Thesedecisionsarenormallybasedontheprinciplesof Withoutnecessaryreviewmechanisms,centraladministrationdoesnotaprioriprecludethis. '^'^Forexample,logicalaccesscontrolswithinanapplicationblockUserAfromviewingFileF.However,ifoperatingsystemsaccesscontrolsdonotalsoblockUserAfromviewingFileF,UserAcanuseautilityprogram(oranotherapplication)toviewthefile. 206 [PDF page 222] 17.LogicalAccessControls separationofdutiesandleastprivilege. AuditTrails.Asdiscussedearlier,logicalaccesscontrolscanbedifficulttoimplementcorrectly.Also,itissometimesnotpossibletomakelogicalaccesscontrolasprecise,orfine-grained,aswouldbeidealforanorganization.Insuchsituations,usersmayeitherdeliberatelyorinadvertentlyabusetheiraccess.Forexample,accesscontrolscannotpreventauserfrommodifyingdatatheuserisauthorizedtomodify,evenifthemodificationisincorrect.Auditingprovidesawaytoidentifyabuseofaccesspermissions.Italsoprovidesameanstoreviewtheactionsofsystemorsecurityadministrators.IdentificationandAuthentication.Inmostlogicalaccesscontrolscenarios,theidentityoftheusermustbeestablishedbeforeanaccesscontroldecisioncanbemade.Theaccesscontrolprocessthenassociatesthepermissibleformsofaccesseswiththatidentity.ThismeansthataccesscontrolcanonlybeaseffectiveastheI&Aprocessemployedforthesystem.PhysicalAccessControl.Mostsystemscanbecompromisedifsomeonecanphysicallyaccessthemachine(i.e.,CPUorothermajorcomponents)by,forexample,restartingthesystemwithdifferentsoftware.Logicalaccesscontrolsare,therefore,dependentonphysicalaccesscontrols(withtheexceptionofencryption,whichcandependsolelyonthestrengthofthealgorithmandthesecrecyofthekey). 17.7CostConsiderationsIncorporatinglogicalaccesscontrolsintoacomputersysteminvolvesthepurchaseoruseofaccesscontrolmechanisms,theirimplementation,andchangesinuserbehavior.DirectCosts.Amongthedirectcostsassociatedwiththeuseoflogicalaccesscontrolsarethepurchaseandsupportofhardware,operatingsystems,andapplicationsthatprovidethecontrols,andanyadd-onsecuritypackages.Themostsignificantpersonnelcostinrelationtologicalaccesscontrolisusuallyforadrmnistration(e.g.,initiallydetermining,assigning,andkeepingaccessrightsuptodate).Label-basedaccesscontrolisavailableinalimitednumberofcommercialproducts,butatgreatercostandwithlessvarietyofselection.Role-basedsystemsarebecomingmoreavailable,buttherearesignificantcostsinvolvedincustomizingthesesystemsforaparticularorganization.Traininguserstounderstandanduseanaccesscontrolsystemisanothernecessarycost.IndirectCosts.Theprimaryindirectcostassociatedwithintroducinglogicalaccesscontrolsintoacomputersystemistheeffectonuserproductivity.Theremaybeadditionaloverheadinvolvedinhavingindividualusersproperlydetermine(whenundertheircontrol)theprotectionattributesofinformation.Anotherindirectcostthatmayariseresultsfromusersnotbeingabletoimmediatelyaccessinformationnecessarytoaccomplishtheirjobsbecausethepermissionswere 207 [PDF page 223] IV.TechnicalControls incorrectlyassigned(orhavechanged).Thissituationisfamiliartomostorganizationsthatputstrongemphasisonlogicalaccesscontrols. ReferencesAbrams,M.D.,etal.AGeneralizedFrameworkforAccessControl:AnInformalDescription.McLean,VA:MitreCorporation,1990.Baldwin,R.W."NamingandGroupingPrivilegestoSimplifySecurityManagementinLargeDatabases."1990IEEESymposiumonSecurityandPrivacyProceedings.Oakland,CA:IEEEComputerSocietyPress,May1990.pp.116-132. Caelli,William,DennisLongley,andMichaelShain.InformationSecurityHandbook.NewYork,NY:StocktonPress,1991.Cheswick,William,andStevenBellovin.FirewallsandInternetSecurity.Reading,MA:Addison-WesleyPublishingCompany,1994.Curry,D.ImprovingtheSecurityofYourUNIXSystem,ITSTD-721-FR-90-21.MenloPark,CA:SRIInternational,1990.Dinkel,Charles.SecureDataNetworkSystemAccessControlDocuments.NISTIR90-4259.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,1990. Fites,P.,andM.Kratz.InformationSystemsSecurity:APractitioner'sReference.NewYork,NY:VanNostrandReinhold,1993.EspeciallyChapters1,9,and12. Garfinkel,S.,andSpafford,G."UNIXSecurityChecklist."PracticalUNIXSecurity.Sebastopol,CA:O'Riley&Associates.Inc.,1991.pp.401-413.Gasser,Morrie.BuildingaSecureComputerSystem.NewYork,NY:VanNostrandReinhold,1988.Haykin,M.,andR.Warner.SmartCardTechnology:NewMethodsforComputerAccessControl.SpecPub500-157.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,1988.Landwehr,C,C.Heitmeyer,andJ.McLean."ASecurityModelforMilitaryMessageSystems."ACMTransactionsonComputerSystems,Vol.2,No.3,August1984.NationalBureauofStandards.GuidelinesforSecurityofComputerApplications.Federal 208 [PDF page 224] 17.LogicalAccessControls InformationProcessingStandardPublication73.June1980.Pfleeger,Charles.SecurityinComputing.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall,Inc.,1989.President'sCouncilonIntegrityandEfficiency.ReviewofGeneralControlsinFederalComputerSystems.Washington,DC:President'sCouncilonIntegrityandEfficiency,October1988. S.Salamone,"InternetworkSecurity:UnsafeatAnyNode?"DataCommunications.22(12),1993.pp.61-68.Sandhu,R."TransactionControlExpressionsforSeparationofDuty."FourthAnnualComputerSecurityApplicationsConferenceProceedings.Orlando,PL,December1988,pp.282-286.Thomsen,D.J."Role-basedApplicationDesignandEnforcement."FourthIFIPWorkshoponDatabaseSecurityProceedings.InternationalFederationforInformationProcessing,Halifax,England,September1990.T.Whiting."UnderstandingVAXA^MSSecurity."ComputersandSecurity.11(8),1992.pp.695-698. I 209 [PDF page 225] [PDF page 226] Chapter18AUDITTRAILS Audittrailsmaintainarecordofsystemactivitybothbysystemandapplicationprocessesandbyuseractivityofsystemsandapplications.'^'Inconjunctionwithappropriatetoolsandprocedures,audittrailscanassistindetectingsecurityviolations,performanceproblems,andflawsinapplications.'^^ TheDifferenceBetweenAuditTrailsandAuditingAnaudittrailisaseriesofrecordsofcomputerevents,aboutanoperatingsj^tem,anapplication,oruseractivities.Acomputersystemmayliaveseveralaudittrails,eachdevotedtoaparticulartypeofactivity. Audittrailsmaybeusedaseitherasupportforregularsystemoperationsorakindofinsurancepolicyorasbothofthese.Asinsurance,audittrailsaremaintainedbutarenotusedunlessneeded,suchasafterasystemoutage.Asasupportforoperations,auditg,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,^^trailsareusedtohelpsystemadministratorsensurethatthesystemorresourceshavenotbeenharmedbyhackers,insiders,ortechnicalproblems. Auditingisthereviewandanalysisofmanagement,operational,andtechnicalcontrols.Theauditorcanobtainvaluableinformationaboutactivityonacomputersystemfromtheaudittrail.Audittrailsimprovetheauditabilityofthecomputersystem.Auditingisdiscussedintheassurancechapter. Thischapterfocusesonaudittrailsasatechnicalcontrol,ratherthantheprocessofsecurityauditing,whichisareviewandanalysisofthesecurityofasystemasdiscussedinChapter9.Thischapterdiscussesthebenefitsandobjectivesofaudittrails,thetypesofaudittrails,andsomecommonimplementationissues. 18.1BenefitsandObjectivesAudittrailscanprovideameanstohelpaccomplishseveralsecurity-relatedobjectives,includingindividualaccountability. Aneventisanyactionthathappensonacomputersystem.Examplesincludeloggingintoasystem,executingaprogram,andopeningafile. Somesecurityexpertsmakeadistinctionbetweenanaudittrailandanauditlogasfollows:alogisarecordofeventsmadebyaparticularsoftwarepackage,andanaudittrailisanentirehistoryofanevent,possiblyusingseverallogs.However,commonusagewithinthesecuritycommunitydoesnotmakeuseofthisdefinition.Therefore,thisdocumentdoesnotdistinguishbetweentrailsandlogs. Thetypeandamountofdetailrecordedbyaudittrailsvarybyboththetechnicalcapabilityoftheloggingapplicationandthemanagerialdecisions.Therefore,whenwestatethat"audittrailscan...,"thereadershouldbeawarethatcapabilitiesvarywidely.211 [PDF page 227] IV.TechnicalControls reconstructionofevents,intrusiondetection,andproblemanalysis. 18.1.1IndividualAccountabilityAudittrailsareatechnicalmechanismthathelpmanagersmaintainindividualaccountability.Byadvisingusersthattheyarepersonallyaccountablefortheiractions,whicharetrackedbyanaudittrailthatlogsuseractivities,managerscanhelppromoteproperuserbehavior.'^^Usersarelesslikelytoattempttocircumventsecuritypolicyiftheyknowthattheiractionswillberecordedinanauditlog. Forexample,audittrailscanbeusedinconcertwithaccesscontrolstoidentifyandprovideinformationaboutuserssuspectedofimpropermodificationofdata(e.g.,introducingerrorsintoadatabase).Anaudittrailmayrecord"before"and"after"versionsofrecords.(Dependinguponthesizeofthefileandthecapabilitiesoftheauditloggingtools,thismaybeveryresource-intensive.)Comparisonscanthenbemadebetweentheactualchangesmadetorecordsandwhatwasexpected.Thiscanhelpmanagementdetermineiferrorsweremadebytheuser,bythesystemorapplicationsoftware,orbysomeothersource.Audittrailsworkinconcertwithlogicalaccesscontrols,whichrestrictuseofsystemresources.Grantingusersaccesstoparticularresourcesusuallymeansthattheyneedthataccesstoaccomplishtheirjob.Authorizedaccess,ofcourse,canbemisused,whichiswhereaudittrailanalysisisuseful.Whileuserscannotbepreventedfromusingresourcestowhichtheyhavelegitimateaccessauthorization,audittraUanalysisisusedtoexaminetheiractions.Forexample,considerapersonnelofficeinwhichusershaveaccesstothosepersonnelrecordsforwhichtheyareresponsible.Audittrailscanrevealthatanindividualisprintingfarmorerecordsthantheaverageuser,whichcouldindicatethesellingofpersonaldata.Anotherexamplemaybeanengineerwhoisusingacomputerforthedesignofanewproduct.Audittrailanalysiscouldrevealthatanoutgoingmodemwasusedextensivelybytheengineertheweekbeforequitting.Thiscouldbeusedtoinvestigatewhetherproprietarydatafilesweresenttoanunauthorizedparty. 18.1.2ReconstructionofEventsAudittrailscanalsobeusedtoreconstructeventsafteraproblemhasoccurred.Damagecanbemoreeasilyassessedbyreviewingaudittrailsofsystemactivitytopinpointhow,when,andwhynormaloperationsceased.Audittrailanalysiscanoftendistinguishbetweenoperator-inducederrors(duringwhichthesystemmayhaveperformedexactlyasinstructed)orsystem-createderrors(e.g.,arisingfromapoorlytestedpieceofreplacementcode).If,forexample,asystemfailsortheintegrityofafile(eitherprogramordata)isquestioned,ananalysisoftheaudittrail Forafullerdiscussionofchangingemployeebehavior,seeChapter13. 212 [PDF page 228] 18.AuditTrails canreconstructtheseriesofstepstakenbythesystem,theusers,andtheapplication.Knowledgeoftheconditionsthatexistedatthetimeof,forexample,asystemcrash,canbeusefulinavoidingfutureoutages.Additionally,ifatechnicalproblemoccurs(e.g.,thecorruptionofadatafile)audittrailscanaidintherecoveryprocess(e.g.,byusingtherecordofchangesmadetoreconstructthefile). 18.1.3IntrusionDetectionIntrusiondetectionreferstotheprocessofidentifyingIfaudittrailshavebeendesignedandattemptstopenetrateasystemandgainunauthorizedimplementedtorecordappropriateaccess.information,theycanassistinintrusion^mi^m^—M^^^^^^^^^MmnMiifciMtiiiMMdetection.Althoughnormallythoughtofasareal-timeeffort,intrusionscanbedetectedinrealtime,byexaminingauditrecordsastheyarecreated(orthroughtheuseofotherkindsofwarningflags/notices),orafterthefact(e.g.,byexaminingauditrecordsinabatchprocess).Real-timeintrusiondetectionisprimarilyaimedatoutsidersattemptingtogainunauthorizedaccesstothesystem.Itmayalsobeusedtodetectchangesinthesystem'sperformanceindicativeof,forexample,avirusorwormattack.Theremaybedifficultiesinimplementingreal-timeauditing,includingunacceptablesystemperformance.After-the-factidentificationmayindicatethatunauthorizedaccesswasattempted(orwassuccessful).Attentioncanthenbegiventodamageassessmentorreviewingcontrolsthatwereattacked.18.1.4ProblemAnalysisAudittrailsmayalsobeusedason-linetoolstohelpidentifyproblemsotherthanintrusionsastheyoccur.Thisisoftenreferredtoasreal-timeauditingormonitoring.Ifasystemorapplicationisdeemedtobecriticaltoanorganization'sbusinessormission,real-timeauditingmaybeimplementedtomonitorthestatusoftheseprocesses(although,asnotedabove,therecanbedifficultieswithreal-timeanalysis).Ananalysisoftheaudittrailsmaybeabletoverifythatthesystemoperatednormally(i.e.,thatanerrormayhaveresultedfromoperatorerror,asopposedtoasystem-originatederror).Suchuseofaudittrailsmaybecomplementedbysystemperformancelogs.Forexample,asignificantincreaseintheuseofsystemresources(e.g.,diskfilespaceoroutgoingmodemuse)couldindicateasecurityproblem. Virusesandwormsofformsofmahciouscode.Avirusisacodesegmentthatreplicatesbyattachingcopiesofitselftoexistingexecutables.Awormisaself-replicatingprogram.213 [PDF page 229] IV.TechnicalControls 18.2AuditTrailsandLogsAsystemcanmaintainseveraldifferentaudittrailsconcurrently.Therearetypicallytwokindsofauditrecords,(1)anevent-orientedlogand(2)arecordofeverykeystroke,oftencalledkeystrokemonitoring.Event-basedlogsusuallycontainrecordsdescribingsystemevents,applicationevents,oruserevents.Anaudittrailshouldincludesufficientinformationtoestablishwhateventsoccurredandwho(orwhat)causedthem.Ingeneral,aneventrecordshouldspecifywhentheeventoccurred,theuserIDassociatedwiththeevent,theprogramorcommandusedtoinitiatetheevent,andtheresult.Dateandtimecanhelpdetermineiftheuserwasamasqueraderortheactualpersonspecified. 18.2.1KeystrokeMonitoring'^'Keystrokemonitoringistheprocessusedtovieworrecordboththekeystrokesenteredbyacomputeruserandthecomputer'sresponseduringaninteractivesession.Keystrokemonitoringisusuallyconsideredaspecialcaseofaudittrails.Examplesofkeystrokemonitoringwouldincludeviewingcharactersastheyaretypedbyusers,readingusers'electronicmail,andviewingotherrecordedinformationtypedbyusers.Someformsofroutinesystemmaintenancemayrecorduserkeystrokes.Thiscouldconstitutekeystrokemonitoringifthekeystrokesarepreservedalongwiththeuseridentificationsothatanadministratorcoulddeterminethekeystrokesenteredbyspecificusers.Keystrokemonitoringisconductedinanefforttoprotectsystemsanddatafromintruderswhoaccessthesystemswithoutauthorityorinexcessoftheirassignedauthority.Monitoringkeystrokestypedbyintruderscanhelpadministratorsassessandrepairdamagecausedbyintruders. 18.2.2AuditEventsSystemauditrecordsaregenerallyusedtomonitorandfine-tunesystemperformance.Applicationaudittrailsmaybeusedtodiscernflawsinapplications,orviolationsofsecuritypolicycommittedwithinanapplication.Userauditsrecordsaregenerallyusedtoholdindividualsaccountablefortheiractions.Ananalysisofuserauditrecordsmayexposeavariety TheDepartmentofJusticehasadvisedthatanambiguityinU.S.lawmakesitunclearwhetherkeystrokemonitoringisconsideredequivalenttoanunauthorizedtelephonewiretap.Theambiguityresultsfromthefactthatcurrentlawswerewrittenyearsbeforesuchconcernsaskeystrokemonitoringorsystemintrudersbecameprevalent.Additionally,nolegalprecedenthasbeensettodeterminewhetherkeystrokemonitoringislegalorillegal.Systemadministratorsconductingsuchmonitoringmightbesubjecttocriminalandcivilliabilities.TheDepartmentofJusticeadvisessystemadministratorstoprotectthemselvesbygivingnoticetosystemusersifkeystrokemonitoringisbeingconducted.Noticeshouldincludeagency/organizationpolicystatements,trainingonthesubject,andabannernoticeoneachsystembeingmonitored.