[PDF page 1] Archived NIST Technical Series Publication The attached publication has been archived (withdrawn), and is provided solely for historical purposes. It may have been superseded by another publication (indicated below). Archived Publication Series/Number: Title: Publication Date(s): Withdrawal Date: Withdrawal Note: Superseding Publication(s) The attached publication has been superseded by the following publication(s): Series/Number: Title: Author(s): Publication Date(s): URL/DOI: Additional Information (if applicable) Contact: Latest revision of the attached publication: Related information: Withdrawal announcement (link): Date updated: June Ϯϯ, 2015 NIST Special Publication 800-18 Guide for Developing Security Plans for Information Technology Systems December 1998 February 2006 SP 800-18 is superseded in its entirety by the publication of SP 800-18 Revision 1 (February 2006). NIST Special Publication 800-18 Revision 1 Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems Marianne Swanson, Joan Hash, Pauline Bowen February 2006 http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-18r1 Computer Security Division (Information Technology Lab) SP 800-18 Revision 1 (as of June 19, 2015) http://csrc.nist.gov/ N/A [PDF page 2] NATLINST.OFSTAND&TECHR.I.C. AlllDSbSD711NiSTPUBLICATIONSNISTSpecialPublication800-18 U.S.DEPARTMENTOFCOMMERCETechnologyAdministrationNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystemsMarianneSwansonandFederalComputerSecurityProgramManagers'ForumWorkingGroup COMPUTERSECURITY QC Nisr.U570.800-18998 [PDF page 3] rheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologywasestablishedin1988byCongressto"assistindustryinthedevelopmentoftechnology...neededtoimproveproductquality,tomodernizemanufacturingprocesses,toensureproductreliability...andtofacilitaterapidcommercialization...ofproductsbasedonnewscientificdiscoveries."NIST,originallyfoundedastheNationalBureauofStandardsin1901,workstostrengthenU.S.industry'scompetitiveness;advancescienceandengineering;andimprovepublichealth,safety,andtheenvironment.Oneoftheagency'sbasicfunctionsistodevelop,maintain,andretaincustodyofthenationalstandardsofmeasurement,andprovidethemeansandmethodsforcomparingstandardsusedinscience,engineering,manufacturing,commerce,industry,andeducationwiththestandardsadoptedorrecognizedbytheFederalGovernment.AsanagencyofdieU.S.CommerceDepartment'sTechnologyAdministration,NISTconductsbasicandappliedresearchinthephysicalsciencesandengineering,anddevelopsmeasurementtechniques,testmethods,standards,andrelatedservices.TheInstitutedoesgenericandprecompetitiveworkonnewandadvancedtechnologies.NIST'sresearchfacilitiesarelocatedatGaithersburg,MD20899,andatBoulder,CO80303.Majortechnicaloperatingunitsandtheirprincipalactivitiesarelistedbelow.FormoreinformationcontactthePublicationsandProgramInquiriesDesk,301-975-3058.OfficeoftheDirector•NationalQualityProgram•InternationalandAcademicAffairsTechnologyServices•StandardsServices•TechnologyPartnerships•MeasurementServices•TechnologyInnovation•InformationServicesAdvancedTechnologyProgram•EconomicAssessment•InformationTechnologyandApplications•ChemicalandBiomedicalTechnology•MaterialsandManufacturingTechnology•ElectronicsandPhotonicsTechnologyManufacturingExtensionPartnershipProgram•RegionalPrograms•NationalPrograms•ProgramDevelopmentElectronicsandElectricalEngineeringLaboratory•Microelectronics•LawEnforcementStandards'•Electricity•SemiconductorElectronics•ElectromagneticFields'•ElectromagneticTechnology'•Optoelectronics'ChemicalScienceandTechnologyLaboratory•Biotechnology'PhysicalandChemicalProperties^•AnalyticalChemistry•ProcessMeasurements•SurfaceandMicroanalysisScience PhysicsLaboratory•ElectronandOpticalPhysics•AtomicPhysics•OpticalTechnology•IonizingRadiation•TimeandFrequency'•QuantumPhysics'MaterialsScienceandEngineeringLaboratory•IntelligentProcessingofMaterials•Ceramics•MaterialsReliability'•Polymers•Metallurgy•NISTCenterforNeutronResearchManufacturingEngineeringLaboratory•PrecisionEngineering•AutomatedProductionTechnology•IntelligentSystems•FabricationTechnology•ManufacturingSystemsIntegrationBuildingandFireResearchLaboratory•Structures•BuildingMaterials•BuildingEnvironment•FireSafetyEngineering•FireScienceInformationTechnologyLaboratory•MathematicalandComputationalSciences^•AdvancedNetworkTechnologies•ComputerSecurity•InformationAccessandUserInterfaces•HighPerformanceSystemsandServices•DistributedComputingandInformationServices•SoftwareDiagnosticsandConformanceTesting 'AtBoulder,CO80303.^SomeelementsatBoulder,CO. [PDF page 4] NISTSpecialPublication800-18GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems MarianneSwansonandFederalComputerSecurityProgramManagers'ForumWorkingGroup COMPUTERSECURITY InformationTechnologyLaboratoryNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyGaithersburg,MD20899-0001 December1998 U.S.DepartmentofCommerceWilliamM.Daley,SecretaryTechnologyAdministrationGaryR.Bachula,ActingUnderSecretaryforTechnologyNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyRaymondG.Kammer,Director [PDF page 5] ReportsonComputerSystemsTechnologyTheInformationTechnologyLaboratory(ITL)attheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology(NIST)promotestheU.S.economyandpublicwelfarebyprovidingtechnicalleadershipfortheNation'smeasurementandstandardsinfrastructureforinformationtechnology.ITLdevelopstests,testmethods,referencedata,proofofconceptimplementationsandtechnicalanalysestoadvancethedevelopmentandproductiveuseofinformationtechnology.ITL'sresponsibilitiesincludethedevelopmentoftechnical,phys-ical,administrative,andmanagementstandardsandguidelinesforthecost-effectivesecurityandprivacyofsensitiveunclassifiedinformationinfederalcomputersystems.ThisSpecialPublication800seriesreportsonITL'sresearch,guidance,andoutreacheffortsincomputersecurity,anditscollaborativeactivitieswithindustry,government,andacademicorganizations. NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologySpecialPublication800-18Natl.Inst.Stand.Technol.Spec.Publ.800-18,102pages(Dec.1998)CODEN:NSPUE2 U.S.GOVERNMENTPRINTINGOFFICEWASHINGTON:1998ForsalebytheSuperintendentofDocuments,U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,Washington,DC20402 [PDF page 6] ExecutiveSummaryTheobjectiveofsystemsecurityplanningistoimproveprotectionofinformationtechnology(IT)resources.Allfederalsystemshavesomelevelofsensitivityandrequireprotectionaspartofgoodmanagementpractice.Theprotectionofasystemmustbedocumentedinasystemsecurityplan.ThecompletionofsystemsecurityplansisarequirementoftheOfficeofManagementandBudget(0MB)CircularA-130,"ManagementofFederalhiformationResources,"AppendixIII,"SecurityofFederalAutomatedInformationResources,"andPublicLaw100-235,"ComputerSecurityActof1987."Thepurposeofthesecurityplanistoprovideanoverviewofthesecurityrequirementsofthesystemanddescribethecontrolsinplaceorplarmedformeetingthoserequirements.Thesystemsecurityplanalsodelineatesresponsibilitiesandexpectedbehaviorofallindividualswhoaccessthesystem.Thesecurityplanshouldbeviewedasdocumentationofthestructuredprocessofplanningadequate,cost-effectivesecurityprotectionforasystem.Itshouldreflectinputfromvariousmanagerswithresponsibilitiesconcerningthesystem,includinginformationowners,thesystemoperator,andthesystemsecuritymanager.Additionalinformationmaybeincludedinthebasicplanandthestructureandformatorganizedaccordingtoagencyneeds,solongasthemajorsectionsdescribedinthisdocumentareadequatelycoveredandreadilyidentifiable.Inorderfortheplanstoadequatelyreflecttheprotectionoftheresources,amanagementofficialmustauthorizeasystemtoprocessinformationoroperate.Theauthorizationofasystemtoprocessinformation,grantedbyamanagementofficial,providesanimportantqualitycontrol.Byauthorizingprocessinginasystem,themanageracceptsitsassociatedrisk. Managementauthorizationshouldbebasedonanassessmentofmanagement,operational,andtechnicalcontrols.Sincethesecurityplanestablishesanddocumentsthesecuritycontrols,itshouldformthebasisfortheauthorization,supplementedbymorespecificstudiesasneeded.Inaddition,aperiodicreviewofcontrolsshouldalsocontributetofiitureauthorizations.Re-authorizationshouldoccurpriortoasignificantchangeinprocessing,butatleasteverythreeyears.Itshouldbedonemoreoftenwherethereisahighriskandpotentialmagnitudeofharm. iii [PDF page 7] [PDF page 8] TableofContentsExecutiveSummaryiii1Introduction11.1Background11.2MajorApplicationorGeneralSupportSystemPlans11.3RelationshiptoOtherNISTSecurityDocuments21.4PurposesofSecurityPlans 21.5SecurityPlanResponsibilities31.6RecommendedFormat31.7AdviceandCommentonPlan 41.8Audience41.9OrganizationofDocument42SystemAnalysis52.1SystemBoundaries52.2MultipleSimilarSystems52.3SystemCategory62.3.1MajorApplications62.3.2GeneralSupportSystem73PlanDevelopment—AllSystems93.1PlanControl 93.2SystemIdentification93.2.1SystemName/Title93.2.2ResponsibleOrganization103.2.3InformationContact(s)103.2.4AssignmentofSecurityResponsibility1 1 3.3SystemOperationalStatus1 1 3.4GeneralDescription/Purpose1 1 3.5SystemEnvironment123.6SystemInterconnection/InformationSharing133.7SensitivityofInformationHandled143.7.1Laws,Regulations,andPoliciesAffectingtheSystem143.7.2GeneralDescriptionofSensitivity154ManagementControls194.1RiskAssessmentandManagement194.2ReviewofSecurityControls1 9 4.3RulesofBehavior204.4PlanningforSecurityintheLifeCycle214.4.1InitiationPhase 224.4.2Development/AcquisitionPhase224.4.3ImplementationPhase 234.4.4Operation/MaintenancePhase234.4.5DisposalPhase 244.5AuthorizeProcessing245OperationalControls26 V [PDF page 9] 5.MA.MajorApplication—OperationalControls275.MA.1PersonnelSecurity275.MA.2PhysicalandEnvironmentalProtection285.MA.2.1ExplanationofPhysicalandEnvironmentSecurity285.MA.2.2ComputerRoomExample305.MA.3Production,Input/OutputControls305.MA.4ContingencyPlanning315.MA.5ApplicationSoftwareMaintenanceControls325.MA.6DatahitegrityA/^alidationControls345.MA.7Documentation355.MA.8SecurityAwarenessandTraining366.MAMajorApplication-TechnicalControls376.MA.1IdentificationandAuthentication376.MA.1.1Identification376.MA.1.2Authentication386.MA.2LogicalAccessControls(Authorization/AccessControls)406.MA.3PublicAccessControls446.MA.4AuditTrails-. 455.GSSGeneralSupportSystem—OperationalControls475.GSS.1PersonnelControls475.GSS.2PhysicalandEnvironmentalProtection485.GSS.2.1ExplanationofPhysicalandEnvironmentSecurity485.GSS.2.2ComputerRoomExample505.GSS.3Production,Input/OutputControls505.GSS.4ContingencyPlanning(ContinuityofSupport)515.GSS.5HardwareandSystemSoftwareMaintenanceControls525.GSS.6hitegrityControls545.GSS.7Documentation555.GSS.8SecurityAwarenessandTraining555.GSS.9IncidentResponseCapability566.GSSGeneralSupportSystem-TechnicalControls586.GSS.1IdentificationandAuthentication586.GSS.1.1Identification586.GSS.1.2Authentication596.GSS.2LogicalAccessControls(Authorization/AccessControls)616.GSS.3AuditTrails 65RulesofBehavior-MajorApplicationlARulesofBehavior-GeneralSupportSystemIBTemplate(s)forSecurityPlan ICGlossaryIDReferencesIEIndex IF vi [PDF page 10] Acknowledgments AcknowledgmentsTheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologywouldliketoacknowledgetheFederalComputerSecurityProgramManagers'Forum,anorganizationsponsoredbytheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology.TheForumestablishedaworkinggrouptodevelopaguidelinefordevelopingsecurityplansforallfederalsystems.Thisdocumentevolvedfromthateffort.Themembersoftheworkinggroupareidentifiedbelow.Pleasenotethatsomemembers'affiliationshavechanged;however,bothindividualandagencyareacknowledged.RobertL.Gignilliant(Chairperson)DepartmentofHealth&HumanServicesSadieI.Pitcher(OriginatingAuthor)DepartmentofCommerce,RetiredDanielBartkoDepartmentofStateJudyBloomDepartmentofJusticePaulineBowenFoodandDrugAdministrationMarleneBroadusDepartmentofStateDorisCarterDepartmentofLaborGraceCulverPatentandTrademarkOfficeBrendaDyerDepartmentofJusticeWilliamGillEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyAliceGannonOfficeofFederalHousingEnterpriseOversightJohnHainesDepartmentofInterior W.RonHessNationalInstitutesofHealthMaryStoneHollandDepartmentofStateShermanHowellFederalDepositInsuranceCorporationPhyllisJonesInternalRevenueServiceJohnKurpielGeneralServicesAdministrationSonjaD.MartinAgencyforInternationalDevelopmentFrancisD.McCuskerPatentandTrademarkOfficeDonMcGinnisEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyLouisM.NumkinNuclearRegulatoryCommissionStevePosniakEqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission vii [PDF page 11] LloydReeseDepartmentofVeteransAffairs PhilSibertDepartmentofEnergyCarlSpellacyOfficeofThriftSupervisionJohnTresslerDepartmentofEducation RebeccaVasvaryNationalOceanographicandAtmosphericsAdministrationTimothyM.WootenFarmCreditAdministration BobSargisAdministrationforChildrenandFamiliesSteveSkolochenkoDepartmentofJusticeJosephineM.ThomasSmallBusinessAdministrationTimothyTurnerOfficeofFederalHousingEnterpriseOversightTedI.WellsPatentandTrademarkOffice Liaddition,aspecialthankyouisduetoCynthiaA.Gosewehr,CensusBureau,forsharingtheplanningguidetemplate.Finally,NISTwouldliketothankalltheotherindividualswhocontributedtothiseffort;theirassistancewascriticaltothepreparationofthisdocument. viii [PDF page 12] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems1IntroductionToday'srapidlychangingtechnicalenvironmentrequiresfederalagenciestoadoptaminimumsetofmanagementcontrolstoprotecttheirinformationtechnology(IT)resources.Thesemanagementcontrolsaredirectedatindividualinformationtechnologyusersinordertoreflectthedistributednatureoftoday'stechnology.Technicalandoperationalcontrolssupportmanagementcontrols.Tobeeffective,thesecontrolsallmustinterrelate.Thisdocumentprovidesaguidelineforfederalagenciestofollowwhendevelopingthesecurityplansthatdocumentthemanagement,technical,andoperationalcontrolsforfederalautomatedinformationsystems. 1.1BackgroundThecompletionofsystemsecurityplansisarequirementoftheOfficeofManagementandBudget(0MB)CircularA-130,"ManagementofFederalInformationResources,"AppendixEI,"SecurityofFederalAutomatedhiformationResources,"updatedin1996,andofPublicLaw100-235,"ComputerSecurityActof1987."0MBCircularA-130,AppendixIII,doesnotdistinguishbetweensensitiveandnon-sensitivesystems.Rather,consistentwiththeComputerSecurityActof1987,theCircularrecognizesthatfederalautomatedinformationsystemshavevariedsensitivityandcriticality.Allfederalsystemshavesomelevelofsensitivityandrequireprotectionaspartofgoodmanagementpractice.Thegenericterm"system"isusedinthisdocumenttomeaneitheramajorapplicationorageneralsupportsystem. *1.2MajorApplicationorGeneralSupportSystemPlansAllapplicationsandsystemsmustbecoveredbysystemsecurityplansiftheyarecategorizedasa"majorapplication"or"generalsupportsystem."Specificsecurityplansforotherapplicationsarenotrequiredbecausethesecuritycontrolsforthoseapplicationsorsystemswouldbeprovidedbythegeneralsupportsystemsinwhichtheyoperate.Forexample,adepartment-wideFinancialManagementSystemwouldbeamajorapplicationrequiringitsownsecurityplan.Alocalprogramdesignedtotrackexpendituresagainstanofficebudgetmightnotbeconsideredamajorapplicationandwouldbecoveredbyageneralsupportsystemsecurityplanforanofficeautomationsystemoralocalareanetwork(LAN).Standardcommercialoff-the-shelfsoftware(suchaswordprocessingsoftware,electronicmailsoftware,utilitysoftware,orothergeneral-purposesoftware)wouldnottypicallybeconsideredamajorapplicationandwouldbecoveredbytheplansforthegeneralsupportsystemonwhichtheyareinstalled. 1 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 13] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems1.3RelationshiptoOtherNISTSecurityDocumentsThisdocumentcompletestheNISTtrilogyofITsecurityprogram-levelguidance.TheplanningguideisintendedtobeacompaniontoNISTSpecialPublication800-12,AnIntroductiontoComputerSecurity:TheNISTHandbook(Handbook)andNISTSpecialPublication800-14,GenerallyAcceptedPrinciplesandPracticesforSecuringInformationTechnologySystems(PrinciplesandPractices).TheNISTHandbookcontainsover200pagesofguidanceinsecuringcomputer-basedresources.Thedocumentexplainsimportantconcepts,costconsiderations,andinterrelationshipsofsecuritycontrols.Itprovidesabroadoverviewofcomputersecurityandprovidesthe"why"tomanysecurity-relatedissues.TheHandbookservedasthetemplateforderivingthepracticesrecommendedintheNISTSpecialPublication800-14,GenerallyAcceptedPrinciplesandPracticesforSecuringInformationTechnologySystems.ThePrinciplesandPracticesdocumentprovidesthe"what"shouldbedoneinsecuringITresources.Theprinciplessectioncontainstheintrinsicexpectationsthatmustbemetwhetherthesystemissmall,largeorownedbyagovernmentagencyorbyaprivatecorporation.Thepracticessectionisthenextlevelinthefoundationofthedocument.Thepracticesshowwhatshouldbedonetoenhanceormeasureanexistingcomputersecurityprogramortoaidinthedevelopmentofanewprogram.Thisplanningguidebuildsonthepracticesportioninthisdocument,mostpracticesarefurtherexpandedandinsomecases,excerptsareprovidedforclarity.TheNISTHandbookandthePrinciplesandPracticesdocumentsshouldbereferencedforfurtherinformation.TheNISTHandbookshouldbeusedtoobtainadditionaldetailorexplanationonanyofthecontrolslisted.ThePrinciplesandPracticesdocumentshouldbeusedasareferencetodescribethecontrolsandusedasaguideforreviewingtheplan.EachplanningguidecontrolchaptereasilymapstotheNISTHandbookandthePrinciplesandPracticesdocumentsincethechaptersinallthreedocumentsarelistedunderthesamethreecontrols,i.e.,management,operational,andtechnical.TheNISTHandbookandthePrinciplesandPracticesdocumentscanbeobtainedfromtheNISTComputerSecurityResourceClearinghouseWebsiteattheURL:http://csrc.nist.gov/ 1.4PurposesofSecurityPlansThepurposesofsystemsecurityplansareto: •Provideanoverviewofthesecurityrequirementsofthesystemanddescribethecontrolsinplaceorplannedformeetingthoserequirements;and•Delineateresponsibilitiesandexpectedbehaviorofallindividualswhoaccessthesystem. 2 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 14] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 1.5SecurityPlanResponsibilitiesTheSystemOwner'isresponsibleforensuringthatthesecurityplanispreparedandforimplementingtheplanandmonitoringitseffectiveness.Securityplansshouldreflectinputfromvariousindividualswithresponsibilitiesconcerningthesystem,includingfunctional"endusers,"InformationOwners,^theSystemAdministrator,andtheSystemSecurityManager.Agenciesmayrequirecontractorcompliancewiththisguideasacontractrequirement.Asecurityplanintheformatspecifiedinthisdocumentorinanotheragreeduponformatissuggestedinthosecaseswherevendorsareoperatingasystemundercontracttothefederalgovernment.Inthoseinstanceswhereacontractororotherentity(e.g.,stateorlocalgovernment)operatesasystemthatsupportsafederalfunction,asecurityplanisrequired.0MBCircularA-130requiresasummaryofthesecurityplantobeincorporatedintothestrategicIRMplanrequiredbythePaperworkReductionAct(44U.S.C.Chapter35).Agenciesshoulddeveloppolicyonthesecurityplanningprocess.Securityplansarelivingdocumentsthatrequireperiodicreviews,modifications,andmilestoneorcompletiondatesforplannedcontrols.Proceduresshouldbeinplaceoutliningwhoreviewstheplansandfollowsuponplannedcontrols.Inaddition,proceduresareneededdescribinghowsecurityplanswillbeusedintheauthorizationforprocessingprocess. 1.6RecommendedFormatWhiletheformatinthisguideisrecommended,itisrecognizedthatsomeagencieshavedevelopedplansusingotherformatsthatmeettheA-130requirementsdescribedinthisdocument.Thisdocumentisintendedasguidanceonlyandshouldnotbeconstruedastheonlyformatallowed.Astandardizedapproach,however,notonlymakesthedevelopmentoftheplaneasierbyprovidingexamples,butalsoprovidesabaselinetoreviewplans.Thelevelofdetailincludedwithintheplanshouldbeconsistentwiththecriticalityandvalueofthesystemtotheorganization'smission(i.e.,amoredetailedplanisrequiredforsystemscriticaltotheorganization'smission).Thesecurityplanshouldfiillyidentifyanddescribethecontrolscurrentlyinplaceorplannedforthesystemandshouldincludealistofrulesofbehavior. TheSystemOwnerisresponsiblefordefmingthesystem'soperatingparameters,authorizedfunctions,andsecurityrequirements.Theinformationownerforinformationstoredwithin,processedby,ortransmittedbyasystemmayormaynotbethesameastheSystemOwner.Also,asinglesystemmayutilizeinformationfrommultipleInformationOwners.^ TheInformationOwnerisresponsibleforestablishingtherulesforappropriateuseandprotectionofthesubjectdata/information(rulesofbehavior).TheInformationOvmerretainsthatresponsibilityevenwhenthedata/informationaresharedwithotherorganizations. 3 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 15] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems1.7AdviceandCommentonPlanIndependentadviceandcommentonthesecurityplanshallbesolicitedpriortotheplan'simplementation.Independentadviceandcommentmustbeobtainedfromindividualswithinoroutsidetheorganization,whoarenotresponsibleforthesystem'sdevelopment,implementation,oroperation.Organizationalpolicyshoulddefinewhowillprovidetheindependentadvice.Individualsprovidingadviceandcommentshouldbeindependentofthesystemowner'sreportingchainandshouldhaveadequateknowledgeorexperiencetoensuretheplancontainsappropriateinformationandmeetsorganizationalsecuritypolicyandstandards.Appropriateindividualsmightincludeanorganization'sITSecurityProgramManager,ITmanagersofothersystems,outsidecontractors,orpersonnelfi^omanotherfederalorganization. 1.8AudienceThisguidehastwodistinctuses.ItistobeusedbythoseindividualsresponsibleforITsecurityatthesystemlevelandattheorganizationlevel.Thedocumentisintendedasaguidewhencreatingsecurityplans.Itiswrittenspecificallyforindividualswithlittleornocomputersecurityexpertise.Thedocumentalsocanbeusedasanauditingtoolbyauditors,managers,andITsecurityofficers.Theconceptspresentedaregenericandcanbeappliedtoorganizationsinprivateandpublicsectors. 1.9OrganizationofDocumentChapter1introducesthedocumentandexplainsitsrelationshiptootherNISTguidanceonITsecurity.Chapter2describesthesystemanalysisprocess.Chapter3providesguidanceonthegeneralinformationcontainedinallsecurityplans.Chapter4presentsthemanagementcontrolsthatshouldbeconsidered.Chapter5describestheoperationalcontrolsandChapter6presentsthetechnicalcontrols.Chapter5andChapter6havebeensplitintotwoformats:oneformatformajorapplicationsandanotherformatforgeneralsupportsystems.Differencesbetweentheoperationalandtechnicalcontrolsofmajorapplicationsandgeneralsupportsystemswarrantseparatesections.Theformatsaredepictedby5.MAand6.MAformajorapplicationsand5.GSSand6.GSSforgeneralsupportsystems.AppendixAprovidesanexampleofRulesofBehaviorforamajorapplication.AppendixBprovidesanexampleofRulesofBehaviorforageneralsupportsystem.Toassistthereaderinpreparingtheplanwiththeappropriateformat,AppendixCcontainstwosecurityplantemplates,oneformajorapplicationsandoneforgeneralsupportsystems.AppendixDcontainsaglossaryofterms.Thetermsfoundintheglossaryarehighlightedinthisdocumentthefirsttimeused.AppendixElistsreferencesthatmaybeusefulinpreparingsecurityplansandfinally,anIndexisprovidedforlocatingspecifictopics. 4 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 16] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems2SystemAnalysisOncecompleted,asecurityplanwillcontaintechnicalinformationaboutthesystem,itssecurityrequirements,andthecontrolsimplementedtoprovideprotectionagainstitsrisksandvulnerabilities.Beforetheplancanbedeveloped,adeterminationmustbemadeastowhichtypeofplanisrequiredforasystem.Thissectionwalksthereaderthroughananalysisofthesystemtodeterminetheboundariesofthesystemandthetypeofsystem. 