[PDF page 1] Archived NIST Technical Series Publication The attached publication has been archived (withdrawn), and is provided solely for historical purposes. It may have been superseded by another publication (indicated below). Archived Publication Series/Number: Title: Publication Date(s): Withdrawal Date: Withdrawal Note: Superseding Publication(s) The attached publication has been superseded by the following publication(s): Series/Number: Title: Author(s): Publication Date(s): URL/DOI: Additional Information (if applicable) Contact: Latest revision of the attached publication: Related information: Withdrawal announcement (link): Date updated: June ϭ9, 2015 NIST Special Publication 800-30 Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems July 2002 September 2012 SP 800-30 is superseded in its entirety by the publication of SP 800-30 Revision 1 (September 2012). NIST Special Publication 800-30 Revision 1 Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative September 2012 http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-30r1 Computer Security Division (Information Technology Lab) SP 800-30 Revision 1 (as of June 19, 2015) http://csrc.nist.gov/ N/A [PDF page 2] NATLINST.OFSTAND&TECH INISIPUBUCATSOt^S NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyTechnologyAdministrationU.S.DepartmentofCommerce NISTSpecialPublication800-30 RiskManagementGuideforInformationTechnologySystemsRecommendationsoftheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyGaryStoneburner,AliceGoguen,andAlexisFeringa COMPUTERSECURITY [PDF page 3] rheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTeciinologywasestablishedin1988byCongressto"assistindustryinthedevelopmentoftechnology...neededtoimproveproductquality,tomodernizemanufacturingprocesses,toensureproductreliability...andtofacilitaterapidcommercialization...ofproductsbasedonnewscientificdiscoveries."NIST,originallyfoundedastheNationalBureauofStandardsin1901,workstostrengthenU.S.industry'scompetitiveness;advancescienceandengineering;andimprovepublichealth,safety,andtheenvironment.Oneoftheagency'sbasicfunctionsistodevelop,maintain,andretaincustodyofthenationalstandardsofmeasurement,andprovidethemeansandmethodsforcomparingstandardsusedinscience,engineering,manufacturing,commerce,industry,andeducationwiththestandardsadoptedorrecognizedbytheFederalGovernment.AsanagencyoftheU.S.CommerceDepartment'sTechnologyAdministration,NISTconductsbasicandappliedresearchinthephysicalsciencesandengineering,anddevelopsmeasurementtechniques,testmethods,standards,andrelatedservices.TheInstitutedoesgenericandprecompetitiveworkonnewandadvancedtechnologies.NIST'sresearchfacilitiesarelocatedatGaithersburg,MD20899,andatBoulder,CO80303.Majortechnicaloperatingunitsandtheirprincipalactivitiesarelistedbelow.FormoreinformationcontactthePublicationsandProgramInquiriesDesk,301-975-3058. OfficeoftheDirector•NationalQualityProgram•InternationalandAcademicAffairs TechnologyServices•StandardsServices•TechnologyPartnerships•MeasurementServices•InformationServices AdvancedTechnologyProgram•EconomicAssessment•InformationTechnologyandApplications•ChemistryandLifeSciences•MaterialsandManufacturingTechnology•ElectronicsandPhotonicsTechnologyManufacturingExtensionPartnershipProgram•RegionalPrograms•NationalPrograms•ProgramDevelopmentElectronicsandElectricalEngineeringLaboratory•Microelectronics•LawEnforcementStandards•Electricity•SemiconductorElectronics•Radio-FrequencyTechnology ' •ElectromagneticTechnology'•Optoelectronics' MaterialsScienceandEngineeringLaboratory•TheoreticalandComputationalMaterialsScience•MaterialsReliability'•Ceramics•Polymers•Metallurgy•NISTCenterforNeutronResearch ChemicalScienceandTechnologyLaboratory•Biotechnology•PhysicalandChemicalProperties'•AnalyticalChemistry•ProcessMeasurements•SurfaceandMicroanalysisSciencePhysicsLaboratory•ElectronandOpticalPhysics•AtomicPhysics•OpticalTechnology•IonizingRadiation•TimeandFrequency'•QuantumPhysics' ManufacturingEngineeringLaboratory•PrecisionEngineering•AutomatedProductionTechnology•IntelligentSystems•FabricationTechnology•ManufacturingSystemsIntegration BuildingandFireResearchLaboratory•AppliedEconomics•Structures•BuildingMaterials•BuildingEnvironment•FireSafetyEngineering•FireScienceInformationTechnologyLaboratory•MathematicalandComputationalSciences^•AdvancedNetworkTechnologies•ComputerSecurity•InformationAccessandUserInterfaces•HighPerformanceSystemsandServices•DistributedComputingandInformationServices•SoftwareDiagnosticsandConformanceTesting•StatisticalEngineering 'AtBoulder,CO80303.2SomeelementsatBoulder,CO. [PDF page 4] NisTSpecialPublication800-30RiskManagementGuideforInformationTechnologySystemsRecommendationsoftheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyGaryStoneburner,AliceGoguen,andAlexisFeringa COMPUTERSECURITY ComputerSecurityDivisionInformationTechnologyLaboratoryNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyGaithersburg,MD20899-8930 July2002 U.S.DepartmentofCommerceDonaldL.Evans,Secretary TechnologyAdministrationPhillipJ.Bond,UnderSecretaryofCommerceforTechnology NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyArdenL.Bement,Jr.,Director [PDF page 5] ReportsonInformationSecurityTechnologyTheInformationTechnologyLaboratory(ITL)attheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology(NIST)promotestheU.S.economyandpublicwelfarebyprovidingtechnicalleadershipfortheNation'smeasurementandstandardsinfrastructure.ITLdevelopstests,testmethods,referencedata,proofofconceptimplementations,andtechnicalanalysestoadvancethedevelopmentandproductiveuseofinformationtechnology.ITL'sresponsibilitiesincludethedevelopmentoftechnical,physical,administrative,andmanagementstandardsandguidelinesforthecost-effectivesecurityandprivacyofsensitiveunclassifiedinformationinFederalcomputersystems.ThisSpecialPublication800-seriesreportsonITL'sresearch,guidance,andoutreacheffortsincomputersecurity,anditscollaborativeactivitieswithindustry,government,andacademicorganizations. Certaincommercialentities,equipment,ormaterialsmaybeidentifiedinthisdocumentinordertodescribeanexperimentalprocedureorconceptadequately.SuchidentificationisnotintendedtoimplyrecommendationorendorsementbytheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,norisitintendedtoimplythattheentities,materials,orequipmentarenecessarilythebestavailableforthepurpose. NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologySpecialPublication800-30Natl.Inst.Stand.Technol.Spec.Publ.800-30,54pages(July2002)CODEN:NSPUE2 U.S.GOVERNMENTPRINTINGOFFICEWASHINGTON:2002 ForsalebytheSuperintendentofDocuments,U.S.GovernmentPrintingOfficeInternet:bookstore.gpo.gov—Phone:(202)512-1800—Fax:(202)512-2250Mail:StopSSOPWashington,DC20402-0001 [PDF page 6] AcknowledgementsTheauthors,GaryStonebumerfromNISTandAhceGoguenandAlexisFeringafromBoozAllenHamilton,wishtoexpresstheirthankstotheircolleaguesatbothorganizationswhorevieweddraftsofthisdocument.Inparticular,TimothyGrance,MarianneSwanson,andJoanHashfromNISTandDebraL.Banning,JeffreyConfer,RandallK.Ewell,andWaseemMamloukfromBoozAllenHamilton,providedvaluableinsightsthatcontributedsubstantiallytothetechnicalcontentofthisdocument.Moreover,wegratefullyacknowledgeandappreciatethemanycommentsfromthepublicandprivatesectorswhosethoughtfulandconstructivecommentsimprovedthequalityandutilityofthispublication. SP800-30 Pageiii [PDF page 7] TABLEOFCONTENTS 1.INTRODUCTION1.1Authority1.2Purpose1.3Objective1.4TargetAudience1.5RelatedReferences1.6GuideStructure2.RISKMANAGEMENTOVERVIEW2.1ImportanceofRiskManagement2.2IntegrationofRiskManagementintoSDLC..2.3KeyRoles3.RISKASSESSMENT3.1Step1:SystemCharacterization3.1.1System-RelatedInformation3.1.2Information-GatheringTechniques3.2Step2:ThreatIdentification3.2.1Threat-SourceIdentification3.2.2MotivationandThreatActions3.3Step3:VulnerabilityIdentification3.3.1VulnerabilitySources3.3.2SystemSecurityTesting, 3.3.3DevelopmentofSecurityRequirementsChecklist. 3.4Step4:ControlAnalysis3.4.1ControlMethods3.4.2ControlCategories3.4.3ControlAnalysisTechnique3.5Step5:LikelihoodDetermination3.6Step6:ImpactAnalysis3.7Step?:RiskDetermination3.7.1Risk-LevelMatrix3.7.2DescriptionofRiskLevel3.8Step8:ControlRecommendations3.9Step9:ResultsDocumentation4.RISKMITIGATION4.1RiskMitigationOptions4.2RiskMitigationStrategy4.3ApproachforControlImplementation, 4.4ControlCategories4.4.1TechnicalSecurityControls4.4.2ManagementSecurityControls4.4.3OperationalSecurityControls4.5Cost-BenefitAnalysis4.6ResidualRisk5.EVALUATIONANDASSESSMENT5.1CioodSecurityPractice5.2KeysforSuccessAppendixA—SampleInterviewQuestionsA-AppendixB—SampleRiskAssessmentReportOutline B- SP800-30 Page [PDF page 8] AppendixC—SampleImplementationSafeguardPlanSummaryTableC-1AppendixD—Acronyms D-1AppendixE—Glossary E-1AppendixF—References F- 1 LISTOFFIGURES Figure3-1RiskAssessmentMethodologyFlowchart9Figure4-1RiskMitigationActionPoints 28Figure4-2RiskMitigationMethodologyFlowchart3 1 Figure4-3TechnicalSecurityControls 33Figure4-4ControlImplementationandResidualRisk 40 LISTOFTABLES Table2-1IntegrationofRiskManagementtotheSDLC 5Table3-1HumanThreats:Threat-Source,Motivation,andThreatActions14Table3-2Vulnerability/ThreatPairs 15Table3-3SecurityCriteria 18Table3-4LikelihoodDefinitions21Table3-5MagnitudeofImpactDefinitions23Table3-6Risk-LevelMatrix 25Table3-7RiskScaleandNecessaryActions 25 SP800-30 Pagev [PDF page 9] [PDF page 10] I ! ' 1.INTRODUCTIONEveryorganizationhasamission.Inthisdigitalera,asorganizationsuseautomatedinformationtechnology(IT)systems^toprocesstheirinformationforbettersupportoftheirmissions,riskmanagementplaysacriticalroleinprotectinganorganization'sinformationassets,andthereforeitsmission,fromIT-relatedrisk. AneffectiveriskmanagementprocessisanimportantcomponentofasuccessfulITsecurityprogram.Theprincipalgoalofanorganization'sriskmanagementprocessshouldbetoprotecttheorganizationanditsabilitytoperformtheirmission,notjustitsITassets.Therefore,theriskmanagementprocessshouldnotbetreatedprimarilyasatechnicalfunctioncarriedoutbytheITexpertswhooperateandmanagetheITsystem,butasanessentialmanagementfunctionoftheorganization. 1.1AUTHORITYThisdocumenthasbeendevelopedbyNISTinfurtheranceofitsstatutoryresponsibilitiesundertheComputerSecurityActof1987andtheInformationTechnologyManagementReformActof1996(specifically15UnitedStatesCode(U.S.C.)278g-3(a)(5)).Thisisnotaguidelinewithinthemeaningof15U.S.C278g-3(a)(3). TheseguidelinesareforusebyFederalorganizationswhichprocesssensitiveinformation.Theyareconsistentwiththerequirementsof0MBCircularA-130,AppendixHI. Theguidelineshereinarenotmandatoryandbindingstandards.Thisdocumentmaybeusedbynon-governmentalorganizationsonavoluntarybasis.Itisnotsubjecttocopyright. NothinginthisdocumentshouldbetakentocontradictstandardsandguidelinesmademandatoryandbindinguponFederalagenciesbytheSecretaryofCommerceunderhisstatutoryauthority.NorshouldtheseguidelinesbeinterpretedasalteringorsupersedingtheexistingauthoritiesoftheSecretaryofCommerce,theDirectoroftheOfficeofManagementandBudget,oranyotherFederalofficial. 1.2PURPOSERiskisthenetnegativeimpactoftheexerciseofavulnerability,consideringboththeprobabilityandtheimpactofoccurrence.Riskmanagementistheprocessofidentifyingrisk,assessingrisk,andtakingstepstoreducerisktoanacceptablelevel.Thisguideprovidesafoundationforthedevelopmentofaneffectiveriskmanagementprogram,containingboththedefinitionsandthepracticalguidancenecessaryforassessingandmitigatingrisksidentifiedwithinITsystems.TheultimategoalistohelporganizationstobettermanageIT-relatedmissionrisks. 1Theterm"ITsystem"referstoageneralsupportsystem(e.g.,mainframecomputer,mid-rangecomputer,localareanetwork,agencywidebackbone)oramajorapplicationthatcanrunonageneralsupportsystemandwhoseuseofinformationresourcessatisfiesaspecificsetofuserrequirements. SP800-30 Page1 [PDF page 11] Inaddition,thisguideprovidesinformationontheselectionofcost-effectivesecuritycontrols.^Thesecontrolscanbeusedtomitigateriskforthebetterprotectionofmission-criticalinformationandtheITsystemsthatprocess,store,andcarrythisinformation. OrganizationsmaychoosetoexpandorabbreviatethecomprehensiveprocessesandstepssuggestedinthisguideandtailorthemtotheirenvironmentinmanagingIT-relatedmissionrisks. 1.3OBJECTIVETheobjectiveofperformingriskmanagementistoenabletheorganizationtoaccomplishitsmission(s)(1)bybettersecuringtheITsystemsthatstore,process,ortransmitorganizationalinformation;(2)byenablingmanagementtomakewell-informedriskmanagementdecisionstojustifytheexpendituresthatarepartofanITbudget;and(3)byassistingmanagementinauthorizing(oraccrediting)theITsystems-^onthebasisofthesupportingdocumentationresultingfromtheperformanceofriskmanagement. 1.4TARGETAUDIENCEThisguideprovidesacommonfoundationforexperiencedandinexperienced,technical,andnon-technicalpersonnelwhosupportorusetheriskmanagementprocessfortheirITsystems.Thesepersonnelinclude — •Seniormanagement,themissionowners,whomakedecisionsabouttheITsecuritybudget.