[NIST,CSLBulletin,March1993]214 [PDF page 230] 18.AuditTrails ofsecurityviolations,whichmightrangefromsimplebrowsingtoattemptstoplantTrojanhorsesorgainunauthorizedprivileges. SampleSystemLogFileShowingAuthenticationMessagesJan2717114:04hostllogin:ROOTLOGINconsoleJan2717:15:04hostlshutdovra:rebootbyrootJan2717:18:38hostllogin:ROOTLOGINconsoleJan2717:19:37hostlreboot:rebootedbyrootJan2809:46:53hostlsu:'suroot'succeededforuserlon/dev/ttypOJan2809:47:35hostlshutdown:rebootbyuserlJan2809:53:24hostlsu:'suroot'succeededforon/dev/ttyplFeb1208:53:22hostlsu:'suroot' succeededforuserlon/dev/ttyplFeb1708:57:50hostldate:setbyuserlFeb1713:22:52hostlsu:'suroot'succeededforuserlon/dev/ttypO Thesystemitselfenforcescertainaspectsofpolicy(particularlysystem-specificpolicy)suchasaccesstofilesandaccesstothesystemitself.Monitoringthealterationofsystemsconfigurationfliesthatimplementthepolicyisimportant.Ifspecialaccesses(e.g.,securityadministratoraccess)havetobeusedtoalterconfigurationfiles,thesystemshouldgenerateauditrecordswhenevertheseaccessesareused. Application-LevelAuditRecordforaMaUDeliverySystemApr911:20:22hostlAA06370:from=,size=3355,class=0Apr911:20:23hostlAA06370:to=,delay=00:00:02,Stat=SentApr911:59:51hostlAA06436:from=,si2e=1424,class=0Apr911:59:52hostlAA06436:to=,delay=00:00:02,Stat=SentApr912:43:52hostlAA06441:from=,size=2077,0X3.Ss=0Apr912:43:53hostlAA06441;to=,delay-00:00:01,Stat=Sent Sometimesafinerlevelofdetailthansystemaudittrailsisrequired.Applicationaudittrailscanprovidethisgreaterlevelofrecordeddetail.Ifanapplicationiscritical,itcanbedesirabletorecordnotonlywhoinvokedtheapplication,butcertaindetailsspecifictoeachuse.Forexample,considerane-mailapplication.Itmaybedesirabletorecordwhosentmail,aswellastowhomtheysentmailandthelengthofmessages.Anotherexamplewouldbethatofadatabaseapplication.Itmaybeusefultorecordwhoaccessedwhatdatabaseaswellastheindividualrows215 [PDF page 231] IV.TechnicalControls orcolumnsofatablethatwereread(orchangedordeleted),insteadofjustrecordingtheexecutionofthedatabaseprogram. UserLogShowingaChronologicalListofCommandsExecutedbyUsers816:02816:01816:01816:01816:00816:00816:00816:00816:00815:57 Auseraudittrailmonitorsandlogsuseractivityinasystemorapplicationbyrecordingeventsinitiatedbytheuser(e.g.,accessofafile,recordorfield,useofamodem).Flexibilityisacriticalfeatureofaudittrails.Ideally(fromasecuritypointofview),asystemadministratorwouldhavetheabilitytomonitorallsystemanduseractivity,butcouldchoosetologonlycertainfunctionsatthesystemlevel,andwithincertainapplications.Thedecisionofhowmuchtologandhowmuchtoreviewshouldbeafunctionofapplication/datasensitivityandshouldbedecidedbyeachfunctionalmanager/applicationownerwithguidancefromthesystemadministratorandthecomputersecuritymanager/officer,weighingthecostsandbenefitsofthelogging.18.2.2.1System-LevelAuditTrailsIfasystem-levelauditcapabilityexists,theaudittrailshouldcapture,ataminimum,anyattempttologon(successfulorunsuccessful),thelog-onID,dateandtimeofeachlog-onattempt,dateandtimeofeachlog-off,thedevicesused,andthefunction(s)performedonceloggedon(e.g.,theapplicationsthattheusertried,successfullyorunsuccessfully,to Ingeneral,auditloggingcanhaveprivacyimplications.Usersshouldbeawareofapplicableprivacylaws,regulations,andpoliciesthatmayapplyinsuchsituations. 216 repuserlttypO0.02seesFriAprIsuserlttypO0.14seesFriAprclearuserlttypO0.05seesFriAprrpcinfouserlttypO0.20seesFriAprnroffuser2ttyp20.75seesFriAprshuser2ttyp20.02seesFriAprmvuser2ttyp20.02FriAprshuser2ttyp20.03seesFriAprcoluser2ttyp20.09seesFriAprmanuser2ttyp20.14seesFriApr Asystemaudittrailshouldbeabletoidentifyfelledlog-onattempts,especiallyifthesystemdoesnotlimitthenumberoffailedlog-onattempts.Unfortunately,somesystera-ievelaudittrailscannotdetectattemptedlog-ons,andtherefore,cannotlogthemforlaterreview.TTieseaudittrailscanonlymonitorandlogsuccessfullog-onsandsubsequentactivity.Toeffectivelydetectintrusion,arecordoffailedlog-onattemptsisrequired. ( [PDF page 232] 18.AuditTrails invoke).System-levelloggingalsotypicallyincludesinformationthatisnotspecificallysecurity-related,suchassystemoperations,cost-accountingcharges,andnetworkperformance.18.2.2.2Application-LevelAuditTrailsSystem-levelaudittrailsmaynotbeabletotrackandlogeventswithinapplications,ormaynotbeabletoprovidethelevelofdetailneededbyapplicationordataowners,thesystemadministrator,orthecomputersecuritymanager.Ingeneral,application-levelaudittrailsmonitorandloguseractivities,includingdatafilesopenedandclosed,specificactions,suchasreading,editing,anddeletingrecordsorfields,andprintingreports.Someapplicationsmaybesensitiveenoughfromadataavailability,confidentiality,and/orintegrityperspectivethata"before"and"after"pictureofeachmodifiedrecord(orthedataelement(s)changedwithinarecord)shouldbecapturedbytheaudittrail. 18.2.2.3UserAuditTrailsUseraudittrailscanusuallylog: •allcommandsdirectlyinitiatedbytheuser;•allidentificationandauthenticationattempts;and•filesandresourcesaccessed. Itismostusefulifoptionsandparametersarealsorecordedfi^omcommands.Itismuchmoreusefultoknowthatausertriedtodeletealogfile(e.g.,tohideunauthorizedactions)thantoknowtheusermerelyissuedthedeletecommand,possiblyforapersonaldatafile. 18.3ImplementationIssuesAudittraildatarequiresprotection,sincethedatashouldbeavailableforusewhenneededandisnotusefulifitisnotaccurate.Also,the AuditLogsforPhysicalAccessPhysicalaccesscontrolsystems(e.g.,acard/keyentrysystemoranalarmsystem)usesoftwareandaudittrailssimilartogeneral-purposecomputers.Thefollowingareexamplesofcriteriathatmaybeusedinselectingwhicheventstolog; Thedateandtimetheaccesswasattemptedormadeshouldbelogged,asshouldthegateordoorthroughwhichtheaccesswasattemptedOrmade,andtheindividual(oruserID)makingtheattempttoaccessthegateordoor.Invalidattemptsshouldbemonitoredandloggedbynoncomputeraudittrailsjustastheyareforcomputer-systemaudittrails.Managementshouldbemadeawareifsomeoneattemptstogainaccessduringunauthorizedhours.Loggedinformationshouldalsoincludeattemptstoadd,modify,ordeletephysicalaccessprivileges(e.g.,grantinganewemployeeaccesstothebuildingorgrantingtransferredemployeesaccesstotheirnewoffice[and,ofcourse,deletingtheiroldaccess,asappUcable]).Aswithsystemandapplicationaudittrails,auditingofnoncomputerfunctionscanbeimplementedtosendmessagestosecuritypersonnelindicatingvalidorinvalidattemptstogainaccesstocontrolledspaces.Inordernottodesensitizeaguardormonitor,allaccessshouldnotresultinmessagesbeingsenttoascreen.Onlyexceptions,suchasfailedaccessattempts,shouldbehighlightedtothosemonitoringaccess. 217 [PDF page 233] IV.TechnicalControls bestplannedandimplementedaudittrailisoflimitedvaluewithouttimelyreviewoftheloggeddata.Audittrailsmaybereviewedperiodically,asneeded(oftentriggeredbyoccurrenceofasecurityevent),automaticallyinrealtime,orinsomecombinationofthese.Systemmanagersandadministrators,withguidancefromcomputersecuritypersonnel,shoulddeterminehowlongaudittraildatawillbemaintained-eitheronthesystemorinarchivefiles. Followingareexamplesofimplementationissuesthatmayhavetobeaddressedwhenusingaudittrails. 18.3.1ProtectingAuditTrailDataAccesstoon-lineauditlogsshouldbestrictlycontrolled.Computersecuritymanagersandsystemadministratorsormanagersshouldhaveaccessforreviewpurposes;however,securityand/oradministrationpersonnelwhomaintainlogicalaccessfunctionsmayhavenoneedforaccesstoauditlogs. Itisparticularlyimportanttoensuretheintegrityofaudittraildataagainstmodification.Onewaytodothisistousedigitalsignatures.(SeeChapter19.)Anotherwayistousewrite-oncedevices.Theaudittrailfilesneedstobeprotectedsince,forexample,intrudersmaytryto"covertheirtracks"bymodifyingaudittrailrecords.Audittrailrecordsshouldbeprotectedbystrongaccesscontrolstohelppreventunauthorizedaccess.Theintegrityofaudittrailinformationmaybeparticularlyimportantwhenlegalissuesarise,suchaswhenaudittrailsareusedaslegalevidence.(Thismay,forexample,requiredailyprintingandsigningofthelogs.)Questionsofsuchlegalissuesshouldbedirectedtothecognizantlegalcounsel.Theconfidentialityofaudittrailinformationmayalsobeprotected,forexample,iftheaudittrailisrecordinginformationaboutusersthatmaybedisclosure-sensitivesuchastransactiondatacontainingpersonalinformation(e.g.,"before"and"after"recordsofmodificationtoincometaxdata).Strongaccesscontrolsandencryptioncanbeparticularlyeffectiveinpreservingconfidentiality. 18.3.2ReviewofAuditTrailsAudittrailscanbeusedtoreviewwhatoccurredafteranevent,forperiodicreviews,andforreal-timeanalysis.Reviewersshouldknowwhattolookfortobeeffectiveinspottingunusualactivity.Theyneedtounderstandwhatnormalactivitylookslike.AudittrailreviewcanbeeasieriftheaudittrailfunctioncanbequeriedbyuserID,terminalID,applicationname,dateandtime,orsomeothersetofparameterstorunreportsofselectedinformation.AuditTrailReviewAfteranEvent.Followingaknownsystemorapplicationsoftwareproblem,aknownviolationofexistingrequirementsbyauser,orsomeunexplainedsystemoruserproblem,theappropriatesystem-levelorapplication-leveladministratorshouldreviewtheaudittrails. 218 [PDF page 234] 18.AuditTrails Reviewbytheapplication/dataownerwouldnormallyinvolveaseparatereport,baseduponaudittraildata,todetermineiftheirresourcesarebeingmisused.PeriodicReviewofAuditTrailData.Applicationowners,dataowners,systemadministrators,dataprocessingfunctionmanagers,andcomputersecuritymanagersshoulddeterminehowmuchreviewofaudittrailrecordsisnecessary,basedontheimportanceofidentifyingunauthorizedactivities.Thisdeterminationshouldhaveadirectcorrelationtothefrequencyofperiodicreviewsofaudittraildata.Real-TimeAuditAnalysis.Traditionally,audittrailsareanalyzedinabatchmodeatregularintervals(e.g.,daily).Auditrecordsarearchivedduringthatintervalforlateranalysis.Auditanalysistoolscanalsobeusedinareal-time,ornearreal-timefashion.Suchintrusiondetectiontoolsarebasedonauditreduction,attacksignature,andvariancetechniques.Manualreviewofauditrecordsinrealtimeisalmostneverfeasibleonlargemultiusersystemsduetothevolumeofrecordsgenerated.However,itmightbepossibletoviewallrecordsassociatedwithaparticularuserorapplication,andviewtheminrealtime.^"18.3.3ToolsforAuditTrailAnalysisManytypesoftoolshavebeendevelopedtohelptoreducetheamountofinformationcontainedinauditrecords,aswellastodistillusefulinformationfromtherawdata.Especiallyonlargersystems,audittrailsoftwarecancreateverylargefiles,whichcanbeextremelydifficulttoanalyzemanually.Theuseofautomatedtoolsislikelytobethedifferencebetweenunusedaudittraildataandarobustprogram.Someofthetypesoftoolsinclude:Auditreductiontoolsarepreprocessorsdesignedtoreducethevolumeofauditrecordstofacilitatemanualreview.Beforeasecurityreview,thesetoolscanremovemanyauditrecordsknowntohavelittlesecuritysignificance.(Thisalonemaycutinhalfthenumberofrecordsintheaudittrail.)Thesetoolsgenerallyremoverecordsgeneratedbyspecifiedclassesofevents,suchasrecordsgeneratedbynightlybackupsmightberemoved.Trends/variance-detectiontoolslookforanomaliesinuserorsystembehavior.Itispossibletoconstructmoresophisticatedprocessorsthatmonitorusagetrendsanddetectmajorvariations.Forexample,ifausertypicallylogsinat9a.m.,butappearsat4:30a.m.onemorning,thismayindicateasecurityproblemthatmayneedtobeinvestigated.Attacksignature-detectiontoolslookforanattacksignature,whichisaspecificsequenceofeventsindicativeofanunauthorizedaccessattempt.Asimpleexamplewouldberepeatedfailedlog-inattempts. Thisissimilartokeystrokemonitoring,though,andmaybelegallyrestricted. 219 [PDF page 235] IV.TechnicalControls 18.4InterdependenciesTheabilitytoauditsupportsmanyofthecontrolspresentedinthishandbook.Thefollowingparagraphsdescribesomeofthemostimportantinterdependencies.Policy.Themostfundamentalinterdependencyofaudittrailsiswithpolicy.Policydictateswhoisauthorizedaccesstowhatsystemresources.Thereforeitspecifies,directlyorindirectly,whatviolationsofpolicyshouldbeidentifiedthroughaudittrails. Assurance.Systemauditingisanimportantaspectofoperationalassurance.Thedatarecordedintoanaudittrailisusedtosupportasystemaudit.Theanalysisofaudittraildataandtheprocessofauditingsystemsarecloselylinked;insomecases,theymayevenbethesamething.Inmostcases,theanalysisofaudittraUdataisacriticalpartofmaintainingoperationalassurance.IdentificationandAuthentication.Audittrailsaretoolsoftenusedtohelpholdusersaccountablefortheiractions.Tobeheldaccountable,theusersmustbeknowntothesystem(usuallyaccomplishedthroughtheidentificationandauthenticationprocess).However,asmentionedearlier,audittrailsrecordeventsandassociatethemwiththeperceiveduser(i.e.,theuserID).Ifauserisimpersonated,theaudittrailwiUestablisheventsbutnottheidentityoftheuser. LogicalAccessControl.Logicalaccesscontrolsrestricttheuseofsystemresourcestoauthorizedusers.Audittrailscomplementthisactivityintwoways.First,theymaybeusedtoidentifybreakdownsinlogicalaccesscontrolsortoverifythataccesscontrolrestrictionsarebehavingasexpected,forexample,ifaparticularuseriserroneouslyincludedinagrouppermittedaccesstoafile.Second,audittrailsareusedtoaudituseofresourcesbythosewhohavelegitimateaccess.Additionally,toprotectaudittrailfiles,accesscontrolsareusedtoensurethataudittrailsarenotmodified.ContingencyPlanning.Audittrailsassistincontingencyplanningbyleavingarecordofactivitiesperformedonthesystemorwithinaspecificapplication.Intheeventofatechnicalmalfunction,thislogcanbeusedtohelpreconstructthestateofthesystem(orspecificfiles). IncidentResponse.Ifasecurityincidentoccurs,suchashacking,auditrecordsandotherintrusiondetectionmethodscanbeusedtohelpdeterminetheextentoftheincident.Forexample,wasjustonefilebrowsed,orwasaTrojanhorseplantedtocollectpasswords?Cryptography.Digitalsignaturescanbeusedtoprotectaudittrailsfromundetectedmodification.(Thisdoesnotpreventdeletionormodificationoftheaudittrail,butwillprovideanalertthattheaudittrailhasbeenaltered.)Digitalsignaturescanalsobeusedinconjunctionwithaddingsecuretimestampstoauditrecords.EncryptioncanbeusedifconfidentialityofaudittraUinformationisimportant. 220 [PDF page 236] 18.AuditTrails 18.5CostConsiderationsAudittrailsinvolvemanycosts.First,somesystemoverheadisincurredrecordingtheaudittrail.Additionalsystemoverheadwillbeincurredstoringandprocessingtherecords.Themoredetailedtherecords,themoreoverheadisrequired.Anothercostinvolveshumanandmachinetimerequiredtodotheanalysis.Thiscanbeminimizedbyusingtoolstoperformmostoftheanalysis.Manysimpleanalyzerscanbeconstructedquickly(andcheaply)fromsystemutilities,buttheyarelimitedtoauditreductionandidentifyingparticularlysensitiveevents.Morecomplextoolsthatidentifytrendsorsequencesofeventsareslowlybecomingavailableasoff-the-shelfsoftware.(Ifcomplextoolsarenotavailableforasystem,developmentmaybeprohibitivelyexpensive.Someintrusiondetectionsystems,forexample,havetakenyearstodevelop.)Thefinalcostofaudittrailsisthecostofinvestigatinganomalousevents.Ifthesystemisidentifyingtoomanyeventsassuspicious,administratorsmayspendunduetimereconstructingeventsandquestioningpersonnel. References Fites,P.,andM.Kratz.InformationSystemsSecurity:APractitioner'sReference.NewYork:VanNostrandReinhold,1993,(especiallyChapter12,pp.331-350).Kim,G.,andE.Spafford,"MonitoringFileSystemIntegrityonUNIXPlatforms."InfosecurityNews.4(4),1993.pp.21-22.Lunt,T."AutomatedAuditTrailAnalysisforIntrusionDetection,"ComputerAuditUpdate,April1992.pp.2-8.NationalComputerSecurityCenter.AGuidetoUnderstandingAuditinTrustedSystems.NCSC-TG-001,Version-2.Ft.Meade,MD,1988.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology."GuidanceontheLegalityofKeystrokeMonitoring."CSLBulletin.March1993. Phillips,P.W."NewApproachIdentifiesMaliciousSystemActivity."Signal.46(7),1992.pp.65-66.Ruthberg,Z.,etal.GuidetoAuditingforControlsandSecurity:ASystemDevelopmentLifeCycleApproach.SpecialPublication500-153.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalBureauofStandards,1988.StoU,Clifford.TheCuckoo'sEgg.NewYork,NY:Doubleday,1989. 221 [PDF page 237] I I i ! I I 1 [PDF page 238] Chapter19CRYPTOGRAPHY Cryptographyisabranchofmathematicsbasedonthetransformationofdata.Itprovidesanimportanttoolforprotectinginformationandisusedinmanyaspectsofcomputersecurity.Forexample,cryptographycanhelpprovidedataconfidentiality,integrity,electronicsignatures,andadvanceduserauthentication.Althoughmoderncryptographyreliesuponadvancedmathematics,userscanreapitsbenefitswithoutunderstandingitsmathematicalunderpinnings.Thischapterdescribescryptographyasatoolforsatisfyingawidespectrumofcomputersecurityneedsandrequirements.Itdescribesfundamentalaspectsofthebasiccryptographictechnologiesandsomespecificwayscryptographycanbeappliedtoimprovesecurity.Thechapteralsoexploressomeof'^theimportantissuesthatshouldbeconsideredwhenincorporatingcryptographyintocomputersystems. Cryptographyistraditionallyassociatedonlywithkeepingdatasecret.However,modemcryptographycanbeusedtoprovidemanysecurityservices,suchaselectronicsignaturesandensuringthatdatahasnotbeenmodified. 19.1BasicCryptographicTechnologiesCryptographyreliesupontwobasiccomponents:analgorithm(orcryptographicmethodology)andakey.Inmoderncryptographicsystems,algorithmsarecomplexmathematicalformulaeandkeysarestringsofbits.Fortwopartiestocommunicate,theymustusethesamealgorithm(oralgorithmsthataredesignedtoworktogether).Insomecases,theymustalsousethesamekey.Manycryptographickeysmustbekeptsecret;^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^sometimesalgorithmsarealsokeptsecret.Therearetwobasictypesofcryptography:"secretTherearetwobasictypesofcryptography:Wand"publickey."secretkeysystems(alsocalledsymmetric^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^systems)andpublickeysystems(alsocalledasymmetricsystems).Table19.1comparessomeofthedistinctfeaturesofsecretandpublickeysystems.Bothtypesofsystemsofferadvantagesanddisadvantages.Often,thetwoarecombinedtoformahybridsystemtoexploitthestrengthsofeachtype.Todeterminewhichtypeofcryptographybestmeetsitsneeds,anorganizationfirsthastoidentifyitssecurityrequirementsandoperatingenvironment. I 223 [PDF page 239] IV.TechnicalControls SECRETKEYPUBLICKEYDISTINCTFEATURESCRYPTOGRAPHYCRYPTOGRAPHYNUMBEROFKEYSSinglekey.Pairofkeys. TYPESOFKEYSKeyissecret.Onekeyisprivate,andonekeyispublic. PROTECTIONOFKEYSDisclosureandDisclosureandmodification.modificationforprivatekeysandmodificationforpublickeys. RELATIVESPEEDSFaster.Slower. Table19.1 19.1.1SecretKeyCryptographyInsecretkeycryptography,two(ormore)partiessharethesamekey,andthatkeyisusedtoencryptanddecryptdata.AsthenameimpUes,secretkeycryptographyreUesonkeepingthekeysecret.Ifthekeyiscompromised,thesecurityofferedbycryptographyisseverelyreducedoreliminated.Secretkeycryptographyassumesthatthepartieswhoshareakeyrelyuponeachothernottodisclosethekeyandprotectitagainstmodification. Secretkeycryptographyhasbeeninuseforcenturies.Earlyformsmerelytransposedthewrittencharacterstohidethemessage. ThebestknownsecretkeysystemistheDataEncryptionStandard(DES),publishedbyNISTasFederalInformationProcessingStandard(HPS)46-2.AlthoughtheadequacyofDEShasattimesbeen^mm^iimK^ii^ammmi^mmKmmmc^ifmmmamquestioned,theseclaimsremainunsubstantiated,andDESremainsstrong.Itisthemostwidelyaccepted,publiclyavaUablecryptographicsystemtoday.TheAmericanNationalStandardsInstitute(ANSI)hasadoptedDESasthebasisforencryption,integrity,accesscontrol,andkeymanagementstandards. TheEscrowedEncryptionStandard,pubUshedasHPS185,alsomakesuseofasecretkeysystem.