2.1SystemBoundariesDefiningwhatconstitutesa"system"forthepurposesofthisguidelinerequiresananalysisofsystemboundariesandorganizationalresponsibilities.Asystem,asdefinedbythisguideline,isidentifiedbyconstructinglogicalboundariesaroundasetofprocesses,communications,storage,andrelatedresources.Theelementswithintheseboundariesconstituteasinglesystemrequiringasecurityplan.Eachelementofthesystemmust:•Beunderthesamedirectmanagementcontrol;•Havethesamefunctionormissionobjective; •Haveessentiallythesameoperatingcharacteristicsandsecurityneeds;and •Resideinthesamegeneraloperatingenvironment.Allcomponentsofasystemneednotbephysicallyconnected(e.g.,[1]agroupofstand-alonepersonalcomputers(PCs)inanoffice;[2]agroupofPCsplacedinemployees'homesunderdefinedtelecommutingprogramrules;[3]agroupofportablePCsprovidedtoemployeeswhorequiremobilecomputingcapabilityfortheirjobs;and[4]asystemwithmultipleidenticalconfigurationsthatareinstalledinlocationswiththesameenvironmentalandphysicalsafeguards). 2.2MultipleSimilarSystemsAnorganizationmayhavesystemsthatdifferonlyintheresponsibleorganizationorthephysicalenvironmentinwhichtheyarelocated(e.g.,airtrafficcontrolsystems).Insuchinstances,itisappropriateandrecommendedtouseplansthatareidenticalexceptforthoseareasofdifference.Thisapproachprovidesconsistentlevelsofprotectionforsimilarsystems. 5 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 17] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems ExampleforMultipleSimilarSystemsAgeneralsupportsysteminWashington,D.C.,providesdistributedapplicationandtelecommunicationssupportforthreeremotesiteslocatedinCalifornia,Colorado,andAlaska.Aseparatesecurityplanmaybepreparedforeachlocation(atotaloffourplans)orasingleplanmaybepreparedwithabbreviated,subordinateplansforeachremotesite.Specifically,a"masterplan"wouldbedevelopedfortheWashington,D.C.,sitebytheorganizationthathasresponsibilityforsystemdevelopment,operation,andmaintenance.Remotesitesecurityplanswouldbeashorter"systemsiteplan"thatreferencesthesecurityplanfortheWashington,D.C.,system(usingitsuniquenameidentifier)andthatcontainsinformationuniquetothesite(e.g.,physical,environmental,responsibleindividuals,hardware,contingencyplan,riskassessment,authorizationforprocessing,andmilestoneorcompletiondatesforplannedcontrols).Systemplansthatreferencethemasterplanmustalsobelistedinthemasterplanbytheiruniquenameidentifiers. Thisapproachfacilitatesanalysisofthesecurityprovidedtotheentiredistributedsystemandhelpsensurethattherearenoweaksecuritylinks. 2.3SystemCategoryThenextstepistocategorizeeachsystemaseithera"majorapplication"orasa"generalsupportsystem."Allapplicationsshouldbecoveredbyasecurityplan.Theapplicationswilleitherbecoveredindividuallyiftheyhavebeendesignatedasamajorapplicationorwithinthesecurityplanofageneralsupportsystem.Asystemmaybedesignatedasamajorapplicationeventhoughitisalsosupportedbyasystemthathasbeendesignatedasageneralsupportsystem.Forexample,aLANmaybedesignatedageneralsupportsystemandhaveasecurityplan.Theorganization'saccountingsystemmaybedesignatedasamajorapplicationeventhoughitissupportedbythecomputingandcommunicationresourcesoftheLAN.Inthisexample,themajorapplicationrequiresadditionalsecurityrequirementsduetothesensitivityoftheinformationtheapplicationprocesses.Whenasecurityplanisrequiredforamajorapplicationthatissupportedbyageneralsupportsystem,coordinationofbothplansisrequired. 2.3.1MajorApplicationsAllfederalapplicationshavevalueandrequiresomelevelofprotection.Certainapplications,becauseoftheinformationtheycontain,process,ortransmitorbecauseoftheircriticalitytotheorganization'smissions,requirespecialmanagementoversight.Theseapplicationsaremajorapplications. 6 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 18] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystemsAgenciesareexpectedtoexercisemanagementjudgmentindeterminingwhichoftheirappHcationsaremajorapphcationsandtoensurethatthesecurityrequirementsofnon-majorapphcationsarediscussedaspartofthesecurityplanfortheapplicablegeneralsupportsystems.Majorapplicationsaresystemsthatperformclearlydefinedfunctionsforwhichtherearereadilyidentifiablesecurityconsiderationsandneeds(e.g.,anelectronicfundstransfersystem).Amajorapplicationmightcomprisemanyindividualprogramsandhardware,software,andtelecommunicationscomponents.Thesecomponentscanbeasinglesoftwareapplicationoracombinationofhardware/softwarefocusedonsupportingaspecificmission-relatedfunction.Amajorapplicationmayalsoconsistofmultipleindividualapplicationsifallarerelatedtoasinglemissionfunction(e.g.,payrollorpersonnel).Ifasystemisdefinedasamajorapplicationandtheapplicationisrunonanotherorganization'sgeneralsupportsystem:•Notifythesystemownerthattheapplicationiscriticalorcontainssensitiveinformationandprovidespecificsecurityrequirements;•Provideacopyofthemajorapplication'ssecurityplantotheoperatorofthegeneralsupportsystem;•Requestacopyofthesystemsecurityplanofthegeneralsupportsystemandensureitprovidesadequateprotectionfortheapplicationandinformation;and•Includeareferencetothegeneralsupportsystemsecurityplan,includingtheuniquename/identifierinformationinSection3.5,SystemEnvironment. 2.3.2GeneralSupportSystemAgeneralsupportsystemisinterconnectedinformationresourcesunderthesamedirectmanagementcontrolwhichsharescommonfunctionality.Ageneralsupportsystemnormallyincludeshardware,software,information,data,applications,communications,facilities,andpeopleandprovidessupportforavarietyofusersand/orapplications.Ageneralsupportsystem,forexample,canbea: •LANincludingsmartterminalsthatsupportabranchoffice;•Backbone(e.g.,agency-wide);•Communicationsnetwork;•Departmentaldataprocessingcenterincludingitsoperatingsystemandutilities, •Tacticalradionetwork;or•Sharedinformationprocessingserviceorganization. '7 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 19] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems Amajorapplicationcanrunonageneralsupportsystem.Thegeneralsupportsystemplanshouldreferencethemajorapplicationplan(s)inSection3.4,GeneralDescription/Purpose. 8 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 20] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 3PlanDevelopment—AllSystemsTheremainderofthisdocumentguidesthereaderinwritingasecurityplan.Thissectionprovidesandrequiresgeneralinformationthatapphestoallsystems.Note:AtemplateofallsectionscontainedinasecurityplanisprovidedinAppendixC.Thetemplateisseparatedintotwoformats,oneformajorapplicationsandoneforgeneralsupportsystems. 3.1PlanControlAllsecurityplans,ataminimum,shouldbemarked,handled,andcontrolledtothelevelofsensitivitydeterminedbyorganizationalpolicy.Inaddition,allsecurityplansshouldbedatedforeaseoftrackingmodificationsandapprovals.Datingeachpageofasecurityplanmaybeappropriateifupdatesaretobemadethroughchangepages.Allplansbeginwiththefollowingsystemidentificationsection. 3.2SystemIdentificationThefirstsectionoftheplanprovidesbasicidentifyinginformationaboutthesystem.Bothtypesofplansmustcontaingeneraldescriptiveinformationregardingwhoisresponsibleforthesystem,thepurposeofthesystem,andthesensitivitylevelofthesystem. 3.2.1SystemName/TitleTheplanbeginswithlistingthenameandtitleofthesystem/application.Eachsystem/applicationshouldbeassignedauniquename/identifier.Assigningauniqueidentifiertoeachsystemhelpstoensurethatappropriatesecurityrequirementsaremetbasedontheuniquerequirementsforthesystem,andthatallocatedresourcesareappropriatelyapplied.Further,theuseofuniquesystemidentifiersisintegraltotheITsysteminvestmentmodelsandanalysesestablishedundertherequirementsoftheInformationTechnologyManagementReformActof1996(alsoknownastheClinger-CohenAct).Theidentifiercouldbeacombinationofalphabeticandnumericcharactersandcanbeusedincombinationwiththesystem/applicationname.Theuniquename/identifiershouldremainthesamethroughoutthelifeofthesystemtoallowtheorganizationtotrackcompletionofsecurityrequirementsovertime.Note:Ifnouniquename/identifierhasbeenassignedorisnotknown,contactthesecurityorinformationresourcemanagementofficeforassistance. 9 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 21] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 3.2.2ResponsibleOrganizationInthissection,listthefederalorganizationalsub-componentresponsibleforthesystem.Ifastateorlocalgovernmentorcontractorperformsthefunction,identifyboththefederalandotherorganizationanddescribetherelationship.Bespecificabouttheorganizationanddonotabbreviate.Includephysicallocationsandaddresses. DepartmentofFederalGovernmentOfficeoftheSecretaryInformationResourcesManagement14""StreetandConstitutionAvenue,Room1000Washington,DC20000Thissystemismaintainedby:ContractorFirm163MainStreet,Suite202Washington,DC20000 3.2.3InformationContact(s)Listthename,title,organization,andtelephonenumberofoneormorepersonsdesignatedtobethepoint(s)ofcontactforthissystem.Oneofthecontactsgivenshouldbeidentifiedasthesystemowner.Thedesignatedpersonsshouldhavesufficientknowledgeofthesystemtobeabletoprovideadditionalinformationorpointsofcontact,asneeded. ExampleofResponsibleOrganization ExampleInformationContactsMs.JaneSmith(SystemOwner)ABCDivisionChief1111WestStreet,Room222Rockville,MD20852(301)123-4567 Mr.JohnDoeProgramManagerABCDivision1111WestStreet,Room233Rockville,MD20852(301)123-8910 10 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 22] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 3.2.4AssignmentofSecurityResponsibilityAnindividualmustbeassignedresponsibilityinwritingtoensurethattheapplicationorgeneralsupportsystemhasadequatesecurity.Tobeeffective,thisindividualmustbeknowledgeableofthemanagement,operational,andtechnicalcontrolsusedtoprotectthesystem.Includethename,title,andtelephonenumberoftheindividualwhohasbeenassignedresponsibilityforthesecurityofthesystem. ExampleSecurityContactBillSmith,ComputerSpecialistABCDivision,XYZBranch1111WestStreet,Room444Rockville,MD20852(301)123-1213 3.3SystemOperationalStatusIndicateoneormoreofthefollowingforthesystem'soperationalstatus.Ifmorethanonestatusisselected,listwhichpartofthesystemiscoveredundereachstatus. •Operational—thesystemisoperating.•Underdevelopment—thesystemisbeingdesigned,developed,orimplemented. •Undergoingamajormodification—thesystemisundergoingamajorconversionortransition.Ifthesystemisunderdevelopmentorundergoingamajormodification,provideinformationaboutthemethodsusedtoassurethatup-frontsecurityrequirementsareincluded.Includespecificcontrolsintheappropriatesectionsoftheplandependingonwherethesystemisinthesecuritylifecycle. 3.4GeneralDescription/PurposePresentabriefdescription(one-threeparagraphs)ofthefunctionandpurposeofthesystem(e.g.,economicindicator,networksupportforanorganization,businesscensusdataanalysis,cropreportingsupport). 11 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 23] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems Ifthesystemisageneralsupportsystem,listallapplicationssupportedbythegeneralsupportsystem.Specifyiftheapplicationisorisnotamajorapplicationandincludeuniquename/identifiers,whereapplicable.Describeeachapplication'sfunctionandtheinformationprocessed.Includealistofuserorganizations,whethertheyareinternalorexternaltothesystemowner'sorganization,andageneraldescriptionofthetypeofinformationandprocessingprovided.Requestinformationfromtheapplicationowners(andacopyofthesecurityplansformajorapplications)toensuretheirrequirementsaremet. 3.5SystemEnvironmentProvideabrief(one-threeparagraphs)generaldescriptionofthetechnicalsystem.Includeanyenvirormientalortechnicalfactorsthatraisespecialsecurityconcerns,suchas: •ThesystemisconnectedtotheInternet; •Itislocatedinaharshoroverseasenvironment;•Softwareisrapidlyimplemented;•Thesoftwareresidesonanopennetworkusedbythegeneralpublicorwithoverseasaccess;•Theapplicationisprocessedatafacilityoutsideoftheorganization'scontrol;or•Thegeneralsupportmainframehasdial-uplines. ExampleSystemEnvironmentThesystemisphysicallyhousedinagovernment-ownedbuildinglocatedinWashington,D.C.TheentirebuildingisoccupiedbyDepartmentofABCCivilServiceandcontractorpersonnelandisnotopentothegeneralpublic.Thesystemusesmainframehardware.ThesystemconsistsofaBrandX9999supercomputerandaBrandY8888mainframeconfiguration.TheoperatingsystemrunningontheBrandX9999systemisOS-YYYYandontheBrandY8888systemisOS-00001.ThesecuritysoftwareprotectingallsystemresourcesfromthetoplevelsareXYZandPDQ.DOA-XX-0123,acomplex,wide-areacommunicationnetworksystem,providessupporttoclientagenciesnationwide. 12 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 24] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems Describetheprimarycomputingplatform(s)used(e.g.,mainframe,desktop,LANorWideAreaNetwork(WAN).Includeageneraldescriptionoftheprincipalsystemcomponents,includinghardware,software,andcommunicationsresources.Discussthetypeofcommunicationsincluded(e.g.,dedicatedcircuits,dialcircuits,publicdata/voicenetworks,Internet).Describecontrolsusedtoprotectcommunicationlinesintheappropriatesectionsofthesecurityplan.Includeanysecuritysoftwareprotectingthesystemandinformation.Describeingeneraltermsthetypeofsecurityprotectionprovided(e.g.,accesscontroltothecomputingplatformandstoredfilesattheoperatingsystemleveloraccesstodatarecordswithinanapplication).Includeonlycontrolsthathavebeenimplementedorareplanned,ratherthanlistingthecontrolsthatareavailableinthesoftware.Controlsthatareavailable,butnotimplemented,providenoprotection. 3.6SystemInterconnection/InformationSharingSysteminterconnectionisthedirectconnectionofsystemsforthepurposeofsharinginformationresources.Systeminterconnection,ifnotappropriatelyprotected,mayresultinacompromiseofallconnectedsystemsandthedatatheystore,process,ortransmit.Itisimportantthatsystemoperators,informationowners,andmanagementobtainasmuchinformationaspossibleaboutthevulnerabilitiesassociatedwithsysteminterconnectionandinformationsharingandtheincreasedcontrolsrequiredtomitigatethosevulnerabilities.Thesecurityplanforthesystemsoftenservesasamechanismtoeffectthissecurityinformationexchangeandallowsmanagementtomakeinformeddecisionsregardingriskreductionandacceptance.0MBCircularA-130requiresthatwrittenmanagementauthorization(oftenintheformofaMemorandumofUnderstandingorAgreement,)beobtainedpriortoconnectingwithothersystemsand/orsharingsensitivedata/information.Thewrittenauthorizationshalldetailtherulesofbehaviorandcontrolsthatmustbemaintainedbytheinterconnectingsystems.Adescriptionoftherulesforinterconnectingsystemsandforprotectingshareddatamustbeincludedwiththissecurityplan.SeeSection4.3,RulesofBehavior.Inthissection,providethefollowinginformationconcerningtheauthorizationfortheconnectiontoothersystemsorthesharingofinformation: •Listofinterconnectedsystems(includingInternet); •Uniquesystemidentifiers,ifappropriate;•Nameofsystem(s);•Organizationowningtheothersystem(s);•Typeofinterconnection(TCP/IP,Dial,SNA,etc.); 13 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 25] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems •Shortdiscussionofmajorconcernsorconsiderationsindetermininginterconnection(donotrepeatthesystemrulesincludedinSection4.3);•Nameandtitleofauthorizingmanagementofficial(s); •Dateofauthorization;•SystemofRecord,ifapplicable(PrivacyActdata);•Sensitivitylevelofeachsystem; •Interactionamongsystems;and•SecurityconcernsandRulesofBehavioroftheothersystemsthatneedtobeconsideredintheprotectionofthissystem. 3.7SensitivityofInformationHandledThissectionprovidesadescriptionofthetypesofinformationhandledbythesystemandananalysisofthecriticalityoftheinformation.Thesensitivityandcriticalityoftheinformationstoredwithin,processedby,ortransmittedbyasystemprovidesabasisforthevalueofthesystemandisoneofthemajorfactorsinriskmanagement.Thedescriptionwillprovideinformationtoavarietyofusers,including:•Analysts/programmerswhowilluseittohelpdesignappropriatesecuritycontrols;•Internalandexternalauditorsevaluatingsystemsecuritymeasures;and•Managersmakingdecisionsaboutthereasonablenessofsecuritycountermeasures.Thenatureoftheinformationsensitivityandcriticalitymustbedescribedinthissection.Thedescriptionmustcontaininformationonapplicablelaws,regulations,andpoliciesaffectingthesystemandageneraldescriptionofsensitivityasdiscussedbelow. 3.7.1Laws,Regulations,andPoliciesAffectingtheSystemListanylaws,regulations,orpoliciesthatestablishspecificrequirementsforconfidentiality,integrity,oravailabilityofdata/informationinthesystem.TheComputerSecurityActof1987,0MBCircularA-130,andgeneralagencysecurityrequirementsneednotbelistedsincetheymandatesecurityforallsystems.Eachorganizationshoulddecideontheleveloflaws,regulations,andpoliciestoincludeinthesecurityplan.ExamplesmightincludethePrivacyActoraspecificstatuteorregulationconcerningtheinformationprocessed(e.g.,taxorcensusinformation).Ifthesystem 14 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 26] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems processesrecordssubjecttothePrivacyAct,includethenumberandtitleofthePrivacyActsystem(s)ofrecordsandwhetherthesystem(s)areusedforcomputermatchingactivities., SeeAppendixEforreferencetotheNISTComputerSecurityDivision'sComputerSecurityResourceClearinghouse(CSRC)Website.CSRCcontainsinformationonawidevarietyofcomputersecurityresources,includingalistofapplicablelawsandregulations. ExampleApplicableLawsorRegulationsAffectingtheSystemPrivacyActof1974(PL-93-579)PaperworkReductionActof1980asamendedin19950MBCircularA-123 3.7.2GeneralDescriptionofSensitivityBothinformationandinformationsystemshavedistinctlifecycles.Itisimportantthatthedegreeofsensitivityofinformationbeassessedbyconsideringtherequirementsforavailability,integrity,andconfidentialityoftheinformation.Thisprocessshouldoccuratthebeginningoftheinformationsystem'slifecycleandbere-examinedduringeachlifecyclestage.Theintegrationofsecurityconsiderationsearlyinthelifecycleavoidscostlyretrofittingofsafeguards.However,securityrequirementscanbeincorporatedduringanylifecyclestage.Thepurposeofthissectionistoreviewthesystemrequirementsagainsttheneedforavailability,integrity,andconfidentiality.Byperformingthisanalysis,thevalueofthesystemcanbedetermined.Thevalueisoneofthefirstmajorfactorsinriskmanagement.Asystemmayneedprotectionforoneormoreofthefollowingreasons:•ConfidentialityThesystemcontainsinformationthatrequiresprotectionfromunauthorizeddisclosure. ExampleofInformationRequiringProtection—ConfidentialityTimeddisseminationinformation(e.g.,cropreportinformation),personalinformation(coveredbyPrivacyAct),proprietarybusinessinformation(e.g.,businessplans). 15 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 27] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems •IntegrityThesystemcontainsinformationwhichmustbeprotectedfromunauthorized,unanticipated,orunintentionalmodification. ExampleofInformationRequiringProtection—IntegrityCensusinformation,economicindicators,orfinancialtransactionsystems. •AvailabilityThesystemcontainsinformationorprovidesserviceswhichmustbeavailableonatimelybasistomeetmissionrequirementsortoavoidsubstantiallosses. ExampleofInformationRequiringProtection—AvailabilitySystemscriticaltosafety,lifesupport,andhurricaneforecasting. Describe,ingeneralterms,theinformationhandledbythesystemandtheneedforprotectivemeasures.Relatetheinformationhandledtoeachofthethreebasicprotectionrequirementsabove(confidentiality,integrity,andavailability).Includeastatementoftheestimatedriskandmagnitudeofharmresultingfromtheloss,misuse,orunauthorizedaccesstoormodificationofinformationinthesystem.Totheextentpossible,describethisimpactintermsofcost,inabilitytocarryoutmandatedftmctions,timeliness,etc. Foreachofthethreecategories(confidentiality,integrity,andavailability),indicateiftheprotectionrequirementis: •High—acriticalconcernofthesystem;•Medium—animportantconcern,butnotnecessarilyparamountintheorganization'spriorities;or•Low—-someminimallevelorsecurityisrequired,butnottothesamedegreeastheprevioustwocategories. 16 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 28] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems ExamplesofaGeneralProtectionRequirementStatementAhighdegreeofsecurityforthesystemisconsideredmandatorytoprotecttheconfidentiahty,integrity,andavailabiUtyofinformation.Theprotectionrequirementsforallapplicationsarecriticalconcernsforthesystem.orConfidentialityisnotaconcernforthissystemasitcontainsinformationintendedforimmediatereleasetothegeneralpublicconcerningseverestorms.Theintegrityoftheinformation,however,isextremelyimportanttoensurethatthemostaccurateinformationisprovidedtothepublictoallowthemtomakedecisionsaboutthesafetyoftheirfamiliesandproperty.Themostcriticalconcernistoensurethatthesystemisavailableatalltimestoacquire,process,andprovidewarninginformationimmediatelyaboutlife-threateningstorms. ExampleConfidentialityConsiderationsEvaluationCommentHighTheapplicationcontainsproprietarybusinessinformationandotherfinancialinformation,whichifdisclosedtounauthorizedsources,couldcauseunfairadvantageforvendors,contractors,orindividualsandcouldresultinfinanciallossoradverselegalactiontouserorganizations.MediumSecurityrequirementsforassuringconfidentialityareofmoderateimportance.Havingaccesstoonlysmallportionsoftheinformationhaslittlepracticalpurposeandthesatelliteimagerydatadoesnotrevealinformationinvolvingnationalsecurity.LowThemissionofthissystemistoproducelocalweatherforecastinformationthatismadeavailabletothenewsmediaforecastersandthegeneralpublicatalltimes.Noneoftheinformationrequiresprotectionagainstdisclosure. 17 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 29] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems ExampleIntegrityConsiderationsEvaluationCommentHighTheapplicationisafinancialtransactionsystem.UnauthorizedoruninieniionaimoaiiicaiionoiinisinioiiiiaiioncouiQresuiimirauQ,underoroverpaymentsofobligations,fines,orpenaltiesresultingfromlateorinadequatepayments,andlossofpublicconfidence.MediumAssuranceoftheintegrityoftheinformationisrequiredtotheextentthatdestructionoftheinformationwouldrequiresignificantexpenaiiuresoitimeanoeriontoreplace.A.unougncorrupieainformationwouldpresentaninconveniencetothestaff,mostinformation,andallvitalinformation,isbackedupbyeitherpaperdocumentationorondisk.LowThesystemmainlycontainsmessagesandreports.Ifthesemessagesandreportsweremodifiedbyunauthorized,unanticipatedorunintentionalmeans,employeeswoulddetectthemodifications;however,thesemodificationswouldnotbeamajorconcernfortheorganization. ExampleAvailabilityConsiderationsEvaluationCommentHighTheapplicationcontainspersormelandpayrollinformationconcerningemployeesofthevarioususergroups.Unavailabilityofthesystemcouldresultininabilitytomeetpayrollobligationsandcouldcauseworkstoppageandfailureofuserorganizationstomeetcriticalmissionrequirements.Thesystemrequires24-houraccess.MediumInformationavailabilityisofmoderateconcerntothemission.MacintoshandIBMPCavailabilitywouldberequiredwithinthefourtofive-dayrange.Informationbackupsmaintainedatoff-sitestoragewouldbesufficienttocarryonwithlimitedofficetasks.LowThesystemservesprimarilyasaserverfore-mailforthesevenusersofthesystem.ConferencemessagesareduplicatedbetweenSeattleandD.C.servers.Shouldthesystembecomeunavailable,theD.C.userswouldcoimecttotheSeattleserverandcontinuetoworkwithonlythelossofoldmailmessages. 18 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 30] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 4ManagementControlsInthisseetion,describethemanagementcontrolmeasures(inplaceorplanned)thatareintendedtomeettheprotectionrequirementsofthemajorapplicationorgeneralsupportsystem.Managementcontrolsfocusonthemanagementofthecomputersecuritysystemandthemanagementofriskforasystem.Thetypesofcontrolmeasuresshallbeconsistentwiththeneedforprotectionofthemajorapplicationorgeneralsupportsystem.Toaidthereader,abriefexplanationofthevariousmanagementcontrolsisprovided.Formoredetailonmanagementcontrols,seeNISTSpecialPublication800-12,AnIntroductiontoComputerSecurity:TheNISTHandbook. 