•FederalChiefInformationOfficers,whoensuretheimplementationofriskmanagementforagencyITsystemsandthesecurityprovidedfortheseITsystems•TheDesignatedApprovingAuthority(DAA),whoisresponsibleforthefinaldecisiononwhethertoallowoperationofanITsystem•TheITsecurityprogrammanager,whoimplementsthesecurityprogram•Informationsystemsecurityofficers(ISSO),whoareresponsibleforITsecurity•ITsystemownersofsystemsoftwareand/orhardwareusedtosupportITfunctions.•Informationownersofdatastored,processed,andtransmittedbytheITsystems•Businessorfunctionalmanagers,whoareresponsiblefortheITprocurementprocess•Technicalsupportpersonnel(e.g.,network,system,application,anddatabaseadministrators;computerspecialists;datasecurityanalysts),whomanageandadministersecurityfortheITsystems•ITsystemandapplicationprogrammers,whodevelopandmaintaincodethatcouldaffectsystemanddataintegrity Theterms"safeguards"and"controls"refertorisk-reducingmeasures;thesetermsareusedinterchangeablyinthisguidancedocument.OfficeofManagementandBudget'sNovember2000CircularA-130,theComputerSecurityActof1987,andtheGovernmentInformationSecurityReformActofOctober2000requirethatanITsystembeauthorizedpriortooperationandreauthorizedatleastevery3yearsthereafter. SP800-30 Page2 [PDF page 12] •ITqualityassurancepersonnel,whotestandensuretheintegrityoftheITsystemsanddata•Informationsystemauditors,whoauditITsystems•ITconsultants,whosupportclientsinriskmanagement. 1.5RELATEDREFERENCESThisguideisbasedonthegeneralconceptspresentedinNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology(NIST)SpecialPublication(SP)800-27,EngineeringPrinciplesforITSecurity,alongwiththeprinciplesandpracticesinNISTSP800-14,GenerallyAcceptedPrinciplesandPracticesforSecuringInformationTechnologySystems.Inaddition,itisconsistentwiththepoliciespresentedinOfficeofManagementandBudget(0MB)CircularA-130,AppendixIII,"SecurityofFederalAutomatedInformationResources";theComputerSecurityAct(CSA)of1987;andtheGovernmentInformationSecurityReformActofOctober2000. 1.6GUIDESTRUCTURETheremainingsectionsofthisguidediscussthefollowing: •Section2providesanoverviewofriskmanagement,howitfitsintothesystemdevelopmentlifecycle(SDLC),andtherolesofindividualswhosupportandusethisprocess.•Section3describestheriskassessmentmethodologyandthenineprimarystepsinconductingariskassessmentofanITsystem.•Section4describestheriskmitigationprocess,includingriskmitigationoptionsandstrategy,approachforcontrolimplementation,controlcategories,cost-benefitanalysis,andresidualrisk.•Section5discussesthegoodpracticeandneedforanongoingriskevaluationandassessmentandthefactorsthatwillleadtoasuccessfulriskmanagementprogram. Thisguidealsocontainssixappendixes.AppendixAprovidessampleinterviewquestions.AppendixBprovidesasampleoutlineforuseindocumentingriskassessmentresults.AppendixCcontainsasampletableforthesafeguardimplementationplan.AppendixDprovidesalistoftheacronymsusedinthisdocument.AppendixEcontainsaglossaryoftermsusedfrequentlyinthisguide.AppendixFlistsreferences. SP800-30 Page3 [PDF page 13] 2.RISKMANAGEMENTOVERVIEWThisguidedescribestheriskmanagementmethodology,howitfitsintoeachphaseoftheSDLC,andhowtheriskmanagementprocessistiedtotheprocessofsystemauthorization(oraccreditation). 2.1IMPORTANCEOFRISKMANAGEMENTRiskmanagementencompassesthreeprocesses:riskassessment,riskmitigation,andevaluationandassessment.Section3ofthisguidedescribestheriskassessmentprocess,whichincludesidentificationandevaluationofrisksandriskimpacts,andrecommendationofrisk-reducingmeasures.Section4describesriskmitigation,whichreferstoprioritizing,implementing,andmaintainingtheappropriaterisk-reducingmeasuresrecommendedfromtheriskassessmentprocess.Section5discussesthecontinualevaluationprocessandkeysforimplementingasuccessfulriskmanagementprogram.TheDAAorsystemauthorizingofficialisresponsiblefordeterminingwhethertheremainingriskisatanacceptablelevelorwhetheradditionalsecuritycontrolsshouldbeimplementedtofurtherreduceoreliminatetheresidualriskbeforeauthorizing(oraccrediting)theITsystemforoperation. RiskmanagementistheprocessthatallowsITmanagerstobalancetheoperationalandeconomiccostsofprotectivemeasuresandachievegainsinmissioncapabilitybyprotectingtheITsystemsanddatathatsupporttheirorganizations'missions.ThisprocessisnotuniquetotheITenvironment;indeeditpervadesdecision-makinginallareasofourdailylives.Takethecaseofhomesecurity,forexample.Manypeopledecidetohavehomesecuritysystemsinstalledandpayamonthlyfeetoaserviceprovidertohavethesesystemsmonitoredforthebetterprotectionoftheirproperty.Presumably,thehomeownershaveweighedthecostofsysteminstallationandmonitoringagainstthevalueoftheirhouseholdgoodsandtheirfamily'ssafety,afundamental"mission"need. Theheadofanorganizationalunitmustensurethattheorganizationhasthecapabilitiesneededtoaccomplishitsmission.ThesemissionownersmustdeterminethesecuritycapabilitiesthattheirITsystemsmusthavetoprovidethedesiredlevelofmissionsupportinthefaceofreal-worldthreats.MostorganizationshavetightbudgetsforITsecurity;therefore,ITsecurityspendingmustbereviewedasthoroughlyasothermanagementdecisions.Awell-structuredriskmanagementmethodology,whenusedeffectively,canhelpmanagementidentifyappropriatecontrolsforprovidingthemission-essentialsecuritycapabilities. 2.2INTEGRATIONOFRISKMANAGEMENTINTOSDLCMinimizingnegativeimpactonanorganizationandneedforsoundbasisindecisionmakingarethefundamentalreasonsorganizationsimplementariskmanagementprocessfortheirITsystems.EffectiveriskmanagementmustbetotallyintegratedintotheSDLC.AnITsystem'sSDLChasfivephases:initiation,developmentoracquisition,implementation,operationormaintenance,anddisposal.Insomecases,anITsystemmayoccupyseveralofthesephasesatthesametime.However,theriskmanagementmethodologyisthesameregardlessoftheSDLCphaseforwhichtheassessmentisbeingconducted.RiskmanagementisaniterativeprocessthatcanbeperformedduringeachmajorphaseoftheSDLC.Table2-1describesthecharacteristics SP800-30 Page4 [PDF page 14] ofeachSDLCphaseandindicateshowriskmanagementcanbeperformedinsupportofeachphase. Table2-1IntegrationofRiskManagementintotheSDLCSDLCPhasesPhaseCharacteristicsSupportfromRisl(l\/lanagementActivities Phase1—InitiationTheneedforanITsystemisexpressedandthepurposeandscopeoftheITsystemisdocumented •Identifiedrisksareusedtosupportthedevelopmentofthesystemrequirements,includingsecurityrequirements,andasecurityconceptofoperations(strategy) Phase2—DevelopmentorAcquisitionTheITsystemisdesigned,purchased,programmed,developed,orotherwiseconstructed •TherisksidentifiedduringthisphasecanbeusedtosupportthesecurityanalysesoftheITsystemthatmayleadtoarchitectureanddesigntrade-offsduringsystemdevelopmentPhase3—ImplementationThesystemsecurityfeaturesshouldbeconfigured,enabled,tested,andverified •Theriskmanagementprocesssupportstheassessmentofthesystemimplementationagainstitsrequirementsandwithinitsmodeledoperationalenvironment.DecisionsregardingrisksidentifiedmustbemadepriortosystemoperationPhase4—OperationorMaintenanceThesystemperformsitsfunctions.Typicallythesystemisbeingmodifiedonanongoingbasisthroughtheadditionofhardwareandsoftwareandbychangestoorganizationalprocesses,policies,andprocedures •Riskmanagementactivitiesareperformedforperiodicsystemreauthorization(orreaccreditation)orwhenevermajorchangesaremadetoanITsysteminitsoperational,productionenvironment(e.g.,newsysteminterfaces) Phase5—DisposalThisphasemayinvolvethedispositionofinformation,hardware,andsoftware.Activitiesmayincludemoving,archiving,discarding,ordestroyinginformationandsanitizingthehardwareandsoftware •Riskmanagementactivitiesareperformedforsystemcomponentsthatwillbedisposedoforreplacedtoensurethatthehardwareandsoftwareareproperlydisposedof,thatresidualdataisappropriatelyhandled,andthatsystemmigrationisconductedinasecureandsystematicmanner SP800-30 Page5 [PDF page 15] 2.3KEYROLESRiskmanagementisamanagementresponsibility.Thissectiondescribesthekeyrolesofthepersonnelwhoshouldsupportandparticipateintheriskmanagementprocess. •SeniorManagement.Seniormanagement,underthestandardofduecareandultimateresponsibilityformissionaccomplishment,mustensurethatthenecessaryresourcesareeffectivelyappliedtodevelopthecapabilitiesneededtoaccomplishthemission.Theymustalsoassessandincorporateresultsoftheriskassessmentactivityintothedecisionmakingprocess.AneffectiveriskmanagementprogramthatassessesandmitigatesIT-relatedmissionrisksrequiresthesupportandinvolvementofseniormanagement.•ChiefInformationOfficer(CIO).TheCIOisresponsiblefortheagency'sITplanning,budgeting,andperformanceincludingitsinformationsecuritycomponents.Decisionsmadeintheseareasshouldbebasedonaneffectiveriskmanagementprogram.•SystemandInformationOwners.Thesystemandinformationownersareresponsibleforensuringthatpropercontrolsareinplacetoaddressintegrity,confidentiality,andavailabilityoftheITsystemsanddatatheyown.TypicallythesystemandinformationownersareresponsibleforchangestotheirITsystems.Thus,theyusuallyhavetoapproveandsignoffonchangestotheirITsystems(e.g.,systemenhancement,majorchangestothesoftwareandhardware).Thesystemandinformationownersmustthereforeunderstandtheirroleintheriskmanagementprocessandfullysupportthisprocess.•BusinessandFunctionalManagers.ThemanagersresponsibleforbusinessoperationsandITprocurementprocessmusttakeanactiveroleintheriskmanagementprocess.Thesemanagersaretheindividualswiththeauthorityandresponsibilityformakingthetrade-offdecisionsessentialtomissionaccomplishment.TheirinvolvementintheriskmanagementprocessenablestheachievementofpropersecurityfortheITsystems,which,ifmanagedproperly,willprovidemissioneffectivenesswithaminimalexpenditureofresources.•ISSO.ITsecurityprogrammanagersandcomputersecurityofficersareresponsiblefortheirorganizations'securityprograms,includingriskmanagement.Therefore,theyplayaleadingroleinintroducinganappropriate,structuredmethodologytohelpidentify,evaluate,andminimizeriskstotheITsystemsthatsupporttheirorganizations'missions.ISSOsalsoactasmajorconsultantsinsupportofseniormanagementtoensurethatthisactivitytakesplaceonanongoingbasis.•ITSecurityPractitioners.ITsecuritypractitioners(e.g.,network,system,application,anddatabaseadministrators;computerspecialists;securityanalysts;securityconsultants)areresponsibleforproperimplementationofsecurityrequirementsintheirITsystems.AschangesoccurintheexistingITsystemenvironment(e.g.,expansioninnetworkconnectivity,changestotheexistinginfrastructureandorganizationalpolicies,introductionofnewtechnologies),theITsecuritypractitionersmustsupportorusetheriskmanagementprocesstoidentifyandassessnewpotentialrisksandimplementnewsecuritycontrolsasneededtosafeguardtheirITsystems. SP800-30 Page6 [PDF page 16] •SecurityAwarenessTrainers(Security/SubjectMatterProfessionals).Theorganization'spersonnelaretheusersoftheITsystems.UseoftheITsystemsanddataaccordingtoanorganization'spolicies,guidelines,andrulesofbehavioriscriticaltomitigatingriskandprotectingtheorganization'sITresources.TominimizerisktotheITsystems,itisessentialthatsystemandapplicationusersbeprovidedwithsecurityawarenesstraining.Therefore,theITsecuritytrainersorsecurity/subjectmatterprofessionalsmustunderstandtheriskmanagementprocesssothattheycandevelopappropriatetrainingmaterialsandincorporateriskassessmentintotrainingprogramstoeducatetheendusers. SP800-30 Page7 [PDF page 17] 3.RISKASSESSMENTRiskassessmentisthefirstprocessintheriskmanagementmethodology.OrganizationsuseriskassessmenttodeterminetheextentofthepotentialthreatandtheriskassociatedwithanITsystemthroughoutitsSDLC.Theoutputofthisprocesshelpstoidentifyappropriatecontrolsforreducingoreliminatingriskduringtheriskmitigationprocess,asdiscussedinSection4. Riskisafunctionofthelikelihoodofagiventhreat-source'sexercisingaparticularpotentialvulnerability,andtheresultingimpactofthatadverseeventontheorganization. Todeterminethelikelihoodofafutureadverseevent,threatstoanITsystemmustbeanalyzedinconjunctionwiththepotentialvulnerabilitiesandthecontrolsinplacefortheITsystem.Impactreferstothemagnitudeofharmthatcouldbecausedbyathreat'sexerciseofavulnerability.ThelevelofimpactisgovernedbythepotentialmissionimpactsandinturnproducesarelativevaluefortheITassetsandresourcesaffected(e.g.,thecriticalityandsensitivityoftheITsystemcomponentsanddata).Theriskassessmentmethodologyencompassesnineprimarysteps,whicharedescribedinSections3.1through3.9 — •Step1—SystemCharacterization(Section3.1)•Step2—^ThreatIdentification(Section3.2)•Step3—^VulnerabilityIdentification(Section3.3)•StepA—ControlAnalysis(Section3.4)•Step5—LikelihoodDetermination(Section3.5)•Step6—ImpactAnalysis(Section3.6)•Step7—RiskDetermination(Section3.7)•Step8—ControlRecommendations(Section3.8)•Step9—ResultsDocumentation(Section3.9). Steps2,3,4,and6canbeconductedinparallelafterStep1hasbeencompleted.Figure3-1depictsthesestepsandtheinputstoandoutputsfromeachstep. SP800-30 Pages [PDF page 18] InputRiskAssessmentActivitiesOutput •Hardware•Software•Systeminterfaces•Dataandinformation•People^»Systemmission, 'Historyofsystemattack 'Datafromintelligenceagencies,NIPC,OIG.FedCIRC,massmedia. •Reportsfrompriorriskassessments•Anyauditcomments•Securityrequirements•Securitytestresults >Currentcontrols 'Plannedcontrols •Threat-sourcemotivation•Threatcapacity•Nahireofvulnerability•Currentcontrols •Missionimpactanalysis•Assetcriticalityassessment•Datacriticality•Datasensitivity 'Likelihoodofthreatexploitation 'Magnitudeofimpact 'Adequacyofplaimedorcurrentcontrols Step1.SystemCharacterization IStep2.ThreatIdentification IStep3.