(SeethediscussionofKeyEscrowEncryptioninthischapter.) 224 [PDF page 240] 19.Cryptography 19.1.2PublicKeyCryptographyWhereassecretkeycryptographyusesasinglekeysharedbytwo(ormore)parties,publicPublickeycryptographyisamoderninventionandkeycryptographyusesapairofkeysforeachrequirestheuseofadvancedmathematics.party.Oneofthekeysofthepairis"public"^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^g^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^andtheotheris"private."Thepublickeycanbemadeknowntootherparties;theprivatekeymustbekeptconfidentialandmustbeknownonlytoitsowner.Bothkeys,however,needtobeprotectedagainstmodification.Publickeycryptographyisparticularlyusefulwhenthepartieswishingtocommunicatecannotrelyuponeachotherordonotshareacommonkey.Thereareseveralpublickeycryptographicsystems.OneofthefirstpublickeysystemsisRSA,whichcanprovidemanydifferentsecurityservices.TheDigitalSignatureStandard(DSS),describedlaterinthechapter,isanotherexampleofapublickeysystem.19.1.3HybridCryptographicSystemsPublicandsecretkeycryptographyhaverelativeadvantagesanddisadvantages.Althoughpublickeycryptographydoesnotrequireuserstoshareacommonkey,secretkeycryptographyismuchfaster:equivalentimplementationsofsecretkeycryptographycanrun1,000to10,000timesfasterthanpublickeycryptography.secretkeysystemsareoftenusedforbulkdataencryptionandpublickeysystemsforautomatedkeyTomaximizetheadvantagesandminimizethedistribution.disadvantagesofbothsecretandpublickey^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^cryptography,acomputersystemcanusebothtypesinacomplementarymanner,witheachperformingdifferentfunctions.Typically,thespeedadvantageofsecretkeycryptographymeansthatitisusedforencryptingdata.Publickeycryptographyisusedforapplicationsthatarelessdemandingtoacomputersystem'sresources,suchasencryptingthekeysusedbysecretkeycryptography(fordistribution)ortosignmessages.19.1.4KeyEscrowBecausecryptographycanprovideextremelystrongencryption,itcanthwartthegovernment'seffortstolawflillyperformelectronicsurveillance.Forexample,ifstrongcryptographyisusedtoencryptaphoneconversation,acourt-authorizedwiretapwillnotbeeffective.Tomeettheneedsofthegovernmentandtoprovideprivacy,thefederalgovernmenthasadoptedvoluntarykeyescrowcryptography.Thistechnologyallowstheuseofstrongencryption,butalsoallowsthegovernmentwhenlegallyauthorizedtoobtaindecryptionkeysheldbyescrowagents.NISThaspublishedtheEscrowedEncryptionStandardasFTPS185.UndertheFederalGovernment's225 [PDF page 241] IV.TechnicalControls voluntarykeyescrowinitiative,thedecryptionkeysaresplitintopartsandgiventoseparateescrowauthorities.Accesstoonepartofthekeydoesnothelpdecryptthedata;bothkeysmustbeobtained. 19.2UsesofCryptographyCryptographyisusedtoprotectdatabothinsideandoutsidetheboundariesofacomputersystem.Outsidethecomputersystem,cryptographyissometimestheonlywaytoprotectdata.Whileinacomputersystem,dataisnormallyprotectedwithlogicalandphysicalaccesscontrols(perhapssupplementedbycryptography).However,whenintransitacrosscommunicationslinesorresidentonsomeoneelse'scomputer,datacannotbeprotectedbytheoriginator's'^'*logicalorphysicalaccesscontrols.Cryptographyprovidesasolutionbyprotectingdataevenwhenthedataisnolongerinthecontroloftheoriginator.19.2.1DataEncryptionOneofthebestwaystoobtaincost-effectivedataconfidentialityisthroughtheuseofencryption.Encryptiontransformsintelligibledata,calledplaintext,^^^intoanunintelligibleform,calledciphertext.Thisprocessisreversedthroughtheprocessofdecryption.Oncedataisencrypted,theciphertextdoesnothavetobeprotectedagainstdisclosure.However,ifciphertextismodified,itwillnotdecryptcorrectly.Bothsecretkeyandpublickeycryptographycanbeusedfordataencryptionalthoughnotallpublickeyalgorithmsprovidefordataencryption.Touseasecretkeyalgorithm,dataisencryptedusingakey.Thesamekeymustbeusedto Theoriginatordoesnothavetobetheoriginalcreatorofthedata.Itcanalsobeaguardianorcustodianofthedata. '^^Plaintextcanbeintelligibletoahuman(e.g.,anovel)ortoamachine(e.g.,executablecode). 226 SecretKeyEncryption/DecryptionOriginalMessage:'SendthemoneyonFriday" 4KeyQ \Encryption EncryptedMessage:"Dmif\yjr\,pmru\pm\Gtofsu/"AKeyIC'1DiCTVPiton Original(Decrypted)Message:"SendthemoneyonFriday* [PDF page 242] 19.Cryptography decryptthedata.UseofPublicKeyCryptographyforEncryption/DecryptionWhenpublickeycryptographyisusedforencryption,anypartymayuseanyotherparty'spublickeytoencryptamessage;however,onlythepartywiththecorrespondingprivatekeycandecrypt,andthusread,themessage. MessagePreparedbyPersonA EncryptedMessageTransmittedtoPersonBSincesecretkeyencryptionistypicallymuchfaster,itisnormallyusedforencryptinglargeramountsofdata.PlaintextMessageReadbyPersonB19.2.2IntegrityPersonAknowsthatonlyPersonBcanreadthemessage.Incomputersystems,itisnotalwayspossibleforhumanstoscaninformationtodetermineifdatahasbeenerased,added,ormodified.Evenifscanningwerepossible,theindividualmayhavenowayofknowingwhatthecorrectdatashouldbe.Forexample,"do"maybechangedto"donot,"or$1,000maybechangedto$10,000.Itisthereforedesirabletohaveanautomatedmeansofdetectingbothintentionalandunintentionalmodificationsofdata.Whileerrordetectingcodeshavelongbeenusedincommunicationsprotocols(e.g.,paritybits),thesearemoreeffectiveindetecting(andcorrecting)unintentionalmodifications.Theycanbedefeatedbyadversaries.Cryptographycaneffectivelydetectbothintentionalandunintentionalmodification;however,cryptographydoesnotprotectfilesfrombeingmodified.Bothsecretkeyandpublickeycryptographycanbeusedtoensureintegrity.Althoughnewerpublickeymethodsmayoffermoreflexibilitythantheoldersecretkeymethod,secretkeyintegrityverificationsystemshavebeensuccessfullyintegratedintomanyapplications.Whensecretkeycryptographyisused,amessageauthenticationcode(MAC)iscalculatedfromandappendedtothedata.Toverifythatthedatahasnotbeenmodifiedatalatertime,anypartywithaccesstothecorrectsecretkeycanrecalculatetheMAC.ThenewMACiscomparedwiththeoriginalMAC,andiftheyareidentical,theverifierhasconfidencethatthedatahasnotbeenmodifiedbyanunauthorizedparty.FTPS113,ComputerDataAuthentication,specifiesastandardtechniqueforcalculatingaMACforintegrityverification. Publickeycryptographyverifiesintegritybyusingofpublickeysignaturesandsecurehashes.Asecurehashalgorithmisusedtocreateamessagedigest.Themessagedigest,calledahash,isa227 [PDF page 243] IV.TechnicalControls shortformofthemessagethatchangesifthemessageismodified.Thehashisthensignedwithaprivatekey.Anyonecanrecalculatethehashandusethecorrespondingpublickeytoverifytheintegrityofthemessage.'^^ 19.2.3ElectronicSignaturesToday'scomputersystemsstoreandprocessincreasingnumbersofpaper-baseddocumentsinelectronicform.Havingdocumentsinelectronicformpermitsrapidprocessingandtransmissionandimprovesoverallefficiency.However,approvalofapaperdocumenthastraditionallybeenindicatedbyawrittensignature.Whatisneeded,therefore,istheelectronicequivalentofawrittensignaturethatcanberecognizedashavingthesamelegalstatusasawrittensignature.Inadditiontotheintegrityprotections,discussedabove,cryptographycanprovideameansoflinkingadocumentwithaparticularperson,asisdonewithawrittensignature.Electronicsignaturescanuseeithersecretkeyorpublickeycryptography;however,publickeymethodsaregenerallyeasiertouse. Cryptographicsignaturesprovideextremelystrongproofthatamessagehasnotbeenalteredandwassignedbyaspecifickey.'^^However,thereareothermechanismsbesidescryptographic-basedelectronicsignaturesthatperformasimilarfunction.Thesemechanismsprovidesomeassuranceoftheoriginofamessage,someverificationofthemessage'sintegrity,orboth.'^^ WhatIsanElectronicSignature?Anelectronicsignatureisacryptographicmechanismthatperformsasimilarftinctiontoawrittensignature.Itisusedtoverifytheoriginandcontentsofamessage.Forexample,arecipientofdata(e.g.,ane-mailmessage)canverifywhosignedthedataandthatthedatawasnotmodifiedafterbeingsigned.Thisalsomeansthattheoriginator(e.g.,senderofane-mailmessage)cannotfalselydenyhavingsignedthedata. Sometimesasecurehashisusedforintegrityverification.However,thiscanbedefeatedifthehashisnotstoredinasecurelocation,sinceitmaybepossibleforsomeonetochangethemessageandthenreplacetheoldhashwithanewonebasedonthemodifiedmessage.ElectronicsignaturesrelyonthesecrecyofthekeysandthelinkorbindingbetweentheownerofthekeyandthekeyitselfIfakeyiscompromised(bytheft,coercion,ortrickery),thentheelectronicoriginatorofamessagemaynotbethesameastheownerofthekey.Althoughthebindingofcryptographickeystoactualpeopleisasignificantproblem,itdoesnotnecessarilymakeelectronicsignatureslesssecurethanwrittensignatures.Trickeryandcoercionareproblemsforwrittensignaturesaswell.Inaddition,writtensignaturesareeasilyforged.Thestrengthofthesemechanismsrelativetoelectronicsignaturesvariesdependingonthespecificimplementation;however,ingeneral,electronicsignaturesarestrongerandmoreflexible.Thesemechanismsmaybeusedinconjunctionwithelectronicsignaturesorseparately,dependinguponthesystem'sspecificneedsandlimitations. 228 [PDF page 244] 19.Cryptography Examinationofthetransmissionpathofamessage.Whenmessagesaresentacrossanetwork,suchastheInternet,themessagesourceandthephysicalpathofthemessagearerecordedasapartofthemessage.Thesecanbeexaminedelectronicallyormanuallytohelpascertaintheoriginofamessage.Useofavalue-addednetworkprovider.Iftwoormorepartiesarecommunicatingviaathirdpartynetwork,thenetworkprovidermaybeabletoprovideassurancethatmessagesoriginatefromagivensourceandhavenotbeenmodified.Acknowledgmentstatements.Therecipientofanelectronicmessagemayconfirmthemessage'soriginandcontentsbysendingbackanacknowledgementstatement.•Useofaudittrails.Audittrailscantrackthesendingofmessagesandtheircontentsforlaterreference.Simplytakingadigitalpictureofawrittensignaturedoesnotprovideadequatesecurity.Suchadigitizedwrittensignaturecouldeasilybecopiedfromoneelectronicdocumenttoanotherwithnowaytodeterminewhetheritislegitimate.Electronicsignatures,ontheotherhand,areuniquetothemessagebeingsignedandwillnotverifyiftheyarecopiedtoanotherdocument.19.2.3.1SecretKeyElectronicSignaturesSystemsincorporatingmessageauthenticationAnelectronicsignaturecanbeimplementedtechnologyhavebeenapprovedforusebythefederalusingsecretkeymessageauthenticationcodesgovernmentasareplacementforwrittensignatures^»*.^X ^r 1 onelectromcdocuments.(MACs).Forexample,iftwopartiesshareasecretkey,andonepartyreceivesdatawithaMACthatiscorrectlyverifiedusingthesharedkey,thatpartymayassumethattheotherpartysignedthedata.Thisassumes,however,thatthetwopartiestrusteachother.Thus,throughtheuseofaMAC,inadditiontodataintegrity,aformofelectronicsignatureisobtained.Usingadditionalcontrols,suchaskeynotarizationandkeyattributes,itispossibletoprovideanelectronicsignatureevenifthetwopartiesdonottrusteachother.19.2.3.2PublicKeyElectronicSignaturesAnothertypeofelectronicsignaturecalledadigitalsignatureisimplementedusingpublickeycryptography.Dataiselectronicallysignedbyapplyingtheoriginator'sprivatekeytothedata.(Theexactmathematicalprocessfordoingthisisnotimportantforthisdiscussion.)Toincreasethespeedoftheprocess,theprivatekeyisappliedtoashorterformofthedata,calleda"hash"or"messagedigest,"ratherthantotheentiresetofdata.Theresultingdigitalsignaturecanbestoredortransmittedalongwiththedata.Thesignaturecanbeverifiedbyanypartyusingthepublickeyofthesigner.Thisfeatureisveryuseful,forexample,whendistributingsignedcopies229 [PDF page 245] IV.TechnicalControls ofvirus-freesoftware.Anyrecipientcanverifythattheprogramremainsvirus-free.Ifthesignatureverifiesproperly,thentheverifierhasconfidencethatthedatawasnotmodifiedafterbeingsignedandthattheownerofthepublickeywasthesigner. NISThaspublishedstandardsforadigitalsignatureandasecurehashforusebythefederalgovernmentinFIPS186,DigitalSignatureStandardandFIPS180,SecureHashStandard.19.2.4UserAuthenticationCryptographycanincreasesecurityinuserauthenticationtechniques.AsdiscussedinChapter16,cryptographyisthebasisforseveraladvancedauthenticationmethods.Insteadofcommunicatingpasswordsoveranopennetwork,authenticationcanbeperformedbydemonstratingknowledgeofacryptographickey.Usingthesemethods,aone-timepassword,whichisnotsusceptibletoeavesdropping,canbeused.UserauthenticationcanuseeithersecretorpubUckeycryptography.19.3ImplementationIssuesThissectionexploresseveralmiportantissuesthatshouldbeconsideredwhenusing(e.g.,designing,implementing,integrating)cryptographyinacomputersystem.19.3.1SelectingDesignandImplementationStandardsNISTandotherorganizationshavedevelopednumerousstandardsfordesigning,implementing,andusingcryptographyandforintegratingitintoautomatedsystems.Byusingthesemm^mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm^^^^nmmmmmstandards,organizationscanreducecostsandprotecttheirinvestmentsintechnology.Applicablesecuritystandardsprovideacommon„,, •J1• II1 levelofsecurityandinteroperabilityamongusers.Standardsprovidesolutionsthathavebeenacceptedbyawidecommunityandthathave^^i^giiigggggggggggggi^^^^^^^^beenreviewedbyexpertsinrelevantareas.Standardshelpensureinteroperabilityamongdifferentvendors'equipment,thusallowingan UseofPublicKeyCryptographyforDigitalSignatureMessagePreparedbyPersonA PersonA'sprivatekey TransmittedtoPersonB PersonA's]VtrlflcatlompublickeyWJ MessageVerifiedReadbyPersonB PersonBknowsthatonlyPersonAcouldhavesentthemessage. 230 [PDF page 246] 19.Cryptography organizationtoselectfromamongvariousproductsinordertofindcost-effectiveequipment.Managersandusersofcomputersystemswillhavetoselectamongvariousstandardswhendecidingtousecryptography.Theirselectionshouldbebasedoncost-effectivenessanalysis,trendsinthestandard'sacceptance,andinteroperabilityrequirements.Inaddition,eachstandardshouldbecarefullyanalyzedtodetermineifitisapplicabletotheorganizationandthedesiredapplication.Forexample,theDataEncryptionStandardandtheEscrowedEncryptionStandardarebothapplicabletocertainapplicationsinvolvingcommunicationsofdataovercommercialmodems.Somefederalstandardsaremandatoryforfederalcomputersystems,includingDES(HPS46-2)andtheDSS(HPS181).19.3.2DecidingonHardwarevs.SoftwareImplementationsThetrade-offsamongsecurity,cost,simplicity,efficiency,andeaseofimplementationneedtobestudiedbymanagersacquiringvarioussecurityproductsmeetingastandard.Cryptographycanbeimplementedineitherhardwareorsoftware.Eachhasitsrelatedcostsandbenefits. Ingeneral,softwareislessexpensiveandslowerthanhardware,althoughforlargeapplications,hardwaremaybelessexpensive.Inaddition,softwaremaybelesssecure,sinceitismoreeasilymodifiedorbypassedthanequivalenthardwareproducts.Tamperresistanceisusuallyconsideredbetterinhardware.Inmanycases,cryptographyisimplementedinahardwaredevice(e.g.,electronicchip,ROM-protectedprocessor)butiscontrolledbysoftware.Thissoftwarerequiresintegrityprotectiontoensurethatthehardwaredeviceisprovidedwithcorrectinformation(i.e.,controls,data)andisnotbypassed.Thus,ahybridsolutionisgenerallyprovided,evenwhenthebasiccryptographyisimplementedinhardware.Effectivesecurityrequiresthecorrectmanagementoftheentirehybridsolution. 19.3.3ManagingKeysThepropermanagementofcryptographickeysisessentialtotheeffectiveuseofcryptographyforsecurity.Ultimately,thesecurityofinformationprotectedbycryptographydirectlydependsupontheprotectionaffordedtokeys.Allkeysneedtobeprotectedagainstmodification,andsecretkeysandprivatekeysneedprotectionagainstunauthorizeddisclosure.Keymanagementinvolvestheproceduresandprotocols,bothmanualandautomated,usedthroughouttheentirelifecycleofthekeys.Thisincludesthegeneration,distribution,storage,entry,use,destruction,andarchivingofcryptographickeys.Withsecretkeycryptography,thesecretkey(s)shouldbesecurelydistributed(i.e.,safeguarded231 [PDF page 247] IV.TechnicalControls againstunauthorizedreplacement,modification,anddisclosure)tothepartieswishingtocommunicate.Dependinguponthenumberandlocationofusers,thistaskmaynotbetrivial.Automatedtechniquesforgeneratinganddistributingcryptographickeyscaneaseoverheadcostsofkeymanagement,butsomeresourceshavetobedevotedtothistask.FTPS171,KeyManagementUsingANSIX9. 