4.1RiskAssessmentandManagement0MBCircularA-130nolongerrequiresthepreparationofaformalriskanalysis.Itdoes,however,requireanassessmentofriskaspartofarisk-basedapproachtodeterminingadequate,cost-effectivesecurityforasystem.Themethodsusedtoassessthenatureandlevelofrisktothesystemshouldincludeaconsiderationofthemajorfactorsinriskmanagement:thevalueofthesystemorapplication,threats,vulnerabilities,andtheeffectivenessofcurrentorproposedsafeguards.Themethodsusedshouldbedescribedinatleastoneparagraph.Forexample,didtheselectedriskassessmentmethodologyidentifythreats,vulnerabilities,andtheadditionalsecuritymeasuresrequiredtomitigateoreliminatethepotentialthatthosethreats/vuhierabilitiescouldhaveonthesystemoritsassets?Includethedatethatthesystemriskassessmentwasconducted.Statehowtheidentifiedrisksrelatetotherequirementsforconfidentiality,integrity,andavailabilitydeterminedforthesystem.Ifthereisnoriskassessmentforyoursystem,includeamilestonedate(monthandyear)forcompletionoftheriskassessment.Iftheriskassessmentismorethanthreeyearsoldortherehavebeenmajorchangestothesystemorfunctions,includeamilestonedate(monthandyear)forcompletionofaneworupdatedriskassessment.Assessingtherisktoasystemshouldbeanongoingactivitytoensurethatnewthreatsandvulnerabilitiesareidentifiedandappropriatesecuritymeasuresareimplemented. 4.2ReviewofSecurityControls0MBCircularA-130requiresthatatleasteverythreeyearsanindependentreviewofthesecuritycontrolsforeachmajorapplicationbeperformed.Forgeneralsupportsystems,0MBCircularA-130requiresthatthesecuritycontrolsbereviewedbyanindependentauditorselfreviewatleasteverythreeyears.Describethetypeofreviewandfindingsconductedonthegeneralsupportsystemormajorapplicationinthelastthreeyears.Includeinformationaboutthelastindependentauditorreviewofthesystemandwhoconductedthereview.Discussanyfindingsorrecommendationsfromthereviewandincludeinformationconcerningcorrectionofanydeficienciesorcompletionofanyrecommendations.Indicateifthereviewidentifiedadeficiencyreportableunder0MB 19 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 31] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems CircularNo.A-123ortheFederalManagers'FinancialIntegrityActifthereisnoassignmentofsecurityresponsibility,nosecurityplan,ornoauthorizationtoprocessforasystem.Indicateinthissectionifanindependentauditorreviewhasnotbeenconductedonthissystem.Securityreviews,assessments,orevaluationsmaybeconductedonyoursystembyinternalorexternalorganizationsorgroups.Suchreviewsincludeonesconductedonyourfacilityorsitebyphysicalsecurityspecialistsfromothercomponentsofyourorganization,systemaudits,orsecurityprogramreviewsperformedbyyourInspectorGeneral'sstafforcontractors.Thesereviewsmayevaluatethesecurityofthetotalsystemoralogicalsegment/subsystem.Thesystemdescriptions,findings,andrecommendationsfromthesetypesofreviewsmayserveastheindependentreview,ifthereviewisthorough,andmayprovideinformationtosupportyourriskassessmentandriskmanagement.Ifothertypesofsecurityevaluationshavebeenconductedonyoursystem,includeinformationaboutwhoperformedthereview,whenthereviewwasperformed,thepurposeofthereview,thefindings,andtheactionstakenasaresultofthereview.Therevieworauditshouldbeindependentofthemanagerresponsibleforthemajorapplicationorgeneralsupportsystem.Independentauditscanbeinternalorexternalbutshouldbeperformedbyanindividualororganizationfreefrompersonalandexternalfactorswhichcouldimpairtheirindependenceortheirperceivedindependence(e.g.,theydesignedthesystemunderreview).Forsomehigh-risksystemswithrapidlychangingtechnology,threeyearsmaybetoolongandreviewsmayneedtobeconductedmorefrequently.Theobjectiveofthesereviewsistoprovideverificationthatthecontrolsselectedand/orinstalledprovidealevelofprotectioncommensuratewiththeacceptablelevelofriskforthesystem.Thedeterminationthatthelevelofriskisacceptablemustbemaderelativetothesystemrequirementsforconfidentiality,integrity,andavailabilityaswellastheidentifiedthreats.Thesecurityofasystemmaydegradeovertime,asthetechnologychanges,thesystemevolves,orpeopleandprocedureschange.Periodicreviewsprovideassurancethatmanagement,operations,personnel,andtechnicalcontrolsarefunctioningeffectivelyandprovidingadequatelevelsofprotection.Thetypeandrigorofrevieworauditshouldbecommensuratewiththeacceptablelevelofriskthatisestablishedintherulesforthesystemandthelikelihoodoflearningusefrilinformationtoimprovesecurity.Technicaltoolssuchasvirusscanners,vulnerabilityassessmentproducts(whichlookforknownsecurityproblems,configurationerrors,andtheinstallationofthelatesthardware/software"patches"),andpenetrationtestingcanassistintheongoingreviewofsystemsecuritymeasures.Thesetools,however,arenosubstituteforaformalmanagementreviewatleasteverythreeyears. 4.3RulesofBehaviorAttachtherulesofbehaviorforthegeneralsupportsystemormajorapplicationasanappendixandreferencetheappendixnumberinthissection,orinserttherulesintothis 20 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 32] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems section.Asetofrulesofbehaviormustbeestablishedforeachsystem.Thesecurityrequiredbytherulesisonlyasstringentasnecessarytoprovideadequatesecurityforthesystemandtheinformationitcontains.Theacceptablelevelofriskshouldformthebasisfordeterminingtherules.AppendixAcontainsasamplerulesofbehaviorforafinancialsystem,whichiscategorizedasamajorapplication.AppendixBcontainsasamplerulesofbehaviorforalocalareanetwork,whichiscategorizedasageneralsupportsystem.Therulesofbehaviorshouldclearlydelineateresponsibilitiesandexpectedbehaviorofallindividualswithaccesstothesystem.Therulesshouldstatetheconsequencesofinconsistentbehaviorornoncompliance.Therulesshouldbeinwritingandformthebasisforsecurityawarenessandtraining.RulesofBehaviorshallalsoincludeappropriatelimitsoninterconnectionstoothersystemsanddefineserviceprovisionandrestorationpriorities.Theyshouldcoversuchmattersasworkathome,dial-inaccess,connectiontotheInternet,useofcopyrightedworks,unofficialuseofgovernmentequipment,theassignmentandlimitationofsystemprivileges,andindividualaccountability.Rulesshouldreflectadministrativeandtechnicalsecuritycontrolsinthesystem.Forexample,rulesregardingpassworduseshouldbeconsistentwithtechnicalpasswordfeaturesinthesystem.Suchruleswouldalsoincludelimitationsonchanginginformation,searchingdatabases,ordivulginginformation.Rulesofbehaviormaybeenforcedthroughadministrativesanctionsspecificallyrelatedtothesystem(e.g.,lossofsystemprivileges)orthroughmoregeneralsanctionsasareimposedforviolatingotherrulesofconduct.Therulesofbehaviorshouldbemadeavailabletoeveryuserpriortoreceivingauthorizationforaccesstothesystem.Itisrecommendedthattherulescontainasignaturepageforeachusertoacknowledgereceipt. 4.4PlanningforSecurityintheLifeCycleAlthoughacomputersecurityplancanbedevelopedforasystematanypointinthelifecycle,therecommendedapproachistodrawuptheplanatthebeginningofthecomputersystemlifecycle.Itisrecognizedthatinsomecases,thesystemmayatanyonetimebeinseveralphasesofthelifecycle.Forexample,alargehumanresourcessystemmaybeintheoperation/maintenancephase,whiletheolder,batch-oriented,inputsub-systemisbeingreplacedbyanew,distributed,interactiveuserinterface.Inthiscase,thelifecyclephasesforthesystemarethedisposalphase(dataandequipment)relatedtotheretirementofthebatch-orientedtransactionsystem,theinitiationandacquisitionphaseassociatedwiththereplacementinteractiveinputsystem,andtheoperations/maintenancephaseforthebalanceofthesystem.Inthissection,determinewhichphase(s)ofthelifecyclethesystem,orpartsofthesystem,arein.Identifyhowsecurityhasbeenhandledduringtheapplicablelifecyclephase.Listedbelowisadescriptionofeachphaseofthelifecycle,whichincludesquestionsthatwillpromptthereadertoidentifyhowsecurityhasbeenaddressedduringthelifecyclephase(s)thatthemajorapplicationorgeneralsupportsystemisin.There 21 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 33] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems aremanymodelsfortheITsystemlifecyclebutmostcontainfivebasicphases:Initiation,development/acquisition,implementation,operation,anddisposal. 4.4.1InitiationPhaseDuringtheinitiationphase,theneedforasystemisexpressedandthepurposeofthesystemisdocumented.Asensitivityassessmentcanbeperformedwhichlooksatthesensitivityoftheinformationtobeprocessedandthesystemitself.Ifthesystemorpartofthesystemisintheinitiationphase,referencethesensitivityassessmentdescribedinSection3.7,SensitivityofInformationHandled. 4.4.2Development/AcquisitionPhaseDuringthisphase,thesystemisdesigned,purchased,programmed,developed,orotherwiseconstructed.Thisphaseoftenconsistsofotherdefinedcycles,suchasthesystemdevelopmentcycleortheacquisitioncycle.Duringthefirstpartofthedevelopment/acquisitionphase,securityrequirementsshouldbedevelopedatthesametimesystemplannersdefinetherequirementsofthesystem.Theserequirementscanbeexpressedastechnicalfeatures(e.g.,accesscontrols),assurances(e.g.,backgroundchecksforsystemdevelopers),oroperationalpractices(e.g.,awarenessandtraining).Ifthesystemorpartofthesystemisinthisphase,includeageneraldescriptionofanyspecificationsthatwereusedandwhethertheyarebeingmaintained.Amongthequestionsthatshouldbeaddressedarethefollowing:•Duringthesystemdesign,weresecurityrequirementsidentified?•Weretheappropriatesecuritycontrolswithassociatedevaluationandtestproceduresdevelopedbeforetheprocurementaction?•Didthesolicitationdocuments(e.g.,RequestforProposals)includesecurityrequirementsandevaluation/testprocedures?•Didtherequirementspermitupdatingsecurityrequirementsasnewthreats/vulnerabilitiesareidentifiedandasnewtechnologiesareimplemented?•Ifthisisapurchasedcommercialapplicationortheapplicationcontainscommercial,off-the-shelfcomponents,weresecurityrequirementsidentifiedandincludedintheacquisitionspecifications? 22 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 34] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 4.4.3ImplementationPhaseIntheimplementationphase,thesystem'ssecurityfeaturesshouldbeconfiguredandenabled,thesystemshouldbetestedandinstalledorfielded,andthesystemauthorizedforprocessing.(SeeSection4.5,AuthorizeProcessing,foradescriptionofthatrequirement.)Adesignreviewandsystemstestshouldbeperformedpriortoplacingthesystemintooperationtoassurethatitmeetssecurityspecifications.Inaddition,ifnewcontrolsareaddedtotheapplicationorthesupportsystem,additionalacceptancetestsofthosenewcontrolsmustbeperformed.Thisensuresthatnewcontrolsmeetsecurityspecificationsanddonotconflictwithorinvalidateexistingcontrols.Theresultsofthedesignreviewsandsystemtestsshouldbefullydocumented,updatedasnewreviewsortestsareperformed,andmaintainedintheofficialorganizationrecords.Ifthesystemorpartsofthesystemareintheimplementationphase,describewhenandwhoconductedthedesignreviewsandsystemstests.Includeinformationaboutadditionaldesignreviewsandsystemstestsforanynewcontrolsaddedaftertheinitialacceptancetestswerecompleted.Discusswhetherthedocumentationofthesereviewsandtestshavebeenkeptup-to-dateandmaintainedintheorganizationrecords. 4.4.4Operation/MaintenancePhaseDuringthisphase,thesystemperformsitswork.Thesystemisalmostalwaysbeingcontinuouslymodifiedbytheadditionofhardwareandsoftwareandbynumerousotherevents.Ifthesystemisundergoingmodifications,determinewhichphaseofthelifecyclethesystemmodificationsareinanddescribethesecurityactivitiesconductedorplannedforinthatpartofthesystem.Forthesystemintheoperation/maintenancephase,thesecurityplandocumentsthesecurityactivities.Inappropriatesectionsofthissecurityplan,thefollowinghigh-levelitemsshouldbedescribed: •SecurityOperationsandAdministration.Operationofasysteminvolvesmanysecurityactivities.Performingbackups,holdingtrainingclasses,managingcryptographickeys,keepingupwithuseradministrationandaccessprivileges,andupdatingsecuritysoftwarearesomeexamples. •OperationalAssurance.Operationalassuranceexamineswhetherasystemisoperatedaccordingtoitscurrentsecurityrequirements.Thisincludesboththeactionsofpeoplewhooperateorusethesystemandthefunctioningoftechnicalcontrols.Amanagementofficialmustauthorizeinwritingtheuseofthesystembasedonimplementationofitssecurityplan.(SeeSection4.5,AuthorizeProcessingforadescriptionofthatrequirement.)•AuditsandMonitoring.Tomaintainoperationalassurance,organizationsusetwobasicmethods:systemauditsandmonitoring.Thesetermsareusedlooselywithinthecomputersecuritycommunityandoftenoverlap.Asystemauditisaone-timeorperiodiceventtoevaluatesecurity.Monitoringreferstoanongoingactivitythat 23 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 35] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems examineseitherthesystemortheusers,higeneral,themore"real-time"anactivityis,themoreitfallsintothecategoryofmonitoring. 4.4.5DisposalPhaseThedisposalphaseoftheITsystemlifecycleinvolvesthedispositionofinformation,hardware,andsoftware.Ifthesystemorpartofthesystemisattheendofthelifecycle,brieflydescribeinthissectionhowthefollowingitemsaredisposed:•Information.Informationmaybemovedtoanothersystem,archived,discarded,ordestroyed.Whenarchivinginformation,considerthemethodforretrievingtheinformationinthefuture.Whileelectronicinformationisgenerallyeasiertoretrieveandstore,thetechnologyusedtocreatetherecordsmaynotbereadilyavailableintheftiture.Measuresmayalsohavetobetakenforthefutureuseofdatathathasbeenencrypted,suchastakingappropriatestepstoensurethesecurelong-termstorageofcryptographickeys.ItisimportanttoconsiderlegalrequirementsforrecordsretentionwhendisposingofITsystems.Forfederalsystems,systemmanagementofficialsshouldconsultwiththeirofficeresponsibleforretainingandarchivingfederalrecords. •MediaSanitization.Theremovalofinformationfromastoragemedium(suchasaharddiskortape)iscalledsanitization.Differentkindsofsanitizationprovidedifferentlevelsofprotection.Adistinctioncanbemadebetweenclearinginformation(renderingitunrecoverablebykeyboardattack)andpurging(renderinginformationunrecoverableagainstlaboratoryattack).Therearethreegeneralmethodsofpurgingmedia:overwriting,degaussing(formagneticmediaonly),anddestruction. 4.5AuthorizeProcessingTheterm"authorizeprocessing"istheauthorizationgrantedbyamanagementofficialforasystemtoprocessinformation.(Note:Someagenciesrefertothisauthorizationasaccreditation.)Authorizationprovidesaformofqualitycontrolandisrequiredunder0MBCircularA-130.Itforcesmanagersandtechnicalstafftofindthebestfitforsecurity,giventechnicalconstraints,operationalconstraints,andmissionrequirements.Byauthorizingprocessinginasystem,amanageracceptstheriskassociatedwithit.Inthissectionoftheplan,includethedateofauthorization,name,andtitleofmanagementofficial.Ifnotauthorized,providethenameandtitleofmanagerrequestingapprovaltooperateanddateofrequest.Boththesecurityofficialandtheauthorizingmanagementofficialhavesecurityresponsibilities.Thesecurityofficialisclosertotheday-to-dayoperationofthesystemandwilldirect,perform,ormonitorsecuritytasks.Theauthorizingofficialwillnormallyhavegeneralresponsibilityfortheorganizationsupportedbythesystem.Authorizationis 24 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 36] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems notadecisionthatshouldbemadebythesecuritystaff.SomeagencieshaveestablishedthesystemapprovalprocessasaformalaccreditationprocedurewheretheapprovingauthorityistermedtheDesignatedApproving/AccreditationAuthority(DAA).Formalizationofthesystemauthorizationprocessreducesthepotentialthatsystemswillbeplacedintoaproductionenvironmentwithoutappropriatemanagementreview.Managementauthorizationmustbebasedonanassessmentofmanagement,operational,andtechnicalcontrols.Sincethesecurityplanestablishesthesystemprotectionrequirementsanddocumentsthesecuritycontrolsinthesystem,itshouldformthebasisfortheauthorization.Authorizationisusuallysupportedbyatechnicalevaluationand/orsecurityevaluation,riskassessment,contingencyplan,andsignedrulesofbehavior.Note:Someagenciesrefertothetechnicalevaluationand/orsecurityevaluationasacertificationreview.Re-authorizationshouldoccurpriortoasignificantchangeinthesystem,butatleasteverythreeyears.Itshouldbedonemoreoftenwherethereishighriskandpotentialmagnitudeofharm.Belowistheminimumsecuritycontrolsthatmustbeinplacepriortoauthorizingasystemforprocessing.Thelevelofcontrolsshouldbeconsistentwiththelevelofsensitivitythesystemcontains. •Technicaland/orsecurityevaluationcomplete.•Riskassessmentconducted.•Rulesofbehaviorestablishedandsignedbyusers.•Contingencyplandevelopedandtested. •Securityplandeveloped,updated,andreviewed.•Systemmeetsallapplicablefederallaws,regulations,policies,guidelines,andstandards.•hi-placeandplannedsecuritysafeguardsappeartobeadequateandcippropriateforthesystem.•In-placesafeguardsareoperatingasintended. 25 UseforAllSystems [PDF page 37] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems5OperationalControlsBeginninginthischapterandcontinuingthroughChapter6,TechnicalControls,therearetwoformatsandrelatedguidanceprovided:oneformatandrelatedguidanceformajorapplicationsandanothersetforgeneralsupportsystems.Fromthischapteron,thereisenoughofadifferencebetweenthecontrolsforamajorapplicationandageneralsupportsystemtowarrantadivisionbysystemtype.Thesectionnumberingofthesetwochaptersdiffersfromtherestofthedocument.Thetwochaptersarenumberedas5.MAand6.MAforMajorApplication,then5.GSSand6.GSSforGeneralSupportSystem.AtemplateofallsectionscontainedinasecurityplanisprovidedinAppendixC.Thetemplateisseparatedintotwoformats,oneforMajorApplicationsandanotherforGeneralSupportSystems. 26UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 38] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems5.MA.MajorApplication-OperationalControlsTheoperationalcontrolsaddresssecuritymethodsthatfocusonmechanismsthatprimarilyareimplementedandexecutedbypeople(asopposedtosystems).Thesecontrolsareputinplacetoimprovethesecurityofaparticularsystem(orgroupofsystems).Theyoftenrequiretechnicalorspecializedexpertise—andoftenrelyuponmanagementactivitiesaswellastechnicalcontrols.Inthissection,describetheoperationalcontrolmeasures(inplaceorplanned)thatareintendedtomeettheprotectionrequirementsofthemajorapplication. 5.MA.1PersonnelSecurityThegreatestharm/disruptiontoasystemcomesfromtheactionsofindividuals,bothintentionalandunintentional.Alltoooften,systemsexperiencedisruption,damage,loss,orotheradverseimpactduetothewell-intentionedactionsofindividualsauthorizedtouseormaintainasystem(e.g.,theprogrammerwhoinsertsoneminorchange,theninstallstheprogramintotheproductionenvironmentwithouttesting). hithissection,includedetailedinformationaboutthefollowingpersonnelsecuritymeasures.ItisrecommendedthatmostofthesemeasuresbeincludedaspartoftheRulesofBehavior.IftheyareincorporatedintheRulesofBehavior,referencetheapplicablesection. •Haveallpositionsbeenreviewedforsensitivitylevel?Ifallpositionshavenotbeenreviewed,statetheplanneddateforcompletionofpositionsensitivityanalysis. •Astatementastowhetherindividualshavereceivedthebackgroundscreeningappropriateforthepositiontowhichtheyareassigned.Ifallindividualshavenothadappropriatebackgroundscreening,includethedatebywhichsuchscreeningwillbecompleted.•Ifindividualsarepermittedsystemaccesspriortocompletionofappropriatebackgroundscreening,describetheconditionsunderwhichthisisallowedandanycompensatingcontrolstomitigatetheassociatedrisk. •Isuseraccessrestricted(leastprivilege)todatafiles,toprocessingcapability,ortoperipheralsandtypeofaccess(e.g.,read,write,execute,delete)totheminimumnecessarytoperformthejob?•Arecriticalfunctionsdividedamongdifferentindividuals(separationofduties)toensurethatnoindividualhasallnecessaryauthorityorinformationaccesswhichcouldresultinfraudulentactivity?•Isthereaprocessforrequesting,establishing,issuing,andclosinguseraccounts? UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 39] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems•Whatmechanismsareinplaceforholdingusersresponsiblefortheiractions?•Whataretheterminationproceduresforafriendlyterminationandanunfriendlytermination? 5.MA.2PhysicalandEnvironmentalProtectionPhysicalandenvironmentalsecuritycontrolsareimplementedtoprotectthefacilityhousingsystemresources,thesystemresourcesthemselves,andthefacilitiesusedtosupporttheiroperation.Anorganization'sphysicalandenvironmentalsecurityprogramshouldaddressthefollowingseventopicswhichareexplainedbelow.Inthissection,brieflydescribethephysicalandenvironmentalcontrolsinplaceforthemajorapplication 5.MA.2.1ExplanationofPhysicalandEnvironmentSecurityAccessControls.Physicalaccesscontrolsrestricttheentryandexitofpersonnel(andoftenequipmentandmedia)fromanarea,suchasanofficebuilding,suite,datacenter,orroomcontainingalocalareanetwork(LAN)server.Physicalaccesscontrolsshouldaddressnotonlytheareacontainingsystemhardware,butalsolocationsofwiringusedtoconnectelementsofthesystem,supportingservices(suchaselectricpower),backupmedia,andanyotherelementsrequu^edforthesystem'soperation.Itisimportanttoreviewtheeffectivenessofphysicalaccesscontrolsineacharea,bothduringnormalbusinesshoursandatothertimes—particularlywhenanareamaybeunoccupied. FireSafetyFactors.Buildingfiresareaparticularlyimportantsecuritythreatbecauseofthepotentialforcompletedestructionofbothhardwareanddata,therisktohumanlife,andthepervasivenessofthedamage.Smoke,corrosivegases,andhighhumidityfromalocalizedfirecandamagesystemsthroughoutanentirebuilding.Consequently,itisimportanttoevaluatethefiresafetyofbuildingsthathousesystems.FailureofSupportingUtilities.Systemsandthepeoplewhooperatethemneedtohaveareasonablywell-controlledoperatingenvironment.Consequently,failuresofelectricpower,heatingandair-conditioningsystems,water,sewage,andotherutilitieswillusuallycauseaserviceinterruptionandmaydamagehardware.Organizationsshouldensurethattheseutilities,includingtheirmanyelements,functionproperly. StructuralCollapse.Organizationsshouldbeawarethatabuildingmaybesubjectedtoaloadgreaterthanitcansupport.Mostcommonlythisresultsfromanearthquake,asnowloadontheroofbeyonddesigncriteria,anexplosionthatdisplacesorcutsstructuralmembers,orafirethatweakensstructuralmembers.PlumbingLeaks.Whileplumbingleaksdonotoccureveryday,theycanbeseriouslydisruptive.Anorganizationshouldknowthelocationofplumbinglinesthatmight 28UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 40] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystemsendangersystemhardwareandtakestepstoreducerisk(e.g.,movinghardware,relocatingplumbinglines,andidentifyingshutoffvalves.)InterceptionofData.Dependingonthetypeofdataasystemprocesses,theremaybeasignificantriskifthedataisintercepted.Organizationsshouldbeawarethattherearethreeroutesofdatainterception:directobservation,interceptionofdatatransmission,andelectromagneticinterception.MobileandPortableSystems.Theanalysisandmanagementofriskusuallyhastobemodifiedifasystemisinstalledinavehicleorisportable,suchasalaptopcomputer.Thesysteminavehiclewillsharetherisksofthevehicle,includingaccidentsandtheft,aswellasregionalandlocalrisks.Organizationsshould:•Securelystorelaptopcomputerswhentheyarenotinuse;and•Encryptdatafilesonstoredmedia,whencost-effective,asaprecautionagainstdisclosureofinformationifalaptopcomputerislostorstolen. 29UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 41] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems5.MA.2.2ComputerRoomExampleAppropriateandadequatecontrolswillvarydependingontheindividualsystemrequirements.Theexamplelistshowsthetypesofcontrolsforanapplicationresidingonasysteminacomputerroom.Thelistisnotintendedtobeall-inclusiveortoimplythatallsystemsshouldhaveallcontrolslisted. ExamplePhysical/EnvironmentalControlsForComputerRoomInPlaceCardkeysforbuildingandwork-areaentrancesTwenty-fourhourguardsatallentrances/exitsCipherlockoncomputerroomdoorRaisedfloorincomputerroomDedicatedcoolingsystemHumidifierintapelibraryEmergencylightingincomputerroomFourfireextinguishersratedforelectricalfiresOneB/C-ratedfireextinguisherSmoke,water,andheatdetectorsEmergencypower-offswitchbyexitdoorSurgesuppressorEmergencyreplacementserverZoneddrypipesprinklersystemUninterruptablepowersupplyforLANserversPowerstrips/suppressorsforperipheralsPowerstrips/suppressorsforcomputersControlledaccesstofileserverroomPlannedPlasticsheetsforwaterprotection,August1999Closed-circuittelevisionmonitors,January2000 5.MA.3Production,Input/OutputControlsInthissection,provideasynopsisoftheproceduresinplacethatsupporttheoperationsoftheapplication.Belowisasamplingoftopicsthatshouldbereported. •Usersupport.Isthereahelpdeskorgroupthatoffersadviceandcanrespondtosecurityincidentsinatimelymanner?Arethereproceduresinplacedocumenting 30UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 42] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystemshowtorecognize,handle,andreportincidentsand/orproblems?AdditionalquestionsareprovidedinSection5.GSS.8,hicidentResponseCapability.