->|VulnerabilityIdentification IStep4.ControlAnalysis IIStep6.ImpactAnalysis •LossofIntegrity•LossofAvailability•LossofConfidentiality IStep7.RiskDetermination Step9.ResultsDocumentation •SystemBoundary•SystemFunctions•SystemandDataCriticality•SystemandDataSensitivity ThreatStatement ListofPotentialVulnerabilities ListofCurrentandPlannedControls Step5. 1—LikelihoodDeterminationLikelihoodRating ImpactRating RisksandAssociatedRiskLevels rStep8. —RecommendedControlRecommendationsControls RiskAssessmentReport Figure3-1.RiskAssessmentMethodologyFlowchart SP800-30 Page9 [PDF page 19] 3.1STEPl:SYSTEMCHARACTERIZATION InassessingrisksforanITsystem,thefirststepistodefinethescopeoftheeffort.Inthisstep,theboundariesoftheITsystemareidentified,alongwiththeresourcesandtheinformationthatconstitutethesystem.CharacterizinganITsystemestablishesthescopeoftheriskassessmenteffort,delineatestheoperationalauthorization(oraccreditation)boundaries,andprovidesinformation(e.g.,hardware,software,systemconnectivity,andresponsibledivisionorsupportpersonnel)essentialtodefiningtherisk. Section3.1.1describesthesystem-relatedinformationusedtocharacterizeanITsystemanditsoperationalenvironment.Section3.1.2suggeststheinformation-gatheringtechniquesthatcanbeusedtosolicitinformationrelevanttotheITsystemprocessingenvironment.Themethodologydescribedinthisdocumentcanbeappliedtoassessmentsofsingleormultiple,interrelatedsystems.Inthelattercase,itisimportantthatthedomainofinterestandallinterfacesanddependenciesbewelldefinedpriortoapplyingthemethodology. 3.1.1System-RelatedInformationIdentifyingriskforanITsystemrequiresakeenunderstandingofthesystem'sprocessingenvironment.Thepersonorpersonswhoconducttheriskassessmentmustthereforefirstcollectsystem-relatedinformation,whichisusuallyclassifiedasfollows: •Hardware•Software•Systeminterfaces(e.g.,internalandexternalconnectivity)•Dataandinformation•PersonswhosupportandusetheITsystem•Systemmission(e.g.,theprocessesperformedbytheITsystem)•Systemanddatacriticality(e.g.,thesystem'svalueorimportancetoanorganization)•Systemanddatasensitivity.^ AdditionalinformationrelatedtotheoperationalenvironmentaloftheITsystemanditsdataincludes,butisnotlimitedto,thefollowing: •ThefunctionalrequirementsoftheITsystem•Usersofthesystem(e.g.,systemuserswhoprovidetechnicalsupporttotheITsystem;applicationuserswhousetheITsystemtoperformbusinessfunctions)•SystemsecuritypoliciesgoverningtheITsystem(organizationalpolicies,federalrequirements,laws,industrypractices)•Systemsecurityarchitecture ^Thelevelofprotectionrequiredtomaintainsystemanddataintegrity,confidentiality,andavailability. SP800-30 Page10 [PDF page 20] •Currentnetworktopology(e.g.,networkdiagram)•Informationstorageprotectionthatsafeguardssystemanddataavailability,integrity,andconfidentiality•FlowofinformationpertainingtotheITsystem(e.g.,systeminterfaces,systeminputandoutputflowchart)•TechnicalcontrolsusedfortheITsystem(e.g.,built-inoradd-onsecurityproductthatsupportsidentificationandauthentication,discretionaryormandatoryaccesscontrol,audit,residualinformationprotection,encryptionmethods)•ManagementcontrolsusedfortheITsystem(e.g.,rulesofbehavior,securityplanning)•OperationalcontrolsusedfortheITsystem(e.g.,personnelsecurity,backup,contingency,andresumptionandrecoveryoperations;systemmaintenance;off-sitestorage;useraccountestablishmentanddeletionprocedures;controlsforsegregationofuserfunctions,suchasprivilegeduseraccessversusstandarduseraccess)•PhysicalsecurityenvironmentoftheITsystem(e.g.,facilitysecurity,datacenterpolicies)•EnvironmentalsecurityimplementedfortheITsystemprocessingenvironment(e.g.,controlsforhumidity,water,power,pollution,temperature,andchemicals). Forasystemthatisintheinitiationordesignphase,systeminformationcanbederivedfromthedesignorrequirementsdocument.ForanITsystemunderdevelopment,itisnecessarytodefinekeysecurityrulesandattributesplannedforthefutureITsystem.SystemdesigndocumentsandthesystemsecurityplancanprovideusefulinformationaboutthesecurityofanITsystemthatisindevelopment.ForanoperationalITsystem,dataiscollectedabouttheITsysteminitsproductionenvironment,includingdataonsystemconfiguration,connectivity,anddocumentedandundocumentedproceduresandpractices.Therefore,thesystemdescriptioncanbebasedonthesecurityprovidedbytheunderlyinginfrastructureoronfuturesecurityplansfortheITsystem. 3.1.2Information-GatheringTechniquesAny,oracombination,ofthefollowingtechniquescanbeusedingatheringinformationrelevanttotheITsystemwithinitsoperationalboundary: •Questionnaire.Tocollectrelevantinformation,riskassessmentpersonnelcandevelopaquestionnaireconcerningthemanagementandoperationalcontrolsplannedorusedfortheITsystem.ThisquestionnaireshouldbedistributedtotheapplicabletechnicalandnontechnicalmanagementpersonnelwhoaredesigningorsupportingtheITsystem.Thequestionnairecouldalsobeusedduringon-sitevisitsandinterviews.•On-siteInterviews.InterviewswithITsystemsupportandmanagementpersonnelcanenableriskassessmentpersonneltocollectusefulinformationabouttheITsystem(e.g.,howthesystemisoperatedandmanaged).On-sitevisitsalsoallowrisk SP800-30 Page1 1 [PDF page 21] assessmentpersonneltoobserveandgatherinformationaboutthephysical,environmental,andoperationalsecurityoftheITsystem.AppendixAcontainssampleinterviewquestionsaskedduringinterviewswithsitepersonneltoachieveabetterunderstandingoftheoperationalcharacteristicsofanorganization.Forsystemsstillinthedesignphase,on-sitevisitwouldbeface-to-facedatagatheringexercisesandcouldprovidetheopportunitytoevaluatethephysicalenvironmentinwhichtheITsystemwilloperate.•DocumentReview.Policydocuments(e.g.,legislativedocumentation,directives),systemdocumentation(e.g.,systemuserguide,systemadministrativemanual,systemdesignandrequirementdocument,acquisitiondocument),andsecurity-relateddocumentation(e.g.,previousauditreport,riskassessmentreport,systemtestresults,systemsecurityplan^,securitypolicies)canprovidegoodinformationaboutthesecuritycontrolsusedbyandplannedfortheITsystem.Anorganization'smissionimpactanalysisorassetcriticalityassessmentprovidesinformationregardingsystemanddatacriticalityandsensitivity.•UseofAutomatedScanningTool.Proactivetechnicalmethodscanbeusedtocollectsysteminformationefficiently.Forexample,anetworkmappingtoolcanidentifytheservicesthatrunonalargegroupofhostsandprovideaquickwayofbuildingindividualprofilesofthetargetITsystem(s). Informationgatheringcanbeconductedthroughouttheriskassessmentprocess,fromStep1(SystemCharacterization)throughStep9(ResultsDocumentation).OutputfromStep1—CharacterizationoftheITsystemassessed,agoodpictureoftheITsystemenvironment,anddelineationofsystemboundary 3.2STEP2:THREATIDENTIFICATIONAthreatisthepotentialforaparticularthreat-sourcetosuccessfullyexerciseaparticularvulnerability.Avulnerabilityisaweaknessthatcanbeaccidentallytriggeredorintentionallyexploited.Athreat-sourcedoesnotpresentariskwhenthereisnovulnerabilitythatcanbeexercised.Indeterminingthelikelihoodofathreat(Section3.5),onemustconsiderthreat-sources,potentialvulnerabilities(Section3.3),andexistingcontrols(Section3.4). Threat:Thepotentialforathreat-sourcetoexercise(accidentallytriggerorintentionallyexploit)aspecificvulnerability. 3.2.1Threat-SourceIdentificationThegoalofthisstepistoidentifythepotentialthreat-sourcesandcompileathreatstatementlistingpotentialthreat-sourcesthatareapplicabletotheITsystembeingevaluated.Threat-Source:Either(1)intentandmethodtargetedattheintentionalexploitationofavulnerabilityor(2)asituationandmethodthatmayaccidentallytriggeravulnerability. ^Duringtheinitialphase,ariskassessmentcouldbeusedtodeveloptheinitialsystemsecurityplan. SP800-30 Page12 [PDF page 22] Athreat-sourceisdefinedasanycircumstanceoreventwiththepotentialtocauseharmtoanITsystem.Thecommonthreat-sourcescanbenatural,human,orenvironmental. Inassessingthreat-sources,itisimportanttoconsiderallpotentialthreat-sourcesthatcouldcauseharmtoanITsystemanditsprocessingenvironment.Forexample,althoughthethreatstatementforanITsystemlocatedinadesertmaynotinclude"naturalflood"becauseofthelowlikelihoodofsuchanevent'soccurring,environmentalthreatssuchasaburstingpipecanquicklyfloodacomputerroomandcausedamagetoanorganization'sITassetsandresources.Humanscanbethreat-sourcesthroughintentionalacts,suchasdeliberateattacksbymaliciouspersonsordisgruntledemployees,orunintentionalacts,suchasnegligenceanderrors.Adeliberateattackcanbeeither(1)amaliciousattempttogainunauthorizedaccesstoanITsystem(e.g.,viapasswordguessing)inordertocompromisesystemanddataintegrity,availability,orconfidentialityor(2)abenign,butnonethelesspurposeful,attempttocircumventsystemsecurity.Oneexampleofthelattertypeofdeliberateattackisaprogrammer'swritingaTrojanhorseprogramtobypasssystemsecurityinorderto"getthejobdone." 3.2.2MotivationandTlireatActionsMotivationandtheresourcesforcarryingoutanattackmakehumanspotentiallydangerousthreat-sources.Table3-1presentsanoverviewofmanyoftoday'scommonhumanthreats,theirpossiblemotivations,andthemethodsorthreatactionsbywhichtheymightcarryoutanattack.Thisinformationwillbeusefultoorganizationsstudyingtheirhumanthreatenvironmentsandcustomizingtheirhumanthreatstatements.Inaddition,reviewsofthehistoryofsystembreak-ins;securityviolationreports;incidentreports;andinterviewswiththesystemadministrators,helpdeskpersonnel,andusercommunityduringinformationgatheringwillhelpidentifyhumanthreat-sourcesthathavethepotentialtoharmanITsystemanditsdataandthatmaybeaconcernwhereavulnerabilityexists. CommonThreat-SourcesNaturalThreats—^Floods,earthquakes,tornadoes,landslides,avalanches,electricalstorms,andothersuchevents.«HumanThreats—^Eventsthatareeitherenabledbyorcausedbyhumanbeings,suchasunintentionalacts(inadvertentdataentry)ordeliberateactions(networkbasedattacks,malicioussoftwareupload,unauthorizedaccesstoconfidentialinformation),EnvironmentalThreats—Long-termpowerfailure,pollution,chemicals,liquidleakage. SP800-30 Page13 [PDF page 23] Table3-1.HumanThreats:Threat-Source,Motivation,andThreatActionsThreat-SourceMotivationThreatActions Hacker,crackerChallengeEgoRebellion •Hacking•Socialengineering•Systemintrusion,break-ins•Unauthorizedsystemaccess ComputercriminalDestructionofinformationlllonf)!informationHicolociiroMonetarygainUnauthorizeddataalteration •Computercrime(e.g.,cyberstalking)•Fraudulentact(e.g.,replay,impersonation,interception)•Informationbribery•Spoofing•Systemintrusion Terrorist BlackmailDestructionExploitationRevenge •Bomb/Terrorism•Informationwarfare•Systemattack(e.g.,distributeddenialofservice)•Systempenetration•Systemtampering Industrialespionage(companies,foreignnovprnmpnt^nthprUWUI1II11^1IIO,V/ilIwlgovernmentinterests) CompetitiveadvantageEconomicespionage •Economicexploitation•Informationtheft•Intrusiononpersonalprivacy•Socialengineering•Systempenetration•Unauthorizedsystemaccess(accesstoclassified,proprietary,and/ortechnology-relatedinformation) Insiders(poorlytrained,disgruntled,malicious,negligent,dishonest,orterminatedemployees) CuriosityEgoIntelligenceMonetarygainRevengeUnintentionalerrorsandomissions(e.g.,dataentryerror,programmingerror) •Assaultonanemployee•Blackmail•Browsingofproprietaryinformation•Computerabuse•Fraudandtheft•Informationbribery•Inputoffalsified,corrupteddata•Interception•Maliciouscode(e.g.,virus,logicbomb,Trojanhorse)•Saleofpersonalinformation•Systembugs•Systemintrusion•Systemsabotage•UnauthorizedsystemaccessAnestimateofthemotivation,resources,andcapabilitiesthatmayberequiredtocarryoutasuccessfulattackshouldbedevelopedafterthepotentialthreat-sourceshavebeenidentified,inordertodeterminethelikelihoodofathreat'sexercisingasystemvulnerability,asdescribedinSection3.5. SP800-30 Page14 j i I [PDF page 24] Thethreatstatement,orthelistofpotentialthreat-sources,shouldbetailoredtotheindividualorganizationanditsprocessingenvironment(e.g.,end-usercomputinghabits).Ingeneral,informationonnaturalthreats(e.g.,floods,earthquakes,storms)shouldbereadilyavailable.Knownthreatshavebeenidentifiedbymanygovernmentandprivatesectororganizations.Intrusiondetectiontoolsalsoarebecomingmoreprevalent,andgovernmentandindustryorganizationscontinuallycollectdataonsecurityevents,therebyimprovingtheabilitytorealisticallyassessthreats.Sourcesofinformationinclude,butarenotlimitedto,thefollowing: •Intelligenceagencies(forexample,theFederalBureauofInvestigation'sNationalInfrastructureProtectionCenter)•FederalComputerIncidentResponseCenter(FedCIRC)•Massmedia,particularlyWeb-basedresourcessuchasSecurityFocus.com,SecurityWatch.com,SecurityPortal.com,andSANS.org. OutputfromStep2—Athreatstatementcontainingalistofthreat-sourcesthatcouldexploitsystemvulnerabilities 3.3STEP3:VULNERABILITYIDENTIFICATIONTheanalysisofthethreattoanITsystemmustincludeananalysisofthevulnerabilitiesassociatedwiththesystemenvironment.Thegoalofthisstepistodevelopalistofsystemvulnerabilities(flawsorweaknesses)thatcouldbeexploitedbythepotentialthreat-sources. Table3-2presentsexamplesofvulnerability/threatpairs. Table3-2.Vulnerability/ThreatPairsVulnerabilityThreat-SourceThreatActionTerminatedemployees'systemidentifiers(ED)arenotremovedfromthesystemTerminatedemployeesDialingintothecompany'snetworkandaccessingcompanyproprietarydataCompanyfirewallallowsinboundtelnet,andguestYDisenabledonXYZserver Unauthorizedusers(e.g.,hackers,terminatedemployees,computercriminals,terrorists) UsingtelnettoXYZserverandbrowsingsystemfileswiththeguestID Thevendorhasidentifiedflawsinthesecuritydesignofthesystem;however,newpatcheshavenotbeenappliedtothesystem Unauthorizedusers(e.g.,hackers,disgruntledemployees,computercriminals,terrorists) Obtainingunauthorizedaccesstosensitivesystemfilesbasedonknownsystemvulnerabilities Vulnerability:Aflaworweaknessinsystemsecurityprocedures,design,implementation,orinternalcontrolsthatcouldbeexercised(accidentallytriggeredorintentionallyexploited)andresultinasecuritybreachoraviolationofthesystem'ssecuritypoUcy. SP800-30 Page15 [PDF page 25] VulnerabilityThreat-SourceThreatActionDatacenteruseswatersprinklerstosuppressfire;tarpaulinstoprotecthardwareandequipmentfromwaterdamagearenotinplace Fire,negligentpersonsWatersprinklersbeingturnedoninthedatacenter Recommendedmethodsforidentifyingsystemvulnerabilitiesaretheuseofvulnerabilitysources,theperformanceofsystemsecuritytesting,andthedevelopmentofasecurityrequirementschecklist. Itshouldbenotedthatthetypesofvulnerabilitiesthatwillexist,andthemethodologyneededtodeterminewhetherthevulnerabilitiesarepresent,willusuallyvarydependingonthenatureoftheITsystemandthephaseitisin,intheSDLC: •IftheITsystemhasnotyetbeendesigned,thesearchforvulnerabilitiesshouldfocusontheorganization'ssecuritypolicies,plannedsecurityprocedures,andsystemrequirementdefinitions,andthevendors'ordevelopers'securityproductanalyses(e.g.,whitepapers).