1 7,provideskeymanagementsolutionsforavarietyofoperationalenvironments.Publickeycryptographyusersalsohavetosatisfycertainkeymanagementrequirements.Forexample,sinceaprivate-publickeypairisassociatedwith(i.e.,generatedorheldby)aspecificuser,itisnecessarytobindthepublicpartofthekeypairtotheuser.'^^ Inasmallcommunityofusers,publickeysandtheir"owners"canbestronglyboundbysimplyexchangingpublickeys(e.g.,puttingthemonaCD-ROMorothermedia).However,conductingelectronicbusinessonalargerscale,potentiallyinvolvinggeographicallyandorganizationallydistributedusers,necessitatesameansforobtainingpublickeyselectronicallywithahighdegreeofconfidenceintheirintegrityandbindingtoindividuals.Thesupportforthebindingbetweenakeyanditsownerisgenerallyreferredtoasapublickeyinfrastructure.Usersalsoneedtobeableenterthecommunityofkeyholders,generatekeys(orhavethemgeneratedontheirbehalf),disseminatepublickeys,revokekeys(incase,forexample,ofcompromiseoftheprivatekey),andchangekeys.Inaddition,itmaybenecessarytobuildintime/datestampingandtoarchivekeysforverificationofoldsignatures.19.3.4SecurityofCryptographicModulesCryptographyistypicallyimplementedinamoduleofsoftware,firmware,hardware,orsomecombinationthereofThismodulecontainsthecryptographicalgorithm(s),certaincontrolparameters,andtemporarystoragefacilitiesforthekey(s)beingusedbythealgorithm(s).Theproperfunctioningofthecryptographyrequiresthesecuredesign,implementation,anduseofthecryptographicmodule.Thisincludesprotectingthemoduleagainsttampering. HPS140-1,SecurityRequirementsforCryptographicModules,specifiesthephysicalandlogicalsecurityrequirementsforcryptographicmodules.Thestandarddefinesfoursecuritylevelsforcryptographicmodules,witheachlevelprovidingasignificantincreaseinsecurityovertheprecedinglevelThefourlevelsallowforcost-effectivesolutionsthatareappropriatefordifferentdegreesofdatasensitivityanddifferentapplicationenvironments.Theusercanselectthebestmoduleforanygivenapplicationorsystem,avoidingthecostofunnecessarysecurityfeatures. Insomecases,thekeymaybeboundtoapositionoranorganization,ratherthantoanindividualuser. 232 [PDF page 248] 19.Cryptography 19.3.5ApplyingCryptographytoNetworksTheuseofcryptographywithinnetworkingapplicationsoftenrequiresspecialconsiderations.Intheseapplications,thesuitabilityofacryptographicmodulemaydependonitscapabilityforhandlingspecialrequirementsimposedbylocallyattachedcommunicationsequipmentorbythenetworkprotocolsandsoftware.Encryptedinformation,MACs,ordigitalsignaturesmayrequiretransparentcommunicationsprotocolsorequipmenttoavoidbeingmisinterpretedbythecommunicationsequipmentorsoftwareascontrolinformation.Itmaybenecessarytoformattheencryptedinformation,MAC,ordigitalsignaturetoensurethatitdoesnotconfusethecommunicationsequipmentorsoftware.Itisessentialthatcryptographysatisfytherequirementsimposedbythecommunicationsequipmentanddoesnotinterferewiththeproperandefficientoperationofthenetwork.Dataisencryptedonanetworkusingeitherlinkorend-to-endencryption.Ingeneral,linkencryptionisperformedbyserviceproviders,suchasadatacommunicationsprovider.Linkencryptionencryptsallofthedataalongacommunicationspath(e.g.,asatellitelink,telephonecircuit,orTlline).Sincelinkencryptionalsoencryptsroutingdata,communicationsnodesneedtodecryptthedatatocontinuerouting.End-to-endencryptionisgenerallyperformedbytheend-userorganization.Althoughdataremainsencryptedwhenbeingpassedthroughanetwork,routinginformationremainsvisible.Itispossibletocombinebothtypesofencryption.19.3.6ComplyingwithExportRulesTheU.S.Governmentcontrolstheexportofcryptographicimplementations.Therulesgoverningexportcanbequitecomplex,sincetheyconsidermultiplefactors.Inaddition,cryptographyisarapidlychangingfield,andrulesmaychangefi"omtimetotime.Questionsconcerningtheexportofaparticularimplementationshouldbeaddressedtoappropriatelegalcounsel. 19.4InterdependenciesTherearemanyinterdependenciesamongcryptographyandothersecuritycontrolshighlightedinthishandbook.Cryptographybothdependsonothersecuritysafeguardsandassistsinprovidingthem.PhysicalSecurity.Physicalprotectionofacryptographicmoduleisrequiredtoprevent-oratleastdetect-physicalreplacementormodificationofthecryptographicsystemandthekeyswithinit.Inmanyenvironments(e.g.,openoffices,portablecomputers),thecryptographicmoduleitselfhastoprovidethedesiredlevelsofphysicalsecurity.Inotherenvironments(e.g.,closedcommunicationsfacilities,steel-encasedCash-IssuingTerminals),acryptographicmodulemaybesafelyemployedwithinasecuredfacility. 233 [PDF page 249] IV.TechnicalControls UserAuthentication.Cryptographycanbeusedbothtoprotectpasswordsthatarestoredincomputersystemsandtoprotectpasswordsthatarecommunicatedbetweencomputers.Furthermore,cryptographic-basedauthenticationtechniquesmaybeusedinconjunctionwith,orinplaceof,password-basedtechniquestoprovidestrongerauthenticationofusers.LogicalAccessControl.Inmanycases,cryptographicsoftwaremaybeembeddedwithinahostsystem,anditmaynotbefeasibletoprovideextensivephysicalprotectiontothehostsystem.Inthesecases,logicalaccesscontrolmayprovideameansofisolatingthecryptographicsoftwarefromotherpartsofthehostsystemandforprotectingthecryptographicsoftwarefromtamperingandthekeysfromreplacementordisclosure.Theuseofsuchcontrolsshouldprovidetheequivalentofphysicalprotection.AuditTrails.Cryptographymayplayausefulroleinaudittrails.Forexample,auditrecordsmayneedtobesigned.Cryptographymayalsobeneededtoprotectauditrecordsstoredoncomputersystemsfromdisclosureormodification.Audittrailsarealsousedtohelpsupportelectronicsignatures.Assurance.Assurancethatacryptographicmoduleisproperlyandsecurelyimplementedisessentialtotheeffectiveuseofcryptography.NISTmaintainsvalidationprogramsforseveralofitsstandardsforcryptography.Vendorscanhavetheirproductsvalidatedforconformancetothestandardthrougharigoroussetoftests.Suchtestingprovidesincreasedassurancethatahh^^^^^h^^^^^h^^^^h^^^hmhmodulemeetsstatedstandards,andsystem.. ,. ^ ,^...., , NISTmaintainsvaJidationprogramsforseveralofItsdesigners,integrators,anduserscanhavecryptographicstandards,greaterconfidencethatvalidatedproductsconformtoacceptedstandards.,^1,^^,^^^^^^,^^^,,^^,,,,^^^^^^^^,^^Acryptographicsystemshouldbemonitoredandperiodicallyauditedtoensurethatitissatisfyingitssecurityobjectives.Allparametersassociatedwithcorrectoperationofthecryptographicsystemshouldbereviewed,andoperationofthesystemitselfshouldbeperiodicallytestedandtheresultsaudited.Certaininformation,suchassecretkeysorprivatekeysinpublickeysystems,shouldnotbesubjecttoaudit.However,nonsecretornonprivatekeyscouldbeusedinasimulatedauditprocedure.19.5CostConsiderationsUsingcryptographytoprotectinformationhasbothdirectandindirectcosts.Costisdeterminedinpartbyproductavailability;awidevarietyofproductsexistforimplementingcryptographyinintegratedcircuits,add-onboardsoradapters,andstand-aloneunits. 234 [PDF page 250] 19.Cryptography 19.5.1DirectCostsThedirectcostsofcryptographyinclude:•Acquiringorimplementingthecryptographicmoduleandintegratingitintothecomputersystem.Themedium(i.e.,hardware,software,firmware,orcombination)andvariousotherissuessuchaslevelofsecurity,logicalandphysicalconfiguration,andspecialprocessingrequirementswillhaveanimpactoncost.•Managingthecryptographyand,inparticular,managingthecryptographickeys,whichincludeskeygeneration,distribution,archiving,anddisposition,aswellassecuritymeasurestoprotectthekeys,asappropriate.19.5.2IndirectCostsTheindirectcostsofcryptographyinclude:•Adecreaseinsystemornetworkperformance,resultingfi-omtheadditionaloverheadofapplyingcryptographicprotectiontostoredorcommunicateddata.•Changesinthewayusersinteractwiththesystem,resultingfrommorestringentsecurityenforcement.However,cryptographycanbemadenearlytransparenttotheuserssothattheimpactisminimal.ReferencesAlexander,M.,ed."ProtectingDataWithSecretCodes,"InfosecurityNews.4(6),1993.pp.72-78.AmericanBankersAssociation.AmericanNationalStandardforFinancialInstitutionKeyManagement(Wholesale).ANSIX9.17-1985.Washington,DC,1985.Denning,P.,andD.Denning,"TheClipperandCapstoneEncryptionSystems."AmericanScientist.81(4),1993.pp.319-323. Diffie,W.,andM.Hellman."NewDirectionsinCryptography."IEEETransactionsonInformationTheory.Vol.IT-22,No.6,November1976.pp.644-654.Duncan,R."EncryptionABCs."InfosecurityNews.5(2),1994.pp.36-41. InternationalOrganizationforStandardization.InformationProcessingSystems-OpenSystems 235 [PDF page 251] IV.TechnicalControls InterconnectionReferenceModel-Part2:SecurityArchitecture.ISO7498/2.1988.Meyer,C.H.,andS.M.Matyas.Cryptography:ANewDimensioninComputerDataSecurity.NewYork,NY:JohnWiley&Sons,1982.Nechvatal,James.Public-KeyCryptography.SpecialPublication800-2.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,April1991.NationalBureauofStandards.ComputerDataAuthentication.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication113.May30,1985.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology."AdvancedAuthenticationTechnology."ComputerSystemsLaboratoryBulletin.November1991.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.DataEncryptionStandard.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication46-2.December30,1993.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology."DigitalSignatureStandard."ComputerSystemsLaboratoryBulletin.January1993.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.DigitalSignatureStandard.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication186.May1994.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.EscrowedEncryptionStandard.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication185.1994.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.KeyManagementUsingANSIX9.17.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication171.April27,1992.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.SecureHashStandard.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication180.May11,1993.NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.SecurityRequirementsforCryptographicModules.FederalInformationProcessingStandardPublication140-1.January11,1994.Rivest,R.,A.Shamir,andL.Adleman."AMethodforObtainingDigitalSignaturesandPublic-KeyCryptosystems."CommunicationsoftheACM.,Vol.21,No.2,1978.pp.120-126.Saltman,RoyG.,ed.GoodSecurityPracticesforElectronicCommerce,IncludingElectronicDatainterchange.SpecialPublication800-9.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.December1993. 236 [PDF page 252] 19.Cryptography Schneier,B."ATaxonomyofEncryptionAlgorithms."ComputerSecurityJournal.9(1),1193.pp.39-60.Schneier,B."FourCryptoStandards."InfosecurityNews.4(2),1993.pp.38-39.Schneier,B.AppliedCryptography:Protocols,Algorithms,andSourceCodeinC.NewYork,NY:JohnWiley&Sons,Inc.,1994.U.S.Congress,OfficeofTechnologyAssessment."SecuritySafeguardsandPractices."DefendingSecrets,SharingData:NewLocksandKeysforElectronicInformation.Washington,DC:1987,pp.54-72. 237 [PDF page 253] [PDF page 254] V.EXAMPLE 239 [PDF page 255] [PDF page 256] Chapter20ASSESSINGANDMITIGATINGTHERISKSTOAHYPOTHETICALCOMPUTERSYSTEM Thischapterillustrateshowahypotheticalgovernmentagency(HGA)dealswithcomputersecurityissuesinitsoperatingenvironment.ItfollowstheevolutionofHGA'sinitiationofanassessmentofthethreatstoitscomputersecuritysystemallthewaythroughtoHGA'srecommendationsformitigatingthoserisks.Intherealworld,manysolutionsexistforcomputersecurityproblems.Nosinglesolutioncansolvesimilarsecurityproblemsinallenvironments.Likewise,thesolutionspresentedinthisexamplemaynotbeappropriateforallenvironments.Thiscasestudyisprovidedforillustrativepurposesonly,andshouldnotbeconstruedasThisexamplecanbeusedtohelpunderstandhowguidanceorspecificrecommendationstosecurityissuesareexamined,howsomepotentialsolvingspecificsecurityissues.Becauseasolutionsareanalyzed,howtheircostandbenefitsare , . 1 . weighed,andultimatelyhowmanagementacceptscomprehensiveexampleattemptingto uiv,^i^ rfo responsibilityforrisks.illustrateallhandbooktopicswouldbeinordinatelylong,thisexamplenecessarilysimplifiestheissuespresentedandomitsmanydetails.Forinstance,tohighlightthesimilaritiesanddifferencesamongcontrolsinthedifferentprocessingenvironments,itaddressessomeofthemajortypesofprocessingplatformslinkedtogetherinadistributedsystem:personalcomputers,local-areanetworks,wide-areanetworks,andmainframes;itdoesnotshowhowtosecuretheseplatforms.Thissectionalsohighlightstheimportanceofmanagement'sacceptanceofaparticularlevelofrisk—thiswUl,ofcourse,varyfromorganizationtoorganization.Itismanagement'sprerogativetodecidewhatlevelofriskisappropriate,givenoperatingandbudgetenvironmentsandotherapplicablefactors. 20.1InitiatingtheRiskAssessmentHGAhasinformationsystemsthatcompriseandareintertwinedwithseveraldifferentkindsofassetsvaluableenoughtomeritprotection.HGA'ssystemsplayakeyroleintransferringU.S.Governmentfundstoindividualsintheformofpaychecks;hence,financialresourcesareamongtheassetsassociatedwithHGA'ssystems.ThesystemcomponentsownedandoperatedbyHGA Whilethischapterdrawsuponmanyactualsystems,detailsandcharacteristicswerechangedandmerged.Althoughthechapterisarrangedaroundanagency,thecasestudycouldalsoapplytoalargedivisionorofficewithinanagency. 241 [PDF page 257] V.Example arealsoassets,asarepersonnelinformation,contractingandprocurementdocuments,draftregulations,internalcorrespondence,andavarietyofotherday-to-daybusinessdocuments,memos,andreports.HGA'sassetsincludeintangibleelementsaswell,suchasreputationoftheagencyandtheconfidenceofitsemployeesthatpersonalinformationwillbehandledproperlyandthatthewageswillbepaidontime.ArecentchangeinthedirectorshipofHGAhasbroughtinanewmanagementteam.AmongthenewChiefInformationOfficer'sfirstactionswasappointingaComputerSecurityProgramManagerwhoimmediatelyinitiatedacomprehensiveriskanalysistoassessthesoundnessofHGA'scomputersecurityprograminprotectingtheagency'sassetsanditscompliancewithfederaldirectives.Thisanalysisdrewuponpriorriskassessments,threatstudies,andapplicableinternalcontrolreports.TheComputerSecurityProgramManageralsoestablishedatimetableforperiodicreassessments.Sincethewide-areanetworkandmainframeusedbyHGAareownedandoperatedbyotherorganizations,theywerenottreatedintheriskassessmentasHGA'sassets.AndalthoughHGA'spersonnel,buildings,andfacilitiesareessentialassets,theComputerSecurityProgramManagerconsideredthemtobeoutsidethescopeoftheriskanalysis. AfterexaminingHGA'scomputersystem,theriskassessmentteamidentifiedspecificthreatstoHGA'sassets,reviewedHGA'sandnationalsafeguardsagainstthosethreats,identifiedthevulnerabilitiesofthosepolicies,andrecommendedspecificactionsformitigatingtheremainingriskstoHGA'scomputersecurity.Thefollowingsectionsprovidehighlightsfromtheriskassessment.Theassessmentaddressedmanyotherissuesattheprogrammaticandsystemlevels.However,thischapterfocusesonsecurityissuesrelatedtothetimeandattendanceapplication.(OtherissuesarediscussedinChapter6.) 20.2HGA'sComputerSystemHGAreliesonthedistributedcomputersystemsandnetworksshowninFigure20.1.Theyconsistofacollectionofcomponents,someofwhicharesystemsintheirownright.SomebelongtoHGA,butothersareownedandoperatedbyotherorganizations.Thissectiondescribesthesecomponents,theirroleintheoveralldistributedsystemarchitecture,andhowtheyareusedbyHGA.20.2.1SystemArchitectureMostofHGA'sstaff(amixofclerical,technical,andmanagerialstaff)areprovidedwithpersonalcomputers(PCs)locatedintheiroffices.EachPCincludeshard-diskandfloppy-diskdrives. ThePCsareconnectedtoalocalareanetwork(LAN)sothatuserscanexchangeandshare 242 [PDF page 258] [PDF page 259] V.Example information.ThecentralcomponentoftheLANisaLANserver,amorepowerfulcomputerthatactsasanintermediarybetweenPCsonthenetworkandprovidesalargevolumeofdiskstorageforsharedinformation,includingsharedapplicationprograms.Theserverprovideslogicalaccesscontrolsonpotentiallysharableinformationviaelementaryaccesscontrollists.Theseaccesscontrolscanbeusedtolimituseraccesstovariousfilesandprogramsstoredontheserver.SomeprogramsstoredontheservercanberetrievedviatheLANandexecutedonaPC;otherscanonlybeexecutedontheserver. Toinitiateasessiononthenetworkorexecuteprogramsontheserver,usersataPCmustlogintotheserverandprovideauseridentifierandpasswordknowntotheserver.Thentheymayusefilestowhichtheyhaveaccess.Oneoftheapplicationssupportedbytheserveriselectronicmail(e-maU),whichcanbeusedbyallPCusers.OtherprogramsthatrunontheservercanonlybeexecutedbyalimitedsetofPCusers.Severalprinters,distributedthroughoutHGA'sbuildingcomplex,areconnectedtotheLAN.UsersatPCsmaydirectprintoutstowhicheverprinterismostconvenientfortheiruse.SinceHGAmustfrequentlycommunicatewithindustry,theLANalsoprovidesaconnectiontotheInternetviaarouter.TherouterisanetworkinterfacedevicethattranslatesbetweentheprotocolsandaddressesassociatedwiththeLANandtheInternet.Therouteralsoperformsnetworkpacketfiltering,aformofnetworkaccesscontrol,andhasrecentlybeenconfiguredtodisallownon-e-mail(e.g.,fdetransfer,remotelog-in)betweenLANandInternetcomputers.TheLANserveralsohasconnectionstoseveralotherdevices.