•Procedurestoensureunauthorizedindividualscannotread,copy,alter,orstealprintedorelectronicinformation. •Proceduresforensuringthatonlyauthorizeduserspickup,receive,ordeliverinputandoutputinformationandmedia.•Audittrailsforreceiptofsensitiveinputs/outputs.•Proceduresforrestrictingaccesstooutputproducts.•Proceduresandcontrolsusedfortransportingormailingmediaorprintedoutput.•hitemal/extemallabelingforappropriatesensitivity(e.g..PrivacyAct,Proprietary).•Externallabelingwithspecialhandlinginstructions(e.g.,log/inventoryidentifiers,controlledaccess,specialstorageinstructions,releaseordestructiondates).•Audittrailsforinventorymanagement. •Mediastoragevaultorlibraryphysicalandenvironmentalprotectioncontrolsandprocedures. •Proceduresforsanitizingelectronicmediaforreuse(e.g.,overwriteordegaussingofelectronicmedia). •Proceduresforcontrolledstorage,handling,ordestructionofspoiledmediaormediathatcannotbeeffectivelysanitizedforreuse.•Proceduresforshreddingorotherdestructivemeasuresforhardcopymediawhennolongerrequired. 5.MA.4ContingencyPlanningProceduresarerequiredthatwillpermittheorganizationtocontinueessentialfunctionsifinformationtechnologysupportisinterrupted.Theseprocedures(contingencyplans,businessinterruptionplans,andcontinuityofoperationsplans)shouldbecoordinatedwiththebackup,contingency,andrecoveryplansofanygeneralsupportsystems,includingnetworksusedbytheapplication.Thecontingencyplansshouldensurethatinterfacingsystemsareidentifiedandcontingency/disasterplanningcoordinated.Brieflydescribetheprocedures(contingencyplan)thatwouldbefollowedtoensuretheapplicationcontinuestobeprocessedifthesupportingITsystemswereunavailableand 31UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 43] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystemsprovidethedetailedplansasanattachment.Includeconsiderationofthefollowingquestionsinthisdescription: •Aretestedcontingencyplansinplacetopermitcontinuityofmission-criticalfunctionsintheeventofacatastrophicevent?•AretesteddisasterrecoveryplansinplaceforallsupportingITsystemsandnetworks?•Areformalwrittenemergencyoperatingprocedurespostedorlocatedtofacilitatetheiruseinemergencysituations? •Howoftenarecontingency,disaster,andemergencyplanstested? •Areallemployeestrainedintheirrolesandresponsibilitiesrelativetotheemergency,disaster,andcontingencyplans?Includedescriptionsofthefollowingcontrols:•Anyagreementsforbackupprocessing(e.g.,hotsitecontractwithacommercialserviceprovider).•Documentedbackupproceduresincludingfrequency(daily,weekly,monthly)andscope(fijUbackup,incrementalbackup,anddifferentialbackup).•Locationofstoredbackups(off-siteoron-site). •Generationsofbackupskept.•Coverageofbackupprocedures,e.g.,whatisbeingbackedup. 5.MA.5ApplicationSoftwareMaintenanceControlsThesecontrolsareusedtomonitortheinstallationof,andupdatesto,applicationsoftwaretoensurethatthesoftwarefiinctionsasexpectedandthatahistoricalrecordismaintainedofapplicationchanges.Thishelpsensurethatonlyauthorizedsoftwareisinstalledonthesystem.Suchcontrolsmayincludeasoftwareconfigurationpolicythatgrantsmanagerialapproval(re-authorizeprocessing)tomodificationsandrequiresthatchangesbedocumented.Othercontrolsincludeproductsandproceduresusedinauditingfororpreventingillegaluseofsharewareorcopyrightedsoftware.Softwaremaintenanceproceduresmayalsobetermedversioncontrol,changemanagement,orconfigurationmanagement.Thefollowingquestionsareexamplesofitemsthatshouldbeaddressedinrespondingtothissection: 32UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 44] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems•Wastheapplicationsoftwaredevelopedin-houseorundercontract?•Doesthegovernmentownthesoftware?•Wastheapplicationsoftwarereceivedft-omanotherfederalagencywiththeunderstandingthatitisfederalgovernmentproperty? •Istheapplicationsoftwareacopyrightedcommercialoff-the-selfproductorshareware?•Ifacopyrightedcommercialoff-the-selfproduct(orshareware),weresufficientlicensedcopiesofthesoftwarepurchasedforallofthesystemsonwhichthisapplicationwillbeprocessed?•Isthereaformalchangecontrolprocessinplacefortheapplication,andifso,doesitrequirethatallchangestotheapplicationsoftwarebetestedandapprovedbeforebeingputintoproduction?•Aretestdata"live"dataormade-updata? •Areallchangestotheapplicationsoftwaredocumented?•Havetrapdoor"hotkeys"beenactivatedforemergencydatarepairs?•Aretestresultsdocumented?•Howareemergencyfixeshandled?•Arethereorganizationalpoliciesagainstillegaluseofcopyrightedsoftwareorshareware?•Areperiodicauditsconductedofusers'computers(PCs)toensureonlylegallicensedcopiesofsoftwareareinstalled?•Whatproductsandproceduresareusedtoprotectagainstillegaluseofsoftware? •Aresoftwarewarrantiesmanagedtominimizethecostofupgradesandcost-reimbursementorreplacementfordeficiencies? 33UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 45] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems5.MA.6DataIntegrityalidationControlsDataintegritycontrolsareusedtoprotectdatafromaccidentalormaliciousalterationordestructionandtoprovideassurancetotheuserthattheinformationmeetsexpectationsaboutitsqualityandthatithasnotbeenaltered.Validationcontrolsrefertotestsandevaluationsusedtodeterminecompliancewithsecurityspecificationsandrequirements.hithissection,describeanycontrolsthatprovideassurancetousersthattheinformationhasnotbeenalteredandthatthesystemfunctionsasexpected.Thefollowingquestionsareexamplesofsomeofthecontrolsthatfitinthiscategory: •Isvirusdetectionandeliminationsoftwareinstalled?Ifso,arethereproceduresfor: >Updatingvirussignaturefiles; >Automaticand/ormanualvirusscans(automaticscanonnetworklog-in,automaticscanonclient/serverpoweron,automaticscanondisketteinsertion,automaticscanondownloadfromanunprotectedsourcesuchastheInternet,scanformacroviruses);and>Viruseradicationandreporting? •Arereconciliationroutinesusedbythesystem,i.e.,checksums,hashtotals,recordcounts?Includeadescriptionoftheactionstakentoresolveanydiscrepancies.•Arepasswordcrackers/checkersused?•Areintegrityverificationprogramsusedbyapplicationstolookforevidenceofdatatampering,errors,andomissions?Techniquesincludeconsistencyandreasonablenesschecksandvalidationduringdataentryandprocessing.Describetheintegritycontrolsusedwithinthesystem. •Areintrusiondetectiontoolsinstalledonthesystem?Describewherethetool(s)areplaced,thetypeofprocessesdetected/reported,andtheproceduresforhandlingintrusions.(ReferenceSection5.MA.3Production,Input/OutputControlsiftheproceduresforhandlingintrusionsarealreadydescribed.) •Issystemperformancemonitoringusedtoanalyzesystemperformancelogsinrealtimetolookforavailabilityproblems,includingactiveattacks,andsystemandnetworkslowdownsandcrashes?•Ispenetrationtestingperformedonthesystem?Ifso,whatproceduresareinplacetoensuretheyareconductedappropriately?•Ismessageauthenticationusedintheapplicationtoensurethatthesenderofamessageisknownandthatthemessagehasnotbeenalteredduringtransmission? 34UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 46] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystemsStatewhethermessageauthenticationhasbeendeterminedtobeappropriateforyoursystem.Ifso,describethemethodology. 5.MA.7DocumentationDocumentationisasecuritycontrolinthatitexplainshowsoftware/hardwareistobeusedandformalizessecurityandoperationalproceduresspecifictothesystem.Documentationforasystemincludesdescriptionsofthehardwareandsoftware,policies,standards,procedures,andapprovalsrelatedtoautomatedinformationsystemsecurityintheapplicationandthesupportsystem(s)onwhichitisprocessed,toincludebaciaxpandcontingencyactivities,aswellasdescriptionsofuserandoperatorprocedures.Documentationshouldbecoordinatedwiththegeneralsupportsystemand/ornetworkmanager(s)toensurethatadequateapplicationandinstallationdocumentationaremaintainedtoprovidecontinuityofoperationsListthedocumentationmaintainedfortheapplication.Theexamplelistisprovidedtoshowthetypeofdocumentationthatwouldnormallybemaintainedforasystemandisnotintendedtobeallinclusiveorimplythatallsystemsshouldhaveallitemslisted. ExampleDocumentationforMajorApplication -Vendor-supplieddocumentationofhardware-Vendor-supplieddocumentationofsoftware-Applicationrequirements-Applicationsecurityplan-Generalsupportsystem(s)securityplan(s)-Applicationprogramdocumentationandspecifications-Testingproceduresandresults-Standardoperatingprocedures-Emergencyprocedures-Contingencyplans-Memorandaofunderstandingwithinterfacingsystems-Disasterrecoveryplans-Userrulesofbehavior-Usermanuals-Riskassessment-Backupprocedures-Authorizeprocessingdocumentsandstatement 35UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 47] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 5.MA.8SecurityAwarenessandTrainingTheComputerSecurityActrequiresfederalagenciestoprovideforthemandatoryperiodictrainingincomputersecurityawarenessandacceptedcomputersecuritypracticesforallemployeeswhoareinvolvedwiththemanagement,use,oroperationofafederalcomputersystemwithinorunderthesupervisionofthefederalagency.Thisincludescontractorsaswellasemployeesoftheagency.0MBCircularA-130,AppendixIII,issuedin1996,enforcessuchmandatorytrainingbyrequiringitscompletionpriortograntingaccesstothesystemandthroughperiodicrefreshertrainingforcontinuedaccess.Therefore,eachusermustbeversedinacceptablerulesofbehaviorfortheapplicationbeforebeingallowedaccesstothesystem.Thetrainingprogramshouldalsoinformtheuseronhowtogethelpwhenhavingdifficultyusingthesystemandproceduresforreportingsecurityincidents.Accessprovidedtomembersofthepublicshouldbeconstrainedbycontrolsintheapplications,andtrainingshouldbewithinthecontextofthosecontrolsandmayconsistonlyofnotificationatthetimeofaccess.hicludeinthissectionoftheplaninformationaboutthefollowing: •Theawarenessprogramfortheapplication(posters,booklets,andtrinkets). •Thetypeandfrequencyofapplication-specifictrainingprovidedtoemployeesandcontractorpersonnel(seminars,workshops,formalclassroom,focusgroups,role-basedtraining,andon-the-jobtraining). •Thetypeandfrequencyofgeneralsupportsystemtrainingprovidedtoemployeesandcontractorpersonnel(seminars,workshops,formalclassroom,focusgroups,role-basedtraining,andon-the-jobtraining). •Theproceduresforassuringthatemployeesandcontractorpersonnelhavebeenprovidedadequatetraining.Note:Contractoremployeesarerequiredtoreceivethesamelevelofautomatedinformationsystemssecurityawarenessandtrainingasfederalemployees.Thistrainingrequirementshouldbeincludedasappropriateinallcontracts. 36UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 48] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems6.MAMajorApplication-TechnicalControlsTechnicalcontrolsfocusonsecuritycontrolsthatthecomputersystemexecutes.Thecontrolscanprovideautomatedprotectionfromunauthorizedaccessormisuse,facilitatedetectionofsecurityviolations,andsupportsecurityrequirementsforapplicationsanddata.Theimplementationoftechnicalcontrols,however,alwaysrequiressignificantoperationalconsiderationsandshouldbeconsistentwiththemanagementofsecuritywithintheorganization.Inthissection,describethetechnicalcontrolmeasures(inplaceorplanned)thatareintendedtomeettheprotectionrequirementsofthemajorapplication. 6.MA.1IdentificationandAuthenticationIdentificationandAuthenticationisatechnicalmeasurethatpreventsunauthorizedpeople(orunauthorizedprocesses)fromenteringanITsystem.Accesscontrolusuallyrequiresthatthesystembeabletoidentifyanddifferentiateamongusers.Forexample,accesscontrolisoftenbasedonleastprivilege,whichreferstothegrantingtousersofonlythoseaccessesminimallyrequiredtoperformtheirduties.UseraccountabilityrequiresthelinkingofactivitiesonanITsystemtospecificindividualsand,therefore,requiresthesystemtoidentifyusers. 6.MA.1.1IdentificationIdentificationisthemeansbywhichauserprovidesaclaimedidentitytothesystem.ThemostcommonformofidentificationistheuserID.Inthissectionoftheplan,brieflydescribehowthemajorapplicationidentifiesaccesstothesystemUniqueIdentification.Anorganizationshouldrequireuserstoidentifythemselvesuniquelybeforebeingallowedtoperformanyactionsonthesystemunlessuseranonymityorotherfactorsdictateotherwise.CorrelateActionstoUsers.Thesystemshouldinternallymaintaintheidentityofallactiveusersandbeabletolinkactionstospecificusers.(SeeSection6.MA.4,AuditTrails.) MaintenanceofUserIDs.AnorganizationshouldensurethatalluserIDsbelongtocurrentlyauthonztdusers.Identificationdatamustbekeptcurrentbyaddingnewusersanddeletingformerusers.InactiveUserIDs.UserIDsthatareinactiveonthesystemforaspecificperiodoftime(e.g.,threemonths)shouldbedisabled. 37UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 49] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems6.MA.1.2AuthenticationAuthenticationisthemeansofestablishingthevalidityofauser'sclaimedidentitytothesystem.Therearethreemeansofauthenticatingauser'sidentitywhichcanbeusedaloneorincombination:somethingtheindividualknows(asecret-e.g.,apassword,PersonalIdentificationNumber(PIN),orcryptographickey);somethingtheindividualpossesses(atoken~e.g.,anATMcardorasmartcard);andsomethingtheindividualis(abiometrics~e.g.,characteristicssuchasavoicepattern,handwritingdynamics,orafingerprint).Inthissection,describethemajorapplication'sauthenticationcontrolmechanisms.Belowisalistofitemsthatshouldbeconsideredinthedescription: •Describethemethodofuserauthentication(password,token,andbiometrics).•Ifapasswordsystemisused,providethefollowingspecificinformation:•Allowablecharacterset,•Passwordlength(minimum,maximum),•Passwordagingtimeframesandenforcementapproach,•Numberofgenerationsofexpiredpasswordsdisallowedforuse,•Proceduresforpasswordchanges,•Proceduresforhandlinglostpasswords,and•Proceduresforhandlingpasswordcompromise. •Proceduresfortrainingusersandthematerialscovered.Note:Therecommendedminimumnumberofcharactersinapasswordissixtoeightcharactersinacombinationofalpha,numeric,orspecialcharacters. •Indicatethefrequencyofpasswordchanges,describehowpasswordchangesareenforced(e.g.,bythesoftwareorSystemAdministrator),andidentifywhochangesthepasswords(theuser,thesystem,ortheSystemAdministrator).•Describeanybiometricscontrolsused.Includeadescriptionofhowthebiometricscontrolsareimplementedonthesystem.•Describeanytokencontrolsusedonthesystemandhowtheyareimplemented.>Arespecialhardwarereadersrequired?>AreusersrequiredtouseauniquePersonalIdentificationNumber(PIN)?>WhoselectsthePIN,theuserorSystemAdministrator?>Doesthetokenuseapasswordgeneratortocreateaone-timepassword? 38UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 50] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems >Isachallenge-responseprotocolusedtocreateaone-timepassword? •Describethelevelofenforcementoftheaccesscontrolmechanism(network,operatingsystem,andapplication). •Describehowtheaccesscontrolmechanismsupportsindividualaccountabilityandaudittrails(e.g.,passwordsare.associatedwithauseridentifierthatisassignedtoasingleindividual). •Describetheself-protectiontechniquesfortheuserauthenticationmechanism(e.g.,passwordsaretransmittedandstoredwithone-wayencryptiontopreventanyone[includingtheSystemAdministrator]fromreadingtheclear-textpasswords,passwordsareautomaticallygenerated,passwordsarecheckedagainstadictionaryofdisallowedpasswords,passwordsareencryptedwhileintransmission). •Statethenumberofinvalidaccessattemptsthatmayoccurforagivenuseridentifieroraccesslocation(terminalorport)anddescribetheactionstakenwhenthatlimitisexceeded.•Describetheproceduresforverifyingthatallsystem-providedadministrativedefaultpasswordshavebeenchanged. •Describetheproceduresforlimitingaccessscriptswithembeddedpasswords(e.g.,scriptswithembeddedpasswordsareprohibited,scriptswithembeddedpasswordsareallowedonlyforbatchapplications). •Describeanypoliciesthatprovideforbypassinguserauthenticationrequirements,single-sign-ontechnologies(e.g.,host-to-host,authenticationservers,user-to-hostidentifier,andgroupuseridentifiers)andanycompensatingcontrols. •Ifdigitalsignaturesareused,thetechnologymustconformwithFederalInformationProcessingStandards(FIPS)186,DigitalSignatureStandardandPIPS180-1,SecureHashStandardissuedbyNIST,unlessawaiverhasbeengranted.Describeanyuseofdigitalorelectronicsignatures.Addressthefollowingspecificissues: •Statethedigitalsignaturestandardsused.IfthestandardsusedarenotNISTstandards,pleasestatethedatethewaiverwasgrantedandthenameandtitleoftheofficialgrantingthewaiver.•Describetheuseofelectronicsignaturesandthesecuritycontrolprovided. •Discusscryptographickeymanagementproceduresforkeygeneration,distribution,storage,entry,use,destructionandarchiving. 39UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 51] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 6.MA.2LogicalAccessControls(Authorization/AccessControls)Logicalaccesscontrolsarethesystem-basedmechanismsusedtospecifywhoorwhat(e.g.,inthecaseofaprocess)istohaveaccesstoaspecificsystemresourceandthetypeofaccessthatispermitted.hithissection,discussthecontrolsinplacetoauthorizeorrestricttheactivitiesofusersandsystempersonnelwithintheapplication.Describehardwareorsoftwarefeaturesthataredesignedtopermitonlyauthorizedaccesstoorwithintheapplication,torestrictuserstoauthorizedtransactionsandfunctions,and/ortodetectunauthorizedactivities(e.g.,accesscontrollists).Thefollowingareareasthatshouldbeconsidered.•Describeformalpoliciesthatdefinetheauthoritythatwillbegrantedtoeachuserorclassofusers.Indicateifthesepoliciesfollowtheconceptofleastprivilegewhichrequiresidentifyingtheuser'sjobfunctions,determiningtheminimumsetofprivilegesrequiredtoperformthatfunction,andrestrictingtheusertoadomainwiththoseprivilegesandnothingmore.Licludeinthedescriptiontheproceduresforgrantingnewusersaccessandtheproceduresforwhentheroleorjobfunctionchanges.•Identifywhetherthepoliciesincludeseparationofdutiesenforcementtopreventanindividualfromhavingallnecessaryauthorityorinformationaccesstoallowfraudulentactivitywithoutcollusion. •Describetheapplication'scapabilitytoestablishanAccessControlListorregisteroftheusersandthetypesofaccesstheyarepermitted.•IndicatewhetheramanualAccessControlListismaintained.•Indicateifthesecuritysoftwareallowsapplicationownerstorestricttheaccessrightsofotherapplicationusers,thegeneralsupportsystemadministrator,oroperatorstotheapplicationprograms,data,orfiles. •Describehowapplicationusersarerestrictedfromaccessingtheoperatingsystem,otherapplications,orothersystemresourcesnotneededintheperformanceoftheirduties.•IndicatehowoftenAccessControlListsarereviewedtoidentifyandremoveuserswhohavelefttheorganizationorwhosedutiesnolongerrequireaccesstotheapplication.•Describecontrolstodetectunauthorizedtransactionattemptsbyauthorizedand/orunauthorizedusers. 40UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 52] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems•Describepolicyorlogicalaccesscontrolsthatregulatehowusersmaydelegateaccesspermissionsormakecopiesoffilesorinformationaccessibletootherusers.This"discretionaryaccesscontrol"maybeappropriateforsomeapplications,andinappropriateforothers.Documentanyevaluationmadetojustify/supportuseof"discretionaryaccesscontrol."•hidicateafterwhatperiodofuserinactivitythesystemautomaticallyblanksassociateddisplayscreensand/orafterwhatperiodofuserinactivitythesystemautomaticallydisconnectsinactiveusersorrequirestheusertoenterauniquepasswordbeforereconnectingtothesystemorapplication.•Describeanyrestrictionstopreventusersfi"omaccessingthesystemorapplicationsoutsideofnormalworkhoursoronweekends.Discussin-placerestrictions. •Indicateifencryptionisusedtopreventunauthorizedaccesstosensitivefilesaspartofthesystemorapplicationaccesscontrolprocedures.(Ifencryptionisusedprimarilyforauthentication,includethisinformationinthesectionabove.)Ifencryptionisusedaspartoftheaccesscontrols,provideinformationaboutthefollowing:>Whatcryptographicmethodology(e.g.,secretkeyandpublickey)isused?Ifaspecificoff-the-shelfproductisused,providethenameoftheproduct.Iftheproductandtheimplementationmethodmeetfederalstandards(e.g..DataEncryptionStandard,DigitalSignatureStandard),includethatinformation.>Discusscryptographickeymanagementproceduresforkeygeneration,distribution,storage,entry,use,destruction,andarchiving.•IfyourapplicationisrunningonasystemthatisconnectedtotheInternetorotherwideareanetwork(s),discusswhatadditionalhardwareortechnicalcontrolshavebeeninstalledandimplementedtoprovideprotectionagainstunauthorizedsystempenetrationandotherknownInternetthreatsandvulnerabilities. •Describeanytypeofsecuregatewayorfirewallinuse,includingitsconfiguration,(e-g.,configuredtorestrictaccesstocriticalsystemresourcesandtodisallowcertaintypesoftraffictopassthroughtothesystem).•Provideinformationregardinganyportprotectiondevicesusedtorequirespecificaccessauthorizationtothecommunicationports,includingtheconfigurationoftheportprotectiondevices,andifadditionalpasswordsortokensarerequired. •Identifywhetherinternalsecuritylabelsareusedtocontrolaccesstospecificinformationtypesorfiles,andifsuchlabelsspecifyprotectivemeasuresorindicateadditionalhandlinginstructions. UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 53] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems•Indicateifhost-basedauthenticationisused.(Thisisanaccesscontrolapproachthatgrantsaccessbasedontheidentityofthehostoriginatingtherequest,insteadoftheindividualuserrequestingaccess.) Itisrecommendedthatastandardizedlog-onbannerbeplacedonthesystem.PublicLaw99-474requiresthatawarningmessagebedisplayed,notifyingunauthorizedusersthattheyhaveaccessedaU.S.Governmentcomputersystemandunauthorizedusecanbepunishedbyfinesorimprisormient.Someofthesystemsnowinuseareintendedforunrestrictedusebythegeneralpublic(e.g.,Internet-basedsystemsusedforwidespreadpublicinformationdissemination),asituationnotprevalentwhenPublicLaw99-474wasenacted.Duetotheiradverseimpactontheintendeduserpopulation,highlyrestrictivewarningbarmersmaynotbeappropriate.Thechoiceofwhichscreenwarningbarmertoimplementisuptothesystemownerandshouldbebasedonsystem-specifictechnologylimitations,datasensitivity,orotheruniquesystemrequirements.Inthissection,describetherationaleforelectingtouseornotusewarningbannersandprovideanexampleofthebaimersused.Whereappropriate,statewhethertheDepartmentofJustice,ComputerCrimeandIntellectualPropertiesSection,approvedthewarningbanner. 42UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 54] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems ExampleWarningBannersBannerSelectionRationaleApprovedbyDOJ**WARNING**WARNING**WARNING**ThisisaCAgencv")computersystem.(Agency)computersystemsareprovidedfortheprocessingofOfficialU.S.Governmentinformationonly.AlldatacontainedonCAgencv)computersystemsisownedbythe(Agency)mavbemonitored,intercepted,recorded,read,copied,orcapturedinanymanneranddisclosedinanymanner,byauthorizedpersonnel.THEREISNORIGHTOFPRIVACYINTHISSYSTEM.Systempersonnelmay^IVCWJlawCXliUik/CiliCilLUiilV^laidallyUUlCllllalCVlUCllUCUlcrimefoundon(Agency)computersystems.USEOFTHISSYSTEMBYANYUSER.AUTHORIZEDORUNAUTHORIZED.CONSTITUTESCONSENTTOTHISMONITORING.INTERCEPTION.RECORDING.READING.COPYING.ORCAPTURINGandDISCLOSURE.**WARXING**WAJuNTNG**WAilNING** SystemisforGovenmientuseonlyandalltransmissionsmaybemonitored.Yes **WARNING**WARNING**WARNING**ThisisaUnitedStates(Agency)computersystem,whichmaybeaccessedandusedonlyforofficialGovernmentbusinessbyauthorizedpersonnel.Unauthorizedaccessoruseofthiscomputersystemmaysubjectviolatorstocriminal,civil,and/oradministrativeaction. SystemisforGovernmentuseonly.Monitoringisonlyperformedinsupportofsystemoperationsandtoinvestigatepotentialsecurityevents. Yes Allinformationonthiscomputersystemmaybeintercepted,recorded,read,copied,anddisclosedbyandtoauthorizedpersonnelforofficialpurposes,includingcriminalinvestigations.Accessoruseofthiscomputersystembyanypersonwhetherauthorizedorunauthorized,constitutesconsenttotheseterms.