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SP 800-12: An Introduction to Computer Security

Selected pages that mention A-130. Other pages are omitted.

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Introduction

has been, and continues to be, the subject of much debate among computer security experts.

Availability: A "requirement intended to assure that systems work promptly and service is not

denied to authorized users.

Confidentiality: A requirement that private or confidential information not be disclosed to

unauthorized individuals.

1.5 Legal Foundation for Federal Computer Security Programs

The executive principles discussed in the next chapter explain the need for computer security. In

addition, within the federal government, a number of laws and regulations mandate that agencies

protect their computers, the information they process, and related technology resources (e.g.,

telecommunications).^ The most important are listed below.

• The Computer Security Act of 1987 requires agencies to identify sensitive systems, conduct computer security training, and develop computer security plans.

• The Federal Information Resources Management Regulation (FIRMR) is the primary

regulation for the use, management, and acquisition of computer resources in the federal

government.

• 0MB Circular A-130 (specifically Appendix III) requires that federal agencies establish

security programs containing specified elements.

Note that many more specific requirements, many of which are agency specific, also exist.

Federal managers are responsible for familiarity and compliance with applicable legal

requirements. However, laws and regulations do not normally provide detailed instructions for

protecting computer-related assets. Instead, they specify requirements - such as restricting the

availability of personal data to authorized users. This handbook aids the reader in developing an

effective, overall security approach and in selecting cost-effective controls to meet such

requirements.

" Computers at Risk, p. 54.

' Although not Hsted, readers should be aware that laws also exist that may affect nongovernment organizations.

7

Chapter 6

COMPUTER SECURITY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Computers and the information they process are critical to many organizations' ability to perform

their mission and business functions. It therefore makes sense that executives view computer

security as a management issue and seek to protect their organization's computer resources as

they would any other valuable asset. To do this effectively requires developing of a

comprehensive management approach.

This chapter presents an organizationwide

approach to computer security and discusses OMB Circular A-130, "Management of Federal

its important management function." Because Information Resources," requires that federal agencies

organizations differ vastly in size, complexity, establish computer security programs.

management styles, and culture, it is not mammammmm^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m

possible to describe one ideal computer

security program. However, this chapter does describe some of the features and issues common

to many federal organizations.

6.1 Structure of a Computer Security Program

Many computer security programs that are distributed throughout the organization have different

elements performing various functions. While this approach has benefits, the distribution of the

computer security function in many organizations is haphazard, usually based upon history (i.e., who was available in the organization to do what when the need arose). Ideally, the distribution

of computer security functions should result from a planned and integrated management

philosophy.

Managing computer security at multiple levels brings many benefits. Each level contributes to the

overall computer security program with different types of expertise, authority, and resources. In

general, higher-level officials (such as those at the headquarters or unit levels in the agency

described above) better understand the organization as a whole and have more authority. On the

other hand, lower-level officials (at the computer facility and applications levels) are more familiar

with the specific requirements, both technical and procedural, and problems of the systems and

This chapter is primarily directed at federal agencies, which are generally very large and complex organizations.

This chapter discusses programs which are suited to managing security in such environments. They may be wholly

inappropriate for smaller organizations or private sector firms.

" This chapter addresses the management of security programs, not the various activities such as risk analysis or

contingency planning that make up an effective security program.

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//. Management Controls

computer security within an organization. In the federal government, the organization could

consist of a department, agency, or other major operating unit.

As with the management of all resources, central computer security management can be

performed in many practical and cost-effective ways. The importance of sound management

cannot be overemphasized. There is also a downside to centrally managed computer security

programs. Specifically, they present greater risk that errors in judgement will be more widely

propagated throughout the organization. As they strive to meet their objectives, managers need

to consider the full impact of available options when establishing their computer security

programs.

6.2.1 Benefits of Central Computer Security Programs

A central security program should provide two quite distinct types of benefits:

• Increased efficiency and economy of security throughout the organization, and

• the ability to provide centralized enforcement and oversight.

Both of these benefits are in keeping with the purpose of the Paperwork Reduction Act, as

implemented in 0MB Circular A- 1 30.

The Paperwork Reduction Act establishes a broad mandate for agencies to perform their

information management activities in an efficient, effective, and economical manner... .