•IftheITsystemisbeingimplemented,theidentificationofvulnerabilitiesshouldbeexpandedtoincludemorespecificinformation,suchastheplannedsecurityfeaturesdescribedinthesecuritydesigndocumentationandtheresultsofsystemcertificationtestandevaluation.•IftheITsystemisoperational,theprocessofidentifyingvulnerabilitiesshouldincludeananalysisoftheITsystemsecurityfeaturesandthesecuritycontrols,technicalandprocedural,usedtoprotectthesystem. 3.3.1VulnerabilitySourcesThetechnicalandnontechnicalvulnerabilitiesassociatedwithanITsystem'sprocessingenvironmentcanbeidentifiedviatheinformation-gatheringtechniquesdescribedinSection3.1.2.Areviewofotherindustrysources(e.g.,vendorWebpagesthatidentifysystembugsandflaws)willbeusefulinpreparingfortheinterviewsandindevelopingeffectivequestionnairestoidentifyvulnerabilitiesthatmaybeapplicabletospecificITsystems(e.g.,aspecificversionofaspecificoperatingsystem).TheInternetisanothersourceofinformationonknownsystemvulnerabilitiespostedbyvendors,alongwithhotfixes,servicepacks,patches,andotherremedialmeasuresthatmaybeappliedtoeliminateormitigatevulnerabilities.Documentedvulnerabilitysourcesthatshouldbeconsideredinathoroughvulnerabilityanalysisinclude,butarenotlimitedto,thefollowing: •PreviousriskassessmentdocumentationoftheITsystemassessed•TheITsystem'sauditreports,systemanomalyreports,securityreviewreports,andsystemtestandevaluationreports•Vulnerabilitylists,suchastheNISTI-CATvulnerabilitydatabase(http://icat.nist.gov) SP800-30 Page16 [PDF page 26] •Securityadvisories,suchasFedCIRCandtheDepartmentofEnergy'sComputerIncidentAdvisoryCapabilitybulletins•Vendoradvisories•Commercialcomputerincident/emergencyresponseteamsandpostlists(e.g.,SecurityFocus.comforummailings)•InformationAssuranceVulnerabilityAlertsandbulletinsformilitarysystems•Systemsoftwaresecurityanalyses. 3.3.2SystemSecurityTestingProactivemethods,employingsystemtesting,canbeusedtoidentifysystemvulnerabilitiesefficiently,dependingonthecriticalityoftheITsystemandavailableresources(e.g.,allocatedfunds,availabletechnology,personswiththeexpertisetoconductthetest).Testmethodsinclude — •Automatedvulnerabilityscanningtool•Securitytestandevaluation(ST&E)•Penetrationtesting.*^ Theautomatedvulnerabilityscanningtoolisusedtoscanagroupofhostsoranetworkforknownvulnerableservices(e.g.,systemallowsanonymousFileTransferProtocol[FTP],sendmailrelaying).However,itshouldbenotedthatsomeofthepotentialvulnerabilitiesidentifiedbytheautomatedscanningtoolmaynotrepresentrealvulnerabilitiesinthecontextofthesystemenvironment.Forexample,someofthesescanningtoolsratepotentialvulnerabilitieswithoutconsideringthesite'senvironmentandrequirements.Someofthe"vulnerabilities"flaggedbytheautomatedscanningsoftwaremayactuallynotbevulnerableforaparticularsitebutmaybeconfiguredthatwaybecausetheirenvironmentrequiresit.Thus,thistestmethodmayproducefalsepositives. ST&EisanothertechniquethatcanbeusedinidentifyingITsystemvulnerabilitiesduringtheriskassessmentprocess.Itincludesthedevelopmentandexecutionofatestplan(e.g.,testscript,testprocedures,andexpectedtestresults).ThepurposeofsystemsecuritytestingistotesttheeffectivenessofthesecuritycontrolsofanITsystemastheyhavebeenappliedinanoperationalenvironment.Theobjectiveistoensurethattheappliedcontrolsmeettheapprovedsecurityspecificationforthesoftwareandhardwareandimplementtheorganization'ssecuritypolicyormeetindustrystandards. PenetrationtestingcanbeusedtocomplementthereviewofsecuritycontrolsandensurethatdifferentfacetsoftheITsystemaresecured.Penetrationtesting,whenemployedintheriskassessmentprocess,canbeusedtoassessanITsystem'sabilitytowithstandintentionalattemptstocircumventsystemsecurity.ItsobjectiveistotesttheITsystemfromtheviewpointofathreat-sourceandtoidentifypotentialfailuresintheITsystemprotectionschemes. TheNISTSPdraft800-42,NetworkSecurityTestingOverview,describesthemethodologyfornetworksystemtestingandtheuseofautomatedtools. SP800-30 Page17 [PDF page 27] Theresultsofthesetypesofoptionalsecuritytestingwillhelpidentifyasystem'svulnerabilities. 3.3.3DevelopmentofSecurityRequirementsCliecklistDuringthisstep,theriskassessmentpersonneldeterminewhetherthesecurityrequirementsstipulatedfortheITsystemandcollectedduringsystemcharacterizationarebeingmetbyexistingorplannedsecuritycontrols.Typically,thesystemsecurityrequirementscanbepresentedintableform,witheachrequirementaccompaniedbyanexplanationofhowthesystem'sdesignorimplementationdoesordoesnotsatisfythatsecuritycontrolrequirement. Asecurityrequirementschecklistcontainsthebasicsecuritystandardsthatcanbeusedtosystematicallyevaluateandidentifythevulnerabilitiesoftheassets(personnel,hardware,software,information),nonautomatedprocedures,processes,andinformationtransfersassociatedwithagivenITsysteminthefollowingsecurityareas: •Management•Operational•Technical. Table3-3listssecuritycriteriasuggestedforuseinidentifyinganITsystem'svulnerabilitiesineachsecurityarea. Table3-3.SecurityCriteriaSecurityAreaSecurityCriteria ManagementSecurity•Assignmentofresponsibilities•Continuityofsupport•Incidentresponsecapability•Periodicreviewofsecuritycontrols•Personnelclearanceandbackgroundinvestigations•Riskassessment•Securityandtechnicaltraining•Separationofduties•Systemauthorizationandreauthorization•Systemorapplicationsecurityplan OperationalSecurity•Controlofair-bornecontaminants(smoke,dust,chemicals)•Controlstoensurethequalityoftheelectricalpowersupply•Datamediaaccessanddisposal•Externaldatadistributionandlabeling•Facilityprotection(e.g.,computerroom,datacenter,office)•Humiditycontrol•Temperaturecontrol•Workstations,laptops,andstand-alonepersonalcomputers SP800-30 Page18 [PDF page 28] SecurityAreaSecurityCriteria TechnicalSecurity•Communications(e.g.,dial-in,systeminterconnection,routers)•Cryptography•Discretionaryaccesscontrol•Identificationandauthentication•Intrusiondetection•Objectreuse•Systemaudit Theoutcomeofthisprocessisthesecurityrequirementschecklist.SourcesthatcanbeusedincompiUngsuchachecklistinclude,butarenotlimitedto,thefollowinggovernmentregulatoryandsecuritydirectivesandsourcesapplicabletotheITsystemprocessingenvironment:•CSAof1987•FederalInformationProcessingStandardsPublications•OMBNovember2000CircularA-130•PrivacyActof1974•SystemsecurityplanoftheITsystemassessed•Theorganization'ssecuritypolicies,guidelines,andstandards•Industrypractices. TheNISTSP800-26,SecuritySelf-AssessmentGuideforInformationTechnologySystems,providesanextensivequestionnairecontainingspecificcontrolobjectivesagainstwhichasystemorgroupofinterconnectedsystemscanbetestedandmeasured.Thecontrolobjectivesareabstracteddirectlyfromlong-standingrequirementsfoundinstatute,policy,andguidanceonsecurityandprivacy. Theresultsofthechecklist(orquestionnaire)canbeusedasinputforanevaluationofcomplianceandnoncompliance.Thisprocessidentifiessystem,process,andproceduralweaknessesthatrepresentpotentialvulnerabilities. OutputfromStep3—Alistofthesystemvulnerabilities(observations)"^thatcouldbeexercisedbythepotentialthreat-sources 3.4STEP4:CONTROLANALYSISThegoalofthisstepistoanalyzethecontrolsthathavebeenimplemented,orareplannedforimplementation,bytheorganizationtominimizeoreliminatethelikelihood(orprobability)ofathreat'sexercisingasystemvulnerability. Becausetheriskassessmentreportisnotanauditreport,somesitesmayprefertoaddresstheidentifiedvulnerabiUtiesasobservationsinsteadoffindingsintheriskassessmentreport. SP800-30 Page19 [PDF page 29] Toderiveanoveralllikelihoodratingthatindicatestheprobabilitythatapotentialvulnerabilitymaybeexercisedwithintheconstructoftheassociatedthreatenvironment(Step5below),theimplementationofcurrentorplannedcontrolsmustbeconsidered.Forexample,avulnerability(e.g.,systemorproceduralweakness)isnotlikelytobeexercisedorthelikelihoodislowifthereisalowlevelofthreat-sourceinterestorcapabilityorifthereareeffectivesecuritycontrolsthatcaneliminate,orreducethemagnitudeof,harm.Sections3.4.1through3.4.3,respectively,discusscontrolmethods,controlcategories,andthecontrolanalysistechnique. 3.4.1ControlMethodsSecuritycontrolsencompasstheuseoftechnicalandnontechnicalmethods.Technicalcontrolsaresafeguardsthatareincorporatedintocomputerhardware,software,orfirmware(e.g.,accesscontrolmechanisms,identificationandauthenticationmechanisms,encryptionmethods,intrusiondetectionsoftware).Nontechnicalcontrolsaremanagementandoperationalcontrols,suchassecuritypolicies;operationalprocedures;andpersonnel,physical,andenvironmentalsecurity. 3.4.2ControlCategoriesThecontrolcategoriesforbothtechnicalandnontechnicalcontrolmethodscanbefurtherclassifiedaseitherpreventiveordetective.Thesetwosubcategoriesareexplainedasfollows: •Preventivecontrolsinhibitattemptstoviolatesecuritypolicyandincludesuchcontrolsasaccesscontrolenforcement,encryption,andauthentication.•Detectivecontrolswarnofviolationsorattemptedviolationsofsecuritypolicyandincludesuchcontrolsasaudittrails,intrusiondetectionmethods,andchecksums. Section4.4furtherexplainsthesecontrolsfromtheimplementationstandpoint.Theimplementationofsuchcontrolsduringtheriskmitigationprocessisthedirectresultoftheidentificationofdeficienciesincurrentorplannedcontrolsduringtheriskassessmentprocess(e.g.,controlsarenotinplaceorcontrolsarenotproperlyimplemented). 3.4.3ControlAnalysisTechniqueAsdiscussedinSection3.3.3,developmentofasecurityrequirementschecklistoruseofanavailablechecklistwillbehelpfulinanalyzingcontrolsinanefficientandsystematicmanner.Thesecurityrequirementschecklistcanbeusedtovalidatesecuritynoncomplianceaswellascompliance.Therefore,itisessentialtoupdatesuchcheckliststoreflectchangesinanorganization'scontrolenvironment(e.g.,changesinsecuritypolicies,methods,andrequirements)toensurethechecklist'svalidity. OutputfromStep4—ListofcurrentorplannedcontrolsusedfortheITsystemtomitigatethelikelihoodofavulnerability'sbeingexercisedandreducetheimpactofsuchanadverseevent SP800-30 Page20 [PDF page 30] 3.5STEPS:LIKELIHOODDETERMINATIONToderiveanoveralllikelihoodratingthatindicatestheprobabilitythatapotentialvulnerabilitymaybeexercisedwithintheconstructoftheassociatedthreatenvironment,thefollowinggoverningfactorsmustbeconsidered: •Threat-sourcemotivationandcapability•Natureofthevulnerability•Existenceandeffectivenessofcurrentcontrols. Thelikelihoodthatapotentialvulnerabilitycouldbeexercisedbyagiventhreat-sourcecanbedescribedashigh,medium,orlow.Table3-4belowdescribesthesethreelikelihoodlevels. Table3-4.LikelihoodDefinitionsLikelihoodLevelLikelihoodDefinitionHighThethreat-sourceishighlymotivatedandsufficientlycapable,andcontrolstopreventthevulnerabilityfrombeingexercisedareineffective. MediumThethreat-sourceismotivatedandcapable,butcontrolsareinplacethatmayimpedesuccessfulexerciseofthevulnerability. LowThethreat-sourcelacksmotivationorcapability,orcontrolsareinplacetoprevent,oratleastsignificantlyimpede,thevulnerabilityfrombeingexercised. OutputfromStep5—Likelihoodrating(High,Medium,Low) 3.6STEP6:IMPACTANALYSISThenextmajorstepinmeasuringlevelofriskistodeterminetheadverseimpactresultingfromasuccessfulthreatexerciseofavulnerability.Beforebeginningtheimpactanalysis,itisnecessarytoobtainthefollowingnecessaryinformationasdiscussedinSection3.1.1: •Systemmission(e.g.,theprocessesperformedbytheITsystem)•Systemanddatacriticality(e.g.,thesystem'svalueorimportancetoanorganization)•Systemanddatasensitivity. Thisinformationcanbeobtainedfromexistingorganizationaldocumentation,suchasthemissionimpactanalysisreportorassetcriticalityassessmentreport.Amissionimpactanalysis(alsoknownasbusinessimpactanalysis[BIA]forsomeorganizations)prioritizestheimpactlevelsassociatedwiththecompromiseofanorganization'sinformationassetsbasedonaqualitativeorquantitativeassessmentofthesensitivityandcriticalityofthoseassets.Anassetcriticalityassessmentidentifiesandprioritizesthesensitiveandcriticalorganizationinformationassets(e.g.,hardware,software,systems,services,andrelatedtechnologyassets)thatsupporttheorganization'scriticalmissions. SP800-30 Page21 [PDF page 31] Ifthisdocumentationdoesnotexistorsuchassessmentsfortheorganization'sITassetshavenotbeenperformed,thesystemanddatasensitivitycanbedeterminedbasedonthelevelofprotectionrequiredtomaintainthesystemanddata'savailability,integrity,andconfidentiality.RegardlessofthemethodusedtodeterminehowsensitiveanITsystemanditsdataare,thesystemandinformationownersaretheonesresponsiblefordeterminingtheimpactlevelfortheirownsystemandinformation.Consequently,inanalyzingimpact,theappropriateapproachistointerviewthesystemandinformationowner(s). Therefore,theadverseimpactofasecurityeventcanbedescribedintermsoflossordegradationofany,oracombinationofany,ofthefollowingthreesecuritygoals:integrity,availability,andconfidentiality.Thefollowinglistprovidesabriefdescriptionofeachsecuritygoalandtheconsequence(orimpact)ofitsnotbeingmet: •LossofIntegrity.Systemanddataintegrityreferstotherequirementthatinformationbeprotectedfromimpropermodification.IntegrityislostifunauthorizedchangesaremadetothedataorITsystembyeitherintentionaloraccidentalacts.Ifthelossofsystemordataintegrityisnotcorrected,continueduseofthecontaminatedsystemorcorrupteddatacouldresultininaccuracy,fraud,orerroneousdecisions.Also,violationofintegritymaybethefirststepinasuccessfulattackagainstsystemavailabilityorconfidentiality.Forallthesereasons,lossofintegrityreducestheassuranceofanITsystem.