•AmodempoolisprovidedsothatHGA'semployeesontravelcan"dialup"viathepublicswitched(telephone)networkandreadorsende-mail.Toinitiateadial-upsession,ausermustsuccessfullylogin.Duringdial-upsessions,theLANserverprovidesaccessonlytoe-mailfacilities;nootherfunctionscanbeinvoked. = •Aspecialconsoleisprovidedfortheserveradministratorswhoconfiguretheserver,establishanddeleteuseraccounts,andhaveotherspecialprivilegesneededforadministrativeandmaintenancefunctions.Thesefunctionscanonlybeinvokedfromtheadministratorconsole;thatis,theycannotbeinvokedfromaPConthenetworkorfromadial-upsession.•AconnectiontoagovernmentagencyX.25-basedwide-areanetwork(WAN)isprovidedsothatinformationcanbetransferredtoorfromotheragencysystems.OneoftheotherhostsontheWANisalargemultiagencymainframesystem.ThismainframeisusedtocoUectandprocessinformationfromalargenumberof244 [PDF page 260] 20.AssessingandMitigatingtheRiskstoaHypotheticalComputerSystem agencieswhileprovidingarangeofaccesscontrols.20.2.2SystemOperationalAuthority/OwnershipThesystemcomponentscontainedwithinthelargedashedrectangleshowninFigure20.1aremanagedandoperatedbyanorganizationwithinHGAknownastheComputerOperationsGroup(COG).ThisgroupincludesthePCs,LAN,server,console,printers,modempool,androuter.TheWANisownedandoperatedbyalargecommercialtelecommunicationscompanythatprovidesWANservicesunderagovernmentcontract.ThemainframeisownedandoperatedbyafederalagencythatactsasaserviceproviderforHGAandotheragenciesconnectedtotheWAN.20.2.3SystemApplicationsPCsonHGA'sLANareusedforwordprocessing,datamanipulation,andothercommonapplications,includingspreadsheetandprojectmanagementtools.Manyofthesetasksareconcernedwithdatathataresensitivewithrespecttoconfidentialityorintegrity.Someofthesedocumentsanddataalsoneedtobeavailableinatimelymanner.Themainframealsoprovidesstorageandretrievalservicesforotherdatabasesbelongingtoindividualagencies.Forexample,severalagencies,includingHGA,storetheirpersonneldatabasesonthemainframe;thesedatabasescontaindatesofservice,leavebalances,salaryandW-2information,andsoforth. Inadditiontotheirtimeandattendanceapplication,HGA'sPCsandtheLANserverareusedtomanipulateotherkindsofinformationthatmaybesensitivewithrespecttoconfidentialityorintegrity,includingpersonnel-relatedcorrespondenceanddraftcontractingdocuments.20.3ThreatstoHGA'sAssetsDifferentassetsofHGAaresubjecttodifferentkindsofthreats.Somethreatsareconsideredlesslikelythanothers,andthepotentialimpactofdifferentthreatsmayvarygreatly.Thelikelihoodofthreatsisgenerallydifficulttoestimateaccurately.BothHGAandtheriskassessment'sauthorshaveattemptedtotheextentpossibletobasetheseestimatesonhistoricaldata,buthavealsotriedtoanticipatenewtrendsstimulatedbyemergingtechnologies(e.g.,externalnetworks).20.3.1PayrollFraudAsformostlargeorganizationsthatcontrolfinancialassets,attemptsatfraudandembezzlementarelikelytooccur.Historically,attemptsatpayrollfraudhavealmostalwayscomefromwithinHGAortheotheragenciesthatoperatesystemsonwhichHGAdepends.AlthoughHGAhasthwartedmanyoftheseattempts,andsomehaveinvolvedrelativelysmallsumsofmoney,it 245 [PDF page 261] V.Example considerspreventingfinancialfraudtobeacriticalcomputersecuritypriority,particularlyinlightofthepotentialfinanciallossesandtherisksofdamagetoitsreputationwithCongress,thepublic,andotherfederalagencies.AttemptstodefraudHGAhaveincludedthefollowing:•Submittingfraudulenttimesheetsforhoursordaysnotworked,orforpayperiodsfollowingterminationortransferofemployment.Theformermaytaketheformofoverreportingcompensatoryorovertimehoursworked,orunderreportingvacationorsickleavetaken.Alternatively,attemptshavebeenmadetomodifytimesheetdataafterbeingenteredandapprovedforsubmissiontopayroll.•Falsifyingormodifyingdatesordataonwhichone's"yearsofservice"computationsarebased,therebybecomingeligibleforretirementearlierthanallowed,orincreasingone'spensionamount.•Creatingemployeerecordsandtimesheetsforfictitiouspersonnel,andattemptingtoobtaintheirpaychecks,particularlyafterarrangingfordirectdeposit.20.3.2PayrollErrorsOfgreaterlikelihood,butofperhapslesserpotentialimpactonHGA,areerrorsintheentryoftimeandattendancedata;failuretoenterinformationdescribingnewemployees,terminations,andtransfersinatimelymanner;accidentalcorruptionorlossoftimeandattendancedata;orerrorsininteragencycoordinationandprocessingofpersonneltransfers. ErrorsofthesekindscancausefinancialdifficultiesforemployeesandaccountingproblemsforHGA.Ifanemployee'svacationorsickleavebalancebecamenegativeerroneouslyduringthelastpayperiodoftheyear,theemployee'slastpaycheckwouldbeautomaticallyreduced.AnindividualwhotransfersbetweenHGAandanotheragencymayriskreceivingduplicatepaychecksornopaychecksforthepayperiodsimmediatelyfollowingthetransfer.ErrorsofthissortthatoccurneartheendoftheyearcanleadtoerrorsinW-2formsandsubsequentdifficultieswiththetaxcollectionagencies.20.3.3InterruptionofOperationsHGA'sbuildingfacilitiesandphysicalplantareseveraldecadesoldandarefrequentlyunderrepairorrenovation.Asaresult,power,airconditioning,andLANorWANconnectivityfortheserveraretypicallyinterruptedseveraltimesayearforperiodsofuptooneworkday.Forexample,onseveraloccasions,constructionworkershaveinadvertentlyseveredpowerornetworkcables.Fires,floods,storms,andothernaturaldisasterscanalsointerruptcomputeroperations,ascanequipmentmalfunctions.246 [PDF page 262] 20.AssessingandMitigatingtheRiskstoaHypotheticalComputerSystem Anotherthreatofsmalllikelihood,butsignificantpotentialimpact,isthatofamaliciousordisgruntledemployeeoroutsiderseekingtodisrupttime-criticalprocessing(e.g.,payroll)bydeletingnecessaryinputsorsystemaccounts,misconfiguringaccesscontrols,plantingcomputerviruses,orstealingorsabotagingcomputersorrelatedequipment.Suchinterruptions,dependinguponwhentheyoccur,canpreventtimeandattendancedatafromgettingprocessedandtransferredtothemainframebeforethepayrollprocessingdeadline.20.3.4DisclosureorBrokerageofInformationOtherkindsofthreatsmaybestimulatedbythegrowingmarketforinformationaboutanorganization'semployeesorinternalactivities.Individualswhohavelegitimatework-relatedreasonsforaccesstothemasteremployeedatabasemayattempttodisclosesuchinformationtootheremployeesorcontractorsortosellittoprivateinvestigators,employmentrecruiters,thepress,orotherorganizations.HGAconsiderssuchthreatstobemoderatelylikelyandoflowtohighpotentialimpact,dependingonthetypeofinformationinvolved.20.3.5Network-RelatedThreatsMostofthehumanthreatsofconcerntoHGAoriginatefrominsiders.Nevertheless,HGAalsorecognizestheneedtoprotectitsassetsfromoutsiders.Suchattacksmayservemanydifferentpurposesandposeabroadspectrumofrisks,includingunauthorizeddisclosureormodificationofinformation,unauthorizeduseofservicesandassets,orunauthorizeddenialofservices. AsshowninFigure20.1,HGA'ssystemsareconnectedtothethreeexternalnetworks:(1)theInternet,(2)theInteragencyWAN,and(3)thepublic-switched(telephone)network.Althoughthesenetworksareasourceofsecurityrisks,connectivitywiththemisessentialtoHGA'smissionandtotheproductivityofitsemployees;connectivitycannotbeterminatedsimplybecauseofsecurityrisks. Ineachofthepastfewyearsbeforeestablishingitscurrentsetofnetworksafeguards,HGAhaddetectedseveralattemptsbyoutsiderstopenetrateitssystems.Most,butnotallofthese,havecomefromtheInternet,andthosethatsucceededdidsobylearningorguessinguseraccountpasswords.Intwocases,theattackerdeletedorcorruptedsignificantamountsofdata,mostofwhichwerelaterrestoredfrombackupfiles.Inmostcases,HGAcoulddetectnoilleffectsoftheattack,butconcludedthattheattackermayhavebrowsedthroughsomefiles.HGAalsoconcededthatitssystemsdidnothaveauditloggingcapabilitiessufficienttotrackanattacker'sactivities.Hence,formostoftheseattacks,HGAcouldnotaccuratelygaugetheextentofpenetration., Inonecase,anattackermadeuseofabuginane-mailutilityandsucceededinacquiringSystemAdministratorprivilegesontheserver—asignificantbreach.HGAfoundnoevidencethattheattackerattemptedtoexploittheseprivilegesbeforebeingdiscoveredtwodayslater.Whenthe247 [PDF page 263] V.Example attackwasdetected,COGimmediatelycontactedtheHGA'sIncidentHandlingTeam,andwastoldthatabugfixhadbeendistributedbytheservervendorseveralmonthsearlier.Toitsembarrassment,COGdiscoveredthatithadalreadyreceivedthefix,whichitthenpromptlyinstalled.Itnowbelievesthatnosubsequentattacksofthesamenaturehavesucceeded.AlthoughHGAhasnoevidencethatithasbeensignificantlyharmedtodatebyattacksviaexternalnetworks,itbelievesthattheseattackshavegreatpotentialtoinflictdamage.HGA'smanagementconsidersitselfluckythatsuchattackshavenotharmedHGA'sreputationandtheconfidenceofthecitizensitsserves.Italsobelievesthelikelihoodofsuchattacksviaexternalnetworkswillincreaseinthefuture. 20.3.6OtherThreatsHGA'ssystemsalsoareexposedtoseveralotherthreatsthat,forreasonsofspace,cannotbefullyenumeratedhere.ExamplesofthreatsandHGA'sassessmentoftheirprobabilitiesandimpactsincludethoselistedinTable20.1 . 20.4CurrentSecurityMeasuresHGAhasnumerouspoliciesandproceduresforprotectingitsassetsagainsttheabovethreats.ThesearearticulatedinHGA'sComputerSecurityManual,whichimplementsandsynthesizestherequirementsofmanyfederaldirectives,suchasAppendixIIIto0MBCircularA-130,theComputerSecurityActof1987,andthePrivacyAct.Themanualalsoincludespoliciesforautomatedfinancialsystems,suchasthosebasedon0MBCircularsA-123andA-127,aswellastheFederalManagers'FinancialIntegrityAct.Severalexamplesofthosepoliciesfollow,astheyapplygenerallytotheuseandadministrationofHGA'scomputersystemandspecificallytosecurityissuesrelatedtotimeandattendance,payroll,andcontinuityofoperations.20.4.1GeneralUseandAdministrationofHGA'sComputerSystemHGA'sComputerOperationsGroup(COG)isresponsibleforcontrolling,administering,andmaintainingthecomputerresourcesownedandoperatedbyHGA.ThesefunctionsaredepictedinFigure20.1enclosedinthelarge,dashedrectangle.OnlyindividualsholdingthejobtitleSystemAdministratorareauthorizedtoestablishlog-inIDsandpasswordsonmultiuserHGAsystems(e.g.,theLANserver).OnlyHGA'semployeesandcontractpersonnelmayusethesystem,andonlyafterreceivingwrittenauthorizationfromthedepartmentsupervisor(or,inthecaseofcontractors,thecontractingofficer)towhomtheseindividualsreport.COGissuescopiesofallrelevantsecuritypoliciesandprocedurestonewusers.Beforeactivating 248 [PDF page 264] 20.AssessingandMitigatingtheRiskstoaHypotheticalComputerSystem asystemaccountforanewusers,COGrequiresthatthey(1)attendasecurityawarenessandtrainingcourseorcompleteaninteractivecomputer-aided-instructiontrainingsessionand(2)signanacknowledgmentformindicatingthattheyunderstandtheirsecurityresponsibilities. Authorizedusersareassignedasecretlog-inIDandpassword,whichtheymustnotsharewithanyoneelse.TheyareexpectedtocomplywithallofHGA'spasswordselectionandsecurityprocedures(e.g.,periodicallychangingpasswords).Userswhofailtodosoaresubjecttoarangeofpenalties. ExamplesofThreatstoHGASystemsPotentialThreatProbabilityImpactAccidentalLoss/ReleaseofDisclosure-SensitiveInformationMediumLow/Medium AccidentalDestructionofInformationHighMedium LossofInformationduetoVirusContaminationMediumMedium MisuseofSystemResourcesLowLow TheftHighMediumUnauthorizedAccesstoTelecommunicationsResources'MediumMedium NaturalDisasterLowHigh 'HGAoperatesaPBXsystem,whichmaybevukerableto(1)hackerdisruptionsofPBXavailabihtyand,consequently,agencyoperations,(2)unauthorizedaccesstooutgoingphoneHnesforiong-distanceservices,(3)unauthorizedaccesstostoredvoice-mailmessages,and(4)surreptitiousaccesstootherwiseprivateconversations/datatransmissions. Table20.1UserscreatingdatathataresensitivewithrespecttodisclosureormodificationareexpectedtomakeeffectiveuseoftheautomatedaccesscontrolmechanismsavailableonHGAcomputerstoreducetheriskofexposuretounauthorizedindividuals.(Appropriatetrainingandeducationareinplacetohelpusersdothis.)Ingeneral,accesstodisclosure-sensitiveinformationistobegrantedonlytoindividualswhosejobsrequireit. 249 [PDF page 265] V.Example 20.4.2ProtectionAgainstPayrollFraudandErrors:TimeandAttendanceApplicationThetimeandattendanceapplicationplaysamajorroleinprotectingagainstpayrollfraudanderrors.SincethetimeandattendanceapplicationisacomponentofalargerautomatedpayroUprocess,manyofitsfunctionalandsecurityrequirementshavebeenderivedfrombothgovernmentwideandHGA-specificpoliciesrelatedtopayrollandleave.Forexample,HGAmustprotectpersonalinformationinaccordancewiththePrivacyAct.Dependingonthespecifictypeofinformation,itshouldnormallybeviewableonlybytheindividualconcerned,theindividual'ssupervisors,andpersonnelandpayrolldepartmentemployees.Suchinformationshouldalsobetimelyandaccurate.Eachweek,employeesmustsignandsubmitatimesheetthatidentifiesthenumberofhourstheyhaveworkedandtheamountofleavetheyhavetaken.TheTimeandAttendanceClerkentersthedataforagivengroupofemployeesandrunsanapplicationontheLANservertoverifythedata'svalidityandtoensurethatonlyauthorizeduserswithaccesstotheTimeandAttendanceClerk'sfunctionscanentertimeandattendancedata.TheapplicationperformsthesesecuritychecksbyusingtheLANserver'saccesscontrolandidentificationandauthentication(I&A)mechanisms.Theapplicationcomparesthedatawithalimiteddatabaseofemployeeinformationtodetectincorrectemployeeidentifiers,implausiblenumbersofhoursworked,andsoforth.Aftercorrectinganydetectederrors,theclerkrunsanotherapplicationthatformatsthetimeandattendancedataintoareport,flaggingexception/out-of-boundconditions(e.g.,negativeleavebalances).Departmentsupervisorsareresponsibleforreviewingthecorrectnessofthetimesheetsoftheemployeesundertheirsupervisionandindicatingtheirapprovalbyinitialingthetimesheets.Iftheydetectsignificantirregularitiesandindicationsoffraudinsuchdata,theymustreporttheirfindingstothePayrollOfficebeforesubmittingthetimesheetsforprocessing.Inkeepingwiththeprincipleofseparationofduty,alldataontimesheetsandcorrectionsonthesheetsthatmayaffectpay,leave,retirement,orotherbenefitsofanindividualmustbereviewedforvaliditybyatleasttwoauthorizedindividuals(otherthantheaffectedindividual). ProtectionAgainstUnauthorizedExecutionOnlyuserswithaccesstoTimeandAttendanceSupervisorftinctionsmayapproveandsubmittimeandattendancedata—orsubsequentcorrectionsthereof—tothemainframe.Supervisorsmaynotapprovetheirowntimeandattendancedata.OnlytheSystemAdministratorhasbeengrantedaccesstoassignaspecialaccesscontrolprivilegetoserverprograms.Asaresult,theserver'soperatingsystemisdesignedtopreventabogustimeandattendanceapplicationcreatedbyanyotheruserfromcommunicatingwiththeWANand,hence,withthemainframe. 250 [PDF page 266] 20.AssessingandMitigatingtheRiskstoaHypotheticalComputerSystem ThetimeandattendanceapplicationissupposedtobeconfiguredsothattheclerkandsupervisorfunctionscanonlybecarriedoutfromspecificPCsattachedtotheLANandonlyduringnormalworkinghours.Administratorsarenotauthorizedtoexercisefunctionsofthetimeandattendanceapplicationapartfromthoseconcernedwithconfiguringtheaccounts,passwords,andaccesspermissionsforclerksandsupervisors.Administratorsareexpresslyprohibitedbypolicyfromentering,modifying,orsubmittingtimeandattendancedataviathetimeandattendanceapplicationorothermechanisms."