**WARNING**WARNING**WARNING** Theseals,initials,andagencyidentificationcannotbeusedwithoutthewrittenpermissionoftheagency.Informationdissemination.Systemopentothegeneralpublic.Associatedrisksaredenialofaccessandtransitoryembarrassmenttotheagency. No NoneInformationdissemination.Systemopentothegeneralpublic.Associatedrisksaredenialofaccessandtransitoryembarrassmenttotheagency. No 43UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 55] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems6.MA.3PublicAccessControlsWhereanorganization'sapplicationpromotesorpermitspublicaccess,additionalsecuritycontrolsareneededtoprotecttheintegrityoftheapplicationandtheconfidenceofthepublicintheapplication.Suchcontrolsincludesegregatinginformationmadedirectlyaccessibletothepublicfromofficialorganizationrecords.Publicaccesssystemsaresubjecttoagreaterthreatfromoutsideattacks.Inpublicaccesssystems,usersareoftenanonymousanduntrainedinthesystemandtheirresponsibilities.Attacksonpublicaccesssystemscouldhaveasubstantialimpactontheorganization'sreputationandthelevelofpublictrustandconfidence.Threatsfrominsidersarealsogreater(e.g.,errorsintroducedbydisgruntledemployeesorunintentionalerrorsbyuntrainedusers). Ifthepublicaccessesthemajorapplication,describetheadditionalcontrolsinplace.Thefollowinglistdescribesthetypeofcontrolsthatmightprovideprotectioninapublicaccesssystemandissuesthatshouldbeconsidered.Itisnotintendedtoincludeallpossiblecontrolsorissues. •Someformofidentificationandauthentication(thismaybedifficult). •Accesscontroltolimitwhattheusercanread,write,modify,ordelete. •Controlstopreventpublicusersfrommodifyinginformationonthesystem. •Digitalsignatures.•CD-ROMforon-linestorageofinformationfordistribution. •Putcopiesofinformationforpublicaccessonaseparatesystem. •Prohibitpublictoaccess"live"databases.•Verifythatprogramsandinformationdistributedtothepublicarevirus-free. •Audittrailsanduserconfidentiality.•Systemanddataavailability. •Legalconsiderations. 44UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 56] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems6.MA.4AuditTrailsAudittrailsmaintainarecordofsystemactivitybysystemorapplicationprocessesandbyuseractivity.Inconjunctionwithappropriatetoolsandprocedures,audittrailscanprovideameanstohelpaccomplishseveralsecurity-relatedobjectives,includingindividualaccountability,reconstructionofevents,intrusiondetection,andproblemidentification.Inthissection,describetheaudittrailmechanismsinplace.Alistofitemstoconsiderareprovidedbelow:•Doestheaudittrailsupportaccountabilitybyprovidingatraceofuseractions?•Cantheaudittrailsupportafter-the-factinvestigationsofhow,when,andwhynormaloperationsceased? •Areaudittrailsdesignedandimplementedtorecordappropriateinformationthatcanassistinintrusiondetection? •Areaudittrailsusedasonlinetoolstohelpidentifyproblemsotherthanintrusionsastheyoccur?•Doestheaudittrailincludesufficientinformationtoestablishwhateventsoccurredandwho(orwhat)causedthem?Ingeneral,aneventrecordshouldspecify;>Typeofevent;>Whentheeventoccurred;>UserIDassociatedwiththeevent;and>Programorcommandusedtoinitiatetheevent. •Isaccesstoonlineauditlogsstrictlycontrolled? •Isthereseparationofdutiesbetweensecuritypersonnelwhoadministertheaccesscontrolfunctionandthosewhoadministertheaudittrail? •Istheconfidentialityofaudittrailinformationprotectedif,forexample,itrecordspersonalinformationaboutusers? •Describehowfrequentlyaudittrailsarereviewedandwhethertherearereviewguidelines. •CantheaudittrailbequeriedbyuserID,terminalID,applicationname,dateandtime,orsomeothersetofparameterstorunreportsofselectedinformation? 45UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 57] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems•Doestheappropriatesystem-levelorapplication-leveladministratorreviewtheaudittrailsfollowingaknownsystemorapplicationsoftwareproblem,aknownviolationofexistingrequirementsbyauser,orsomeunexplainedsystemoruserproblem?•Auditanalysistools,suchasthosebasedonauditreduction,attacksignature,andvariancetechniques,canbeusedinareal-timeornearreal-timefashion.Doestheorganizationusethemanytypesoftoolsthathavebeendevelopedtohelpreducetheamountofinformationcontainedinauditrecords,aswellastodistilluseftilinformationfromtherawdata?Keystrokemonitoringistheprocessusedtovieworrecordboththekeystrokesenteredbyacomputeruserandthecomputer'sresponseduringaninteractivesession.Keystrokemonitoringisusuallyconsideredaspecialcaseofaudittrails.TheDepartmentofJusticehasadvisedthatanambiguityinU.S.lawmakesitunclearwhetherkeystrokemonitoringisconsideredequivalenttoanunauthorizedtelephonewiretap.Ifkeystrokemonitoringisusedinaudittrails,organizationsshouldhaveawrittenpolicyandnotifyusers.TheRulesofBehaviormaybeonevehiclefordistributingtheinformation.Ifkeystrokemonitoringisused,providereferencetothepolicyandthemeansofnotification.AlsoindicatewhethertheDepartmentofJusticehasreviewedthepolicy. 46UseforMajorApplication [PDF page 58] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 5.GSSGeneralSupportSystem—OperationalControlsTheoperationalcontrolsaddresssecuritymechanismsthatfocusonmethodsthatprimarilyareimplementedandexecutedbypeople(asopposedtosystems).Thesecontrolsareputinplacetoimprovethesecurityofaparticularsystem(orgroupofsystems).Theyoftenrequiretechnicalorspecializedexpertiseandoftenrelyuponmanagementactivitiesaswellastechnicalcontrols,hithissection,describetheoperationalcontrolmeasures(inplaceorplanned)thatareintendedtomeettheprotectionrequirementsofthegeneralsupportsystem. 5.GSS.1PersonnelControlsThegreatestharm/disruptiontoasystemcomesfromtheactionsofindividuals,bothintentionalandunintentional.Alltoooften,systemsexperiencedisruption,damage,loss,orotheradverseimpactduetothewell-intentionedactionsofindividualsauthorizedtouseormaintainasystem(e.g.,theprogrammerwhoinsertsoneminorchange,theninstallstheprogramintotheproductionenvironmentwithouttesting). Inthissection,includedetailedinformationaboutthefollowingpersonnelsecuritymeasures.Itisrecommendedthatmostofthesemeasuresbeincludedaspartoftherulesofbehavior.Iftheyareincorporatedintherulesofbehavior,referencetheapplicablesection. •Haveallpositionsbeenreviewedforsensitivitylevel?Ifallpositionshavenotbeenreviewed,statetheplanneddateforcompletionofpositionsensitivityanalysis. •Astatementastowhetherindividualshavereceivedthebackgroundscreeningappropriateforthepositiontowhichtheyareassigned.Ifallindividualshavenothadappropriatebackgroundscreening,includethedatebywhichsuchscreeningwillbecompleted.•Ifindividualsarepermittedsystemaccesspriortocompletionofappropriatebackgroundscreening,describetheconditionsunderwhichthisisallowedandanycompensatingcontrolstomitigatetheassociatedrisk. •Areusersaccessrestricted(leastprivilege)todatafiles,toprocessingcapability,ortoperipheralsandtypeofaccess(e.g.,read,write,execute,delete)totheminimumnecessarytoperformthejob? •Arecriticalftinctionsdividedamongdifferentindividuals(separationofduties)toensurethatnoindividualhasallnecessaryauthorityorinformationaccesswhichcouldresultinfraudulentactivity?•Isthereaprocessforrequesting,establishing,issuing,andclosinguseraccounts? UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 59] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems •Whatmechanismsareinplaceforholdinguser'sresponsiblefortheiractions?•Whataretheterminationproceduresforafriendlyterminationandanunfriendlytermination? 5.GSS.2PhysicalandEnvironmentalProtectionPhysicalandenvironmentalsecuritycontrolsareimplementedtoprotectthefacilityhousingsystemresources,thesystemresourcesthemselves,andthefacilitiesusedtosupporttheiroperation.Anorganization'sphysicalandenvironmentalsecurityprogramshouldaddressthefollowingseventopicswhichareexplainedbelow,hithissection,brieflydescribethephysicalandenvironmentalcontrolsinplaceorplannedforthegeneralsupportsystem. 5.GSS.2.1ExplanationofPhysicalandEnvironmentSecurityAccessControls.Physicalaccesscontrolsrestricttheentryandexitofpersonnel(andoftenequipmentandmedia)fromanarea,suchasanofficebuilding,suite,datacenter,orroomcontainingalocalareanetwork(LAN)server.Physicalaccesscontrolsshouldaddressnotonlytheareacontainingsystemhardware,butalsolocationsofwiringusedtoconnectelementsofthesystem,supportingservices(suchaselectricpower),backupmedia,andanyotherelementsrequiredforthesystem'soperation.Itisimportanttoreviewtheeffectivenessofphysicalaccesscontrolsineacharea,bothduringnormalbusinesshoursandatothertimes~particularlywhenanareamaybeunoccupied. FireSafetyFactors.Buildingfu-esareaparticularlyimportantsecuritythreatbecauseofthepotentialforcompletedestructionofbothhardwareanddata,therisktohumanlife,andthepervasivenessofthedamage.Smoke,corrosivegases,andhighhumidityfromalocalizedfirecandamagesystemsthroughoutanentirebuilding.Consequently,itisimportanttoevaluatethefiresafetyofbuildingsthathousesystems.FailureofSupportingUtilities.Systemsandthepeoplewhooperatethemneedtohaveareasonablywell-controlledoperatingenvironment.Consequently,failuresofelectricpower,heatingandair-conditioningsystems,water,sewage,andotherutilitieswillusuallycauseaserviceinterruptionandmaydamagehardware.Organizationsshouldensurethattheseutilities,includingtheirmanyelements,ftmctionproperly. StructuralCollapse.Organizationsshouldbeawarethatabuildingmaybesubjectedtoaloadgreaterthanitcansupport.Mostcommonlythisisaresultofanearthquake,asnowloadontheroofbeyonddesigncriteria,anexplosionthatdisplacesorcutsstructuralmembers,orafirethatweakensstructuralmembers. UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 60] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems PlumbingLeaks.Whileplumbingleaksdonotoccureveryday,theycanbeseriouslydisruptive.Anorganizationshouldknowthelocationofplumbinglinesthatmightendangersystemhardwareandtakestepstoreducerisk(e.g.,movinghardware,relocatingplumbinglines,andidentifyingshutoffvalves.)hiterceptionofData.Dependingonthetypeofdataasystemprocesses,theremaybeasignificantriskifthedataisintercepted.Organizationsshouldbeawarethattherearethreeroutesofdatainterception:directobservation,interceptionofdatatransmission,andelectromagneticinterception.MobileandPortableSystems.Theanalysisandmanagementofriskusuallyhastobemodifiedifasystemisinstalledinavehicleorisportable,suchasalaptopcomputer.Thesysteminavehiclewillsharetherisksofthevehicle,includingaccidentsandtheft,aswellasregionalandlocalrisks.Organizationsshould:•Securelystorelaptopcomputerswhentheyarenotinuse. •Encryptdatafilesonstoredmedia,whencost-effective,asaprecautionagainstdisclosureofinformationifalaptopcomputerislostorstolen. UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 61] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 5.GSS.2.2ComputerRoomExampleAppropriateandadequatecontrolswillvarydependingontheindividualsystemrequirements.Theexamplelistshowsthetypesofcontrolsforanapplicationresidingonasysteminacomputerroom.Thelistisnotintendedtobeallinclusiveortoimplythatallsystemsshouldhaveallcontrolslisted. ExamplePhysical/EnvironmentalControlsForComputerRoomInPlaceCardkeysforbuildingandwork-areaentrancesTwenty-fourhourguardsatallentrances/exitsCipherlockoncomputerroomdoorRaisedfloorincomputerroomDedicatedcoolingsystemHumidifierintapelibraryEmergencylightingincomputerroomFourfireextinguishersratedforelectricalfiresOneB/CratedfireextinguisherSmoke,water,andheatdetectorsEmergencypower-offswitchbyexitdoorSurgesuppressorEmergencyreplacementserverZoneddrypipesprinklersystemUninterruptablepowersupplyforLANserversPowerstrips/suppressorsforperipheralsPowerstrips/suppressorsforcomputersControlledaccesstofileserverroomPlannedPlasticsheetsforwaterprotection,August1999Closed-circuittelevisionmonitors,January2000 5.GSS.3Production,Input/OutputControlsInthissection,provideasynopsisoftheproceduresinplacethatsupportthegeneralsupportsystem.Belowisasamplingoftopicsthatshouldbereported. •Usersupport. UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 62] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems •Procedurestoensureunauthorizedindividualscannotread,copy,alter,orstealprintedorelectronicinformation.•Proceduresforensuringthatonlyauthorizeduserspickup,receive,ordeliverinputandoutputinformationandmedia.•Audittrailsforreceiptofsensitiveinputs/outputs.•Proceduresforrestrictingaccesstooutputproducts.•Proceduresandcontrolsusedfortransportingormailingmediaorprintedoutput.•Internal/externallabelingforappropriatesensitivity(e.g.,PrivacyAct,Proprietary).•Externallabelingwithspecialhandlinginstructions(e.g.,log/inventoryidentifiers,controlledaccess,specialstorageinstructions,releaseordestructiondates).•Audittrailsforinventorymanagement.•Mediastoragevaultorlibraryphysicalandenvironmentalprotectioncontrolsandprocedures.•Proceduresforsanitizingelectronicmediaforreuse(e.g.,overwriteordegaussingofelectronicmedia).•Proceduresforcontrolledstorage,handling,ordestructionofspoiledmediaormediathatcarmotbeeffectivelysanitizedforreuse.•Proceduresforshreddingorotherdestructivemeasuresforhardcopymediawhennolongerrequired. 5.GSS.4ContingencyPlanning(ContinuityofSupport)Generalsupportsystemsrequireappropriateemergency,backup,andcontingencyplans.Theseplan?shouldbetestedregularlytoassurethecontinuityofsupportintheeventofsystemfailure.Also,theseplansshouldbeknowntousersandcoordinatedwiththeirplansforapplications.Describetheprocedures(contingencyplan)thatwouldbefollowedtoensurethesystemcontinuestoprocessallcriticalapplicationsifadisastershouldoccurandprovideareferencetothedetailedplans,hicludeconsiderationofthefollowingquestionsinthisdescription: UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 63] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems •Istestedcontingencyplaninplacetopermitcontinuityofmission-criticalfunctionsintheeventofacatastrophicevent?•IstesteddisasterrecoveryplaninplaceforallsupportingITsystemsandnetworks?•Isformalvmttenemergencyoperatingprocedurepostedorlocatedtofacilitatetheiruseinemergencysituations?•Howoftenarecontingency,disaster,andemergencyplanstested?•Areallemployeestrainedintheirrolesandresponsibilitiesrelativetotheemergency,disaster,andcontingencyplans?Includedescriptionsofthefollowingcontrols. •Anyagreementsforbackupprocessing(e.g.,hotsitecontractwithacommercialserviceprovider). •Documentedbackupproceduresincludingfrequency(daily,weekly,monthly)andscope(fullbackup,incrementalbackup,anddifferentialbackup).•Locationofstoredbackups(off-siteoron-site). •Generationsofbackupskept.•Coverageofbackupprocedures,e.g.,whatisbeingbackedup. 5.GSS.5HardwareandSystemSoftwareMaintenanceControlsThesecontrolsareusedtomonitortheinstallationof,andupdatesto,hardware,operatingsystemsoftware,andothersoftwaretoensurethatthehardwareandsoftwareftinctionasexpected,andthatahistoricalrecordismaintainedofapplicationchanges.Thesecontrolsmayalsobeusedtoensurethatonlyauthorizedsoftwareisinstalledonthesystem.Suchcontrolsmayincludeahardwareandsoftwareconfigurationpolicythatgrantsmanagerialapproval(re-authorizeprocessing)tomodificationsandrequiresthatchangesbedocumented.Othercontrolsincludeproductsandproceduresusedinauditingfor,orpreventing,illegaluseofsharewareorcopyrightedsoftware.Inthissection,provideseveralparagraphsonthehardwareandsystemsoftwaremaintenancecontrolsinplaceorplanned.Thefollowingstatementsareexamplesofitemsthatshouldbeaddressedinrespondingtothissection:•Areproceduresinplacetoensurethatmaintenanceandrepairactivitiesareaccomplishedwithoutadverselyaffectingsystemsecurity?Considerthefollowingitems: UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 64] I GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems >Restriction/controlsonthosewhoperformmaintenanceandrepairactivities. >Specialproceduresforperformanceofemergencyrepairandmaintenance.>Managementofhardware/softwarewarrantiesandupgradepoHciestomaximizeuseofsuchitemstominimizecosts. >Proceduresusedforitemsservicedthroughon-siteandoff-sitemaintenance(e.g.,escortofmaintenancepersonnel,sanitizationofdevicesremovedfromthesite). >Proceduresusedforcontrollingremotemaintenanceserviceswherediagnosticproceduresormaintenanceisperformedthroughtelecommunicationsarrangements.Describetheconfigurationmanagementproceduresforthesystem.Considerthefollowingitemsinthedescription: •Versioncontrolthatallowsassociationofsystemcomponentstotheappropriatesystemversion.•Proceduresfortestingand/orapprovingsystemcomponents(operatingsystem,othersystem,utility,applications)priortopromotiontoproduction. •Impactanalysestodeterminetheeffectofproposedchangesonexistingsecuritycontrolstoincludetherequiredtrainingforbothtechnicalandusercommunitiesassociatedwiththechangeinhardware/software.•Changeidentification,approval,anddocumentationprocedures. •Proceduresforensuringcontingencyplansandotherassociateddocumentationareupdatedtoreflectsystemchanges. •Aretestdata"live"dataormade-updata?•Howareemergencyfixeshandled?Describethepoliciesforhandlingcopyrightedsoftwareorshareware.Considerincludinginthisdescriptionanswerstothefollowingquestions: •Arethereorganizationalpoliciesagainstillegaluseofcopyrightedsoftwareorshareware?•Dothepoliciescontainprovisionsforindividualandmanagementresponsibilitiesandaccountability,includingpenalties? UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 65] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems •Areperiodicauditsconductedofusers'computers(PCs)toensureonlylegallicensedcopiesofsoftwareareinstalled? •Whatproductsandproceduresareusedtoprotectagainstillegaluseofsoftware?•Aresoftwarewarrantiesmanagedtominimizethecostofupgradesandcost-reimbursementorreplacementfordeficiencies? 5.GSS.6IntegrityControlsIntegritycontrolsareusedtoprotecttheoperatingsystem,applications,andinformationinthesystemfromaccidentalormaliciousalterationordestructionandtoprovideassurancetotheuserthattheinformationmeetsexpectationsaboutitsqualityandthatithasnotbeenaltered. Inthissection,describeanycontrolsthatprovideassurancetousersthattheinformationhasnotbeenalteredandthatthesystemfunctionsasexpected.Thefollowingquestionsareexamplesofsomeofthecontrolsthatfitinthiscategory: •Isvirusdetectionandeliminationsoftwareinstalled?Ifso,arethereproceduresfor: >Updatingvirussignaturefiles; >Automaticand/ormanualvirusscans(automaticscanonnetworklog-in,automaticscanonclient/serverpoweron,automaticscanondisketteinsertion,automaticscanondownloadfi'omanunprotectedsourcesuchastheInternet,scanformacroviruses);and>Viruseradicationandreporting?•Arereconciliationroutinesusedbythesystem,i.e.,checksums,hashtotals,recordcounts?Includeadescriptionoftheactionstakentoresolveanydiscrepancies. •Arepasswordcrackers/checkersused?•Are•integrityverificationprogramsusedbyapplicationstolookforevidenceofdatatampering,errors,andomissions?Techniquesincludeconsistencyandreasonablenesschecksandvalidationduringdataentryandprocessing.Describetheintegritycontrolsusedwithinthesystem. •Issystemperformancemonitoringusedtoanalyzesystemperformancelogsinrealtimetolookforavailabilityproblems,includingactiveattacks,andsystemandnetworkslowdownsandcrashes? UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 66] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems •Ismessageauthenticationusedintheapplicationtoensurethatthesenderofamessageisknownandthatthemessagehasnotbeenalteredduringtransmission?Statewhethermessageauthenticationhasbeendeterminedtobeappropriateforyoursystem.Ifso,describethemethodology. 5.GSS.7DocumentationDocumentationisasecuritycontrolinthatitexplainshowsoftware/hardwareistobeusedandformalizessecurityandoperationalproceduresspecifictothesystem.Documentationforasystemincludesdescriptionsofthehardwareandsoftware,policies,standards,procedures,andapprovalsrelatedtoautomatedinformationsystemsecurityonthesupportsystem,includingbackupandcontingencyactivities,aswellasdescriptionsofuserandoperatorprocedures.Listthedocumentationmaintainedforthegeneralsupportsystem.Anexamplelistisprovidedtoshowthetypeofdocumentationthatwouldnormallybemaintainedforasystem.Thelistisnotintendedtobeall-inclusiveorimplythatallsystemsshouldhaveallitemslisted. ExamplesofGeneralSupportSystemDocumentation -Vendor-supplieddocumentationofhardware-Vendor-supplieddocumentationofsoftware-Generalsupportsystemsecurityplan-Testingproceduresandresults-Standardoperatingprocedures-Emergencyprocedures-Contingencyplans-Disasterrecoveryplans-Userrulesofbehavior-Usermanuals-Riskassessment-Backupprocedures-Authorizeprocessingdocumentsandstatements 5.GSS.8SecurityAwarenessandTrainingTheComputerSecurityActrequiresfederalagenciestoprovidemandatoryperiodictrainingincomputersecurityawarenessandacceptedcomputersecuritypracticeforallemployeeswhoareinvolvedwiththemanagement,use,oroperationofafederalcomputersystemwithinorunderthesupervisionofthefederalagency.Thisincludes UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 67] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems contractorsaswellasemployeesoftheagency.0MBCircularA-130,AppendixIII,issuedin1996,enforcessuchmandatorytrainingbyrequiringitscompletionpriortograntingaccesstothesystemandthroughperiodicrefreshertrainingforcontinuedaccess.Therefore,eachusermustbeversedinacceptablerulesofbehaviorforthesystembeforebeingallowedaccesstothesystem.Thetrainingprogramshouldalsoinformtheuseronhowtogethelpwhenhavingdifficultyusingthesystemandproceduresforreportingsecurityincidents.Accessprovidedtomembersofthepublicshouldbeconstrainedbycontrolsintheapplications,andtrainingshouldbewithinthecontextofthosecontrolsandmayconsistonlyofnotificationatthetimeofaccess.Includeinthissectionoftheplaninformationaboutthefollowing:•Theawarenessprogramforthesystem(posters,booklets,andtrinkets). •Thetypeandfrequencyofsystem-specifictrainingprovidedtoemployeesandcontractorpersonnel(seminars,workshops,formalclassroom,focusgroups,role-basedtraining,andon-the-jobtraining). •Theproceduresforassuringthatemployeesandcontractorpersonnelhavebeenprovidedadequatetraining.Note:Contractoremployeesarerequiredtoreceivethesamelevelofautomatedinformationsystemssecurityawarenessandtrainingasfederalemployees.Thistrainingrequirementshouldbeincludedasappropriateinallcontracts. 5.GSS.9IncidentResponseCapabilityAcomputersecurityincidentisanadverseeventinacomputersystemornetworkcausedbyafailureofasecuritymechanismoranattemptedorthreatenedbreachofthesemechanisms\Computersecurityincidentsarebecomingmorecommonandtheirimpactfar-reaching.Whenfacedwithanincident,anorganizationshouldbeabletorespondquicklyinamannerthatbothprotectsitsowninformationandhelpstoprotecttheinformationofothersthatmightbeaffectedbytheincident.0MBCircularA-130requireseachagencytoensurethatthereisacapabilitytoprovidehelptouserswhenasecurityincidentoccursinthesystemandtoshareinformationconcerningcommonvulnerabilitiesandthreats.Inthissection,describetheincidenthandlingproceduresinplaceforthegeneralsupportsystem.Areasofconsiderationinclude: ^Schultz,Brown,LongstaffRespondingtoComputerSecurityIncidents:GuidelinesforIncidentHandling,U.C.TechnicalReportUCRL-104689,1990. UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 68] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems •Isthereaformalincidentresponsecapability(in-houseorexternal)available?Ifthereisnocapabilityestablished,isthereahelpdeskorsimilarorganizationavailableforassistance?>Arethereproceduresforreportingincidentshandledeitherbysystempersonnelorexternally?>Arethereproceduresforrecognizingandhandlingincidents,i.e.,whatfilesandlogsshouldbekept,whotocontact,andwhen? •Whoreceivesandrespondstoalerts/advisories,e.g.,vendorpatches,exploitedvulnerabilities?•Whatpreventativemeasuresareinplace?>Intrusiondetectiontools>Automatedauditlogs>Penetrationtesting UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 69] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 6.GSSGeneralSupportSystem-TechnicalControlsTechnicalcontrolsfocusonsecuritycontrolsthatthecomputersystemexecutes.Thecontrolscanprovideautomatedprotectionfromunauthorizedaccessormisuse,facilitatedetectionofsecurityviolations,andsupportsecurityrequirementsforapplicationsanddata.Theimplementationoftechnicalcontrols,however,alwaysrequiressignificantoperationalconsiderations—andshouldbeconsistentwiththemanagementofsecuritywithintheorganization.Inthissection,describethetechnicalcontrolmeasures(inplaceorplanned)thatareintendedtomeettheprotectionrequirementsofthegeneralsupportsystem. 