•LossofAvailability.Ifamission-criticalITsystemisunavailabletoitsendusers,theorganization'smissionmaybeaffected.Lossofsystemfunctionalityandoperationaleffectiveness,forexample,mayresultinlossofproductivetime,thusimpedingtheendusers'performanceoftheirfunctionsinsupportingtheorganization'smission.•LossofConfidentiality.Systemanddataconfidentialityreferstotheprotectionofinformationfromunauthorizeddisclosure.TheimpactofunauthorizeddisclosureofconfidentialinformationcanrangefromthejeopardizingofnationalsecuritytothedisclosureofPrivacyActdata.Unauthorized,unanticipated,orunintentionaldisclosurecouldresultinlossofpublicconfidence,embarrassment,orlegalactionagainsttheorganization. Sometangibleimpactscanbemeasuredquantitativelyinlostrevenue,thecostofrepairingthesystem,orthelevelofeffortrequiredtocorrectproblemscausedbyasuccessfulthreataction.Otherimpacts(e.g.,lossofpublicconfidence,lossofcredibility,damagetoanorganization'sinterest)cannotbemeasuredinspecificunitsbutcanbequalifiedordescribedintermsofhigh,medium,andlowimpacts.Becauseofthegenericnatureofthisdiscussion,thisguidedesignatesanddescribesonlythequalitativecategories—high,medium,andlowimpact(seeTable3.5). SP800-30 Page22 \ [PDF page 32] Table3-5.MagnitudeofImpactDeHnitionsMagnitudeofImpactimpactDefinition HighExerciseoftlievulnerability(1)mayresultinthehighlycostlylossofmajortangibleassetsorresources;(2)maysignificantlyviolate,harm,orimpedeanorganization'smission,reputation,orinterest;or(3)mayresultinhumandeathorseriousinjury. MediumExerciseofthevulnerability(1)mayresultinthecostlylossoftangibleassetsorresources;(2)mayviolate,harm,orimpedeanorganization'smission,reputation,orinterest;or(3)mayresultinhumaninjury. LowExerciseofthevulnerability(1)mayresultinthelossofsometangibleassetsorresourcesor(2)maynoticeablyaffectanorganization'smission,reputation,orinterest. QuantitativeversusQualitativeAssessment Inconductingtheimpactanalysis,considerationshouldbegiventotheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofquantitativeversusqualitativeassessments.Themainadvantageofthequalitativeimpactanalysisisthatitprioritizestherisksandidentifiesareasforimmediateimprovementinaddressingthevulnerabilities.Thedisadvantageofthequalitativeanalysisisthatitdoesnotprovidespecificquantifiablemeasurementsofthemagnitudeoftheimpacts,thereforemakingacost-benefitanalysisofanyrecommendedcontrolsdifficult. Themajoradvantageofaquantitativeimpactanalysisisthatitprovidesameasurementoftheimpacts'magnitude,whichcanbeusedinthecost-benefitanalysisofrecommendedcontrols.Thedisadvantageisthat,dependingonthenumericalrangesusedtoexpressthemeasurement,themeaningofthequantitativeimpactanalysismaybeunclear,requiringtheresulttobeinterpretedinaqualitativemanner.Additionalfactorsoftenmustbeconsideredtodeterminethemagnitudeofimpact.Thesemayinclude,butarenotlimitedto — •Anestimationofthefrequencyofthethreat-source'sexerciseofthevulnerabilityoveraspecifiedtimeperiod(e.g.,1year)•Anapproximatecostforeachoccurrenceofthethreat-source'sexerciseofthevulnerability•Aweightedfactorbasedonasubjectiveanalysisoftherelativeimpactofaspecificthreat'sexercisingaspecificvulnerability. OutputfromStep6—Magnitudeofimpact(High,Medium,orLow) SP800-30 Page23 [PDF page 33] 3.7STEP7:RISKDETERMINATIONThepurposeofthisstepistoassessthelevelofrisktotheITsystem.Thedeterminationofriskforaparticularthreat/vulnerabilitypaircanbeexpressedasafunctionof — •Thelikelihoodofagiventhreat-source'sattemptingtoexerciseagivenvulnerability•Themagnitudeoftheimpactshouldathreat-sourcesuccessfullyexercisethevulnerability•Theadequacyofplannedorexistingsecuritycontrolsforreducingoreliminatingrisk. Tomeasurerisk,ariskscaleandarisk-levelmatrixmustbedeveloped.Section3.7.1presentsastandardrisk-levelmatrix;Section3.7.2describestheresultingrisklevels. 3.7.1Risk-LevelMatrixThefinaldeterminationofmissionriskisderivedbymultiplyingtheratingsassignedforthreatlikelihood(e.g.,probability)andthreatimpact.Table3.6belowshowshowtheoverallriskratingsmightbedeterminedbasedoninputsfromthethreatlikelihoodandthreatimpactcategories.Thematrixbelowisa3x3matrixofthreatlikelihood(High,Medium,andLow)andthreatimpact(High,Medium,andLow).Dependingonthesite'srequirementsandthegranularityofriskassessmentdesired,somesitesmayusea4x4ora5x5matrix.ThelattercanincludeaVeryLow/VeryHighthreatlikelihoodandaVeryLow/VeryHighthreatimpacttogenerateaVeryLowA^eryHighrisklevel.A"VeryHigh"risklevelmayrequirepossiblesystemshutdownorstoppingofallITsystemintegrationandtestingefforts. ThesamplematrixinTable3-6showshowtheoverallrisklevelsofHigh,Medium,andLowarederived.Thedeterminationoftheserisklevelsorratingsmaybesubjective.Therationaleforthisjustificationcanbeexplainedintermsoftheprobabilityassignedforeachthreatlikelihoodlevelandavalueassignedforeachimpactlevel.Forexample, •Theprobabilityassignedforeachthreatlikelihoodlevelis1.0forHigh,0.5forMedium,0.1forLow•Thevalueassignedforeachimpactlevelis100forHigh,50forMedium,and10forLow. SP800-30 Page24 [PDF page 34] Table3-6.Risk-LevelMatrixImpactThreatLikelihoodLow(10)Medium(50)Higli(100)High{^.0)LowMediumHigh10X1.0=1050X1.0=50100X1.0=100Medium(0.5)LowMediumMedium10X0.5=5 50X0.5=25100X0.5=50Low(0.1)LowLowLow10X0.1=1 50X0.1=5100X0.1=10RiskScale:High(>50to100);Medium(>10to50);Low(1to10)^ 3.7.2DescriptionofRiskLevelTable3-7describestherisklevelsshownintheabovematrix.Thisriskscale,withitsratingsofHigh,Medium,andLow,representsthedegreeorlevelofrisktowhichanITsystem,facility,orproceduremightbeexposedifagivenvulnerabilitywereexercised.Theriskscalealsopresentsactionsthatseniormanagement,themissionowners,musttakeforeachrisklevel. Table3-7.RiskScaleandNecessaryActions RiskLevelRiskDescriptionandNecessaryActions High Ifanobservationorfindingisevaluatedasahiglirisk,thereisastrongneedforcorrectivemeasures.Anexistingsystennmaycontinuetooperate,butacorrectiveactionplanmustbeputinplaceassoonaspossible. MediumIfanobservationisratedasmediumrisk,correctiveactionsareneededandaplanmustbedevelopedtoincorporatetheseactionswithinareasonableperiodoftime. LowIfanobservationisdescribedaslowrisk,thesystem'sDAAmustdeterminewhethercorrectiveactionsarestillrequiredordecidetoaccepttherisk. OutputfromStep7—Risklevel(High,Medium,Low) Ifthelevelindicatedoncertainitemsissolowastobedeemedtobe"negligible"ornonsignificant(valueis<1onriskscaleof1to100),onemaywishtoholdtheseasideinaseparatebucketinlieuofforwardingformanagementaction.Thiswillmakesurethattheyarenotoverlookedwhenconductingthenextperiodicriskassessment.Italsoestablishesacompleterecordofallrisksidentifiedintheanalysis.Theserisksmaymovetoanewrisklevelonareassessmentduetoachangeinthreatlikelihoodand/orimpactandthatiswhyitiscriticalthattheiridentificationnotbelostintheexercise. SP800-30 Page25 [PDF page 35] 3.8STEPS:CONTROLRECOMMENDATIONSDuringthisstepoftheprocess,controlsthatcouldmitigateoreliminatetheidentifiedrisks,asappropriatetotheorganization'soperations,areprovided.ThegoaloftherecommendedcontrolsistoreducethelevelofrisktotheITsystemanditsdatatoanacceptablelevel.Thefollowingfactorsshouldbeconsideredinrecommendingcontrolsandalternativesolutionstominimizeoreliminateidentifiedrisks: •Effectivenessofrecommendedoptions(e.g.,systemcompatibility)•Legislationandregulation•Organizationalpolicy•Operationalimpact•Safetyandreliability. Thecontrolrecommendationsaretheresultsoftheriskassessmentprocessandprovideinputtotheriskmitigationprocess,duringwhichtherecommendedproceduralandtechnicalsecuritycontrolsareevaluated,prioritized,andimplemented. Itshouldbenotedthatnotallpossiblerecommendedcontrolscanbeimplementedtoreduceloss.Todeterminewhichonesarerequiredandappropriateforaspecificorganization,acost-benefitanalysis,asdiscussedinSection4.6,shouldbeconductedfortheproposedrecommendedcontrols,todemonstratethatthecostsofimplementingthecontrolscanbejustifiedbythereductioninthelevelofrisk.Inaddition,theoperationalimpact(e.g.,effectonsystemperformance)andfeasibility(e.g.,technicalrequirements,useracceptance)ofintroducingtherecommendedoptionshouldbeevaluatedcarefullyduringtheriskmitigationprocess. OutputfromStep8—Recommendationofcontrol(s)andalternativesolutionstomitigaterisk 3.9STEP9:RESULTSDOCUMENTATIONOncetheriskassessmenthasbeencompleted(threat-sourcesandvulnerabilitiesidentified,risksassessed,andrecommendedcontrolsprovided),theresultsshouldbedocumentedinanofficialreportorbriefing. Ariskassessmentreportisamanagementreportthathelpsseniormanagement,themissionowners,makedecisionsonpolicy,procedural,budget,andsystemoperationalandmanagementchanges.Unlikeanauditorinvestigationreport,whichlooksforwrongdoing,ariskassessmentreportshouldnotbepresentedinanaccusatorymannerbutasasystematicandanalyticalapproachtoassessingrisksothatseniormanagementwillunderstandtherisksandallocateresourcestoreduceandcorrectpotentiallosses.Forthisreason,somepeopleprefertoaddressthethreat/vulnerabilitypairsasobservationsinsteadoffindingsintheriskassessmentreport.AppendixBprovidesasuggestedoutlinefortheriskassessmentreport. OutputfromStep9—Riskassessmentreportthatdescribesthethreatsandvulnerabilities,measurestherisk,andprovidesrecommendationsforcontrolimplementation SP800-30 Page26I [PDF page 36] 4.RISKMITIGATIONRiskmitigation,thesecondprocessofriskmanagement,involvesprioritizing,evaluating,andimplementingtheappropriaterisk-reducingcontrolsrecommendedfromtheriskassessmentprocess. Becausetheeliminationofallriskisusuallyimpracticalorclosetoimpossible,itistheresponsibilityofseniormanagementandfunctionalandbusinessmanagerstousetheleast-costapproachandimplementthemostappropriatecontrolstodecreasemissionrisktoanacceptablelevel,withminimaladverseimpactontheorganization'sresourcesandmission. Thissectiondescribesriskmitigationoptions(Section4.1),theriskmitigationstrategy(Section4.2),anapproachforcontrolimplementation(Section4.3),controlcategories(Section4.4),thecost-benefitanalysisusedtojustifytheimplementationoftherecommendedcontrols(Section4.5),andresidualrisk(Section4.6). 4.1RISKMITIGATIONOPTIONSRiskmitigationisasystematicmethodologyusedbyseniormanagementtoreducemissionrisk.Riskmitigationcanbeachievedthroughanyofthefollowingriskmitigationoptions: •RiskAssumption.ToacceptthepotentialriskandcontinueoperatingtheITsystemortoimplementcontrolstolowertherisktoanacceptablelevel•RiskAvoidance.Toavoidtheriskbyeliminatingtheriskcauseand/orconsequence(e.g.,forgocertainfunctionsofthesystemorshutdownthesystemwhenrisksareidentified)•RiskLimitation.Tolimittheriskbyimplementingcontrolsthatminimizetheadverseimpactofathreat'sexercisingavulnerability(e.g.,useofsupporting,preventive,detectivecontrols)•RiskPlanning.Tomanageriskbydevelopingariskmitigationplanthatprioritizes,implements,andmaintainscontrols•ResearchandAcknowledgment.Tolowertheriskoflossbyacknowledgingthevulnerabilityorflawandresearchingcontrolstocorrectthevulnerability•RiskTransference.Totransfertheriskbyusingotheroptionstocompensatefortheloss,suchaspurchasinginsurance. Thegoalsandmissionofanorganizationshouldbeconsideredinselectinganyoftheseriskmitigationoptions.Itmaynotbepracticaltoaddressallidentifiedrisks,sopriorityshouldbegiventothethreatandvulnerabilitypairsthathavethepotentialtocausesignificantmissionimpactorharm.Also,insafeguardinganorganization'smissionanditsITsystems,becauseofeachorganization'suniqueenvironmentandobjectives,theoptionusedtomitigatetheriskandthemethodsusedtoimplementcontrolsmayvary.The"bestofbreed"approachistouseappropriatetechnologiesfromamongthevariousvendorsecurityproducts,alongwiththeappropriateriskmitigationoptionandnontechnical,administrativemeasures. SP800-30 Page27 [PDF page 37] 4.2RISKMITIGATIONSTRATEGYSeniormanagement,themissionowners,knowingthepotentialrisksandrecommendedcontrols,mayask,"WhenandunderwhatcircumstancesshouldItakeaction?WhenshallIimplementthesecontrolstomitigatetheriskandprotectourorganization?"TheriskmitigationchartinFigure4-1addressesthesequestions.AppropriatepointsforimplementationofcontrolactionsareindicatedinthisfigurebythewordYES. 