Agencies shall assure an adequate level of security for all agency automated information

systems, whether maintained in-house or commercially.^^

6.2.2 Efficient, Economic Coordination of Information

A central computer security program helps to coordinate and manage effective use of security-

related resources throughout the organization. The most important of these resources are

normally information financial resources.

Sound and timely information is necessary for managers to accomplish their tasks effectively. However, most organizations have trouble collecting information from myriad sources and

effectively processing and distributing it within the organization. This section discusses some of

the sources and elficient uses of computer security information.

Within the federal government, many organizations such as the Office of Management and

OMB Circular A- 130, Section 5; Appendix III, Section 3.

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//. Management Controls

Stable Resource Base. A well-established program will have a stable resource base in terms of

personnel, funds, and other support. Without a stable resource base, it is impossible to plan and

execute programs and projects effectively.

Existence of Policy. Policy provides the foundation for the central computer security program

and is the means for documenting and promulgating important decisions about computer security. A central computer security program should also publish standards, regulations, and guidelines

that implement and expand on policy. (See Chapter 5.)

Published Mission and Functions Statement. A published mission statement grounds the central

computer security program into the unique operating environment of the organization. The

statement clearly establishes the function of the computer security program and defines

responsibilities for both the computer security program and other related programs and entities.

Without such a statement, it is impossible to develop criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of

the program.

Long-Term Computer Security Strategy. A well-established program explores and develops long-

term strategies to incorporate computer security into the next generation of information

technology. Since the computer and telecommunications field moves rapidly, it is essential to plan

for future operating environments.

Compliance Program. A central computer security program needs to address compliance with

national policies and requirements, as well as organization-specific requirements. National

requirements include those prescribed under the Computer Security Act of 1987, OMB Circular A- 130, the FIRMR, and Federal Information Processing Standards.

Intraorganizational Liaison. Many offices

within an organization can affect computer

security. The Information Resources Management organization and physical

security office are two obvious examples. However, computer security often overlaps

with other offices, such as safety, reliability

and quality assurance, internal control, or the

Office of the Inspector General. An effective program should have established relationships

with these groups in order to integrate

computer security into the organization's

management. The relationships should encompass more than just the sharing of information; the offices should influence each other.

Liaison with External Groups. There are many sources of computer security information, such as

Example

Agency IRM offices engage in strategic and tactical

planning for both information and information

technology, in accordance with the Paperwork

Reduction Act and OMB Circular A-130. Security

should be an important component of these plans. The security needs of the agency should be reflected

in the information technology choices and the

information needs of the agency should be reflected in

the security program.

52

6. Computer Security Program Management

The most significant direct cost of a computer security program is personnel. In addition, many

programs make frequent and effective use of consultants and contractors. A program also needs

funds for training and for travel, oversight, information collection and dissemination, and meetings

with personnel at other levels of computer security management.

References

Federal Information Resources Management Regulations, especially 201-2. General Services

Administration. Washington, DC.

General Accounting Office. Automated Systems Security- Federal Agencies Should Strengthen

Safeguards Over Personal and Other Sensitive Data. GAO Report LCD 78-123. Washington,

DC. 1978.

General Services Administration. Information Resources Security: What Every Federal Manager

Should Know. Washington, DC.

Helsing, C, M. Swanson, and M. Todd. Executive Guide to the Protection of Information

Resources., Special Publication 500-169. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and

Technology, 1989.

Helsing, C, M. Swanson, and M. Todd. Management Guide for the Protection of Information

Resources. Special Publication 500-170. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and

Technology, 1989.

"Managing an Organization Wide Security Program." Computer Security Institute, San Francisco, CA. (course)

Office of Management and Budget. "Guidance for Preparation of Security Plans for Federal Computer Systems That Contain Sensitive Information." 0MB Bulletin 90-08. Washington, DC,

1990.

Office of Management and Budget. Management of Federal Information Resources. 0MB

Circular A- 130.

Owen, R., Jr. "Security Management: Using the Quality Approach." Proceedings of the 15th

National Computer Security Conference. Baltimore, MD: Vol. 2, 1992. pp. 584-592.

Spiegel, L. "Good LAN Security Requires Ajialysis of Corporate Data." Infoworld. 15(52), 1993.

p. 49.