6.GSS.1IdentificationandAuthenticationIdentificationandAuthenticationisatechnicalmeasurethatpreventsunauthorizedpeople(orunauthorizedprocesses)fromenteringanITsystem.Accesscontrolusuallyrequiresthatthesystembeabletoidentifyanddifferentiateamongusers.Forexample,accesscontrolisoftenbasedonleastprivilege,whichreferstothegrantingtousersofonlythoseaccessesminimallyrequiredtoperformtheirduties.UseraccountabilityrequiresthelinkingofactivitiesonanITsystemtospecificindividualsand,therefore,requiresthesystemtoidentifyusers. 6.GSS.1.1IdentificationIdentificationisthemeansbywhichauserprovidesaclaimedidentitytothesystem.ThemostcommonformofidentificationistheuserID.Inthissectionoftheplan,describehowthegeneralsupportsystemidentifiesaccesstothesystem.UniqueIdentification.Anorganizationshouldrequireuserstoidentifythemselvesuniquelybeforebeingallowedtoperformanyactionsonthesystemunlessuseranonymityorotherfactorsdictateotherwise.CorrelateActionstoUsers.Thesystemshouldinternallymaintaintheidentityofallactiveusersandbeabletolinkactionstospecificusers.(SeeSection6.GSS.4,AuditTrails.) MaintenanceofUserIDs.AnorganizationshouldensurethatalluserIDsbelongtocurrentlyauthorizedusers.Identificationdatamustbekeptcurrentbyaddingnewusersanddeletingformerusers.InactiveUserIDs.UserIDsthatareinactiveonthesystemforaspecificperiodoftime(e.g.,threemonths)shouldbedisabled. UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 70] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 6.GSS.1.2AuthenticationAuthenticationisthemeansofestabhshingthevalidityofauser'sclaimedidentitytothesystem.Therearethreemeansofauthenticatingauser'sidentitywhichcanbeusedaloneorincombination:somethingtheindividualknows(asecret~e.g.,apassword,PersonalIdentificationNumber(PIN),orcryptographickey);somethingtheindividualpossesses(atoken~e.g.,anATMcardorasmartcard);andsomethingtheindividualis(abiometrics~e.g.,characteristicssuchasavoicepattern,handwritingdynamics,orafingerprint).Inthissection,describethegeneralsupportsystem'sauthenticationcontrolmechanisms.Belowisalistofitemsthatshouldbeconsideredinthedescription:•Describethemethodofuserauthentication(password,token,andbiometrics).•Ifapasswordsystemisused,providethefollowingspecificinformation:>Allowablecharacterset; >Passwordlength(minimum,maximum);>Passwordagingtimeframesandenforcementapproach;>Numberofgenerationsofexpiredpasswordsdisallowedforuse;>Proceduresforpasswordchanges;>Proceduresforhandlinglostpasswords,and>Proceduresforhandlingpasswordcompromise. •Proceduresfortrainingusersandthematerialscovered.Note:Therecommendedminimumnumberofcharactersforapasswordissixtoeightcharactersinacombinationofalpha,numeric,orspecialcharacters. •Indicate-thefrequencyofpasswordchanges,describehowpasswordchangesareenforced(e.g.,bythesoftwareorSystemAdministrator),andidentifywhochangesthepasswords(theuser,thesystem,ortheSystemAdministrator). •Describeanybiometricscontrolsused.Includeadescriptionofhowthebiometricscontrolsareimplementedonthesystem. •Describeanytokencontrolsusedonthissystemandhowtheyareimplemented.>Arespecialhardwarereadersrequired? UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 71] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems >AreusersrequiredtouseauniquePersonalIdentificationNumber(PIN)?>WhoselectsthePIN,theuserorSystemAdministrator?>Doesthetokenuseapasswordgeneratortocreateaone-timepassword?and>Isachallenge-responseprotocolusedtocreateaone-timepassword? •Describethelevelofenforcementoftheaccesscontrolmechanism(network,operatingsystem,andapplication). •Describehowtheaccesscontrolmechanismsupportsindividualaccountabilityandaudittrails(e.g.,passwordsareassociatedwithauseridentifierthatisassignedtoasingleindividual).•Describetheself-protectiontechniquesfortheuserauthenticationmechanism(e.g.,passwordsaretransmittedandstoredwithone-wayencryptiontopreventanyone[includingtheSystemAdministrator]fromreadingtheclear-textpasswords,passwordsareautomaticallygenerated,passwordsarecheckedagainstadictionaryofdisallowedpasswords). •Statethenumberofinvalidaccessattemptsthatmayoccurforagivenuseridentifieroraccesslocation(terminalorport)anddescribetheactionstakenwhenthatlimitisexceeded.•Describetheproceduresforverifyingthatallsystem-providedadministrativedefaultpasswordshavebeenchanged.•Describetheproceduresforlimitingaccessscriptswithembeddedpasswords(e.g.,scriptswithembeddedpasswordsareprohibited,scriptswithembeddedpasswordsareonlyallowedforbatchapplications).•Describeanypoliciesthatprovideforbypassinguserauthenticationrequirements,single-sign-ontechnologies(e.g.,host-to-host,authenticationservers,user-to-hostidentifier,andgroupuseridentifiers)andanycompensatingcontrols.•Ifdigitalsignaturesareused,thetechnologymustconformswithFIPS186,DigitalSignatureStandardandFIPS180-1,SecureHashStandardissuedbyNIST,unlessawaiverhasbeengranted.Describeanyuseofdigitalorelectronicsignatures.Addressthefollowingspecificissues:>Statethedigitalsignaturestandardsused.IfthestandardsusedarenotNISTstandards,pleasestatethedatethewaiverwasgranted,andthenameandtitleoftheofficialgrantingthewaiver. UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 72] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems >Describetheuseofelectronicsignaturesandthesecuritycontrolprovided.>Discusscryptographickeymanagementproceduresforkeygeneration,distribution,storage,entry,use,destructionandarchiving. 6.GSS.2LogicalAccessControls(Authorization/AccessControls)Logicalaccesscontrolsarethesystem-basedmechanismsusedtospecifywhoorwhat(e.g.,inthecaseofaprocess)istohaveaccesstoaspecificsystemresourceandthetypeofaccessthatispermitted.Inthissection,discussthecontrolsinplacetoauthorizeorrestricttheactivitiesofusersandsystempersonnelwithinthegeneralsupportsystem.Describehardwareorsoftwarefeaturesthataredesignedtopermitonlyauthorizedaccesstoorwithinthesystem,torestrictuserstoauthorizedtransactionsandfunctions,and/ortodetectunauthorizedactivities(e.g.,accesscontrollists).Thefollowingareareasthatshouldbeconsidered. •Describeformalpoliciesthatdefinetheauthoritythatwillbegrantedtoeachuserorclassofusers.Indicateifthesepoliciesfollowtheconceptofleastprivilegewhichrequiresidentifyingtheuser'sjobfunctions,determiningtheminimumsetofprivilegesrequiredtoperformthatfunction,andrestrictingtheusertoadomainwiththoseprivilegesandnothingmore.Includeinthedescriptiontheproceduresforgrantingnewusersaccessandtheproceduresforwhentheroleorjobfunctionchanges.•Identifywhetherthepoliciesincludeseparationofdutiesenforcementtopreventanindividualfromhavingallnecessaryauthorityorinformationaccesstoallowfraudulentactivitywithoutcollusion. •Describethesystem'scapabilitytoestablishanAccessControlListorregisteroftheusers,andthetypesofaccesstheyarepermitted.•IndicatewhetheramanualAccessControlListismaintained. •Indicateifthesecuritysoftwareallowsapplicationownerstorestricttheaccessrightsofotherapplicationusers,thegeneralsupportsystemadministrator,oroperatorstotheapplicationprograms,data,orfiles. •Describehowapplicationusersarerestrictedfromaccessingtheoperatingsystem,otherapplications,orothersystemresourcesnotneededintheperformanceoftheirduties.•IndicatehowoftenAccessControlListsarereviewedtoidentifyandremoveuserswhohavelefttheorganizationorwhosedutiesnolongerrequireaccesstotheapplication. UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 73] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems •Describepolicyorlogicalaccesscontrolsthatregulatehowusersmaydelegateaccesspermissionsormakecopiesoffilesorinformationaccessibletootherusers.This"discretionaryaccesscontrol"maybeappropriateforsomeapplications,andinappropriateforothers.Documentanyevaluationmadetojustify/supportuseof"discretionaryaccesscontrol." •Describecontrolstodetectunauthorizedtransactionattemptsbyauthorizedand/orunauthorizedusers.•hidicateafterwhatperiodofuserinactivitythesystemautomaticallyblanksassociateddisplayscreensand/orafterwhatperiodofuserinactivitythesystemautomaticallydisconnectsinactiveusersorrequirestheusertoenterauniquepasswordbeforereconnectingtothesystemorapplication.•Describeanyrestrictionstopreventusersfromaccessingthesystemorapplicationsoutsideofnormalworkhoursoronweekends.Discussin-placerestrictions. •Indicateifencryptionisusedtopreventunauthorizedaccesstosensitivefilesaspartofthesystemorapplicationaccesscontrolprocedures.(Ifencryptionisusedprimarilyforauthentication,includethisinformationinthesectionabove.)Ifencryptionisusedaspartoftheaccesscontrols,provideinformationaboutthefollowing:>Whatcryptographicmethodology(e.g.,secretkeyandpublickey)isused?Ifaspecificoff-the-shelfproductisused,providethenameoftheproduct.Iftheproductandtheimplementationmethodmeetsfederalstandards(e.g..DataEncryptionStandard,DigitalSignatureStandard),includethatinformation.>Discusscryptographickeymanagementproceduresforkeygeneration,distribution,storage,entry,use,destruction,andarchiving.•IfthegeneralsupportsystemisconnectedtotheInternetorotherwideareanetwork(s),discusswhatadditionalhardwareortechnicalcontrolshavebeeninstalledandimplementedtoprovideprotectionagainstunauthorizedsystempenetrationandotherknownInternetthreatsandvulnerabilities. •Describeanytypeofsecuregatewayorfirewallinuse,includingitsconfiguration,(e.g.,configuredtorestrictaccesstocriticalsystemresourcesandtodisallowcertaintypesoftraffictopassthroughtothesystem).•Provideinformationregardinganyportprotectiondevicesusedtorequirespecificaccessauthorizationtothecommunicationports,includingtheconfigurationoftheportprotectiondevicesandifadditionalpasswordsortokensarerequired. UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 74] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems •Identifywhetherinternalsecuritylabelsareusedtocontrolaccesstospecificinformationtypesorfiles,andifsuchlabelsspecifyprotectivemeasuresorindicateadditionalhandlinginstructions.•Indicateifhost-basedauthenticationisused.(Thisisanaccesscontrolapproachthatgrantsaccessbasedontheidentityofthehostoriginatingtherequest,insteadoftheindividualuserrequestingaccess.)Inaddition,documentationforasystemshouldincludeastandardizedlog-onbanner.PublicLaw99-474requiresthatawarningmessagebedisplayed,notifyingunauthorizedusersthattheyhaveaccessedaU.S.Governmentcomputersystemandunauthorizedusecanbepunishedbyfinesorimprisonment.Someofthesystemsnowinuseareintendedforunrestrictedusebythegeneralpublic(e.g.,Internet-basedsystemsusedforwidespreadpublicinformationdissemination),asituationnotprevalentwhenPublicLaw99-474wasenacted.Thus,duetotheiradverseimpactontheintendeduserpopulation,highlyrestrictivewarningbannersmaynotbeappropriate.Thechoiceofwhichscreenwarningbarmertoimplementisuptothesystemownerandshouldbebasedonsystem-specifictechnologylimitations,datasensitivity,orotheruniquesystemrequirements.Inthissection,describetherationaleforelectingtouseornotusewarningbannersandprovideanexampleofthebannersused.Whereappropriate,statewhethertheDepartmentofJustice,ComputerCrimeandIntellectualPropertiesSection,approvedthewarningbanner. UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 75] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems ExampleWarningBannersBannerSelectionRationaleApprovedbyDOJ**WARNING**WARNING**WARNING**ThisisafAgencv)computersystem,fAgency)computersystemsareprovidedfortheprocessingofOfficialU.S.Governmentinformationonly.Alldatacontainedon(Agency)computersystemsisownedbythe(Agency)mavbemonitored,intercepted,recorded,read,copied,orcapturedinanymanneranddisclosedinanymanner,byauthorizedpersonnel.THEREISNORIGHTOFPRIVACYINTHISSYSTEM.Systempersonnelmaygivetolawenforcementofficialsanypotentialevidenceofcrimefoundon(Agency)computersystems.USEOFTHISSYSTEMBYANYUSER.AUTHORIZEDORUNAUTHORIZED.CONSTITUTESCONSENTTOTHISMONITORING.INTERCEPTION.RECORDING.READING.COPYING.ORCAPTURINGandDISCLOSURE.**WARNING**WARNING**WARNING** SystemisforGovernmentuseonlyandalltransmissionsmaybemonitored. - Yes **WARNING**WARNING**WARNING**ThisisaUnitedStates(Agency)computersystem,whichmaybeaccessedandusedonlyforofficialGovernmentbusinessbyauthorizedpersonnel.Unauthorizedaccessoruseofthiscomputersystemmaysubjectviolatorstocriminal,civil,and/oradministrativeaction. SystemisforGovernmentuseonly.Monitoringisonlyperformedinsupportofsystemoperationsandtoinvestigatepotentialsecurityevents. Yes Allinformationonthiscomputersystemmaybeintercepted,recorded,read,copied,anddisclosedbyandtoauthorizedpersonnelforofficialpurposes,includingcriminalinvestigations.Accessoruseofthiscomputersystembyanypersonwhetherauthorizedorunauthorized,constitutesconsenttotheseterms.**WARNING**WARNING**WARNING** Theseals,initials,andagencyidentificationcannotbeusedwithoutthewrittenpermissionoftheagency.Informationdissemination.Systemopentothegeneralpublic.Associatedrisksaredenialofaccessandtransitoryembarrassmenttotheagency. No NoneInformationdissemination.Systemopentothegeneralpublic.Associatedrisksaredenialofaccessandtransitoryembarrassmenttotheagency. No UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 76] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems 6.GSS.3AuditTrailsAudittrailsmaintainarecordofsystemactivitybysystemorapplicationprocessesandbyuseractivity.Inconjunctionwithappropriatetoolsandprocedures,audittrailscanprovideameanstohelpaccomplishseveralsecurity-relatedobjectives,includingindividualaccountability,reconstructionofevents,intrusiondetection,andproblemidentification.Inthissection,describetheaudittrailmechanismsinplace.Alistofitemstoconsiderareprovidedbelow: •Doestheaudittrailprovideaccountabilitybyprovidingatraceofuseractions? •Cantheaudittrailsupportafter-the-factinvestigationsofhow,when,andwhynormaloperationsceased?•Areaudittrailsdesignedandimplementedtorecordappropriateinformationthatcanassistinintrusiondetection?•Areaudittrailsusedasonlinetoolstohelpidentifyproblemsotherthanintrusionsastheyoccur? •Doestheaudittrailincludesufficientinformationtoestablishwhateventsoccurredandwho(orwhat)causedthem.Ingeneral,aneventrecordshouldspecify:>Typeofevent;>Whentheeventoccurred;>UserIDassociatedwiththeevent;and>Programorcommandusedtoinitiatetheevent.•Isaccesstoonlineauditlogsstrictlycontrolled? •Isthereseparationofdutiesbetweensecuritypersonnelwhoadministertheaccesscontrolfunctionandthosewhoadministertheaudittrail? •Istheconfidentialityofaudittrailinformationprotectedif,forexample,itrecordspersonalinformationaboutusers?•Describehowfrequentlyaudittrailsarereviewedandwhethertherearereviewguidelines. •CantheaudittrailbequeriedbyuserID,terminalID,applicationname,dateandtime,orsomeothersetofparameterstorunreportsofselectedinformation. UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 77] GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems •Doestheappropriatesystem-levelorapplication-leveladministratorreviewtheaudittrailsfollowingaknownsystemorapplicationsoftwareproblem,aknownviolationofexistingrequirementsbyauser,orsomeunexplainedsystemoruserproblem?•Auditanalysistools,suchasthosebasedonauditreduction,attacksignature,andvariancetechniques,canbeusedinareal-time,ornearreal-time,fashion.Doestheorganizationusethemanytypesoftoolsthathavebeendevelopedtohelpreducetheamountofinformationcontainedinauditrecords,aswellastodistillusefulinformationfromtherawdata?Keystrokemonitoringistheprocessusedtovieworrecordboththekeystrokesenteredbyacomputeruserandthecomputer'sresponseduringaninteractivesession.Keystrokemonitoringisusuallyconsideredaspecialcaseofaudittrails.TheDepartmentofJusticehasadvisedthatanambiguityinU.S.lawmakesitunclearwhetherkeystrokemonitoringisconsideredequivalenttoanunauthorizedtelephonewiretap.Ifkeystrokemonitoringisusedinaudittrails,organizationsshouldhaveawrittenpolicyandnotifyusers.TheRulesofBehaviormaybeonevehiclefordistributingtheinformation.Ifkeystrokemonitoringisused,providereferencetothepolicyandthemeansofnotification.AlsoindicatewhethertheDepartmentofJusticehasreviewedthepolicy. 66UseforGeneralSupportSystem [PDF page 78] AppendixA—RulesofBehaviorMajorApplication RulesofBehaviorHYPOTHETICALGOVERNMENTAGENCY'S(HGA)FINANCIALINFORMATIONSYSTEM 1.IntroductionThefollowingrulesofbehavioraretobefollowedbyallusersoftheHGA'sFinancialInformationSystem(HFIS).TherulesclearlydelineateresponsibilitiesofandexpectationsforallindividualswithaccesstotheHFIS.Non-complianceoftheseruleswillbeenforcedthroughsanctionscommensuratewiththelevelofinfraction.Actionsmayrangefromaverbalorwrittenwarning,removalofsystemaccessforaspecificperiodoftime,reassignmenttootherduties,ortermination,dependingontheseverityoftheviolation. 1.ResponsibilitiesTheChief,FinancialInformationSystemsBranch,isresponsibleforensuringanadequatelevelofprotectionisaffordedtotheFIS,throughanappropriatemixoftechnical,administrative,andmanagerialcontrols.TheBranchChiefdevelopspoliciesandprocedures,ensuresthedevelopmentandpresentationofuserandcontractorawarenesssessions,andinspectsandspotcheckstodeterminethatanadequatelevelofcompliancewithsecurityrequirementsexists.TheBranchChiefisresponsibleforperiodicallyconductingvulnerabilityanalysestohelpdetermineifsecuritycontrolsareadequate.Specialattentionwillbegiventothosenewanddevelopingtechnologies,systems,andapplicationsthatcanopenorhaveopenedvulnerabilitiesinHGA'ssecurityposture. 2.OtherPoliciesandProceduresTherulesarenottobeusedinplaceofexistingpolicy,rathertheyareintendedtoenhanceandfurtherdefinethespecificruleseachusermustfollowwhileaccessingHFIS.Therulesareconsistentwiththepolicyandproceduresdescribedinthefollowingdirectives:HGAIRMComputerSecurityHandbook.ThenewlyrevisedHandbook,datedApril4,1998,containscomputersecurityguidanceonawiderangeoftopics,i.e.,personnelsecurity,incidenthandling,accesscontrolmechanisms.ThisdocumentcontainsresponsibilitiesfortheSECURITYOFFICE,HGAmanagers,andusers. lA [PDF page 79] AppendixA—RulesofBehaviorMajorApplicationHFISAccessControlManagementDirective.Thisdirective,datedMay6,1997,containsresponsibilitiesforHFISdataownersandapplicationadministrators.DraftHFISAccessControlManagementDirective.ThedraftHFISAccessControlManagementDirectivecontainsspecificresponsibilitiesforthesecurityofficer. LetterforExternal(non-HGA)Users.AletterforNon-HGAuserswhichtransmitstheapplicableHGApoliciesshouldbeprovidedtoallnon-HGAuserswhileusingHFIS,orwhenusingHGAsystemsandapplicationsingeneral.TheseresponsibilitiesshouldbeincludedintrainingHGAprovidesforagencysecuritypointsofcontact,andshouldbeincludedininteragencyagreementsorotherformalagreementsordocumentsbetweenHGAandotherorganizations. 3.ApplicationRules4.1Workathome.HGAPersonnelPolicyDirective97-03,datedMarch10,1997,authorizesDivisionDirectorstodesignatespecificemployees(e.g.,criticaljobseries,employeesonmaternityleave,employeeswithcertainmedicalconditions)aseligibleforworkingathome.Anywork-at-homearrangementshould:•beinwriting;•identifythetimeperiodtheworkathomewillbeallowed;•identifywhatgovernmentequipmentandsupplieswillbeneededbytheemployeeathome,andhowthatequipmentandsupplieswillbetransferredandaccountedfor; •identifyiftelecommutingwillbeneededandallowed(thisissueshouldbediscussedbetweentherequestingorganization.InformationResourcesManagementDivision(IRMD),andtheSECURITYOFFICE;seeSection4.2);and•bereviewedbyHGA'spersonnelofficepriortocommencement.4.2Dial-inaccess.TheIRMDivisionDirectormayauthorizedial-inaccesstoHFIS.Itisunderstoodthatdial-inaccessposesadditionalsecurityrisks,butmaybecomenecessaryforcertainjobfunctions.Ifdial-inaccessisallowed,IRMDandthesecurityofficewillregularlyreviewtelecommunicationslogsandHGAphonerecords,andconductspot-checkstodetermineifHGAbusinessfunctionsarecomplyingwithcontrolsplacedontheuseofdial-inlines.Alldial-incallswilluseone-timepasswords.Ifdial-inaccessisallowedtootherapplicationsonthesystemonwhichHFISresides,themanagersofthoseapplicationsshouldalsodetermineifsuchaccesscouldposearisktoHFISdata. 2A [PDF page 80] AppendixA-RulesofBehaviorMajorApplication4.3ConnectiontotheInternet.SomeHGApersonnelhaveaccesstotheInternet.HGAshouldensurethattheuserauthenticationrequiredforaccessisadequatetoprotectHFISprogramsanddata.Ifsuchaccessisallowed,HGAshouldcarefullydocumentallexternalconnectionstoensureaccesstoHFISislimitedtocontrolledpointsofentry.4.4Protectionofsoftwarecopyrightlicenses.AllcopyrightlicensesassociatedwiththeCOTSHFISsoftwarearecompliedwithbyHGApersonnel,aswellasbycontractorsresponsiblefordevelopingandmaintainingHFIS.HGArequiresthatallcopyrightlicensesforallPC-basedandLAN-basedsoftwareusedbyHFISprogrampersormelandcontractorpersormelareunderstoodandthatthesepersonnelcomplywiththelicenserequirements.Endusers,supervisors,andfunctionmanagersareultimatelyresponsibleforthiscompliance.4.5Unofficialuseofgovernmentequipment.Usersshouldbeawarethatpersonaluseofinformationresourcesisnotauthorized. Iacknowledgereceiptof,understandmyresponsibilities,andwillcomplywiththerulesofbehaviorfortheHFIS. SignatureofUserDate 3A [PDF page 81] [PDF page 82] AppendixB—RulesofBehaviorGeneralSupportSystems RulesofBehaviorHypotheticalGovernmentAgency's(HGA)BackboneLocalAreaNetworkTherulesofbehaviorcontainedinthisdocumentaretobefollowedbyallusersoftheHGALocalAreaNetwork(LAN).UserswillbeheldaccountablefortheiractionsontheLAN.IfanemployeeviolatesHGApolicyregardingtherulesoftheLAN,theymaybesubjecttodisciplinaryactionatthediscretionofHGAmanagement.Actionsmayrangefromaverbalorwrittenwarning,removalofsystemaccessforaspecificperiodoftime,reassignmenttootherduties,ortermination,dependingontheseverityoftheviolation.Workathome.HGAPersonnelPolicyDirective97-03,datedMarch10,1997,authorizesDivisionDirectorstodesignatespecificemployees(e.g.,criticaljobseries,employeesonmaternityleave,employeeswithcertainmedicalconditions)aseligibleforworkingathome.Anyworkathomearrangementshould:•beinvmting; •identifythetimeperiodtheworkathomewillbeallowed;•identifywhatgovernmentequipmentandsupplieswillbeneededbytheemployeeathome,andhowthatequipmentandsupplieswillbetransferredandaccountedfor; •identifyiftelecommutingwillbeneededandallowed(thisissueshouldbediscussedbetweentherequestingorganization,InformationResourcesManagementDivision(IRMD),andtheSECURITYOFFICE;seeDial-inaccesssectionbelow);and •bereviewedbyHGA'spersonnelofficepriortocommencement. Dial-inaccess.Nodial-inaccessisusedtoaccessLANservers.However,ifajustifiableneedoccurs,theIRMDivisionDirectormayauthorizedial-inaccesstoaLANserver.Itisunderstoodthatdial-inaccesswouldposeadditionalsecurityrisks,butmaybecomenecessaryforcertainjobfunctions.Ifdial-inaccessisallowed,IRMDandtheSECURITYOFFICEwillregularlyreviewtelecommunicationslogsandHGAphonerecords,andconductspot-checkstodetermineifHGAbusinessfunctionsarecomplyingwithcontrolsplacedontheuseofdial-inlines.Alldial-incallswilluseone-timepasswords.ConnectiontotheInternet.SomeHGApersonnelhaveaccesstotheInternet.AccesstotheInternetshouldbecloselycontrolledbytheSECURITYOFFICE.HGAdivisions,staffmanagers,andtechniciansshouldknowthatonlyHGA-authorizedInternet IB [PDF page 83] AppendixB—RulesofBehaviorGeneralSupportSystemsconnectionswillbeallowed,andthatallconnectionsmustconformtoHGA'ssecurityandcommunicationsarchitecture.Protectionofcopyrightlicenses(software)—LANandPCusersarenottodownloadLAN-residentsoftware.AuditlogswillbereviewedtodeterminewhetheremployeesattempttoaccessLANserversonwhichvaluable,off-the-shelfsoftwareresides,buttowhichusershavenotbeengrantedaccess.Auditlogswillalsoshowusers'useofa"copy"command;thismayindicateattemptstoillegallydownloadsoftware.UnauthorizedcopyingofPC-basedsoftwareisalsoprohibited.Unofficialuseofgovernmentequipment—Usersshouldbeawarethatpersonaluseofinformationresources—LANandPC-isnotauthorized.Useofpasswords—UsersaretousepasswordsofalengthspecifiedbytheLANsystemadministrators—amixofsix(6)alphaandnumericcharacters,theyaretokeeppasswordsconfidentialandarenottosharepasswordswithanyone.Systemprivileges—UsersaregivenaccesstotheLANbasedonaneedtoperformspecificwork.Usersaretoworkwithintheconfinesoftheaccessallowedandarenottoattemptaccesstosystemsorapplicationstowhichaccesshasnotbeenauthorized.Individualaccountability—UserswillbeheldaccountablefortheiractionsontheLAN.ThisisstressedduringcomputersecurityawarenesstrainingsessionsRestorationofservice—TheavailabilityoftheLANisaconcerntoallusers.AllusersareresponsibleforensuringtherestorationofservicesintheeventtheLANisunoperational. Iacknowledgereceiptof,understandmyresponsibilities,andwillcomplywiththerulesofbehaviorfortheHGABackboneLAN. SignatureofUserDate 2B [PDF page 84] AppendixC-TemplateforMajorApplicationTemplateforSecurityPlanMajorApplicationSecurityPlan SYSTEMIDENTIFICATIONDate:SystemName/Title•UniqueIdentifier&NameGiventotheSystemResponsibleOrganization•ListorganizationresponsiblefortheapplicationInformationContact(s)•Nameofperson(s)knowledgeableabout,ortheownerof,thesystem.NameTitleAddressPhoneAssignmentofSecurityResponsibility•Nameofpersonresponsibleforsecurityofthesystem.NameTitleAddressPhoneSystemOperationalStatusIfmorethanonestatusisselected,listwhichpartofthesystemiscoveredundereachstatus. •Operational•UnderDevelopment•UndergoingamajormodificationGeneralDescription/Purpose•Describethefunctionorpurposeoftheapplicationandtheinformationprocessed.