1& UnacceptableRisk3 Figure4-1.RiskMitigationActionPointsThisstrategyisfurtherarticulatedinthefollowingrulesofthumb,whichprovideguidanceonactionstomitigaterisksfromintentionalhumanthreats: •Whenvulnerability(orflaw,weakness)exists—implementassurancetechniquestoreducethelikelihoodofavulnerability'sbeingexercised.•Whenavulnerabilitycanbeexercised—applylayeredprotections,architecturaldesigns,andadministrativecontrolstominimizetheriskoforpreventthisoccurrence.•Whentheattacker'scostislessthanthepotentialgain->applyprotectionstodecreaseanattacker'smotivationbyincreasingtheattacker'scost(e.g.,useofsystemcontrolssuchaslimitingwhatasystemusercanaccessanddocansignificantlyreduceanattacker'sgain).•Whenlossistoogreat—applydesignprinciples,architecturaldesigns,andtechnicalandnontechnicalprotectionstolimittheextentoftheattack,therebyreducingthepotentialforloss. Thestrategyoutlinedabove,withtheexceptionofthethirdlistitem("Whentheattacker'scostislessthanthepotentialgain"),alsoappliestothemitigationofrisksarisingfromenvironmental SP800-30 Page28 [PDF page 38] orunintentionalhumanthreats(e.g.,systemorusererrors).(Becausethereisno"attacker,"nomotivationorgainisinvolved.) 4.3APPROACHFORCONTROLIMPLEMENTATIONWhencontrolactionsmustbetaken,thefollowingruleapplies: Addressthegreatestrisksandstriveforsufficientriskmitigationatthelowestcost,withminimalimpactonothermissioncapabilities. Thefollowingriskmitigationmethodologydescribestheapproachtocontrolimplementation: •Step1—PrioritizeActionsBasedontherisklevelspresentedintheriskassessmentreport,theimplementationactionsareprioritized.Inallocatingresources,toppriorityshouldbegiventoriskitemswithunacceptablyhighriskrankings(e.g.,riskassignedaVeryHighorHighrisklevel).Thesevulnerability/threatpairswillrequireimmediatecorrectiveactiontoprotectanorganization'sinterestandmission. OutputfromStep1—ActionsrankingfromHightoLow •Step2—EvaluateRecommendedControlOptionsThecontrolsrecommendedintheriskassessmentprocessmaynotbethemostappropriateandfeasibleoptionsforaspecificorganizationandITsystem.Duringthisstep,thefeasibility(e.g.,compatibility,useracceptance)andeffectiveness(e.g.,degreeofprotectionandlevelofriskmitigation)oftherecommendedcontroloptionsareanalyzed.Theobjectiveistoselectthemostappropriatecontroloptionforminimizingrisk. OutputfromStep2—Listoffeasiblecontrols •Step3—ConductCost-BenefitAnalysisToaidmanagementindecisionmakingandtoidentifycost-effectivecontrols,acost-benefitanalysisisconducted.Section4.5detailstheobjectivesandmethodofconductingthecost-benefitanalysis. OutputfromStep3—Cost-benefitanalysisdescribingthecostandbenefitsofimplementingornotimplementingthecontrols •Step4—SelectControlOnthebasisoftheresultsofthecost-benefitanalysis,managementdeterminesthemostcost-effectivecontrol(s)forreducingrisktotheorganization'smission.Thecontrolsselectedshouldcombinetechnical,operational,andmanagementcontrolelementstoensureadequatesecurityfortheITsystemandtheorganization. OutputfromStep4—Selectedcontrol(s) SP800-30 Page29 [PDF page 39] •Step5—AssignResponsibilityAppropriatepersons(in-housepersonnelorexternalcontractingstaff)whohavetheappropriateexpertiseandskill-setstoimplementtheselectedcontrolareidentified,andresponsibilityisassigned. OutputfromStep5—Listofresponsiblepersons •Step6—DevelopaSafeguardImplementationPlanDuringthisstep,asafeguardimplementationplan^(oractionplan)isdeveloped.Theplanshould,ataminimum,containthefollowinginformation:-Risks(vulnerability/threatpairs)andassociatedrisklevels(outputfromriskassessmentreport)-Recommendedcontrols(outputfromriskassessmentreport)-Prioritizedactions(withprioritygiventoitemswithVeryHighandHighrisklevels)-Selectedplannedcontrols(determinedonthebasisoffeasibility,effectiveness,benefitstotheorganization,andcost)-Requiredresourcesforimplementingtheselectedplannedcontrols-Listsofresponsibleteamsandstaff-Startdateforimplementation-Targetcompletiondateforimplementation-Maintenancerequirements.Thesafeguardimplementationplanprioritizestheimplementationactionsandprojectsthestartandtargetcompletiondates.Thisplanwillaidandexpeditetheriskmitigationprocess.AppendixCprovidesasamplesummarytableforthesafeguardimplementationplan. OutputfromStep6—Safeguardimplementationplan •Step7—^ImplementSelectedControl(s)Dependingonindividualsituations,theimplementedcontrolsmaylowertherisklevelbutnoteliminatetherisk.ResidualriskisdiscussedinSection4.6. OutputfromStep7—Residualrisk Figure4-2depictstherecommendedmethodologyforriskmitigation. ^NISTInteragencyReport4749,SampleStatementsofWorkforFederalComputerSecurityServices:ForUseIn-HouseorContractingOut.December1991. SP800-30 Page30 [PDF page 40] InputRiskMitisationActivitiesOutputr•Risklevelsfromtheriskassessmentreport/ r N•Riskassessmentreport/ Step1.PrioritizeActions IStep2.EvaluateRecommendedControlOptions •Feasibility•Effectiveness Step3.ConductCost-BenefitAnalysis •Impactofimplanaiting•Impactofnotimplementing•Associatedcosts Step5.AssignResponsibility IStep6.DevelopSafeguardImplementationPlan •RisksandAssociatedRiskLevels•PrioritizedActions•RecommendedControls•SelectedPlannedControls•ResponsiblePersons•StartDate•TargetCompletionDate•MaintenanceRequirements IStep7.ImplementSelectedControls ActionsrankingfromHightoLow Listofpossiblecontrols Cost-benefitanalysis SelectedControls Listofresponsiblepersons Safeguardimplementationplan ResidualRisks Figure4-2.RiskMitigationMethodologyFlowchart SP800-30 Page31 [PDF page 41] 4.4CONTROLCATEGORIESInimplementingrecommendedcontrolstomitigaterisk,anorganizationshouldconsidertechnical,management,andoperationalsecuritycontrols,oracombinationofsuchcontrols,tomaximizetheeffectivenessofcontrolsfortheirITsystemsandorganization.Securitycontrols,whenusedappropriately,canprevent,limit,ordeterthreat-sourcedamagetoanorganization'smission. Thecontrolrecommendationprocesswillinvolvechoosingamongacombinationoftechnical,management,andoperationalcontrolsforimprovingtheorganization'ssecurityposture.Thetrade-offsthatanorganizationwillhavetoconsiderareillustratedbyviewingthedecisionsinvolvedinenforcinguseofcomplexuserpasswordstominimizepasswordguessingandcracking.Inthiscase,atechnicalcontrolrequiringadd-onsecuritysoftwaremaybemorecomplexandexpensivethanaproceduralcontrol,butthetechnicalcontrolislikelytobemoreeffectivebecausetheenforcementisautomatedbythesystem.Ontheotherhand,aproceduralcontrolmightbeimplementedsimplybymeansofamemorandumtoallconcernedindividualsandanamendmenttothesecurityguidelinesfortheorganization,butensuringthatusersconsistentlyfollowthememorandumandguidelinewillbedifficultandwillrequiresecurityawarenesstraininganduseracceptance. Thissectionprovidesahigh-leveloverviewofsomeofthecontrolcategories.MoredetailedguidanceaboutimplementingandplanningforITcontrolscanbefoundinNISTSP800-18,GuideforDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems,andNISTSP800-12,AnIntroductiontoComputerSecurity:TheNISTHandbook.Sections4.4.1through4.4.3provideanoverviewoftechnical,management,andoperationalcontrols,respectively. 4.4.1TechnicalSecurityControlsTechnicalsecuritycontrolsforriskmitigationcanbeconfiguredtoprotectagainstgiventypesofthreats.Thesecontrolsmayrangefromsimpletocomplexmeasuresandusuallyinvolvesystemarchitectures;engineeringdisciplines;andsecuritypackageswithamixofhardware,software,andfirmware.Allofthesemeasuresshouldworktogethertosecurecriticalandsensitivedata,information,andITsystemfunctions.Technicalcontrolscanbegroupedintothefollowingmajorcategories,accordingtoprimarypurpose: •Support(Section4.4.1.1).SupportingcontrolsaregenericandunderliemostITsecuritycapabilities.Thesecontrolsmustbeinplaceinordertoimplementothercontrols.•Prevent(Section4.4.1.2).Preventivecontrolsfocusonpreventingsecuritybreachesfromoccurringinthefirstplace.•DetectandRecover(Section4.4.1.3).Thesecontrolsfocusondetectingandrecoveringfromasecuritybreach. Figure4-3depictstheprimarytechnicalcontrolsandtherelationshipsbetweenthem. SP800-30 Page32 [PDF page 42] Identillcation CryptographicKeyManagonicnl SeciiritvAdministrationi SystemProtections(leastprivilege,ohjectreuse,processseparalion,etc.) Figure4-3.TechnicalSecurityControls 4.4.1.1SupportingTechnicalControlsSupportingcontrolsare,bytheirverynature,pervasiveandinterrelatedwithmanyothercontrols.Thesupportingcontrolsareasfollows: •Identification.Thiscontrolprovidestheabilitytouniquelyidentifyusers,processes,andinformationresources.Toimplementothersecuritycontrols(e.g.,discretionaryaccesscontrol[DAC],mandatoryaccesscontrol[MAC],accountability),itisessentialthatbothsubjectsandobjectsbeidentifiable.•CryptographicKeyManagement.Cryptographickeysmustbesecurelymanagedwhencryptographicfunctionsareimplementedinvariousothercontrols.Cryptographickeymanagementincludeskeygeneration,distribution,storage,andmaintenance.•SecurityAdministration.ThesecurityfeaturesofanITsystemmustbeconfigured(e.g.,enabledordisabled)tomeettheneedsofaspecificinstallationandtoaccountforchangesintheoperationalenvironment.Systemsecuritycanbebuiltintooperatingsystemsecurityortheapplication.Commercialoff-the-shelfadd-onsecurityproductsareavailable. SP800-30 Page33 [PDF page 43] •SystemProtections.Underlyingasystem'svarioussecurityfunctionalcapabilitiesisabaseofconfidenceinthetechnicalimplementation.Thisrepresentsthequalityoftheimplementationfromtheperspectivebothofthedesignprocessesusedandofthemannerinwhichtheimplementationwasaccomplished.Someexamplesofsystemprotectionsareresidualinformationprotection(alsoknownasobjectreuse),leastprivilege(or"needtoknow"),processseparation,modularity,layering,andminimizationofwhatneedstobetrusted. 4.4.1.2PreventiveTechnicalControlsThesecontrols,whichcaninhibitattemptstoviolatesecuritypolicy,includethefollowing: •Authentication.Theauthenticationcontrolprovidesthemeansofverifyingtheidentityofasubjecttoensurethataclaimedidentityisvalid.Authenticationmechanismsincludepasswords,personalidentificationnumbers,orPESfs,andemergingauthenticationtechnologythatprovidesstrongauthentication(e.g.,token,smartcard,digitalcertificate,Kerberos).•Authorization.Theauthorizationcontrolenablesspecificationandsubsequentmanagementoftheallowedactionsforagivensystem(e.g.,theinformationownerorthedatabaseadministratordetermineswhocanupdateasharedfileaccessedbyagroupofonlineusers).•AccessControlEnforcement.Dataintegrityandconfidentialityareenforcedbyaccesscontrols.Whenthesubjectrequestingaccesshasbeenauthorizedtoaccessparticularprocesses,itisnecessarytoenforcethedefinedsecuritypolicy(e.g.,MACorDAC).Thesepolicy-basedcontrolsareenforcedviaaccesscontrolmechanismsdistributedthroughoutthesystem(e.g.,MACsensitivitylabels;DACfilepermissionsets,accesscontrollists,roles,userprofiles).Theeffectivenessandthestrengthofaccesscontroldependonthecorrectnessoftheaccesscontroldecisions(e.g.,howthesecurityrulesareconfigured)andthestrengthofaccesscontrolenforcement(e.g.,thedesignofsoftwareorhardwaresecurity).•Nonrepudiation.Systemaccountabilitydependsontheabilitytoensurethatsenderscannotdenysendinginformationandthatreceiverscannotdenyreceivingit.Nonrepudiationspansbothpreventionanddetection.Ithasbeenplacedinthepreventioncategoryinthisguidebecausethemechanismsimplementedpreventthesuccessfulrepudiationofanaction(e.g.,thedigitalcertificatethatcontainstheowner'sprivatekeyisknownonlytotheowner).Asaresult,thiscontrolistypicallyappliedatthepointoftransmissionorreception.•ProtectedCommunications.Inadistributedsystem,theabilitytoaccomplishsecurityobjectivesishighlydependentontrustworthycommunications.Theprotectedcommunicationscontrolensurestheintegrity,availability,andconfidentialityofsensitiveandcriticalinformationwhileitisintransit.Protectedcommunicationsusedataencryptionmethods(e.g.,virtualprivatenetwork,InternetProtocolSecurity[IPSEC]Protocol),anddeploymentofcryptographictechnologies(e.g..DataEncryptionStandard[DES],TripleDES,RAS,MD4,MD5,securehashstandard,andescrowedencryptionalgorithmssuchasClipper)tominimizenetworkthreatssuchasreplay,interception,packetsniffing,wiretapping,oreavesdropping.] I i SP800-30 Page34 j i [PDF page 44] •TransactionPrivacy.Bothgovernmentandprivatesectorsystemsareincreasinglyrequiredtomaintaintheprivacyofindividuals.Transactionprivacycontrols(e.g.,SecureSocketsLayer,secureshell)protectagainstlossofprivacywithrespecttotransactionsperformedbyanindividual. 