^'ProtectionagainstunauthorizedexecutionofthetimeandattendanceapplicationdependsonI&Aandaccesscontrols.WhilethetimeandattendanceapplicationisaccessiblefromanyPC,unlikemostprogramsrunbyPCusers,itdoesnotexecutedirectlyonthePC'sprocessor.Instead,itexecutesontheserver,whilethePCbehavesasaterminal,relayingtheuser'skeystrokestotheserveranddisplayingtextandgraphicssentfromtheserver.ThereasonforthisapproachisthatcommonPCsystemsdonotprovideI&Aandaccesscontrolsand,therefore,cannotprotectagainstunauthorizedtimeandattendanceprogramexecution.AnyindividualwhohasaccesstothePCcouldrunanyprogramstoredthere. AnotherpossibleapproachisforthetimeandattendanceprogramtoperformI&Aandaccesscontrolonitsownbyrequestingandvalidatingapasswordbeforebeginningeachtimeandattendancesession.Thisapproach,however,canbedefeatedeasilybyamoderatelyskilledprogrammingattack,andwasjudgedinadequatebyHGAduringtheapplication'searlydesignphase.Recallthattheserverisamorepowerfulcomputerequippedwithamultiuseroperatingsystemthatincludespassword-basedI&Aandaccesscontrols.Designingthetimeandattendanceapplicationprogramsothatitexecutesontheserverunderthecontroloftheserver'soperatingsystemprovidesamoreeffectivesafeguardagainstunauthorizedexecutionthanexecutingitontheuser'sPC.ProtectionAgainstPayrollErrorsThefrequencyofdataentryerrorsisreducedbyhavingTimeandAttendanceclerksentereachtimesheetintothetimeandattendanceapplicationtwice.Ifthetwocopiesareidentical,bothareconsiderederrorfree,andtherecordisacceptedforsubsequentreviewandapprovalbyasupervisor.Ifthecopiesarenotidentical,thediscrepanciesaredisplayed,andforeachdiscrepancy,theclerkdetermineswhichcopyiscorrect.Theclerkthenincorporatesthecorrectionsintooneofthecopies,whichisthenacceptedforfurtherprocessing.Iftheclerk '"Technically,SystemsAdministratorsmaystillhavetheabilitytodoso.Thishighlightstheimportanceofadequatemanagerialreviews,auditing,andpersonnelbackgroundchecks. 251 [PDF page 267] V.Example makesthesamedata-entryerrortwice,thenthetwocopieswillmatch,andonewillbeacceptedascorrect,eventhoughitiserroneous.Toreducethisrisk,thetimeandattendanceapplicationcouldbeconfiguredtorequirethatthetwocopiesbeenteredbydifferentclerks. Inaddition,eachdepartmenthasoneormoreTimeandAttendanceSupervisorswhoareauthorizedtoreviewthesereportsforaccuracyandtoapprovethembyrunninganotherserverprogramthatispartofthetimeandattendanceapplication.Thedataarethensubjectedtoacollectionof"sanitychecks"todetectentrieswhosevaluesareoutsideexpectedranges.Potentialanomaliesaredisplayedtothesupervisorpriortoallowingapproval;iferrorsareidentified,thedataarereturnedtoaclerkforadditionalexaminationandcorrections.Whenasupervisorapprovesthetimeandattendancedata,thisapplicationlogsintotheinteragencymainframeviatheWANandtransfersthedatatoapayrolldatabaseonthemainframe.Themainframelaterprintspaychecksor,usingapoolofmodemsthatcansenddataoverphonelines,itmaytransferthefundselectronicallyintoemployee-designatedbankaccounts.Withheldtaxesandcontributionsarealsotransferredelectronicallyinthismanner.TheDirectorofPersonnelisresponsibleforensuringthatformsdescribingsignificantpayroll-relatedpersonnelactionsareprovidedtothePayrollOfficeatleastoneweekbeforethepayrollprocessingdateforthefirstaffectedpayperiod.Theseactionsincludehiring,terminations,transfers,leavesofabsencesandreturnsfromsuch,andpayraises. TheManagerofthePayrollOfficeisresponsibleforestablishingandmaintainingcontrolsadequatetoensurethattheamountsofpay,leave,andotherbenefitsreportedonpaystubsandrecordedinpermanentrecordsandthosedistributedelectronicallyareaccurateandconsistentwithtimeandattendancedataandwithotherinformationprovidedbythePersonnelDepartment.Inparticular,paychecksmustneverbeprovidedtoanyonewhoisnotabonafide,active-statusemployeeofHGA.Moreover,thepayofanyemployeewhoterminatesemployment,whotransfers,orwhogoesonleavewithoutpaymustbesuspendedasoftheeffectivedateofsuchaction;thatis,extrapaychecksorexcesspaymustnotbedispersed.ProtectionAgainstAccidentalCorruptionorLossofPayrollDataThesamemechanismsusedtoprotectagainstfraudulentmodificationareusedtoprotectagainstaccidentalcorruptionoftimeandattendancedata—namely,theaccess-controlfeaturesoftheserverandmainframeoperatingsystems.COG'snightlybackupsoftheserver'sdisksprotectagainstlossoftimeandattendancedata.Toalimitedextent,HGAalsoreliesonmainframeadministrativepersonneltobackuptimeandattendancedatastoredonthemainframe,eventhoughHGAhasnodirectcontrolovertheseindividuals.Asadditionalprotectionagainstlossofdataatthemainframe,HGAretainscopiesofalltimeandattendancedataonlineontheserverforatleastoneyear,atwhichtimethedataare252 [PDF page 268] 20.AssessingandMitigatingtheRiskstoaHypotheticalComputerSystem archivedandkeptforthreeyears.Theserver'saccesscontrolsfortheon-linefilesareautomaticallysettoread-onlyaccessbythetimeandattendanceapplicationatthetimeofsubmissiontothemainframe.Theintegrityoftimeandattendancedatawillbeprotectedbydigitalsignaturesastheyareimplemented.TheWAN'scommunicationsprotocolsalsoprotectagainstlossofdataduringtransmissionfromtheservertothemainframe(e.g.,errorchecking).Inaddition,themainframepayrollapplicationincludesaprogramthatisautomaticallyrun24hoursbeforepaychecksandpaystubsareprinted.Thisprogramproducesareportidentifyingagenciesfromwhomtimeandattendancedataforthecurrentpayperiodwereexpectedbutnotreceived.Payrolldepartmentstaffareresponsibleforreviewingthereportsandimmediatelynotifyingagenciesthatneedtosubmitorresubmittimeandattendancedata.Iftimeandattendanceinputorotherrelatedinformationisnotavailableonatimelybasis,pay,leave,andotherbenefitsaretemporarilycalculatedbasedoninformationestimatedfrompriorpayperiods.20.4.3ProtectionAgainstInterruptionofOperationsHGA'spoliciesregardingcontinuityofoperationsarederivedfromrequirementsstatedinOMBCircularA-130.HGArequiresvariousorganizationswithinittodevelopcontingencyplans,testthemannually,andestablishappropriateadministrativeandoperationalproceduresforsupportingthem.Theplansmustidentifythefacilities,equipment,suppUes,procedures,andpersonnelneededtoensurereasonablecontinuityofoperationsunderabroadrangeofadversecircumstances.COGContingencyPlanningCOGisresponsiblefordevelopingandmaintainingacontingencyplanthatsetsforththeproceduresandfacilitiestobeusedwhenphysicalplantfailures,naturaldisasters,ormajorequipmentmalfunctionsoccursufficienttodisruptthenormaluseofHGA'sPCs,LAN,server,router,printers,andotherassociatedequipment.Theplanprioritizesapplicationsthatrelyontheseresources,indicatingthosethatshouldbesuspendedifavailableautomatedfianctionsorcapacitiesaretemporarilydegraded.COGpersonnelhaveidentifiedsystemsoftwareandhardwarecomponentsthatarecompatiblewiththoseusedbytwonearbyagencies.HGAhassignedanagreementwiththoseagencies,wherebytheyhavecommittedtoreservingsparecomputationalandstoragecapacitiessufficienttosupportHGA'ssystem-basedoperationsforafewdaysduringanemergency.NocommunicationdevicesornetworkinterfacesmaybeconnectedtoHGA'ssystemswithoutwrittenapprovaloftheCOGManager.TheCOGstaffisresponsibleforinstallingallknownsecurity-relatedsoftwarepatchesinatimelymannerandformaintainingspareorredundantPCs,servers,storagedevices,andLANinterfacestoensurethatatleast100peoplecansimultaneously253 [PDF page 269] V.Example performwordprocessingtasksatalltimes.Toprotectagainstaccidentalcorruptionorlossofdata,COGpersonnelbackuptheLANserver'sdisksontomagnetictapeeverynightandtransportthetapesweeklytoasisteragencyforstorage.HGA'spoliciesalsostipulatethatallPCusersareresponsibleforbackingupweeklyanysignificantdatastoredontheirPC'slocalharddisks.Forthepastseveralyears,COGhasissuedayearlymemorandumremindingPCusersofthisresponsibility.COGalsostronglyencouragesthemtostoresignificantdataontheLANserverinsteadofontheirPC'sharddisksothatsuchdatawillbebackedupautomaticallyduringCOG'sLANserverbackups.Topreventmorelimitedcomputerequipmentmalfunctionsfrominterruptingroutinebusinessoperations,COGmaintainsaninventoryofapproximatelytenfullyequippedsparePC's,aspareLANserver,andseveralsparediskdrivesfortheserver.COGalsokeepsthousandsoffeetofLANcableonhand.IfasegmentoftheLANcablethatrunsthroughtheceilingsandwallsofHGA'sbuildingsfailsorisaccidentallysevered,COGtechnicianswillruntemporaryLANcablingalongthefloorsofhallwaysandoffices,typicallyrestoringservicewithinafewhoursforaslongasneededuntilthecablefailureislocatedandrepaired.ToprotectagainstPCviruscontamination,HGAauthorizesonlySystemAdministratorsapprovedbytheCOGManagertoinstalllicensed,copyrightedPCsoftwarepackagesthatappearontheCOG-approvedlist.PCsoftwareapplicationsaregenerallyinstalledonlyontheserver.(ThesestipulationsarepartofanHGAassurancestrategythatreliesonthequalityoftheengineeringpracticesofvendorstoprovidesoftwarethatisadequatelyrobustandtrustworthy.)OnlytheCOGManagerisauthorizedtoaddpackagestotheapprovedlist.COGproceduresalsostipulatethateverymonthSystemAdministratorsshouldrunvirus-detectionandothersecurity-configurationvalidationutilitiesontheserverand,onaspot-checkbasis,onanumberofPCs.Iftheyfindavirus,theymustimmediatelynotifytheagencyteamthathandlescomputersecurityincidents.COGisalsoresponsibleforreviewingauditlogsgeneratedbytheserver,identifyingauditrecordsindicativeofsecurityviolations,andreportingsuchindicationstotheIncident-HandlingTeam.TheCOGManagerassignsthesedutiestospecificmembersofthestaffandensuresthattheyareimplementedasintended.TheCOGManagerisresponsibleforassessingadversecircumstancesandforprovidingrecommendationstoHGA'sDirector.Basedontheseandothersourcesofinput,theDirectorwilldeterminewhetherthe.circumstancesaredireenoughtomeritactivatingvarioussetsofprocedurescalledforinthecontingencyplan.DivisionContingencyPlanningHGA'sdivisionsalsomustdevelopandmaintaintheirowncontingencyplans.Theplansmust254 [PDF page 270] 20.AssessingandMitigatingtheRiskstoaHypotheticalComputerSystem identifycriticalbusinessfunctions,thesystemresourcesandapplicationsonwhichtheydepend,andthemaximumacceptableperiodsofinterruptionthatthesefunctionscantoleratewithoutsignificantreductioninHGA'sabilitytofulfillitsmission.Theheadofeachdivisionisresponsibleforensuringthatthedivision'scontingencyplanandassociatedsupportactivitiesareadequate.Foreachmajorapplicationusedbymultipledivisions,achiefofasingledivisionmustbedesignatedastheapplicationowner.Thedesignatedofficial(supportedbyhisorherstaff)isresponsibleforaddressingthatapplicationinthecontingencyplanandforcoordinatingwithotherdivisionsthatusetheapplication. IfadivisionreliesexclusivelyoncomputerresourcesmaintainedbyCOG(e.g.,theLAN),itneednotduplicateCOG'scontingencyplan,butisresponsibleforreviewingtheadequacyofthatplan.IfCOG'splandoesnotadequatelyaddressthedivision'sneeds,thedivisionmustcommunicateitsconcernstotheCOGDirector.Ineithersituation,thedivisionmustmakeknownthecriticalityofitsapplicationstotheCOG.IfthedivisionreliesoncomputerresourcesorservicesthatarenotprovidedbyCOG,thedivisionisresponsiblefor(1)developingitsowncontingencyplanor(2)ensuringthatthecontingencyplansofotherorganizations(e.g.,theWANserviceprovider)provideadequateprotectionagainstservicedisruptions.20.4.4ProtectionAgainstDisclosureorBrokerageofInformationHGA'sprotectionagainstinformationdisclosureisbasedonaneed-to-knowpolicyandonpersonnelhiringandscreeningpractices.Theneed-to-knowpolicystatesthattimeandattendanceinformationshouldbemadeaccessibleonlytoHGAemployeesandcontractorswhoseassignedprofessionalresponsibilitiesrequireit.Suchinformationmustbeprotectedagainstaccessfromallotherindividuals,includingotherHGAemployees.Appropriatehiringandscreeningpracticescanlessentheriskthatanuntrustworthyindividualwillbeassignedsuchresponsibilities. Theneed-to-knowpolicyissupportedbyacollectionofphysical,procedural,andautomatedsafeguards,includingthefollowing:•Timeandattendancepaperdocumentsaremustbestoredsecurelywhennotinuse,particularlyduringeveningsandonweekends.Approvedstoragecontainersincludelockedfilecabinetsanddeskdrawers—towhichonlytheownerhasthekeys.Whilestorageinacontainerispreferable,itisalsopermissibletoleavetimeandattendancedocumentsontopofadeskorotherexposedsurfaceinalockedoffice(withtherealizationthattheguardforcehaskeystotheoffice).(Thisisajudgmentlefttolocaldiscretion.)Similarrulesapplytodisclosure-sensitiveinformationstoredonfloppydisksandotherremovablemagneticmedia.•EveryHGAPCisequippedwithakeylockthat,whenlocked,disablesthePC.255 [PDF page 271] V.Example WheninformationisstoredonaPC'slocalharddisk,theusertowhomthatPCwasassignedisexpectedto(1)lockthePCattheconclusionofeachworkdayand(2)locktheofficeinwhichthePCislocated.•TheLANserveroperatingsystem'saccesscontrolsprovideextensivefeaturesforcontrollingaccesstofiles.Theseincludegroup-orientedcontrolsthatallowteamsofuserstobeassignedtonamedgroupsbytheSystemAdministrator.Groupmembersarethenallowedaccesstosensitivefilesnotaccessibletononmembers.Eachusercanbeassignedtoseveralgroupsaccordingtoneedtoknow.(Thereliablefunctioningofthesecontrolsisassumed,perhapsincorrectly,byHGA.)•AllPCusersundergosecurityawarenesstrainingwhenfirstprovidedaccountsontheLANserver.Amongotherthings,thetrainingstressesthenecessityofprotectingpasswords.ItalsoinstructsuserstologofftheserverbeforegoinghomeatnightorbeforeleavingthePCunattendedforperiodsexceedinganhour.20.4.5ProtectionAgainstNetv/ork-RelatedTiireatsHGA'scurrentsetofexternalnetworksafeguardshasonlybeeninplaceforafewmonths.Thebasicapproachistotightlyrestrictthekindsofexternalnetworkinteractionsthatcanoccurbyfunnelingalltraffictoandfromexternalnetworksthroughtwointerfacesthatfilteroutunauthorizedkindsofinteractions.AsindicatedinFigure20.1,thetwointerfacesarethenetworkrouterandtheLANserver.Theonlykindsofinteractionsthattheseinterfacesalloware(1)e-mailand(2)datatransfersfromtheservertothemainframecontrolledbyafewspecialapplications(e.g.,thetimeandattendanceapplication).Figure20.1showsthatthenetworkrouteristheonlydirectinterfacebetweentheLANandtheInternet.Therouterisadedicatedspecial-purposecomputerthattranslatesbetweentheprotocolsandaddressesassociatedwiththeLANandtheInternet.Internetprotocols,unlikethoseusedontheWAN,specifythatpacketsofinformationcomingfromorgoingtotheInternetmustcarryanindicatorofthekindofservicethatisbeingrequestedorusedtoprocesstheinformation.Thismakesitpossiblefortheroutertodistinguishe-mailpacketsfromotherkindsofpackets—forexample,thoseassociatedwitharemotelog-inrequest.''*^TherouterhasbeenconfiguredbyCOGtodiscardallpacketscomingfromorgoingtotheInternet,exceptthoseassociatedwithe-mail.COGpersonnelbelievethattheroutereffectivelyeliminatesInternet-basedattacksonHGAuseraccountsbecauseitdisallowsaUremotelog-insessions,eventhoseaccompaniedbyalegitimatepassword. '"•^Althoughnotdiscussedinthisexample,recognizethattechnical"spoofing"canoccur. 256 [PDF page 272] 20.AssessingandMitigatingtheRiskstoaHypotheticalComputerSystem TheLANserverenforcesasimilartypeofrestrictionfordial-inaccessviathepublic-switchednetwork.Theaccesscontrolsprovidedbytheserver'soperatingsystemhavebeenconfiguredsothatduringdial-insessions,onlythee-mailutilitycanbeexecuted.(HGApolicy,enforcedbyperiodicchecks,prohibitsinstallationofmodemsonPCs,sothataccessmustbethroughtheLANserver.)Inaddition,theserver'saccesscontrolshavebeenconfiguredsothatitsWANinterfacedeviceisaccessibleonlytoprogramsthatpossessaspecialaccess-controlprivilege.OnlytheSystemAdministratorcanassignthisprivilegetoserverprograms,andonlyahandfulofspecial-purposeapplications,likethetimeandattendanceapplication,havebeenassignedthisprivilege. 20.4.6ProtectionAgainstRisksfromNon-HGAComputerSystemsHGAreliesonsystemsandcomponentsthatitcannotcontroldirectlybecausetheyareownedbyotherorganizations.HGAhasdevelopedapolicytoavoidundueriskinsuchsituations.ThepolicystatesthatsystemcomponentscontrolledandoperatedbyorganizationsotherthanHGAmaynotbeusedtoprocess,store,ortransmitHGAinformationwithoutobtainingexplicitpermissionfromtheapplicationownerandtheCOGManager.PermissiontousesuchsystemcomponentsmaynotbegrantedwithoutwrittencommitmentfromthecontrollingorganizationthatHGA'sinformationwillbesafeguardedcommensuratewithitsvalue,asdesignatedbyHGA.ThispolicyissomewhatmitigatedbythefactthatHGAhasdevelopedanissue-specificpolicyontheuseoftheInternet,whichallowsforitsusefore-mailwithoutsideorganizationsandaccesstootherresources(butnotfortransmissionofHGA'sproprietarydata). 