•Describetheprocessingflowoftheapplicationfi"omsysteminputtosystemoutput.•Listuserorganizations(internal&external)andtypeofdataandprocessingprovided. IC [PDF page 85] AppendixC-TemplateforMajorApplicationSystemEnvironment•Provideageneraldescriptionofthetechnicalsystem.Includeanyenvironmentalortechnicalfactorsthatraisespecialsecurityconcerns(dial-uplines,opennetwork,etc.)•Describetheprimarycomputingplatform(s)usedandadescriptionoftheprincipalsystemcomponents,includinghardware,software,andcommunicationsresources.•Includeanysecuritysoftwareprotectingthesystemandmformation.SystemInterconnection/InformationSharing•Listinterconnectedsystemsandsystemidentifiers(ifappropriate).•Ifconnectedtoanexternalsystemnotcoveredbyasecurityplan,provideashortdiscussionofanysecurityconcernsthatneedtobeconsideredforprotection.•Itisrequiredthatwrittenauthorization(MOUs,MOAs)beobtainedpriortoconnectionwithothersystemsand/orsharingsensitivedata/information.Itshoulddetailtherulesofbehaviorthatmustbemaintainedbytheinterconnectingsystems.Adescriptionoftheserulesmustbeincludedwiththesecurityplanordiscussedinthissection.ApplicableLawsorRegulationsAffectingtheSystem•Listanylawsorregulationsthatestablishspecificrequirementsforconfidentiality,integrity,oravailabilityofdata/informationinthesystem.GeneralDescriptionofInformationSensitivity•Describe,ingeneralterms,theinformationhandledbythesystemandtheneedforprotectivemeasures.Relatetheinformationhandledtoeachofthethreebasicprotectionrequirements(confidentiality,integrity,andavailability).Foreachofthethreecategories,indicateiftherequirementis:High,Medium,orLow.•Includeastatementoftheestimatedriskandmagnitudeofharmresultingfromtheloss,misuse,orunauthorizedaccesstoormodificationofinformationinthesystem. MANAGEMENTCONTROLSRiskAssessmentandManagement•Describetheriskassessmentmethodologyusedtoidentifythethreatsandvulnerabilitiesofthesystem.Includethedatethereviewwasconducted.Ifthereisnosystemriskassessment,includeamilestonedate(monthandyear)forcompletionoftheassessment.ReviewofSecurityControls•Listanyindependentsecurityreviewsconductedonthesysteminthelastthreeyears. 2C [PDF page 86] AppendixC-TemplateforMajorApplication •Includeinformationaboutthetypeofsecurityevaluationperformed,whoperformedthereview,thepurposeofthereview,thefindings,andtheactionstakenasaresult. RulesofBehavior•Asetofrulesofbehaviorinwritingmustbeestablishedforeachsystem.Therulesofbehaviorshouldbemadeavailabletoeveryuserpriortoreceivingaccesstothesystem.Itisrecommendedthattherulescontainasignaturepagetoacknowledgereceipt.•Therulesofbehaviorshouldclearlydelineateresponsibilitiesandexpectedbehaviorofallindividualswithaccesstothesystem.Theyshouldstatetheconsequencesofinconsistentbehaviorornon-compliance.Theyshouldalsoincludeappropriatelimitsoninterconnectionstoothersystems.•Attachtherulesofbehaviorforthesystemasanappendixandreferencetheappendixnumberinthissectionorinserttherulesintothissection.PlanningforSecurityintheLifeCycleDeterminewhichphase(s)ofthelifecyclethesystem,orpartsofthesystemarein.Describehowsecurityhasbeenhandledinthelifecyclephase(s)thesystemiscurrentlyin. InitiationPhase•ReferencethesensitivityassessmentwhichisdescribedinSection3.7,SensitivityofInformationHandled.Development/AcquisitionPhase•Duringthesystemdesign,weresecurityrequirementsidentified?•Weretheappropriatesecuritycontrolswithassociatedevaluationandtestproceduresdevelopedbeforetheprocurementaction?•Didthesolicitationdocuments(e.g..RequestforProposals)includesecurityrequirementsandevaluation/testprocedures?•Didtherequirementspermitupdatingsecurityrequirementsasnewthreats/vulnerabilitiesareidentifiedandasnewtechnologiesareimplemented?•Ifthisisapurchasedcommercialapplicationortheapplicationcontainscommercial,off-the-shelfcomponents,weresecurityrequirementsidentifiedandincludedintheacquisitionspecifications?ImplementationPhase•Weredesignreviewsandsystemstestsrunpriortoplacingthesysteminproduction?Werethetestsdocumented?Hasthesystembeencertified?•Havesecuritycontrolsbeenaddedsincedevelopment?•Hastheapplicationundergoneatechnicalevaluationtoensurethatitmeetsapplicablefederallaws,regulations,policies,guidelines,andstandards?•Includethedateofthecertificationandaccreditation.Ifthesystemisnotauthorizedyet,includedatewhenaccreditationrequestwillbemade. 3C [PDF page 87] AppendixC-TemplateforMajorApplication Operation/MaintenancePhase•Thesecurityplandocumentsthesecurityactivitiesrequiredinthisphase.DisposalPhase•Describeinthissectionhowinformationismovedtoanothersystem,archived,discarded,ordestroyed.Discusscontrolsusedtoensuretheconfidentialityoftheinformation.•Issensitivedataencrypted?•Howisinformationclearedandpurgedfromthesystem?•Isinformationormediapurged,overwritten,degaussedordestroyed?AuthorizeProcessing•Providethedateofauthorization,name,andtitleofmanagementofficialauthorizingprocessinginthesystem.•Ifnotauthorized,providethenameandtitleofmanagerrequestingapprovaltooperateanddateofrequest. OPERATIONALCONTROLSPersonnelSecurity•Haveallpositionsbeenreviewedforsensitivitylevel?•Haveindividualsreceivedbackgroundscreeningsappropriateforthepositiontowhichtheyareassigned.•Isuseraccessrestrictedtotheminimumnecessarytoperformthejob?•Isthereaprocessforrequesting,establishing,issuing,andclosinguseraccounts?•Arecriticalfunctionsdividedamongdifferentindividuals(separationofduties)?•Whatmechanismsareinplaceforholdingusersresponsiblefortheiractions?•Whatarethefriendlyandunfriendlyterminationprocedures?PhysicalandEnvironmentalProtection•Discussthephysicalprotectionintheareawhereapplicationprocessingtakesplace(e.g.,locksonterminals,physicalbarriersaroundthebuildingandprocessingarea,etc.)•Factorstoaddressincludephysicalaccess,firesafety,failureofsupportingutilities,structuralcollapse,plumbingleaks,interceptionofdata,mobileandportablesystems.Production,Input/OutputControlsDescribethecontrolsusedforthemarking,handling,processing,storage,anddisposalofinputandoutputinformationandmedia,aswellaslabelinganddistributionproceduresfortheinformationandmedia.Thecontrolsusedtomonitortheinstallationof,andupdatesto,applicationsoftwareshouldbelisted.Inthissection,provideasynopsisoftheproceduresinplacethatsupporttheoperationsoftheapplication.Belowisasamplingoftopicsthatshouldbereportedinthissection. •UserSupport-Isthereahelpdeskorgroupthatoffersadviceandcanrespondto 4C [PDF page 88] AppendixC-TemplateforMajorApplicationsecurityincidentsinatimelymanner?Arethereproceduresinplacedocumentinghowtorecognize,handle,andreportincidentsand/orproblems?•Procedurestoensureunauthorizedindividualscannotread,copy,alter,orstealprintedorelectronicinformation•Proceduresforensuringthatonlyauthorizeduserspickup,receive,ordeliverinputandoutputinformationandmedia•Audittrailsforreceiptofsensitiveinputs/outputs•Proceduresforrestrictingaccesstooutputproducts•Proceduresandcontrolsusedfortransportingormailingmediaorprintedoutput•kitemal/extemallabelingforsensitivity(e.g.,PrivacyAct,Proprietary)•Externallabelingwithspecialhandlinginstructions(e.g.,log/inventoryidentifiers,controlledaccess,specialstorageinstructions,releaseordestructiondates)•Audittrailsforinventorymanagement•Mediastoragevaultorlibrary-physical,environmentalprotectioncontrols/procedures•Proceduresforsanitizingelectronicmediaforreuse(e.g.,overwritingordegaussing)•Proceduresforcontrolledstorage,handling,ordestructionofspoiledmediaormediathatcannotbeeffectivelysanitizedforreuse•ProceduresforshreddingorotherdestructivemeasuresforhardcopymediawhennolongerrequiredContingencyPlanningBrieflydescribetheprocedures(contingencyplan)thatwouldbefollowedtoensuretheapplicationcontinuestobeprocessedifthesupportingITsystemswereunavailable.Ifaformalcontingencyplanhasbeencompleted,referencetheplan.Acopyofthecontingencyplancanbeattachedasanappendix. •Includedescriptionsforthefollowing:>Anyagreementsofbackupprocessing>Documentedbackupproceduresincludingfrequency(daily,weekly,monthly)andscope(full,incremental,anddifferentialbackup)>Locationofstoredbackupsandgenerationsofbackups•Aretestedcontingency/disasterrecoveryplansinplace?Howoftenaretheytested?•Areallemployeestrainedintheirrolesandresponsibilitiesrelativetotheemergency,disaster,andcontingencyplans?•Coverageofbackupprocedures,e.g.,whatisbeingbackedup?ApplicationSoftwareMaintenanceControls•Wastheapplicationsoftwaredevelopedin-houseorundercontract?•Doesthegovernmentownthesoftware?Wasitreceivedfromanotheragency?•Istheapplicationsoftwareacopyrightedcommercialoff-the-shelfproductorshareware?Hasitbeenproperlylicensedandenoughcopiespurchasedforallsystems? 5C [PDF page 89] AppendixC-TemplateforMajorApplication •Isthereaformalchangecontrolprocessinplaceandifso,doesitrequirethatallchangestotheapplicationsoftwarebetestedandapprovedbeforebeingputintoproduction?•Aretestdata"live"dataormade-updata?•Areallchangestotheapplicationsoftwaredocumented?•Aretestresultsdocumented?•Howareemergencyfixeshandled?•Arethereorganizationalpoliciesagainstillegaluseofcopyrightedsoftware,shareware?•Areperiodicauditsconductedofusers'computerstoensureonlylegallicensedcopiesofsoftwareareinstalled?•Whatproductsandproceduresareusedtoprotectagainstillegaluseofsoftware?•Aresoftwarewarrantiesmanagedtominimizethecostofupgradesandcost-reimbursementorreplacementfordeficiencies?DataIntegrityA^alidationControls•Isvirusdetectionandeliminationsoftwareinstalled?Ifso,arethereproceduresforupdatingvirussignaturefiles,automaticand/ormanualvirusscans,andviruseradicationandreporting?•Isreconciliationroutinesusedbythesystem,i.e.,checksums,hashtotals,recordcounts?Includeadescriptionoftheactionstakentoresolveanydiscrepancies.•Ispasswordcrackers/checkersused?•Isintegrityverificationprogramsusedbyapplicationstolookforevidenceofdatatampering,errors,andomissions?•Areintrusiondetectiontoolsinstalledonthesystem?•Issystemperformancemonitoringusedtoanalyzesystemperformancelogsinrealtimetolookforavailabilityproblems,includingactiveattacks,andsystemandnetworkslowdownsandcrashes?•Ispenetrationtestingperformedonthesystem?Ifso,whatproceduresareinplacetoensuretheyareconductedappropriately?•Ismessageauthenticationusedintheapplicationtoensurethatthesenderofamessageisknownandthatthemessagehasnotbeenalteredduringtransmission?DocumentationDocumentationforasystemincludesdescriptionsofthehardwareandsoftware,policies,standards,procedures,andapprovalsrelatedtoautomatedinformationsystemsecurityintheapplicationandthesupportsystems(s)onwhichitisprocessed,toincludebackupandcontingencyactivities,aswellasdescriptionsofuserandoperatorprocedures.•Listthedocumentationmaintainedfortheapplication(vendordocumentationofhardware/software,functionalrequirements,securityplan,generalsystemsecurityplan,applicationprogrammanuals,testresultsdocuments,standardoperatingprocedures,emergencyprocedures,contingencyplans,userrules/procedures,riskassessment,certificadon/accreditationstatements/documents,verificationreviews/siteinspections.) 6C [PDF page 90] I AppendixC-TemplateforMajorApplicarionSecurityAwarenessandTraining•Describetheawarenessprogramfortheapplication(posters,booklets,andtrinkets).•Describethetypeandfrequencyofapplication-specificandgeneralsupportsystemtrainingprovidedtoemployeesandcontractorpersonnel(seminars,workshops,formalclassroom,focusgroups,role-basedtraining,andon-thejobtraining).•Describetheproceduresforassuringthatemployeesandcontractorpersonnelhavebeenprovidedadequatetraining. TECHNICALCONTROLSIdentificationandAuthentication•Describethemajorapplication'sauthenticationcontrolmechanisms.•Describethemethodofuserauthentication(password,token,andbiometrics)•Providethefollowingifanadditionalpasswordsystemisusedintheapplication:>passwordlength(minimum,maximum)>allowablecharacterset,>passwordagingtimeframesandenforcementapproach,>numberofgenerationsofexpiredpasswordsdisallowedforuse>proceduresforpasswordchanges(afterexpirationandforgotten/lost)>proceduresforhandlingpasswordcompromise•hidicatethefi^equencyofpasswordchanges,describehowchangesareenforced,andidentifywhochangesthepasswords(theuser,thesystem,orthesystemadministrator).•Describehowtheaccesscontrolmechanismsupportindividualaccountabilityandaudittrails(e.g.,passwordsareassociatedwithauserIDthatisassignedtoasingleperson).•Describetheself-protectiontechniquesfortheuserauthenticationmechanism(passwordsareencrypted,automaticallygenerated,arecheckedagainstadictionaryofdisallowedpasswords,passwordsareencryptedwhileintransmission).•Statethenumberofinvalidaccessattemptsthatmayoccurforagivenuseridoraccesslocation(terminalorport)anddescribetheactionstakenwhenthatlimitisexceeded.•Describetheproceduresforverifyingthatallsystem-providedadministrativedefaultpasswordshavebeenchanged.•Describetheproceduresforlimitingaccessscriptswithembeddedpasswords(e.g.,scriptswithembeddedpasswordsareprohibited,scriptswithembeddedpasswordsareonlyallowedforbatchapplications).•Describeanypoliciesthatprovideforbypassinguserauthenticationrequirements,single-sign-ontechnologies(e.g.,host-to-host,authenticationservers,user-to-hostidentifiers,andgroupuseridentifiers)andanycompensatingcontrols.•Describeanyuseofdigitalorelectronicsignaturesandthestandardsused.Discussthekeymanagementproceduresforkeygeneration,distribution,storage,anddisposal. 7C [PDF page 91] AppendixC-TemplateforMajorApplication LogicalAccessControls•Discussthecontrolsinplacetoauthorizeorrestricttheactivitiesofusersandsystempersonnelwithintheapplication.Describehardwareorsoftwarefeaturesthataredesignedtopermitonlyauthorizedaccesstoorwithintheapplication,torestrictuserstoauthorizedtransactionsandftinctions,and/ortodetectunauthorizedactivities(i.e.,accesscontrollists[ACLs]).•Howareaccessrightsgranted?Areprivilegesgrantedbasedonjobfunction?•Describetheapplication'scapabilitytoestablishanACLorregister.•DescribehowapplicationusersarerestrictedfromaccessingtheoperatingVsystem,otherapplications,orothersystemresourcesnotneededintheperformanceoftheirduties.•Describecontrolstodetectunauthorizedtransactionattemptsbyauthorizedand/orunauthorizedusers.Describeanyrestrictionstopreventusersfromaccessingthesystemorapplicationsoutsideofnormalworkhoursoronweekends.•Indicateafterwhatperiodofuserinactivitythesystemautomaticallyblanksassociateddisplayscreensand/orafterwhatperiodofuserinactivitythesystemautomaticallydisconnectsinactiveusersorrequirestheusertoenterauniquepasswordbeforereconnectingtothesystemorapplication.•Indicateifencryptionisusedtopreventaccesstosensitivefilesaspartofthesystemorapplicationaccesscontrolprocedures.•Describetherationaleforelectingtouseornotusewarningbannersandprovideanexampleofthebannersused.Whereappropriate,statewhethertheDept.of ,!•Justice,ComputerCrimeandIntellectualPropertiesSection,approvedthewarningbanner.PublicAccessControlsIfthepublicaccessesthemajorapplication,discusstheadditionalsecuritycontrolsusedtoprotecttheintegrityoftheapplicationandtheconfidenceofthepublicintheapplication.Suchcontrolsincludesegregatinginformationmadedirectlyaccessibletothepublicfromofficialagencyrecords.Othersmightinclude:•Someformofidentificationandauthentication•Accesscontroltolimitwhattheusercanread,write,modify,ordelete•Controlstopreventpublicusersfrommodifyinginformationonthesystem•Digitalsignatures•CD-ROMforon-linestorageofinformationfordistribution•Putcopiesofinformationforpublicaccessonaseparatesystem•Prohibitpublictoaccess"live"databases•Verifythatprogramsandinformationdistributedtothepublicarevirus-free•Audittrailsanduserconfidentiality•Systemanddataavailability•LegalconsiderationsAuditTrails•Doestheaudittrailsupportaccountabilitybyprovidingatraceofuseractions?•Areaudittrailsdesignedandimplementedtorecordappropriateinformationthat 8C [PDF page 92] AppendixC-TemplateforMajorApplicationcanassistinintrusiondetection?•Doestheaudittrailincludesufficientinformationtoestablishwhateventsoccurredandwho(orwhat)causedthem?(typeofevent,whentheeventoccurred,useridassociatedwiththeevent,programorcommandusedtoinitiatetheevent.)•Isaccesstoonlineauditlogsstrictlyenforced?•Istheconfidentialityofaudittrailinformationprotectedif,forexamples,itrecordspersonalinformationaboutusers?•Describehowfrequentlyaudittrailsarereviewedandwhetherthereareguidelines.•Doestheappropriatesystem-levelorapplication-leveladministratorreviewtheaudittrailsfollowingaknownsystemorapplicationsoftwareproblem,aknownviolationofexistingrequirementsbyauser,orsomeunexplainedsystemoruserproblem. 9C [PDF page 93] AppendixC-TemplateforGeneralSupportSystemGeneralSupportSystemSecurityPlanSYSTEMIDENTIFICATIONDate:SystemName/Title•UniqueIdentifierandNameGiventotheSystemResponsibleOrganization•ListorganizationresponsibleforthesystemInformationContact(s)•Nameofperson(s)knowledgeableabout,ortheownerof,thesystem.NameTitleAddressPhoneAssignmentofSecurityResponsibility•Nameofpersonresponsibleforsecurityofthesystem.NameTitleAddressPhoneSystemOperationalStatusIfmorethanonestamsisselected,listwhichpartofthesystemiscoveredundereachstatus. •Operational•UnderDevelopment•UndergoingamajormodificationGeneralDescription/Purpose•Describethefunctionorpurposeofthesystemandtheinformationprocessed.•Describetheprocessingflowoftheapplicationfromsysteminputtosystemoutput.•Listuserorganizations(internalandexternal)andtypeofdataandprocessingprovided.•Listallapplicationssupportedbythegeneralsupportsystem.Describeeachapplication'sfunctionsandinformationprocessed. IOC [PDF page 94] AppendixC-TemplateforGeneralSupportSystemSystemEnvironment•Provideageneraldescriptionofthetechnicalsystem.Includeanyenvironmentalortechnicalfactorsthatraisespecialsecurityconcerns(dial-uplines,opennetwork,etc.)•Describetheprimarycomputingplatform(s)usedandadescriptionoftheprincipalsystemcomponents,includinghardware,software,andcommunicationsresources.•hicludeanysecuritysoftwareprotectingthesystemandinformation.SystemInterconnection/InformationSharing•Listofinterconnectedsystemsandsystemidentifiers(ifappropriate).•Ifconnectedtoanexternalsystemnotcoveredbyasecurityplan,provideashortdiscussionofanysecurityconcernsthatneedtobeconsideredforprotection. •Itisrequiredthatwrittenauthorization(MOUs,MOAs)beobtainedpriortoconnectionwithothersystemsand/orsharingsensitivedata/information.Itshoulddetailtherulesofbehaviorthatmustbemaintainedbytheinterconnectingsystems.Adescriptionoftheserulesmustbeincludedwiththesecurityplanordiscussedinthissection.ApplicableLawsorRegulationsAffectingtheSystem•Listanylawsorregulationsthatestablishspecificrequirementsforconfidentiality,integrity,oravailabilityofdata/informationinthesystem.GeneralDescriptionofInformationSensitivity•Describe,ingeneralterms,theinformationhandledbythesystemandtheneedforprotectivemeasures.Relatetheinformationhandledtoeachofthethreebasicprotectionrequirements(confidentiality,integrity,andavailability).Foreachofthethreecategories,indicateiftherequirementis:High,Medium,orLow.•Includeastatementoftheestimatedriskandmagnitudeofharmresultingfi-omtheloss,misuse,orunauthorizedaccesstoormodificationofinformationinthesystem. MANAGEMENTCONTROLSRiskAssessmentandManagement•Describetheriskassessmentmethodologyusedtoidentifythethreatsandvulnerabilitiesofthesystem.Includethedatethereviewwasconducted.Ifthereisnosystemriskassessment,includeamilestonedate(monthandyear)forcompletionoftheassessment.ReviewofSecurityControls•Listanyindependentsecurityreviewsconductedonthesysteminthelastthreeyears. lie [PDF page 95] AppendixC-TemplateforGeneralSupportSystem•Includeinformationaboutthetypeofsecurityevaluationperformed,whoperformedthereview,thepurposeofthereview,thefindings,andtheactionstakenasaresult. RulesofBehavior•Asetofrulesofbehaviorinwritingmustbeestablishedforeachsystem.Therulesofbehaviorshouldbemadeavailabletoeveryuserpriortoreceivingaccesstothesystem.Itisrecommendedthattherulescontainasignaturepagetoacknowledgereceipt.•Therulesofbehaviorshouldclearlydelineateresponsibilitiesandexpectedbehaviorofallindividualswithaccesstothesystem.Theyshouldstatetheconsequencesofinconsistentbehaviorornoncompliance.Theyshouldalsoincludeappropriatelimitsoninterconnectionstoothersystems.•Attachtherulesofbehaviorforthesystemasanappendixandreferencetheappendixnumberinthissectionorinserttherulesintothissection.PlanningforSecurityintheLifeCycleDeterminewhichphase(s)ofthelifecyclethesystemorpartsofthesystemarein.Describehowsecurityhasbeenhandledinthelifecyclephase(s)thatthesystemiscurrentlyin. InitiationPhase•ReferencethesensitivityassessmentwhichisdescribedinSection3.7,SensitivityofInformationHandled.Development/AcquisitionPhase•Duringthesystemdesign,weresecurityrequirementsidentified?•Weretheappropriatesecuritycontrolswithassociatedevaluationandtestproceduresdevelopedbeforetheprocurementaction?•Didthesolicitationdocuments(e.g..RequestforProposals)includesecurityrequirementsandevaluation/testprocedures?•Didtherequirementspermitupdatingsecurityrequirementsasnewthreats/vulnerabilitiesareidentifiedandasnewtechnologiesareimplemented?•Ifthisisapurchasedcommercialapplicationortheapplicationcontainscommercial,off-the-shelfcomponents,weresecurityrequirementsidentifiedandincludedintheacquisitionspecifications?ImplementationPhase•Weredesignreviewsandsystemstestsrunpriortoplacingthesysteminproduction?Werethetestsdocumented?Hasthesystembeencertified?•Havesecuritycontrolsbeenaddedsincedevelopment?•Hastheapplicationundergoneatechnicalevaluationtoensurethatitmeetsapplicablefederallaws,regulations,policies,guidelines,andstandards?•Includethedateofthecertificationandaccreditation.Ifthesystemisnotauthorizedyet,includedatewhenaccreditationrequestwillbemade. 12C [PDF page 96] AppendixC-TemplateforGeneralSupportSystemOperation/MaintenancePhase•Thesecurityplandocumentsthesecurityactivitiesrequiredinthisphase.DisposalPhase•Describeinthissectionhowinformationismovedtoanothersystem,archived,discarded,ordestroyed.Discusscontrolsusedtoensuretheconfidentialityoftheinformation.•Issensitivedataencrypted?•Howisinformationclearedandpurgedfromthesystem?•Isinformationormediapurged,overwritten,degaussedordestroyed?AuthorizeProcessing•Providethedateofauthorization,name,andtitleofmanagementofficialauthorizingprocessinginthesystem.•Ifnotauthorized,providethenameandtitleofmanagerrequestingapprovaltooperateanddateofrequest. OPERATIONALCONTROLSPersonnelSecurity•Haveallpositionsbeenreviewedforsensitivitylevel?•Haveindividualsreceivedbackgroundscreeningsappropriateforthepositiontowhichtheyareassigned.•Isuseraccessrestrictedtotheminimumnecessarytoperformthejob?•Isthereaprocessforrequesting,establishing,issuing,andclosinguseraccounts?•Arecriticalfunctionsdividedamongdifferentindividuals(separationofduties)?•Whatmechanismsareinplaceforholdingusersresponsiblefortheiractions?•Whatarethefriendlyandunfriendlyterminationprocedures?PhysicalandEnvironmentalProtection•Discussthephysicalprotectionforthesystem.Describetheareawhereprocessingtakesplace(e.g.,locksonterminals,physicalbarriersaroundthebuildingandprocessingarea,etc.)