4.4.1.3DetectionandRecoveryTechnicalControlsDetectioncontrolswarnofviolationsorattemptedviolationsofsecuritypolicyandincludesuchcontrolsasaudittrails,intrusiondetectionmethods,andchecksums.Recoverycontrolscanbeusedtorestorelostcomputingresources.Theyareneededasacomplementtothesupportingandpreventivetechnicalmeasures,becausenoneofthemeasuresintheseotherareasisperfect.Detectionandrecoverycontrolsinclude — •Audit.Theauditingofsecurity-relevanteventsandthemonitoringandtrackingofsystemabnormalitiesarekeyelementsintheafter-the-factdetectionof,andrecoveryfrom,securitybreaches.•IntrusionDetectionandContainment.Itisessentialtodetectsecuritybreaches(e.g.,networkbreak-ins,suspiciousactivities)sothataresponsecanoccurinatimelymanner.Itisalsooflittleusetodetectasecuritybreachifnoeffectiveresponsecanbeinitiated.Theintrusiondetectionandcontainmentcontrolprovidesthesetwocapabilities.•ProofofWholeness.Theproof-of-wholenesscontrol(e.g.,systemintegritytool)analyzessystemintegrityandirregularitiesandidentifiesexposuresandpotentialthreats.Thiscontroldoesnotpreventviolationsofsecuritypolicybutdetectsviolationsandhelpsdeterminethetypeofcorrectiveactionneeded.•RestoreSecureState.Thisserviceenablesasystemtoreturntoastatethatisknowntobesecure,afterasecuritybreachoccurs.•VirusDetectionandEradication.Virusdetectionanderadicationsoftwareinstalledonserversanduserworkstationsdetects,identifies,andremovessoftwarevirusestoensuresystemanddataintegrity. 4.4.2ManagementSecurityControlsManagementsecuritycontrols,inconjunctionwithtechnicalandoperationalcontrols,areimplementedtomanageandreducetheriskoflossandtoprotectanorganization'smission.Managementcontrolsfocusonthestipulationofinformationprotectionpolicy,guidelines,andstandards,whicharecarriedoutthroughoperationalprocedurestofulfilltheorganization'sgoalsandmissions. Managementsecuritycontrols—preventive,detection,andrecovery—thatareimplementedtoreduceriskaredescribedinSections4.4.2.1through4.4.2.3. SP800-30 Page35 [PDF page 45] 4.4.2.1PreventiveManagementSecurityControlsThesecontrolsincludethefollowing: •Assignsecurityresponsibilitytoensurethatadequatesecurityisprovidedforthemission-criticalITsystems•DevelopandmaintainsystemsecurityplanstodocumentcurrentcontrolsandaddressplannedcontrolsforITsystemsinsupportoftheorganization'smission•Implementpersonnelsecuritycontrols,includingseparationofduties,leastprivilege,andusercomputeraccessregistrationandtermination•Conductsecurityawarenessandtechnicaltrainingtoensurethatendusersandsystemusersareawareoftherulesofbehaviorandtheirresponsibilitiesinprotectingtheorganization'smission. 4.4.2.2DetectionManagementSecurityControlsDetectionmanagementcontrolsareasfollows: •Implementpersonnelsecuritycontrols,includingpersonnelclearance,backgroundinvestigations,rotationofduties•Conductperiodicreviewofsecuritycontrolstoensurethatthecontrolsareeffective•Performperiodicsystemaudits•Conductongoingriskmanagementtoassessandmitigaterisk•AuthorizeITsystemstoaddressandacceptresidualrisk. 4.4.2.3RecoveryManagementSecurityControlsThesecontrolsincludethefollowing: •Providecontinuityofsupportanddevelop,test,andmaintainthecontinuityofoperationsplantoprovideforbusinessresumptionandensurecontinuityofoperationsduringemergenciesordisasters•Establishanincidentresponsecapabilitytopreparefor,recognize,report,andrespondtotheincidentandreturntheITsystemtooperationalstatus. 4.4.3OperationalSecurityControlsAnorganization'ssecuritystandardsshouldestablishasetofcontrolsandguidelinestoensurethatsecurityproceduresgoverningtheuseoftheorganization'sITassetsandresourcesareproperlyenforcedandimplementedinaccordancewiththeorganization'sgoalsandmission.Managementplaysavitalroleinoverseeingpolicyimplementationandinensuringtheestablishmentofappropriateoperationalcontrols. SP800-30 Page36 [PDF page 46] Operationalcontrols,implementedinaccordancewithabasesetofrequirements(e.g.,technicalcontrols)andgoodindustrypractices,areusedtocorrectoperationaldeficienciesthatcouldbeexercisedbypotentialthreat-sources.Toensureconsistencyanduniformityinsecurityoperations,step-by-stepproceduresandmethodsforimplementingoperationalcontrolsmustbeclearlydefined,documented,andmaintained.TheseoperationalcontrolsincludethosepresentedinSections4.4.3.1and4.4.3.2below. 4.4.3.1PreventiveOperationalControlsPreventiveoperationalcontrolsareasfollows: •Controldatamediaaccessanddisposal(e.g.,physicalaccesscontrol,degaussingmethod)•Limitexternaldatadistribution(e.g.,useoflabeling)•Controlsoftwareviruses•Safeguardcomputingfacility(e.g.,securityguards,siteproceduresforvisitors,electronicbadgesystem,biometricsaccesscontrol,managementanddistributionoflocksandkeys,barriersandfences)•Securewiringclosetsthathousehubsandcables•Providebackupcapability(e.g.,proceduresforregulardataandsystembackups,archivelogsthatsavealldatabasechangestobeusedinvariousrecoveryscenarios)•Establishoff-sitestorageproceduresandsecurity•Protectlaptops,personalcomputers(PC),workstations•ProtectITassetsfromfiredamage(e.g.,requirementsandproceduresfortheuseoffireextinguishers,tarpaulins,drysprinklersystems,halonfiresuppressionsystem)•Provideemergencypowersource(e.g.,requirementsforuninterruptiblepowersupplies,on-sitepowergenerators)•Controlthehumidityandtemperatureofthecomputingfacility(e.g.,operationofairconditioners,heatdispersal). 4.4.3.2DetectionOperationalControlsDetectionoperationalcontrolsincludethefollowing: •Providephysicalsecurity(e.g.,useofmotiondetectors,closed-circuittelevisionmonitoring,sensorsandalarms)•Ensureenvironmentalsecurity(e.g.,useofsmokeandfiredetectors,sensorsandalarms). 4.5COST-BENEFITANALYSISToallocateresourcesandimplementcost-effectivecontrols,organizations,afteridentifyingallpossiblecontrolsandevaluatingtheirfeasibilityandeffectiveness,shouldconductacost-benefit SP800-30 Page37 [PDF page 47] analysisforeachproposedcontroltodeterminewhichcontrolsarerequiredandappropriatefortheircircumstances.Thecost-benefitanalysiscanbequalitativeorquantitative.Itspurposeistodemonstratethatthecostsofimplementingthecontrolscanbejustifiedbythereductioninthelevelofrisk.Forexample,theorganizationmaynotwanttospend$1,000onacontroltoreducea$200risk. Acost-benefitanalysisforproposednewcontrolsorenhancedcontrolsencompassesthefollowing:•Determiningtheimpactofimplementingtheneworenhancedcontrols•Determiningtheimpactofnotimplementingtheneworenhancedcontrols•Estimatingthecostsoftheimplementation.Thesemayinclude,butarenotlimitedto,thefollowing:-Hardwareandsoftwarepurchases-Reducedoperationaleffectivenessifsystemperformanceorfunctionalityisreducedforincreasedsecurity-Costofimplementingadditionalpoliciesandprocedures-Costofhiringadditionalpersonneltoimplementproposedpolicies,procedures,orservices-Trainingcosts-Maintenancecosts•Assessingtheimplementationcostsandbenefitsagainstsystemanddatacriticalitytodeterminetheimportancetotheorganizationofimplementingthenewcontrols,giventheircostsandrelativeimpact.Theorganizationwillneedtoassessthebenefitsofthecontrolsintermsofmaintaininganacceptablemissionposturefortheorganization.Justasthereisacostforimplementinganeededcontrol,thereisacostfornotimplementingit.Byrelatingtheresultofnotimplementingthecontroltothemission,organizationscandeterminewhetheritisfeasibletoforgoitsimplementation.Cost-BenefitAnalysisExample:SystemXstoresandprocessesmission-criticalandsensitiveemployeeprivacyinformation;however,auditinghasnotbeenenabledforthesystem.Acost-benefitanalysisisconductedtodeterminewhethertheauditfeatureshouldbeenabledforSystemX.Items(1)and(2)addresstheintangibleimpact(e.g.,deterrencefactors)forimplementingornotimplementingthenewcontrol.Item(3)liststhetangibles(e.g.,actualcost). (1)Impactofenablingsystemauditfeature:Thesystemauditfeatureallowsthesystemsecurityadministratortomonitorusers'systemactivitiesbutwillslowdownsystemperformanceandi thereforeaffectuserproductivity.Alsotheimplementationwillrequireadditionalresources,asdescribedinItem3. j I SP800-30 Page38 I [PDF page 48] (2)Impactofnotenablingsystemauditfeature:Usersystemactivitiesandviolationscannotbemonitoredandtrackedifthesystemauditfunctionisdisabled,andsecuritycannotbemaximizedtoprotecttheorganization'sconfidentialdataandmission. (3)Costestimationforenablingthesystemauditfeature: Costforenablingsystemauditfeature—Nocost,built-infeature$0Additionalstafftoperformauditreviewandarchive,peryear$xx,xxxTraining(e.g.,systemauditconfiguration,reportgeneration)$x,xxxAdd-onauditreportingsoftware$x,xxxAuditdatamaintenance(e.g.,storage,archiving),peryear$x,xxx TotalEstimatedCosts $xx,xxx Theorganization'smanagersmustdeterminewhatconstitutesanacceptablelevelofmissionrisk.Theimpactofacontrolmaythenbeassessed,andthecontroleitherincludedorexcluded,aftertheorganizationdeterminesarangeoffeasiblerisklevels.Thisrangewillvaryamongorganizations;however,thefollowingrulesapplyindeterminingtheuseofnewcontrols: •Ifcontrolwouldreduceriskmorethanneeded,thenseewhetheralessexpensivealternativeexists•Ifcontrolwouldcostmorethantheriskreductionprovided,thenfindsomethingelse•Ifcontroldoesnotreducerisksufficiently,thenlookformorecontrolsoradifferentcontrol•Ifcontrolprovidesenoughriskreductionandiscost-effective,thenuseit. Frequentlythecostofimplementingacontrolismoretangiblethanthecostofnotimplementingit.Asaresult,seniormanagementplaysacriticalroleindecisionsconcerningtheimplementationofcontrolmeasurestoprotecttheorganizationalmission. 4.6RESIDUALRISKOrganizationscananalyzetheextentoftheriskreductiongeneratedbytheneworenhancedcontrolsintermsofthereducedthreatlikelihoodorimpact,thetwoparametersthatdefinethemitigatedlevelofrisktotheorganizationalmission. Implementationofneworenhancedcontrolscanmitigateriskby — •Eliminatingsomeofthesystem'svulnerabilities(flawsandweakness),therebyreducingthenumberofpossiblethreat-source/vulnerabilitypairs•Addingatargetedcontroltoreducethecapacityandmotivationofathreat-sourceForexample,adepartmentdeterminesthatthecostforinstallingandmaintainingadd-onsecuritysoftwareforthestand-alonePCthatstoresitssensitivefilesisnotjustifiable,butthatadministrativeandphysicalcontrolsshouldbeimplementedto SP800-30 Page39 [PDF page 49] makephysicalaccesstothatPCmoredifficult(e.g.,storethePCinalockedroom,withthekeykeptbythemanager). •Reducingthemagnitudeoftheadverseimpact(forexample,limitingtheextentofavulnerabilityormodifyingthenatureoftherelationshipbetweentheITsystemandtheorganization'smission). TherelationshipbetweencontrolimplementationandresidualriskisgraphicallypresentedinFigure4-4. Figure4-4.ImplementedControlsandResidualRiskTheriskremainingaftertheimplementationofneworenhancedcontrolsistheresidualrisk.PracticallynoITsystemisriskfree,andnotallimplementedcontrolscaneliminatetherisktheyareintendedtoaddressorreducetheriskleveltozero. Asmandatedby0MBCircularA-130,anorganization'sseniormanagementortheDAA,whoareresponsibleforprotectingtheorganization'sITassetandmission,mustauthorize(oraccredit)theITsystemtobeginorcontinuetooperate.Thisauthorizationoraccreditationmustoccuratleastevery3yearsorwhenevermajorchangesaremadetotheITsystem.TheintentofthisprocessistoidentifyrisksthatarenotfullyaddressedandtodeterminewhetheradditionalcontrolsareneededtomitigatetherisksidentifiedintheITsystem.Forfederalagencies,aftertheappropriatecontrolshavebeenputinplacefortheidentifiedrisks,theDAAwillsignastatementacceptinganyresidualriskandauthorizingtheoperationofthenewITsystemorthecontinuedprocessingoftheexistingITsystem.Iftheresidualriskhasnotbeenreducedtoanacceptablelevel,theriskmanagementcyclemustberepeatedtoidentifyawayofloweringtheresidualrisktoanacceptablelevel. SP800-30 Page40 [PDF page 50] 5.EVALUATIONANDASSESSMENT Inmostorganizations,thenetworkitselfwillcontinuallybeexpandedandupdated,itscomponentschanged,anditssoftwareapplicationsreplacedorupdatedwithnewerversions.Inaddition,personnelchangeswilloccurandsecuritypoliciesarelikelytochangeovertime.Thesechangesmeanthatnewriskswillsurfaceandriskspreviouslymitigatedmayagainbecomeaconcern.Thus,theriskmanagementprocessisongoingandevolving. Thissectionemphasizesthegoodpracticeandneedforanongoingriskevaluationandassessmentandthefactorsthatwillleadtoasuccessfulriskmanagementprogram. 5.1GOODSECURITYPRACTICETheriskassessmentprocessisusuallyrepeatedatleastevery3yearsforfederalagencies,asmandatedbyOMBCircularA-130.However,riskmanagementshouldbeconductedandintegratedintheSDLCforITsystems,notbecauseitisrequiredbylaworregulation,butbecauseitisagoodpracticeandsupportstheorganization'sbusinessobjectivesormission.Thereshouldbeaspecificscheduleforassessingandmitigatingmissionrisks,buttheperiodicallyperformedprocessshouldalsobeflexibleenoughtoallowchangeswherewarranted,suchasmajorchangestotheITsystemandprocessingenvironmentduetochangesresultingfrompoliciesandnewtechnologies. 5.2KEYSFORSUCCESSAsuccessfulriskmanagementprogramwillrelyon(1)seniormanagement'scommitment;(2)thefullsupportandparticipationoftheITteam(seeSection2.3);(3)thecompetenceoftheriskassessmentteam,whichmusthavetheexpertisetoapplytheriskassessmentmethodologytoaspecificsiteandsystem,identifymissionrisks,andprovidecost-effectivesafeguardsthatmeettheneedsoftheorganization;(4)theawarenessandcooperationofmembersoftheusercommunity,whomustfollowproceduresandcomplywiththeimplementedcontrolstosafeguardthemissionoftheirorganization;and(5)anongoingevaluationandassessmentoftheIT-relatedmissionrisks. SP800-30 Page41 [PDF page 51] f [PDF page 52] APPENDIXA:SampleInterviewQuestionsInterviewquestionsshouldbetailoredbaseduponwheretheITsystemassessedisintheSDLC.Samplequestionstobeaskedduringinterviewswithsitepersonneltogainanunderstandingoftheoperationalcharacteristicsofanorganizationmayincludethefollowing: •Whoarevalidusers?