20.5VulnerabilitiesReportedbytheRiskAssessmentTeamTheriskassessmentteamfoundthatmanyoftheriskstowhichHGAisexposedstemfrom(1)thefailureofindividualstocomplywithestablishedpoliciesandproceduresor(2)theuseofautomatedmechanismswhoseassuranceisquestionablebecauseofthewaystheyhavebeendeveloped,tested,implemented,used,ormaintained.TheteamalsoidentifiedspecificvulnerabilitiesinHGA'spoliciesandproceduresforprotectingagainstpayrollfraudanderrors,interruptionofoperations,disclosureandbrokeringofconfidentialinformation,andunauthorizedaccesstodatabyoutsiders.20.5.1VulnerabilitiesRelatedtoPayrollFraudFalsifiedTimeSheetsTheprimarysafeguardsagainstfalsifiedtimesheetsarereviewandapprovalbysupervisorypersonnel,whoarenotpermittedtoapprovetheirowntimeandattendancedata.Theriskassessmenthasconcludedthat,whileimperfect,thesesafeguards£ireadequate.Therelatedrequirementthataclerkandasupervisormustcooperatecloselyincreatingtimeandattendance 257 [PDF page 273] V.Example dataandsubmittingthedatatothemainframealsosafeguardsagainstotherkindsofUlicitmanipulationoftimeandattendancedatabyclerksorsupervisorsactingindependently.UnauthorizedAccessWhenaPCuserentersapasswordtotheserverduringI&A,thepasswordissenttotheserverbybroadcastingitovertheLAN"intheclear."ThisallowsthepasswordtobeinterceptedeasilybyanyotherPCconnectedtotheLAN.Infact,so-called"passwordsniffer"programsthatcapturepasswordsinthiswayarewidelyavailable.Similarly,amaliciousprogramplantedonaPCcouldalsointerceptpasswordsbeforetransmittingthemtotheserver.Anunauthorizedindividualwhoobtainedthecapturedpasswordscouldthenrunthetimeandattendanceapplicationinplaceofaclerkorsupervisor.Usersmightalsostorepasswordsinalog-onscriptfile. BogusTimeandAttendanceApplicationsTheserver'saccesscontrolsareprobablyadequateforprotectionagainstbogustimeandattendanceapplicationsthatrunontheserver.However,theserver'soperatingsystemandaccesscontrolshaveonlybeeninwidespreaduseforafewyearsandcontainanumberofsecurity-relatedbugs.Andtheserver'saccesscontrolsareineffectiveifnotproperlyconfigured,andtheadministrationoftheserver'ssecurityfeaturesinthepasthasbeennotablylax. UnauthorizedModificationofTimeandAttendanceDataProtectionagainstunauthorizedmodificationoftimeandattendancedatarequiresavarietyofsafeguardsbecauseeachsystemcomponentonwhichthedataarestoredortransmittedisapotentialsourceofvulnerabilities. First,thetimeandattendancedataareenteredontheserverbyaclerk.Onoccasion,theclerkmaybegindataentrylateintheafternoon,andcompleteitthefollowingmorning,storingitinatemporaryfilebetweenthetwosessions.Onewaytoavoidunauthorizedmodificationistostorethedataonadisketteandlockitupovernight.Afterbeingentered,thedatawillbestoredinanothertemporaryfileuntilreviewedandapprovedbyasupervisor.Thesefiles,nowstoredonthesystem,mustbeprotectedagainsttampering.Asbefore,theserver'saccesscontrols,ifreliableandproperlyconfigured,canprovidesuchprotection(ascandigitalsignatures,asdiscussedlater)inconjunctionwithproperauditing.Second,whentheSupervisorapprovesabatchoftimeandattendancedata,thetimeandattendanceapplicationsendsthedataovertheWANtothemainframe.TheWANisacollectionofcommunicationsequipmentandspecial-purposecomputerscalled"switches"thatactasrelays,routinginformationthroughthenetworkfromsourcetodestination.Eachswitchisapotentialsiteatwhichthetimeandattendancedatamaybefraudulentlymodified.Forexample,anHGAPCusermightbeabletointercepttimeandattendancedataandmodifythedataenroutetothe258 [PDF page 274] 20.AssessingandMitigatingtheRiskstoaHypotheticalComputerSystem payrollapplicationonthemainframe.Opportunitiesincludetamperingwithincompletetimeandattendanceinputfileswhilestoredontheserver,interceptionandtamperingduringWANtransit,ortamperingonarrivaltothemainframepriortoprocessingbythepayrollapplication.Third,onarrivalatthemainframe,thetimeandattendancedataareheldinatemporaryfileonthemainframeuntilthepayrollapplicationisrun.Consequently,themainframe'sI&Aandaccesscontrolsmustprovideacriticalelementofprotectionagainstunauthorizedmodificationofthedata.Accordingtotheriskassessment,theserver'saccesscontrols,withpriorcaveats,probablyprovideacceptableprotectionagainstunauthorizedmodificationofdatastoredontheserver.TheassessmentconcludedthataWAN-basedattackinvolvingcollusionbetweenanemployeeofHGAandanemployeeoftheWANserviceprovider,althoughunlikely,shouldnotbedismissedentirely,especiallysinceHGAhasonlycursoryinformationabouttheserviceprovider'spersonnelsecuritypracticesandnocontractualauthorityoverhowitoperatestheWAN.Thegreatestsourceofvulnerabilities,however,isthemainframe.Althoughitsoperatingsystem'saccesscontrolsarematureandpowerful,itusespassword-basedI&A.ThisisOfparticularconcern,becauseitservesalargenumberoffederalagenciesviaWANconnections.Anumberoftheseagenciesareknowntohavepoorsecurityprograms.Asaresult,onesuchagency'ssystemscouldbepenetrated(e.g.,fromtheInternet)andthenusedinattacksonthemainframeviatheWAN.Infact,timeandattendancedataawaitingprocessingonthemainframewouldprobablynotbeasattractiveatargettoanattackerasotherkindsofdataor,indeed,disablingthesystem,renderingitunavailable.Forexample,anattackermightbeabletomodifytheemployeedatabasesothatitdisbursedpaychecksorpensionscheckstofictitiousemployees.Disclosure-sensitivelawenforcementdatabasesmightalsobeattractivetargets. Theaccesscontrolonthemainframeisstrongandprovidesgoodprotectionagainstintrudersbreakingintoasecondapplicationaftertheyhavebrokenintoafirst.However,previousauditshaveshownthatthedifficultiesofsystemadministrationmaypresentsomeopportunitiesforintruderstodefeataccesscontrols.20.5.2VulnerabilitiesRelatedtoPayrollErrorsHGA'smanagementhasestablishedproceduresforensuringthetimelysubmissionandinteragencycoordinationofpaperworkassociatedwithpersonnelstatuschanges.However,anunacceptablylargenumberoftroublesomepayroUerrorsduringthepastseveralyearshasbeentracedtothelatesubmissionofpersonnelpaperwork.TheriskassessmentdocumentedtheadequacyofHGA'ssafeguards,butcriticizedthemanagersfornotprovidingsufficientincentivesforcompliance. 259 [PDF page 275] V.Example 20.5.3VulnerabilitiesRelatedtoContinuityofOperationsCOGContingencyPlanningTheriskassessmentcommendedHGAformanyaspectsofCOG'scontingencyplan,butpointedoutthatmanyCOGpersonnelwerecompletelyunawareoftheresponsibilitiestheplanassignedtothem.TheassessmentalsonotedthatalthoughHGA'spoliciesrequireannualtestingofcontingencyplans,thecapabilitytoresumeHGA'scomputer-processingactivitiesatanothercooperatingagencyhasneverbeenverifiedandmayturnouttobeillusory. DivisionContingencyPlanningTheriskassessmentreviewedanumberoftheapplication-orientedcontingencyplansdevelopedbyHGA'sdivisions(includingplansrelatedtotimeandattendance).MostoftheplanswerecursoryandattemptedtodelegatenearlyallcontingencyplanningresponsibilitytoCOG.Theassessmentcriticizedseveraloftheseplansforfailingtoaddresspotentialdisruptionscausedbylackofaccessto(1)computerresourcesnotmanagedbyCOGand(2)nonsystemresources,suchasbuildings,phones,andotherfacilities.Inparticular,thecontingencyplanencompassingthetimeandattendanceapplicationwascriticizedfornotaddressingdisruptionscausedbyWANandmainframeoutages.VirusPreventionTheriskassessmentfoundHGA'svirus-preventionpolicyandprocedurestobesound,butnotedthattherewaslittleevidencethattheywerebeingfollowed.Inparticular,noCOGpersonnelinterviewedhadeverrunavirusscanneronaPConaroutinebasis,thoughseveralhadrunthemduringpublicizedvirusscares.Theassessmentcitedthisasasignificantriskitem.AccidentalCorruptionandLossofDataTheriskassessmentconcludedthatHGA'ssafeguardsagainstaccidentalcorruptionandlossoftimeandattendancedatawereadequate,butthatsafeguardsforsomeotherkindsofdatawerenot.TheassessmentincludedaninformalauditofadozenrandomlychosenPCsandPCusersintheagency.ItconcludedthatmanyPCusersstoresignificantdataontheirPC'sharddisks,butdonotbackthemup.Basedonanecdotes,theassessment'sauthorsstatedthatthereappeartohavebeenmanypastincidentsoflossofinformationstoredonPCharddisksandpredictedthatsuchlosseswouldcontinue.20.5.4VulnerabilitiesRelatedtoInformationDisclosure/BrokerageHGAtakesaconservativeapproachtowardprotectinginformationaboutitsemployees.Sinceinformationbrokerageismorelikelytobeathreattolargecollectionsofdata,HGArisk 260 [PDF page 276] 20.AssessingandMitigatingtheRiskstoaHypotheticalComputerSystem assessmentfocusedprimarily,butnotexclusively,onprotectingthemainframe.Theriskassessmentconcludedthatsignificant,avoidableinformationbrokeringvulnerabilitieswerepresent—particularlyduetoHGA'slackofcompliancewithitsownpoliciesandprocedures.Timeandattendancedocumentsweretypicallynotstoredsecurelyafterhours,andfewPCscontainingtimeandattendanceinformationwereroutinelylocked.Worseyet,fewwereroutinelypowereddown,andmanywereleftloggedintotheLANserverovernight.ThesepracticesmakeiteasyforanHGAemployeewanderingthehaUsafterhourstobrowseorcopytimeandattendanceinformationonanotheremployee'sdesk,PCharddisk,orLANserverdirectories. Theriskassessmentpointedoutthatinformationsenttoorretrievedfi"omxtheserverissubjecttoeavesdroppingbyotherPCsontheLAN.TheLANhardwaretransmitsinformationbybroadcastingittoallconnectionpointsontheLANcable.Moreover,informationsenttoorretrievedfromtheserveristransmittedintheclear—thatis,withoutencryption.GiventhewidespreadavailabilityofLAN"sniffer"programs,LANeavesdroppingistrivialforaprospectiveinformationbrokerand,hence,islikelytooccur.Last,theassessmentnotedthatHGA'semployeemasterdatabaseisstoredonthemainframe,whereitmightbeatargetforinformationbrokeringbyemployeesoftheagencythatownsthemainfi"ame.Itmightalsobeatargetforinformationbrokering,fraudulentmodification,orotherillicitactsbyanyoutsiderwhopenetratesthemainframeviaanotherhostontheWAN.20.5.5Network-RelatedVulnerabilitiesTheriskassessmentconcurredwiththegeneralapproachtakenbyHGA,butidentifiedseveralvulnerabilities.Itreiteratedpreviousconcernsaboutthelackofassuranceassociatedwiththeserver'saccesscontrolsandpointedoutthattheseplayacriticalroleinHGA'sapproach.Theassessmentnotedthatthee-mailutilityallowsausertoincludeacopyofanyotherwiseaccessiblefileinanoutgoingmailmessage.IfanattackerdialedintotheserverandsucceededinlogginginasanHGAemployee,theattackercouldusethemailutilitytoexportcopiesofallthefilesaccessibletothatemployee.Infact,copiescouldbemailedtoanyhostontheInternet. TheassessmentalsonotedthattheWANserviceprovidermayrelyonmicrowavestationsorsatellitesasrelaypoints,therebyexposingHGA'sinformationtoeavesdropping.Similarly,anyinformation,includingpasswordsandmailmessages,transmittedduringadial-insessionissubjecttoeavesdropping. 261 [PDF page 277] V.Example 20.6RecommendationsforMitigatingtheIdentifiedVulnerabilitiesThediscussionsinthefollowingsubsectionswerechosentoillustrateabroadsampling'''^ofhandbooktopics.Riskmanagementandsecurityprogrammanagementthemesareintegralthroughout,withparticularemphasisgiventotheselectionofrisk-drivensafeguards.20.6.1MitigatingPayrollFraudVulnerabilitiesToremovethevulnerabilitiesrelatedtopayrollfraud,theriskassessmentteamrecommended''*^theuseofstrongerauthenticationmechanismsbasedonsmarttokenstogenerateone-timepasswordsthatcannotbeusedbyaninterloperforsubsequentsessions.Suchmechanismswouldmakeitverydifficultforoutsiders(e.g.,fromtheInternet)whopenetratesystemsontheWANtousethemtoattackthemainframe.Theauthorsnoted,however,thatthemainframeservesmanydifferentagencies,andHGAhasnoauthorityoverthewaythemainframeisconfiguredandoperated.Thus,thecostsandproceduraldifficultiesofimplementingsuchcontrolswouldbesubstantial.Theassessmentteamalsorecommendedimprovingtheserver'sadministrativeproceduresandthespeedwithwhichsecurity-relatedbugfixesdistributedbythevendorareinstalledontheserver.AfterinputfromCOGsecurityspecialistsandapplicationowners,HGA'smanagersacceptedmostoftheriskassessmentteam'srecommendations.Theydecidedthatsincetheresidualrisksfromthefalsificationoftimesheetswereacceptablylow,nochangesinprocedureswerenecessary.However,theyjudgedtherisksofpayroUfraudduetotheinterceptabilityofLANserverpasswordstobeunacceptablyhigh,andthusdirectedCOGtoinvestigatethecostsandproceduresassociatedwithusingone-timepasswordsforTimeandAttendanceClerksandsupervisorsessionsontheserver.OtherusersperforminglesssensitivetasksontheLANwouldcontinuetousepassword-basedauthentication.WhiletheimmaturityoftheLANserver'saccesscontrolswasjudgedasignificantsourceofrisk,COGwasonlyabletoidentifyoneotherPCLANproductthatwouldbesignificantlybetterinthisrespect.Unfortunately,thisproductwasconsiderablylessfriendlytousersandapplicationdevelopers,andincompatiblewithotherapplicationsusedbyHGA.ThenegativeimpactofchangingPCLANproductswasjudgedtoohighforthepotentialincrementalgaininsecuritybenefits.Consequently,HGAdecidedtoaccepttherisksaccompanyinguseofthecurrentproduct,butdirectedCOGtoimproveitsmonitoringoftheserver'saccesscontrolconfiguration '''^Someofthecontrols,suchasauditingandaccesscontrols,playanimportantroleinmanyareas.Thelimitednatureofthisexample,however,preventsabroaderdiscussion.Notethat,forthesakeofbrevity,theprocessofevaluatingthecost-effectivenessofvarioussecuritycontrolsisnotspecificallydiscussed. 262 [PDF page 278] 20.AssessingandMitigatingtheRiskstoaHypotheticalComputerSystem anditsresponsivenesstovendorsecurityreportsandbugfixes. HGAconcurredthatrisksoffraudduetounauthorizedmodificationoftimeandattendancedataatorintransittothemainframeshouldnotbeacceptedunlessnopracticalsolutionscouldbeidentified.Afterdiscussionswiththemainframe'sowningagency,HGAconcludedthattheowningagencywasunlikelytoadopttheadvancedauthenticationtechniquesadvocatedintheriskassessment.COG,however,proposedanalternativeapproachthatdidnotrequireamajorresourcecommitmentonthepartofthemainframeowner.Thealternativeapproachwouldemploydigitalsignaturesbasedonpublickeycryptographictechniquestodetectunauthorizedmodificationoftimeandattendancedata.Thedatawouldbedigitallysignedbythesupervisorusingaprivatekeypriortotransmissiontothemainframe.Whenthepayrollapplicationprogramwasrunonthemainframe,itwouldusethecorrespondingpublickeytovalidatethecorrespondencebetweenthetimeandattendancedataandthesignature.AnymodificationofthedataduringtransmissionovertheWANorwhileintemporarystorageatthemainframewouldresultinamismatchbetweenthesignatureandthedata.Ifthepayrollapplicationdetectedamismatch,itwouldrejectthedata;HGApersonnelwouldthenbenotifiedandaskedtoreview,sign,andsendthedataagain.Ifthedataandsignaturematched,thepayrollapplicationwouldprocessthetimeandattendancedatanormally.HGA'sdecisiontouseadvancedauthenticationfortimeandattendanceClerksandSupervisorscanbecombinedwithdigitalsignaturesbyusingsmarttokens.Smarttokensareprogrammabledevices,sotheycanbeloadedwithprivatekeysandinstructionsforcomputingdigitalsignatureswithoutburdeningtheuser.Whensupervisorsapproveabatchoftimeandattendancedata,thetimeandattendanceapplicationontheserverwouldinstructthesupervisortoinserttheirtokeninthetokenreader/writerdeviceattachedtothesupervisors'PC.Theapplicationwouldthensendaspecial"hash"(summary)ofthetimeandattendancedatatothetokenviathePC.Thetokenwouldgenerateadigitalsignatureusingitsembeddedsecretkey,andthentransferthesignaturebacktotheserver,againviathePC.Thetimeandattendanceapplicationrunningontheserverwouldappendthesignaturetothedatabeforesendingthedatatothemainframeand,ultimately,thepayrollapplication.Althoughthisapproachdidnotaddressthebroaderproblemsposedbythemainframe'sI&Avulnerabilities,itdoesprovideareliablemeansofdetectingtimeandattendancedatatampering.Inaddition,itprotectsagainstbogustimeandattendancesubmissionsfromsystemsconnectedtotheWANbecauseindividualswholackatimeandattendancesupervisor'ssmarttokenwillbeunabletogeneratevalidsignatures.(Note,however,thattheuseofdigitalsignaturesdoesrequireincreasedadministration,particularlyintheareaofkeymanagement.)Insummary,digitalsignaturesmitigaterisksfromanumberofdifferentkindsofthreats. HGA'smanagementconcludedthatdigitallysigningtimeandattendancedatawasapractical,cost-effectivewayofmitigatingrisks,anddirectedCOGtopursueitsimplementation.