•Factorstoaddressincludephysicalaccess,firesafety,failureofsupportingutilities,structuralcollapse,plumbingleaks,interceptionofdata,mobileandportablesystems.Production,Input/OutputControlsDescribethecontrolsusedforthemarking,handling,processing,storage,anddisposalofinputandoutputinformationandmedia,aswellaslabelinganddistributionproceduresfortheinformationandmedia.Thecontrolsusedtomonitortheinstallationof,andupdatesto,softwareshouldbelisted.Inthissection,provideasynopsisoftheproceduresinplacethatsupportthesystem.Belowisasamplingoftopicsthatshouldbereportedinthissection. •Usersupport-Isthereahelpdeskorgroupthatoffersadvice? 13C [PDF page 97] AppendixC-TemplateforGeneralSupportSystem •Procedurestoensureunauthorizedindividualscannotread,copy,alter,orstealprintedorelectronicinformation•Proceduresforensuringthatonlyauthorizeduserspickup,receive,ordeliverinputandoutputinformationandmedia•Audittrailsforreceiptofsensitiveinputs/outputs•Proceduresforrestrictingaccesstooutputproducts•Proceduresandcontrolsusedfortransportingormailingmediaorprintedoutput•Internal/externallabelingforsensitivity(e.g.,PrivacyAct,Proprietary)•Externallabelingwithspecialhandlinginstructions(e.g.,log/inventoryidentifiers,controlledaccess,specialstorageinstructions,releaseordestructiondates)•Audittrailsforinventorymanagement•Mediastoragevaultorlibrary-physical,environmentalprotectioncontrols/procedures•Proceduresforsanitizingelectronicmediaforreuse(e.g.,overwritingordegaussing)•Proceduresforcontrolledstorage,handling,ordestructionofspoiledmediaormediathatcannotbeeffectivelysanitizedforreuse•ProceduresforshreddingorotherdestructivemeasuresforhardcopymediawhennolongerrequiredContingencyPlanningBrieflydescribetheprocedures(contingencyplan)thatwouldbefollowedtoensurethesystemcontinuestoprocessallcriticalapplicationsifadisasterweretooccur.Ifaformalcontingencyplanhasbeencompleted,referencetheplan.Acopyofthecontingencyplancanbeattachedasanappendix. •Anyagreementsofbackupprocessing•Documentedbackupproceduresinincludingfrequency(daily,weekly,monthly)andscope(full,incremental,anddifferentialbackup)•Locationofstoredbackupsandgenerationsofbackupskept•Aretestedcontingency/disasterrecoveryplansinplace?Howoftenaretheytested?•Areallemployeestrainedintheirrolesandresponsibilitiesrelativetotheemergency,disaster,andcontingencyplans?HardwareandSystemSoftwareMaintenanceControls•Restriction/controlsonthosewhoperformmaintenanceandrepairactivities.•Specialproceduresforperformanceofemergencyrepairandmaintenance.•Proceduresusedforitemsservicedthroughon-siteandoff-sitemaintenance(e.g.,escortofmaintenancepersonnel,sanitizationofdevicesremovedfromthesite).•Proceduresusedforcontrollingremotemaintenanceserviceswherediagnosticproceduresormaintenanceisperformedthroughtelecommunicationsarrangements. 14C [PDF page 98] AppendixC-TemplateforGeneralSupportSystem•Versioncontrolthatallowsassociationofsystemcomponentstotheappropriatesystemversion.•Proceduresfortestingand/orapprovingsystemcomponents(operatingsystem,othersystem,utility,applications)priortopromotiontoproduction.•Impactanalysestodeterminetheeffectofproposedchangesonexistingsecuritycontrolstoincludetherequiredtrainingforbothtechnicalandusercommunitiesassociatedwiththechangeinhardware/software.•Changeidentification,approval,anddocumentationprocedures.•Proceduresforensuringcontingencyplansandotherassociateddocumentationareupdatedtoreflectsystemchanges.•Aretestdata"live"dataormade-updata?.•Arethereorganizationalpoliciesagainstillegaluseofcopyrightedsoftwareorshareware?IntegrityControls•Isvirusdetectionandeliminationsoftwareinstalled?Ifso,arethereproceduresforupdatingvirussignaturefiles,automaticand/ormanualvirusscans,andviruseradicationandreporting?•Isreconciliationroutinesusedbythesystem,i.e.,checksums,hashtotals,recordcounts?Includeadescriptionoftheactionstakentoresolveanydiscrepancies.•Ispasswordcrackers/checkersused?•Isintegrityverificationprogramsusedbyapplicationstolookforevidenceofdatatampering,errors,andomissions?•Areintrusiondetectiontoolsinstalledonthesystem?•Issystemperformancemonitoringusedtoanalyzesystemperformancelogsinrealtimetolookforavailabilityproblems,includingactiveattacks,andsystemandnetworkslowdownsandcrashes?•Ispenetrationtestingperformedonthesystem?Ifso,whatproceduresareinplacetoensuretheyareconductedappropriately?•Ismessageauthenticationusedinthesystemtoensurethatthesenderofamessageisknownandthatthemessagehasnotbeenalteredduringtransmission?DocumentationDocumentationforasystemincludesdescriptionsofthehardwareandsoftware,policies,standards,procedures,andapprovalsrelatedtoautomatedinformationsystemsecurityofthesystemtoincludebackupandcontingencyactivities,aswellasdescriptionsofuserandoperatorprocedures. •Listthedocumentationmaintainedforthesystem(vendordocumentationofhardware/software,ftinctionalrequirements,securityplan,programmanuals,testresultsdocuments,standardoperatingprocedures,emergencyprocedures,contingencyplans,userrules/procedures,riskassessment,authorizationforprocessing,verificationreviews/siteinspections).SecurityAwareness&Training•Theawarenessprogramforthesystem(posters,booklets,andtrinkets) 15C [PDF page 99] AppendixC-TemplateforGeneralSupportSystem•Typeandfrequencyofgeneralsupportsystemtrainingprovidedtoemployeesandcontractorpersonnel(seminars,workshops,formalclassroom,focusgroups,role-basedtraining,andon-thejobtraining)•TheproceduresforassuringthatemployeesandcontractorpersonnelhavebeenprovidedadequatetrainingIncidentResponseCapability•Arethereproceduresforreportingincidentshandledeitherbysystempersonnelorexternally?•Arethereproceduresforrecognizingandhandlingincidents,i.e.,whatfilesandlogsshouldbekept,whotocontact,andwhen?•Whoreceivesandrespondstoalerts/advisories,e.g.,vendorpatches,exploitedvulnerabilities?•Whatpreventativemeasuresareinplace,i.e.,intrusiondetectiontools,automatedauditlogs,penetrationtesting? TECHNICALCONTROLSIdentificationandAuthentication•Describethemethodofuserauthentication(password,token,andbiometrics).•Ifapasswordsystemisused,providethefollowingspecificinformation:•Allowablecharacterset;•Passwordlength(minimum,maximum);•Passwordagingtimeframesandenforcementapproach;•Numberofgenerationsofexpiredpasswordsdisallowedforuse;•Proceduresforpasswordchanges;•Proceduresforhandlinglostpasswords,and•Proceduresforhandlingpasswordcompromise.•Proceduresfortrainingusersandthematerialscovered.•Indicatethefrequencyofpasswordchanges,describehowpasswordchangesareenforced(e.g.,bythesoftwareorSystemAdministrator),andidentifywhochangesthepasswords(theuser,thesystem,ortheSystemAdministrator).•Describeanybiometricscontrolsused.Includeadescriptionofhowthebiometricscontrolsareimplementedonthesystem.•Describeanytokencontrolsusedonthissystemandhowtheyareimplemented.•Describethelevelofenforcementoftheaccesscontrolmechanism(network,operatingsystem,andapplication).•Describehowtheaccesscontrolmechanismsupportsindividualaccountabilityandaudittrails(e.g.,passwordsareassociatedwithauseridentifierthatisassignedtoasingleindividual).•Describetheself-protectiontechniquesfortheuserauthenticationmechanism(e.g.,passwordsaretransmittedandstoredwithone-wayencryptiontopreventanyone[includingtheSystemAdministrator]fromreadingtheclear-text 16C [PDF page 100] AppendixC-TemplateforGeneralSupportSystempasswords,passwordsareautomaticallygenerated,passwordsarecheckedagainstadictionaryofdisallowedpasswords).•Statethenumberofinvalidaccessattemptsthatmayoccurforagivenuseridentifieroraccesslocation(terminalorport)anddescribetheactionstakenwhenthatlimitisexceeded.•Describetheproceduresforverifyingthatallsystem-providedadministrativedefaultpasswordshavebeenchanged.•Describetheproceduresforlimitingaccessscriptswithembeddedpasswords(e.g.,scriptswithembeddedpasswordsareprohibited,scriptswithembeddedpasswordsareonlyallowedforbatchapplications).•Describeanypoliciesthatprovideforbypassinguserauthenticationrequirements,single-sign-ontechnologies(e.g.,host-to-host,authenticationservers,user-to-hostidentifier,andgroupuseridentifiers)andanycompensatingcontrols.•Ifdigitalsignaturesareused,thetechnologymustconformswithFIPS186,DigitalSignatureStandardandFIPS180-1,SecureHashStandardissuedbyNIST,unlessawaiverhasbeengranted.Describeanyuseofdigitalorelectronicsignatures.LogicalAccessControls•Discussthecontrolsinplacetoauthorizeorrestricttheactivitiesofusersandsystempersonnelwithinthesystem.Describehardwareorsoftwarefeaturesthataredesignedtopermitonlyauthorizedaccesstoorwithinthesystem,torestrictuserstoauthorizedtransactionsandfunctions,and/ortodetectunauthorizedactivities(i.e.,accesscontrollists(ACLs).•Howareaccessrightsgranted?Areprivilegesgrantedbasedonjobfunction?•Describethesystem'scapabilitytoestablishanACLorregister.•Describehowusersarerestrictedfromaccessingtheoperatingsystem,otherapplications,orothersystemresourcesnotneededintheperformanceoftheirduties.•Describecontrolstodetectunauthorizedtransactionattemptsbyauthorizedand/orunauthorizedusers.Describeanyrestrictionstopreventuserfromaccessingthesystemorapplicationsoutsideofnormalworkhoursoronweekends.•Indicateafterwhatperiodofuserinactivitythesystemautomaticallyblanksassociateddisplayscreensand/orafterwhatperiodofuserinactivitythesystemautomaticallydisconnectsinactiveusersorrequirestheusertoenterauniquepasswordbeforereconnectingtothesystemorapplication.•Indicateifencryptionisusedtopreventaccesstosensitivefilesaspartofthesystemorapplicationaccesscontrolprocedures.•Describetherationaleforelectingtouseornotusewarningbannersandprovideanexampleofthebannersused.Whereappropriate,statewhethertheDept.ofJustice,ComputerCrimeandIntellectualPropertiesSection,approvedthewarningbanner. 17C [PDF page 101] AppendixC-TemplateforGeneralSupportSystemAuditTrails•Doestheaudittrailsupportaccountabilitybyprovidingatraceofuseractions?•Areaudittrailsdesignedandimplementedtorecordappropriateinformationthatcanassistinintrusiondetection?•Doestheaudittrailincludesufficientinformationtoestablishwhateventsoccurredandwho(orwhat)causedthem?(typeofevent,whentheeventoccurred,useridassociatedwiththeevent,programorcommandusedtoinitiatetheevent.)•Isaccesstoonlineauditlogsstrictlyenforced?•Istheconfidentialityofaudittrailinformationprotectedif,forexample,itrecordspersonalinformationaboutusers?•Describehowfrequentlyaudittrailsarereviewedandwhetherthereareguidelines.•Doestheappropriatesystem-levelorapplication-leveladministratorreviewtheaudittrailsfollowingaknownsystemorapplicationsoftwareproblem,aknownviolationofexistingrequirementsbyauser,orsomeunexplainedsystemoruserproblem? 18C [PDF page 102] AppendixD-GlossaryGlossary AcceptableRiskisaconcernthatisacceptabletoresponsiblemanagement,duetothecostandmagnitudeofimplementingcountermeasures.Accreditationissynonymouswiththetermauthorizeprocessing.Accreditationistheauthorizationandapprovalgrantedtoamajorapplicationorgeneralsupportsystemtoprocessinanoperationalenvironment.Itismadeonthebasisofacertificationbydesignatedtechnicalpersonnelthatthesystemmeetspre-specifiedtechnicalrequirementsforachievingadequatesystemsecurity.SeealsoAuthorizeProcessing,CertificationandDesignatedApprovingAuthority.AuthorizeProcessingoccurswhenmanagementauthorizesasystembasedonanassessmentofmanagement,operationalandtechnicalcontrols.Byauthorizingprocessinginasystemthemanagementofficialacceptstheriskassociatedwithit.SeealsoAccreditation,Certification,andDesignatedApprovingAuthority.AvailabilityProtectionrequiresbackupofsystemandinformation,contingencyplans,disasterrecoveryplans,andredundancy.Examplesofsystemsandinformationrequiringavailabilityprotectionaretime-sharesystems,mission-criticalapplications,timeandattendance,financial,procurement,orlife-critical. Awareness,TrainingandEducationincludes(1)awarenessprogramssetthestagefortrainingbychangingorganizationalattitudestowardrealizationoftheimportanceofsecurityandtheadverseconsequencesofitsfailure;(2)thepurposeoftrainingistoteachpeopletheskillsthatwillenablethemtoperformtheirjobsmoreeffectively;and(3)educationismorein-depththantrainingandistargetedforsecurityprofessionalsandthosewhosejobsrequireexpertiseinautomatedinformationsecurity. Certificationissynonymouswiththetermauthorizeprocessing.Certificationisthetechnicalevaluationthatestablishestheextenttowhichacomputersystem,application,ornetworkdesignandimplementationmeetsapre-specifiedsetofsecurityrequirements.Seealso{Accreditation)and{AuthorizeProcessing.)ConfidentialityProtectionrequiresaccesscontrolssuchasuserID/passwords,terminalidentifiers,restrictionsonactionslikeread,write,delete,etc.Examplesofconfidentiality-protectedinformationarepersonnel,financial,proprietary,tradesecrets,internalagency,investigations,otherfederalagency,nationalresources,nationalsecurity,andhighornewtechnologyunderExecutiveOrderorActofCongress.DesignatedApprovingAuthority(DAA)istheseniormanagementofficialwhohastheauthoritytoauthorizeprocessing(accredit)anautomatedinformation(majorapplication)or(generalsupportsystem)andaccepttheriskassociatedwiththesystem. ID [PDF page 103] AppendixD-GlossaryGeneralSupportSystemisaninterconnectedinformationresourceunderthesamedirectmanagementcontrolthatsharescommonfunctionality.Itnormallyincludeshardware,software,information,data,applications,communications,facilities,andpeopleandprovidessupportforavarietyofusersand/orapplications,hidividualapplicationssupportdifferentmission-relatedfunctions.Usersmaybefromthesameordifferentorganizations.IndividualAccountabilityrequiresindividualuserstobeheldaccountablefortheiractionsafterbeingnotifiedoftherulesofbehaviorintheuseofthesystemandthepenaltiesassociatedwiththeviolationofthoserules. MajorApplicationisanapplicationthatrequiresspecialattentiontosecurityduetotheriskandmagnitudeoftheharmresultingfromtheloss,misuse,orunauthorizedaccesstoormodificationoftheinformationintheapplication.Abreachinamajorapplicationmightcomprisemanyindividualapplicationprogramsandhardware,software,andtelecommunicationscomponents.Majorapplicationscanbeeitheramajorsoftwareapplicationoracombinationofhardware/softwarewheretheonlypurposeofthesystemistosupportaspecificmission-relatedfunction.Networksincludecommunicationcapabilitythatallowsoneuserorsystemtocormecttoanotheruserorsystemandcanbepartofasystemoraseparatesystem.Examplesofnetworksincludelocalareanetworkorwideareanetworks,includingpublicnetworkssuchastheInternet.OperationalControlsaddresssecuritymethodsthatfocusonmechanismsthatprimarilyareimplementedandexecutedbypeople(asopposedtosystems).Riskisthepossibilityofharmorlosstoanysoftware,information,hardware,administrative,physical,communications,orpersoimelresourcewithinanautomatedinformationsystemoractivity. RiskManagementistheongoingprocessofassessingtherisktoautomatedinformationresourcesandinformation,aspartofarisk-basedapproachusedtodetermineadequatesecurityforasystembyanalyzingthethreatsandvulnerabilitiesandselectingappropriatecost-effectivecontrolstoachieveandmaintainanacceptablelevelofrisk. RulesofBehavioraretherulesthathavebeenestablishedandimplementedconcerninguseof,securityin,andacceptablelevelofriskforthesystem.Ruleswillclearlydelineateresponsibilitiesandexpectedbehaviorofallindividualswithaccesstothesystem.Rulesshouldcoversuchmattersasworkathome,dial-inaccess,connectiontotheInternet,useofcopyrightedworks,unofficialuseoffederalgovernmentequipment,theassignmentandlimitationofsystemprivileges,andindividualaccountability.SensitiveInformationreferstoinformationthatrequiresprotectionduetotheriskandmagnitudeoflossorharmthatcouldresultfrominadvertentordeliberatedisclosure,alteration,ordestructionoftheinformation.Thetermincludesinformationwhose 2D [PDF page 104] AppendixD-Glossaryimproperuseordisclosurecouldadverselyaffecttheabilityofanagencytoaccomplishitsmission,proprietaryinformation,recordsaboutindividualsrequiringprotectionunderthePrivacyAct,andinformationnotreleasableundertheFreedomofInformationAct.Sensitivityinaninformationtechnologyenvironmentconsistsofthesystem,data,andapplicationswhichmustbeexaminedindividuallyandintotal.Allsystemsandapplicationsrequiresomelevelofprotectionforconfidentiality,integrity,andavailabilitywhichisdeterminedbyanevaluationofthesensitivityandcriticalityoftheinformationprocessed,therelationshipofthesystemtotheorganizationsmission,andtheeconomicvalueofthesystemcomponents.Systemisagenerictermusedforbriefnesstomeaneitheramajorapplicationorageneralsupportsystem.SystemOperationalStatusiseither(a)Operational-systemiscurrentlyinoperation,(b)UnderDevelopment-systemiscurrentlyunderdesign,development,orimplementation,or(c)UndergoingaMajorModification-systemiscurrentlyundergoingamajorconversionortransition. TechnicalControlsconsistofhardwareandsoftwarecontrolsusedtoprovideautomatedprotectiontothesystemorapplications.Technicalcontrolsoperatewithinthetechnicalsystemandapplications.Threatisanactivity,deliberateorunintentional,withthepotentialforcausingharmtoanautomatedinformationsystemoractivity. Vulnerabilityisaflaworweaknessthatmayallowharmtooccurtoanautomatedinformationsystemoractivity. 3D [PDF page 105] [PDF page 106] AppendixEReferences ReferencesGuttman,BarbaraandRoback,EdwardAnIntroductiontoComputerSecurity:TheNISTHandbook.SpecialPublication800-12.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,October1995.NISTComputerSecurityResourceClearinghouseWebsiteURL:http://csrc.nist.govOfficeofManagementandBudget.CircularA-130,"ManagementofFederalInformationResources,"AppendixIII,"SecurityofFederalAutomatedInformationResources."1996.PublicLaw100-235,"ComputerSecurityActof1987."[Schultz90]Schultz,Eugene.ProjectLeader,LawrenceLivermoreNationalLaboratory.CERTWorkshop,Pleasanton,CA,1990.Swanson,MarianneandGuttman,Barbara.GenerallyAcceptedPrinciplesandPracticesforSecuringInformationTechnologySystems.SpecialPublication800-14.Gaithersburg,MD:NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,September1996. IE [PDF page 107] [PDF page 108] Index Indexaccesscontrol,13,22,28,37,39,40,41,42,45,48,58,60,61,62,63,65accesscontrollist,40,61accesscontrols,22,28,40,41,48,61,62accreditation,24,25audittrail,39,45,46,60,65,66authorizeprocessing,24availability,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,34,44,54backgroundscreening,27,47backup,28,31,32,35,48,51,52,55certification,25changecontrol,33confidentiality,14,15,16,17,19,20,44,45,65configurationmanagement,32,53cryptographic,23,24,38,39,41,59,61,62disposal,21,22,24distribution,39,41,44,61,62documentation,iii,18,23,35,53,55,63emergencyoperatingprocedures,32encryption,41,62firewall,41,62gateway,41,62generalsupportsystem,1,4,6,7,8,9,11,12,19,20,21,22,26,31,35,36,40,47,48,50,55,56,58,59,61,62handling,31,34,38,41,51,53,56,57,59,63hardwareandsystemsoftwaremaintenancecontrols,52incidentresponsecapability,57independentaudit,1 9 individualaccountability,21,39,45,60,65informationsharing,1 3 in-place,41,62integrity,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,34,44,54integritycontrol,34,54integrityverification,34,54keymanagement,39,41,61,62labeling,31,51leastprivilege,27,37,40,47,58,61localareanetwork,1,21,28,48log,31,51logicalaccesscontrol,41,62majorapplication,1,4,6,7,8,9,12,19,20,21,22,26,27,28,37,38,44media,17,24,28,29,31,48,49,5 1 messageauthentication,34,55milestone,3,6,19network,7,11,12,34,35,39,54,56,600MBCircularA-123,15 IF [PDF page 109] Index 0MBCircularA-130,AppendixIII,1,36,56one-wayencryption,39,60overwrite,31,51password,21,34,38,39,41,54,59,60,62personnelsecurity,27,47PIN,38,59,60planned,iii,2,3,6,13,19,23,25,27,37,47,48,52,58policies,14,25,33,35,39,40,53,55,60,61processing,iii,1,3,6,7,8,12,23,24,25,27,32,34,43,47,52,54,55,64reconciliation,34,54risk,iii,6,13,14,15,16,19,20,21,24,25,27,28,29,47,48,49riskassessment,6,19,20,25riskmanagement,14,15,19,20rules,3,5,13,14,20,21,25,35,36,47,55,56screenwarningbanner,42,63securityawarenessandtraining,21,36,56securityresponsibility,20sensitivity,iii,1,6,9,14,15,22,25,27,31,42,47,51,63sensitivitylevel,9,27,47separationofduties,27,40,45,47,61,65storage,5,18,24,31,39,41,44,51,61,62systemboundaries,5systemidentification,9systeminterconnection,1 3 technicalcontrols,iii,4,11,20,23,25,27,37,41,47,58,62threat,28,44,48token,38,59,60unauthorizedaccess,16,37,41,58,62vulnerabilities,5,13,19,22,41,56,57,62,3,12wideareanetwork,41,62 ALLS.GOVERNMENTPRINTING0FFIC:E:1998-454-53I/93237 [PDF page 110] [PDF page 111] [PDF page 112] TechnicalPublicationsPeriodicalJournalofResearchoftheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology—ReportsNISTresearchanddevelopmentinthosedisciplinesofthephysicalandengineeringsciencesinwhichtheInstituteisactive.Theseincludephysics,chemistry,engineering,mathematics,andcomputersciences.Paperscoverabroadrangeofsubjects,withmajoremphasisonmeasurementmethodologyandthebasictechnologyunderlyingstandardization.AlsoincludedfromtimetotimearesurveyarticlesontopicscloselyrelatedtotheInstitute'stechnicalandscientificprograms.Issuedsixtimesayear. NonperiodicalsMonographs—MajorcontributionstothetechnicalliteratureonvarioussubjectsrelatedtotheInstitute'sscientificandtechnicalactivities.Handbooks—Recommendedcodesofengineeringandindustrialpractice(includingsafetycodes)devel-opedincooperationwithinterestedindustries,professionalorganizations,andregulatorybodies.SpecialPublications—IncludeproceedingsofconferencessponsoredbyNIST,NISTannualreports,andotherspecialpublicationsappropriatetothisgroupingsuchaswallcharts,pocketcards,andbibliographies.NationalStandardReferenceDataSeries—Providesquantitativedataonthephysicalandchemicalpropertiesofmaterials,compiledfromtheworld'sliteratureandcriticallyevaluated.DevelopedunderaworldwideprogramcoordinatedbyNISTundertheauthorityoftheNationalStandardDataAct(PublicLaw90-396).NOTE:TheJournalofPhysicalandChemicalReferenceData(JPCRD)ispublishedbimonthlyforNISTbytheAmericanChemicalSociety(ACS)andtheAmericanInstituteofPhysics(AIP).Subscriptions,reprints,andsupplementsareavailablefromACS,1155SixteenthSt.,NW,Washington,DC20056.BuildingScienceSeries—DisseminatestechnicalinformationdevelopedattheInstituteonbuildingmaterials,components,systems,andwholestructures.Theseriespresentsresearchresults,testmethods,andperformancecriteriarelatedtothestructuralandenvironmentalfunctionsandthedurabilityandsafetycharacteristicsofbuildingelementsandsystems.TechnicalNotes—Studiesorreportswhicharecompleteinthemselvesbutrestrictiveintheirtreatmentofasubject.Analogoustomonographsbutnotsocomprehensiveinscopeordefinitiveintreatmentofthesubjectarea.OftenserveasavehicleforfinalreportsofworkperformedatNISTunderthesponsorshipofothergovernmentagencies.VoluntaryProductStandards—DevelopedunderprocedurespublishedbytheDepartmentofCommerceinPart10,Tide15,oftheCodeofFederalRegulations.Thestandardsestablishnationallyrecognizedrequirementsforproducts,andprovideallconcernedinterestswithabasisforcommonunderstandingofthecharacteristicsoftheproducts.NISTadministersthisprograminsupportoftheeffortsofprivate-sectorstandardizingorganizations.OrderthefollowingNISTpublications—FIPSandNISTIRs—fromtheNationalTechnicalInformationService,Springfield,VA22161.FederalInformationProcessingStandardsPublications(FIPSPUB)—PublicationsinthisseriescollectivelyconstitutedieFederalInformationProcessingStandardsRegister.TheRegisterservesastheofficialsourceofinformationintheFederalGovernmentregardingstandardsissuedbyNISTpursuanttotheFederalPropertyandAdministrativeServicesActof1949asamended,PublicLaw89-306(79Stat.1127),andasimplementedbyExecutiveOrder11717(38FR12315,datedMay11,1973)andPart6ofTitle15CFR(CodeofFederalRegulations).NISTInteragencyorInternalReports(NISTIR)—^TheseriesincludesinterimorfinalreportsonworkperformedbyNI^foroutsidesponsors(bodigovernmentandnongovernment).Ingeneral,initialdistributionishandledbythesponsor;publicdistributionishandledbysalesthroughtheNationalTechnicalInformationService,Springfield,VA22161,inhardcopy,electronicmedia,ormicroficheform.NISTIR'smayalsoreportresultsofNISTprojectsoftransitoryorlimitedinterest,includingtiiosethatwillbepublishedsubsequentlyinmorecomprehensiveform. [PDF page 113] IIucUCO siU2§^t_C/200^i:oc«Q cu.O4= s gCL,CQS OOh