•Whatisthemissionoftheuserorganization?•Whatisthepurposeofthesysteminrelationtothemission?•Howimportantisthesystemtotheuserorganization'smission?•Whatisthesystem-availabilityrequirement?•Whatinformation(bothincomingandoutgoing)isrequiredbytheorganization?•Whatinformationisgeneratedby,consumedby,processedon,storedin,andretrievedbythesystem?•Howimportantistheinformationtotheuserorganization'smission?•Whatarethepathsofinformationflow?•Whattypesofinformationareprocessedbyandstoredonthesystem(e.g.,financial,personnel,researchanddevelopment,medical,commandandcontrol)?•Whatisthesensitivity(orclassification)leveloftheinformation?•Whatinformationhandledbyoraboutthesystemshouldnotbedisclosedandtowhom?•Wherespecificallyistheinformationprocessedandstored?•Whatarethetypesofinformationstorage?•Whatisthepotentialimpactontheorganizationiftheinformationisdisclosedtounauthorizedpersonnel?•Whataretherequirementsforinformationavailabilityandintegrity?•Whatistheeffectontheorganization'smissionifthesystemorinformationisnotreliable?•Howmuchsystemdowntimecantheorganizationtolerate?Howdoesthisdowntimecomparewiththemeanrepair/recoverytime?Whatotherprocessingorcommunicationsoptionscantheuseraccess?•Couldasystemorsecuritymalfunctionorunavailabilityresultininjuryordeath? SP800-30 PageA-1 [PDF page 53] I [PDF page 54] APPENDIXB:SAMPLERISKASSESSMENTREPORTOUTLINEEXECUTIVESUMMARY I.Introduction •Purpose•ScopeofthisriskassessmentDescribethesystemcomponents,elements,users,fieldsitelocations(ifany),andanyotherdetailsaboutthesystemtobeconsideredintheassessment. II.RiskAssessmentApproach Brieflydescribetheapproachusedtoconducttheriskassessment,suchas — •Theparticipants(e.g.,riskassessmentteammembers)•Thetechniqueusedtogatherinformation(e.g.,theuseoftools,questionnaires)•Thedevelopmentanddescriptionofriskscale(e.g.,a3x3,4x4,or5x5risk-levelmatrix).in.SystemCharacterization Characterizethesystem,includinghardware(server,router,switch),software(e.g.,application,operatingsystem,protocol),systeminterfaces(e.g.,communicationlink),data,andusers.Provideconnectivitydiagramorsysteminputandoutputflowcharttodelineatethescopeofthisriskassessmenteffort. IV.ThreatStatementCompileandlistthepotentialthreat-sourcesandassociatedthreatactionsapplicabletothesystemassessed.V.RiskAssessmentResults Listtheobservations(vulnerability/threatpairs).Eachobservationmustinclude — •Observationnumberandbriefdescriptionofobservation(e.g..Observation1:Usersystempasswordscanbeguessedorcracked)•Adiscussionofthethreat-sourceandvulnerabilitypair•Identificationofexistingmitigatingsecuritycontrols•Likelihooddiscussionandevaluation(e.g..High,Medium,orLowlikelihood)•Impactanalysisdiscussionandevaluation(e.g..High,Medium,orLowimpact)•Riskratingbasedontherisk-levelmatrix(e.g.,High,Medium,orLowrisklevel)•Recommendedcontrolsoralternativeoptionsforreducingtherisk. VI.Summary Totalthenumberofobservations.Summarizetheobservations,theassociatedrisklevels,the SP800-30 PageB-1 [PDF page 55] recommendations,andanycommentsinatableformattofacilitatetheimplementationofrecommendedcontrolsduringtheriskmitigationprocess. SP800-30 PageB-2 [PDF page 56] § . . aON.^aj3•31 9i 00IS 1VO C«PL,U ^.2'E ao 0).S£iCOS3^-3cr^,-WO"O«CDQ.(/}(/}CO0)n] o (0Q.is(n ooooCMCMI I1-CMI I N>EisXooenca CO io—— • COisOTC^W=CCD"FCDCOQ-.t^EpEECO(C-DOCO OCD0? 3.ii'c«CDoc^ CD E T-2:COCO CD ocCCOCO^bc COCO0ooCO CO000=x:5 COoQ^O COc0COCO0)OQC3) SIX 0>^CO~cO0 *-^COCO0)(00«0£COO Dco_c5oQB I18o >-5Jo2^^S0w^o9 •—OOO~COJ O) cCCoCO^0^COQ)^CO0!c: M°o 00£>*-„.|0CO"300=CO5>^-QQ.cQ"Jz:COE05OO) CO C6c(Ucjgj§§ 52S>-|CD(1) •ca cP 4^ 2?.sMc3J55S SP800-30 PageC-1 [PDF page 57] I I [PDF page 58] APPENDIXD:ACRONYMS AESAdvancedEncryptionStandardCSAComputerSecurityActDAADesignatedApprovingAuthorityDACDiscretionaryAccessControlDBSDataEncryptionStandardFedCIRCFederalComputerIncidentResponseCenterFTPFileTransferProtocolID Identifier IPSECInternetSecurityProtocolISSOInformationsystemsecurityofficer IT InformationTechnologyITLInformationTechnologyLaboratoryMACMandatoryAccessControlNIPCNationalInfrastructureProtectionCenterNISTNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnologyOIGOfficeofInspectorGeneral0MBOfficeofManagementandBudgetPCPersonalComputerSDLCSystemDevelopmentLifeCycleSP SpecialPublicationST&ESecurityTestandEvaluation SP800-30 [PDF page 59] I [PDF page 60] APPENDIXE:GLOSSARYTERMAccountability Assurance Availability Confidentiality DenialofService DueCare Integrity DEFINITIONThesecuritygoalthatgeneratestherequirementforactionsofanentitytobetraceduniquelytothatentity.Thissupportsnonrepudiation,deterrence,faultisolation,intrusiondetectionandprevention,andafter-actionrecoveryandlegalaction. Groundsforconfidencethattheotherfoursecuritygoals(integrity,availability,confidentiality,andaccountability)havebeenadequatelymetbyaspecificimplementation."Adequatelymet"includes(1)functionalitythatperformscorrectly,(2)sufficientprotectionagainstunintentionalerrors(byusersorsoftware),and(3)sufficientresistancetointentionalpenetrationorbypass. Thesecuritygoalthatgeneratestherequirementforprotectionagainst — •Intentionaloraccidentalattemptsto(1)performunauthorizeddeletionofdataor(2)otherwisecauseadenialofserviceordata•Unauthorizeduseofsystemresources. Thesecuritygoalthatgeneratestherequirementforprotectionfromintentionaloraccidentalattemptstoperformunauthorizeddatareads.Confidentialitycoversdatainstorage,duringprocessing,andintransit. Thepreventionofauthorizedaccesstoresourcesorthedelayingoftime-criticaloperations. Managersandtheirorganizationshaveadutytoprovideforinformationsecuritytoensurethatthetypeofcontrol,thecostofcontrol,andthedeploymentofcontrolareappropriateforthesystembeingmanaged.Thesecuritygoalthatgeneratestherequirementforprotectionagainsteitherintentionaloraccidentalattemptstoviolatedataintegrity(thepropertythatdatahaswhenithasnotbeenalteredinanunauthorizedmanner)orsystemintegrity(thequalitythatasystemhaswhenitperformsitsintendedfunctioninanunimpairedmanner,freefromunauthorizedmanipulation). SP800-30 PageE-1 [PDF page 61] IT-RelatedRisk ITSecurityGoalRiskRiskAssessment RiskManagement Security SecurityGoals Threat Threat-source ThreatAnalysis Vulnerability SP800-30 Thenetmissionimpactconsidering(1)theprobabilitythataparticularthreat-sourcewillexercise(accidentallytriggerorintentionallyexploit)aparticularinformationsystemvulnerabilityand(2)theresultingimpactifthisshouldoccur.IT-relatedrisksarisefromlegalliabilityormissionlossdueto — 1.Unauthorized(maliciousoraccidental)disclosure,modification,ordestructionofinformation2.Unintentionalerrorsandomissions3.ITdisruptionsduetonaturalorman-madedisasters4.FailuretoexerciseduecareanddiligenceintheimplementationandoperationoftheITsystem.SeeSecurityGoalsWithinthisdocument,synonymouswithIT-RelatedRisk. Theprocessofidentifyingtheriskstosystemsecurityanddeterminingtheprobabilityofoccurrence,theresultingimpact,andadditionalsafeguardsthatwouldmitigatethisimpact.PartofRiskManagementandsynonymouswithRiskAnalysis. Thetotalprocessofidentifying,controlling,andmitigatinginformationsystem-relatedrisks.Itincludesriskassessment;cost-benefitanalysis;andtheselection,implementation,test,andsecurityevaluationofsafeguards.Thisoverallsystemsecurityreviewconsidersbotheffectivenessandefficiency,includingimpactonthemissionandconstraintsduetopolicy,regulations,andlaws. Informationsystemsecurityisasystemcharacteristicandasetofmechanismsthatspanthesystembothlogicallyandphysically. Thefivesecuritygoalsareintegrity,availability,confidentiality,accountability,andassurance. Thepotentialforathreat-sourcetoexercise(accidentallytriggerorintentionallyexploit)aspecificvulnerability. Either(1)intentandmethodtargetedattheintentionalexploitationofavulnerabilityor(2)asituationandmethodthatmayaccidentallytriggeravulnerability. Theexaminationofthreat-sourcesagainstsystemvulnerabilitiestodeterminethethreatsforaparticularsysteminaparticularoperationalenvironment.Aflaworweaknessinsystemsecurityprocedures,design,implementation,orinternalcontrolsthatcouldbeexercised(accidentallytriggeredorintentionallyexploited)andresultinasecuritybreachoraviolationofthesystem'ssecuritypolicy. PageE-2 [PDF page 62] APPENDIXF:REFERENCESComputerSystemsLaboratoryBulletin.ThreatstoComputerSystems:AnOverview.March1994. NISTInteragencyReports4749.SampleStatementsofWorkforFederalComputerSecurityServices:ForUseIn-HouseorContractingOut.December1991. NISTSpecialPublication800-12.AnIntroductiontoComputerSecurity:TheNISTHandbook.October1995. NISTSpecialPublication800-14.GenerallyAcceptedPrinciplesandPracticesforSecuringInformationTechnologySystems.September1996.Co-authoredwithBarbaraGuttman.NISTSpecialPublication800-18.GuideForDevelopingSecurityPlansforInformationTechnologySystems.December1998.Co-authoredwithFederalComputerSecurityManagers'ForumWorkingGroup.NISTSpecialPublication800-26,SecuritySelf-AssessmentGuideforInformationTechnologySystems.August2001.NISTSpecialPublication800-27.EngineeringPrinciplesforITSecurity.June2001.0MBCircularA-130.ManagementofFederalInformationResources.AppendixHI.November2000. SP800-30 PageF-1 [PDF page 63] 1 [PDF page 64] TechnicalPublications PeriodicalJournalofResearchoftheNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology—ReportsNISTresearchanddevelopmentinthosedisciplinesofthephysicalandengineeringsciencesinwhichtheInstituteisactive.Theseincludephysics,chemistry,engineering,mathematics,andcomputersciences.Paperscoverabroadrangeofsubjects,withmajoremphasisonmeasurementmethodologyandthebasictechnologyunderlyingstandardization.AlsoincludedfromtimetotimearesurveyarticlesontopicscloselyrelatedtotheInstitute'stechnicalandscientificprograms.Issuedsixtimesayear. NonperiodicalsMonographs—MajorcontributionstothetechnicalliteratureonvarioussubjectsrelatedtotheInstitute'sscientificandtechnicalactivities.Handbooks—Recommendedcodesofengineeringandindustrialpractice(includingsafetycodes)developedincooperationwithinterestedindustries,professionalorganizations,andregulatorybodies.SpecialPublications—IncludeproceedingsofconferencessponsoredbyNIST,NISTannualreports,andotherspecialpublicationsappropriatetothisgroupingsuchaswallcharts,pocketcards,andbibliographies.NationalStandardReferenceDataSeries—Providesquantitativedataonthephysicalandchemicalpropertiesofmaterials,compiledfromtheworld'sliteratureandcriticallyevaluated.DevelopedunderaworldwideprogramcoordinatedbyNISTundertheauthorityoftheNationalStandardDataAct(PublicLaw90-396).NOTE:TheJournalofPhysicalandChemicalReferenceData(JPCRD)ispublishedbimonthlyforNISTbytheAmericanInstituteofPhysics(AIP).SubscriptionordersandrenewalsareavailablefromAIP,P.O.Box503284,St.Louis,MO63150-3284.BuildingScienceSeries—DisseminatestechnicalinformationdevelopedattheInstituteonbuildingmaterials,components,systems,andwholestructures.Theseriespresentsresearchresults,testmethods,andperformancecriteriarelatedtothestructuralandenvironmentalfunctionsandthedurabilityandsafetycharacteristicsofbuildingelementsandsystems.TechnicalNotes—Studiesorreportswhicharecompleteinthemselvesbutrestrictiveintheirtreatmentofasubject.Analogoustomonographsbutnotsocomprehensiveinscopeordefinitiveintreatmentofthesubjectarea.OftenserveasavehicleforfinalreportsofworkperformedatNISTunderthesponsorshipofothergovernmentagencies.VoluntaryProductStandards—DevelopedunderprocedurespublishedbytheDepartmentofCommerceinPart10,Title15,oftheCodeofFederalRegulations.Thestandardsestablishnationallyrecognizedrequirementsforproducts,andprovideallconcernedinterestswithabasisforcommonunderstandingofthecharacteristicsoftheproducts.NISTadministersthisprograminsupportoftheeffortsofprivate-sectorstandardizingorganizations. OrderthefollowingNISTpublications—FIPSandNISTIRs—fromtheNationalTechnicalInformationService,Springfield,VA22161.FederalInformationProcessingStandardsPublications(FIPSPUB)—PublicationsinthisseriescollectivelyconstitutetheFederalInformationProcessingStandardsRegister.TheRegisterservesastheofficialsourceofinformationintheFederalGovernmentregardingstandardsissuedbyNISTpursuanttotheFederalPropertyandAdministrativeServicesActof1949asamended.PublicLaw89-306(79Stat.1127),andasimplementedbyExecutiveOrder11717(38FR12315,datedMay11,1973)andPart6ofTitle15CFR(CodeofFederalRegulations).NISTInteragencyorInternalReports(NISTIR)—TheseriesincludesinterimorfinalreportsonworkperformedbyNISTforoutsidesponsors(bothgoverrunentandnongovernment).Ingeneral,initialdistributionishandledbythesponsor;publicdistributionishandledbysalesthroughtheNationalTechnicalInformationService,Springfield,VA22161,inhardcopy,electronicmedia,ormicroficheform.NISTIR'smayalsoreportresultsofNISTprojectsoftransitoryorlimitedinterest,includingthosethatwillbepublishedsubsequentlyinmorecomprehensiveform. [PDF page 65] oon8 C> O(t