(Theyalso263 [PDF page 279] V.Example notedthatitwouldbeusefulastheagencymovedtouseofdigitalsignaturesinotherapplications.)Thisisanexampleofdevelopingandprovidingasolutioninanenvironmentoverwhichnosingleentityhasoverallauthority.20.6.2MitigatingPayrollErrorVulnerabilitiesAfterreviewingtheriskassessment,HGA'smanagementconcludedthattheagency'scurrentsafeguardsagainstpayrollerrorsandagainstaccidentalcorruptionandlossoftimeandattendancedatawereadequate.However,themanagersalsoconcurredwiththeriskassessment'sconclusionsaboutthenecessityforestablishingincentivesforcomplying(andpenaltiesfornotcomplying)withthesesafeguards.TheythustaskedtheDirectorofPersonneltoensuregreatercompliancewithpaperwork-handlingproceduresandtoprovidequarterlycomplianceauditreports.TheynotedthatthedigitalsignaturemechanismHGAplanstouseforfraudprotectioncanalsoprovideprotectionagainstpayrollerrorsduetoaccidentalcorruption.20.6.3MitigatingVulnerabilitiesRelatedtotheContinuityofOperationsTheassessmentrecommendedthatCOGinstituteaprogramofperiodicinternaltrainingandawarenesssessionsforCOGpersonnelhavingcontingencyplanresponsibilities.TheassessmenturgedthatCOGundertakearehearsalduringthenextthreemonthsinwhichselectedpartsoftheplanwouldbeexercised.Therehearsalshouldincludeattemptingtoinitiatesomeaspectofprocessingactivitiesatoneofthedesignatedalternativesites.HGA'smanagementagreedthatadditionalcontingencyplantrainingwasneededforCOGpersonnelandcommitteditselftoitsfirstplanrehearsalwithinthreemonths.Afterashortinvestigation,HGAdivisionsowningapplicationsthatdependontheWANconcludedthatWANoutages,althoughinconvenient,wouldnothaveamajorimpactonHGA.Thisisbecausethefewtime-sensitiveapplicationsthatrequiredWAN-basedcommunicationwiththemainframewereoriginallydesignedtoworkwithmagnetictapeinsteadoftheWAN,andcouldstilloperateinthatmode;hencecourier-deliveredmagnetictapescouldbeusedasanalternativeinputmediumincaseofaWANoutage.Thedivisionsresponsibleforcontingencyplanningfortheseapplicationsagreedtoincorporateintotheircontingencyplansbothdescriptionsoftheseproceduresandotherimprovements.Withrespecttomainframeoutages,HGAdeterminedthatitcouldnoteasilymakearrangementsforasuitablealternativesite.HGAalsoobtainedandexaminedacopyofthemainframefacility'sowncontingencyplan.Afterdetailedstudy,includingreviewbyanoutsideconsultant,HGAconcludedthattheplanhadmajordeficienciesandposedsignificantrisksbecauseofHGA'srelianceonitforpayrollandotherservices.ThiswasbroughttotheattentionoftheDirectorofHGA,who,inaformalmemorandumtotheheadofthemainframe'sowningagency,calledfor(1)ahigh-levelinteragencyreviewoftheplanbyallagenciesthatrelyonthemainframe,and(2)correctiveactiontoremedyanydeficienciesfound.264 [PDF page 280] 20.AssessingandMitigatingtheRiskstoaHypotheticalComputerSystem HGA'smanagementagreedtoimproveadherencetoitsvirus-preventionprocedures.Itagreed(fromthepointofviewoftheentireagency)thatinformationstoredonPCharddisksisfrequentlylost.Itestimated,however,thatthelaborhourslostasaresultwouldamounttolessthanapersonyear—whichHGAmanagementdoesnotconsidertobeunacceptable.Afterreviewingoptionsforreducingthisrisk,HGAconcludedthatitwouldbecheapertoaccepttheassociatedlossthantocommitsignificantresourcesinanattempttoavoidit.COGvolunteered,however,tosetupanautomatedprogramontheLANserverthate-maUsbackupreminderstoallPCusersonceeachquarter.Inaddition,COGagreedtoprovideregularbackupservicesforabout5percentofHGA'sPCs;thesewiUbechosenbyHGA'smanagementbasedontheinformationstoredontheirharddisks. 20.6.4MitigatingThreatsofInformationDisclosure/BrokeringHGAconcurredwiththeriskassessment'sconclusionsaboutitsexposuretoinformation-brokeringrisks,andadoptedmostoftheassociatedrecommendations.TheassessmentrecommendedthatHGAimproveitssecurityawarenesstraining(e.g.,viamandatoryrefreshercourses)andthatitinstitutesomeformofcomplianceaudits.Thetrainingshouldbesuretostressthepenaltiesfornoncompliance.Italsosuggestedinstalling"screenlock"softwareonPCsthatautomaticallylockaPCafteraspecifiedperiodofidletimeinwhichnokeystrokeshavebeenentered;unlockingthescreenrequiresthattheuserenterapasswordorrebootthesystem.TheassessmentrecommendedthatHGAmodifyitsinformation-handlingpoliciessothatemployeeswouldberequiredtostoresomekindsofdisclosure-sensitiveinformationonlyonPClocalharddisks(orfloppies),butnotontheserver.ThiswouldeliminateorreducerisksofLANeavesdropping.Itwasalsorecommendedthatanactivitylogbeinstalledontheserver(andregularlyreviewed).Moreover,itwouldavoidunnecessaryrelianceontheserver'saccess-controlfeatures,whichareofuncertainassurance.Theassessmentnoted,however,thatthisstrategyconflictswiththedesiretostoremostinformationontheserver'sdiskssothatitisbackeduproutinelybyCOGpersonnel.(ThiscouldbeoffsetbyassigningresponsibilityforsomeoneotherthanthePCownertomakebackupcopies.)SincethesecurityhabitsofHGA'sPCusershavegenerallybeenpoor,theassessmentalsorecommendeduseofhard-diskencryptionutilitiestoprotectdisclosure-sensitiveinformationonunattendedPCsfrombrowsingbyunauthorizedindividuals.Also,waystoencryptinformationontheserver'sdiskswouldbestudied.TheassessmentrecommendedthatHGAconductathoroughreviewofthemainframe'ssafeguardsintheserespects,andthatitregularlyreviewthemainframeauditlog,usingaquerypackage,withparticularattentiontorecordsthatdescribeuseraccessestoHGA'semployeemasterdatabase. 265 [PDF page 281] V.Example 20.6.5MitigatingNetwork-RelatedThreatsTheassessmentrecommendedthatHGA:•requirestrongerI&Afordial-inaccessor,alternatively,thatarestrictedversionofthemailutilitybeprovidedfordial-in,whichwouldpreventauserfromincludingfilesinoutgoingmailmessages;•replaceitscurrentmodempoolwithencryptingmodems,andprovideeachdial-inuserwithsuchamodem;and•workwiththemainframeagencytoinstallasimilarencryptioncapabilityforserver-to-mainframecommunicationsovertheWAN.Aswithpreviousriskassessmentrecommendations,HGA'smanagementtaskedCOGtoanalyzethecosts,benefits,andimpactsofaddressingthevulnerabilitiesidentifiedintheriskassessment.HGAeventuallyadoptedsomeoftheriskassessment'srecommendations,whiledecliningothers.Inaddition,HGAdecidedthatitspolicyonhandlingtimeandattendanceinformationneededtobeclarified,strengthened,andelaborated,withthebeliefthatimplementingsuchapolicywouldhelpreducerisksofInternetanddial-ineavesdropping.Thus,HGAdevelopedandissuedarevisedpolicy,statingthatusersareindividuallyresponsibleforensuringthattheydonottransmitdisclosure-sensitiveinformationoutsideofHGA'sfacilitiesviae-mailorothermeans.Italsoprohibitedthemfromexaminingortransmittinge-mailcontainingsuchinformationduringdial-insessionsanddevelopedandpromulgatedpenaltiesfornoncompliance.20.7SummaryThischapterhasillustratedhowmanyoftheconceptsdescribedinpreviouschaptersmightbeappliedinafederalagency.AnintegratedexampleconcerningaHypotheticalGovernmentAgency(HGA)hasbeendiscussedandusedasthebasisforexamininganumberoftheseconcepts.HGA'sdistributedsystemarchitectureanditsusesweredescribed.Thetimeandattendanceapplicationwasconsideredinsomedetail. Forcontext,somenationalandagency-levelpolicieswerereferenced.Detailedoperationalpoliciesandproceduresforcomputersystemswerediscussedandrelatedtothesehigh-levelpolicies.HGAassetsandthreatswereidentified,andadetailedsurveyofselectedsafeguards,vulnerabilities,andriskmitigationactionswerepresented.Thesafeguardsincludedawidevarietyofproceduralandautomatedtechniques,andwereusedtoillustrateissuesofassurance,compliance,securityprogramoversight,andinter-agencycoordination.Asillustrated,effectivecomputersecurityrequirescleardirectionfromuppermanagement. 266 [PDF page 282] 20.AssessingandMitigatingtheRiskstoaHypotheticalComputerSystem Uppermanagementmustassignsecurityresponsibilitiestoorganizationalelementsandindividualsandmustformulateorelaboratethesecuritypoliciesthatbecomethefoundationfortheorganization'ssecurityprogram.Thesepoliciesmustbebasedonanunderstandingoftheorganization'smissionprioritiesandtheassetsandbusinessoperationsnecessarytofulfillthem.Theymustalsobebasedonapragmaticassessmentofthethreatsagainsttheseassetsandoperations.Acriticalelementisassessmentofthreatlikelihoods.Thesearemostaccuratewhenderivedfromhistoricaldata,butmustalsoanticipatetrendsstimulatedbyemergingtechnologies.Agoodsecurityprogramreliesonanintegrated,cost-effectivecollectionofphysical,procedural,andautomatedcontrols.Cost-effectivenessrequirestargetingthesecontrolsatthethreatsthatposethehighestriskswhileacceptingotherresidualrisks.Thedifficultyofapplyingcontrolsproperlyandinaconsistentmannerovertimehasbeenthedownfallofmanysecurityprograms.Thischapterhasprovidednumerousexamplesinwhichmajorsecurityvulnerabilitiesarosefromalackofassuranceorcompliance.Hence,periodiccomplianceaudits,examinationsoftheeffectivenessofcontrols,andreassessmentsofthreatsareessentialtothesuccessofanyorganization'ssecurityprogram. 267 [PDF page 283] [PDF page 284] CrossReferenceandIndex 269 [PDF page 285] InterdependenciesCrossReference Thefollowingisacrossreferenceoftheinterdependenciessections.Notethatthereferencesonlyincludespecificcontrols.Somecontrolswerereferencedingroups,suchastechnicalcontrolsandoccasionallyinterdependencieswerenotedforallcontrols. ControlChaptersWhereItIsCitedPolicyProgramManagementLifeCyclePersonnelAJserContingencyAwarenessandTrainingLogicalAccessAuditProgramManagement RiskManagement PolicyAwarenessandTrainingLifeCycleContingencyIncidentLifeCycleProgramManagementAssuranceAssuranceLifeCycleSupportandOperationsAuditCryptographyPersonnelTrainingandAwarenessSupportandOperationsAccessTrainingandAwarenessPersonnel/UserIncidentSupportandOperations 270 [PDF page 286] CrossReferenceand ContingencyIncidentSupportandOperationsPhysicalandEnvironmentalAuditIncidentContingencySupportandOperationsAuditPhysicalandEnvironmentContingencySupportandOperationsLogicalAccessCryptographySupportandOperationsContingencyIncidentIdentificationandAuthenticationPersonnel/UserPhysicalandEnvironmentalLogicalAccessAuditCryptographyAccessControlsPolicyPersonnel/UserPhysicalandEnvironmentalIdentificationandAuthenticationAuditCryptographyAuditIdentificationandAuthenticationLogicalAccessCryptographyCryptographyIdentificationandAuthentication 271 [PDF page 287] CrossReferenceandIndex GeneralIndex accountmanagement(user)accesscontrollistsaccessmodesacknowledgmentstatementsaccountabilityaccreditationreaccreditationadvancedauthenticationadvanceddevelopmentassetvaluationattacksignatureaudits/auditingauditreductionauthentication,host-basedauthentication,host-to-hostauthenticationserversauthorization(toprocess) 110-12182,189,199-201,203196-7,200111,112,14412,36,39,143,144,159,179,195,2126,66-7,75,80,81-2,89,90-2,94-5,75,83,84,85,96,100181,204,2309361219,22018,51,73,75,81,82,96-9,110,111,112-3,159,195,21121920518918966,81,112Bbastionhostbiometrics204180,186-7Ccertificationself-certificationchallengeresponsechecksummingcoldsiteComputerSecurityActComputerSecurityProgramManagers'Forumconformance-seevalidationconsequenceassessmentconstraineduserinterfacecost-benefitcrackers-seehackers 75,81,85,91,93,9594185,186,18999125,1263,4,7,52-3,71-2,73,76,143,149,50,52,15161201-265-6,78,173-4 272 [PDF page 288] CrossReferenceandIndex Ddatacategorization202DataEncryptionStandard(DES)205,224,23 1 databaseviews202diagnosticport-seemaintenanceaccountsdial-backmodems203digitalsignature-seeelectronicsignatureDigitalSignatureStandard225,23 1 disposition/disposal75,85,86,160,197,235dual-homedgateway204dynamicpasswordgenerator185Eeaseofsafeuseelectromagneticinterceptionseealsoelectronicmonitoringelectronicmonitoringelectronic/digitalsignatureencryptionend-to-endencryptionEscrowedEncryptionStandardespionageevaluations(product)seealsovalidationexport(ofcryptography) 94172171,182,184,185,186,95,99,218,228-30,233140,162,182,188,199,224-7,233233224,225-6,23122,26-894233-4FFederalInformationResourcesManagementRegulation(HRMR)7,46,48,52firewalls-seesecuregatewaysHRST52,139nSSEA151Ggateways-seesecuregatewaysHhackers25-6,97,116,133,135,136,156,162,182,183,186,204HALON169,170hash,secure228,230hotsite 125,126273 [PDF page 289] CrossReferenceandIndex Iindividualaccountability-seeaccountabilityintegritystatementsintegrityverificationinternalcontrolsintrusiondetection J,Kkeys,cryptographicforauthenticationkeyescrowseealsoEscrowedEncryptionStandardkeymanagement(cryptography)keystrokemonitoringLlabelsleastprivilegeliabilitieslikelihoodanalysislinkencryptionMmaintenanceaccountsmaliciouscode(virus,virusscanning,Trojanhorse)monitoring N,Ooperationalassurance0MBCircularA-130 95100,159-60,227-3098,114100,168,213 182225-685,114-5,186,199,232214 159,202-3107-8,109,112,114,1799562-3233 161-227-8,79,95,99,133-5,157,166,204,213,215,23036,67,75,79,82,86,96,99-101,171,182,184,185,186,205,213,214,215 82-3,89,967,48,52,73,76,116,149 passwordcrackerspasswords,one-timepassword-basedaccesscontrolpenetrationtestingpermissionbitsplan,computersecurityprivacypolicy(general)policy,issue-specific 99-100,182185-6,189,230182,19998-9200-1,20353,71-3,98,127,16114,28-9,38,78,92,19612,33-43,49,51,78,144,16137-40,78274 [PDF page 290] CrossReferenceandIndex policy,programpolicy,system-specificportprotectiondevisesprivilegedaccountsproxyhostpublicaccesspublickeycryptographypublickeyinfrastructure 34-7,5140-3,53,78,86,198,204,205,215203-4206204116-7223-30232Q,RRSAreciprocalagreementsredundantsitereliable(architectures,security)responsibilityseealsoaccountabilityroles,role-basedaccessrouters 22512512593,9412-3,15-20107,113-4,195204 Ssafeguardanalysis61screening(personnel)108-9,113,162secretkeycryptography223-9securegateways(firewalls)204-5sensitive(systems,information)4,7,53,71,76sensitivityassessment75,76-7sensitivity(position)107-9,205separationofduties107,109,114,195singlelog-in188-9standards,guidelines,procedures35,48,51,78,93,231systemintegrity6-7,166TTEMPEST-seeelectromagneticinterceptiontheft 23-4,26,166,172tokens(authentication)115,162,174,180-90threatidentification21-29,61Trojanhorse-seemaliciouscodetrusteddevelopment93trustedsystem6,93,94 275 [PDF page 291] CrossReferenceandIndex U,Vuncertaintyanalysis64,67-8virus,virusscanning-seemaliciouscodevalidationtesting93,234variancedetection219vulnerabilityanalysis61-2W,X,Y,Zwarranties95 276 »U.S.GOVERNMENTPRINTINGOFFICE:1995-^04-525/47912 [PDF page 292] ANNOUNCEMENTOFNEWPUBLICATIONSONCOMPUTERSECURITY SuperintendentofDocumentsGovernmentPrintingOfficeWashington,DC20402 DearSir: Pleaseaddmynametotheannouncementlistofnewpublicationstobeissuedintheseries:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologySpecialPublication800-.NameCompanyAddressCityStateZipCode (NotificationkeyN-503) [PDF page 293] [PDF page 294] II ii i. [PDF page 295] [PDF page 296] TechnicalPublicationsPeriodicalJournalofResearchoftheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology—ReportsNISTresearchanddevelopmentinthosedisciplinesofthephysicalandengineeringsciencesinwhichtheInstituteisactive.Theseincludephysics,chemistry,engineering,mathematics,andcomputersciences.Paperscoverabroadrangeofsubjects,withmajoremphasisonmeasurementmethodologyandthebasictechnologyunderlyingstandardization.AlsoincludedfromtimetotimearesurveyarticlesontopicscloselyrelatedtotheInstitute'stechnicalandscientificprograms.Issuedsixtimesayear. NonperiodicalsMonographs—MajorcontributionstothetechnicalliteratureonvarioussubjectsrelatedtotheInstitute'sscientificandtechnicalactivities.Handbooks—Recommendedcodesofengineeringandindustrialpractice(includingsafetycodes)devel-opedincoof)erationwithinterestedindustries,professionalorganizations,andregulatorybodies.SpecialPublications—IncludeproceedingsofconferencessponsoredbyNIST,NISTannualreports,andotherspecialpublicationsappropriatetothisgroupingsuchaswallcharts,pocketcards,andbibliographies.NationalStandardReferenceDataSeries—Providesquantitativedataonthephysicalandchemicalpropertiesofmaterials,compiledfromtheworld'sliteratureandcriticallyevaluated.DevelopedunderaworldwideprogramcoordinatedbyNISTundertheauthorityoftheNationalStandardDataAct(PublicLaw90-396).NOTE:TheJournalofPhysicalandChemicalReferenceData(JPCRD)ispublishedbimonthlyforNISTbytheAmericanChemicalSociety(ACS)andtheAmericanInstituteofPhysics(AIP).Subscriptions,reprints,andsupplementsareavailablefromACS,1155SixteenthSt.,NW,Washington,DC20056.BuildingScienceSeries—DisseminatestechnicalinformationdevelopedattheInstituteonbuildingmaterials,components,systems,andwholestructures.Theseriespresentsresearchresults,testmethods,andperformancecriteriarelatedtothestructuralandenvironmentalfunctionsandthedurabilityandsafetycharacteristicsofbuildingelementsandsystems.TechnicalNotes—Studiesorreportswhicharecompleteinthemselvesbutrestrictiveintheirtreatmentofasubject.Analogoustomonographsbutnotsocomprehensiveinscopeordefinitiveintreatmentofthesubjectarea.OftenserveasavehicleforfinalreportsofworkperformedatNISTunderthesponsorshipofothergovernmentagencies.VoluntaryProductStandards—DevelopedunderprocedurespublishedbytheDepartmentofCommerceinPart10,Title15,oftheCodeofFederalRegulations.Thestandardsestablishnationallyrecognizedrequirementsforproducts,andprovideallconcernedinterestswithabasisforcommonunderstandingofthecharacteristicsoftheproducts.NISTadministersthisprograminsupportoftheeffortsofprivate-sectorstandardizingorganizations.OrderthefollowingNISTpublications—FIPSandNISTIRs—fromtheNationalTechnicalInformationService,Springfield,VA22161.FederalInformationProcessingStandardsPublications(FIPSPUB)—PublicationsinthisseriescollectivelyconstitutetheFederalInformationProcessingStandardsRegister.TheRegisterservesastheofficialsourceofinformationintheFederalGovernmentregardingstandardsissuedbyNISTpursuanttotheFederalPropertyandAdministrativeServicesActof1949asamended.PublicLaw89-306(79Stat. 1127),andasimplementedbyExecutiveOrder11717(38FR12315,datedMay11,1973)andPart6ofTitle15CFR(CodeofFederalRegulations).NISTInteragencyReports(NISTIR)—AspecialseriesofinterimorfinalreportsonworkperformedbyNISTforoutsidesponsors(bothgovernmentandnongovernment).Ingeneral,initialdistributionishandledbythesponsor;publicdistributionisbytheNationalTechnicalInformationService,Springfield,VA22161,inpapercopyormicroficheform. [PDF page 297] (UitaEUIOard Ot/lBo£3 a>—.ot/5--n ONOn00O O001=3CQ 3Z§OOSi