57

8. Life Cycle Security

can be more expensive and less effective that security that is already integrated into the system. It

can also significantly degrade system performance. Of course, it is virtually impossible to

anticipate the whole array of problems that may arise during a system's lifetime. Therefore, it is

generally useful to update the computer security plan at least at the end of each phase in the life

cycle and after each re-accreditation. For many systems, it may be useful to update the plan more

often.

Life cycle management also helps document security-relevant decisions, in addition to helping

assure management that security is fully considered in all phases. This documentation benefits

system management officials as well as oversight and independent audit groups. System management personnel use documentation as a self-check and reminder of why decisions were made so that the impact of changes in the environment can be more easily assessed. Oversight

and independent audit groups use the documentation in their reviews to verify that system management has done an adequate job and to highlight areas where security may have been

overlooked. This includes examining whether the documentation accurately reflects how the

system is actually being operated.

Within the federal government, the Computer Security Act of 1987 and its implementing

instructions provide specific requirements for computer security plans. These plans are a form of

documentation that helps ensure that security is considered not only during system design and

development but also throughout the rest of the life cycle. Plans can also be used to be sure that

requirements of Appendix III to 0MB Circular A- 130, as well as other applicable requirements,

have been addressed.

8.3 Overview of the Computer System Life Cycle

There are many models for the computer system life cycle but most contain five basic phases, as

pictured in Figure 8.1.

• Initiation. During the initiation phase, the need for a system is expressed and the purpose of

the system is documented.

• Development/Acquisition. During this phase the system is designed, purchased,

programmed, developed, or otherwise constructed. This phase often consists of other

defined cycles, such as the system development cycle or the acquisition cycle.

• Implementation. After initial system testing, the system is installed or fielded.

• Operation/Maintenance. During this phase the system performs its work. The system is

almost always modified by the addition of hardware and software and by numerous other

events.

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//. Management Controls

8.4.1.1 Conducting a Sensitivity

Assessment

A sensitivity assessment looks at the

sensitivity of both the information to be

processed and the system itself. The

assessment should consider legal implications,

organization policy (including federal and

agency policy if a federal system), and the

functional needs of the system. Sensitivity is

normally expressed in terms of integrity,

availability, and confidentiality. Such factors

as the importance of the system to the

organization's mission and the consequences of unauthorized modification, unauthorized

disclosure, or unavailability of the system or data need to be examined when assessing sensitivity. To address these types of issues, the people who use or own the system or information should

participate in the assessment.

A sensitivity assessment should answer the following questions:

• What information is handled by the system?

• What kind of potential damage could occur through error, unauthorized disclosure

or modification, or unavailability of data or the system?

• What laws or regulations affect security (e.g., the Privacy Act or the Fair Trade

Practices Act)?

• To what threats is the system or information particularly vulnerable?

• Are there significant environmental considerations (e.g., hazardous location of

system)?

• What are the security-relevant characteristics of the user community (e.g., level of

technical sophistication and training or security clearances)?

• What internal security standards, regulations, or guidelines apply to this system?

The sensitivity assessment starts an analysis of security that continues throughout the life cycle. The assessment helps determine if the project needs special security oversight, if further analysis is

The definition of sensitive is often misconstrued.

Sensitive is synonymous with important or valuable. Some data is sensitive because it must be kept

confidential. Much more data, however, is sensitive

because its integrity or availability must be assured. The Computer Security Act and 0MB Circular A-1 30

clearly state that information is sensitive if its

unauthorized disclosure, modification (i.e., loss of

integrity), or unavailability would harm the agency. In

general, the more important a system is to the mission

of the agency, the more sensitive it is.

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//. Management Controls

management, operational, and technical issues under operational assurance. The reader should

keep in mind that the division is somewhat artificial and that there is substantial overlap.

9.1 Accreditation and Assurance

Accreditation is a management official's formal acceptance of the adequacy of a system's security.

The best way to view computer security accreditation is as a form of quality control. It forces

managers and technical staff to work together to find workable, cost-effective solutions given

security needs, technical constraints, operational constraints, and mission or business

requirements. The accreditation process obliges managers to make the critical decision regarding

the adequacy of security safeguards and, therefore, to recognize and perform their role in securing

their systems. In order for the decisions to be sound, they need to be based on reliable

information about the implementation of both technical and nontechnical safeguards. These

include:

• Technical features (Do they operate as intended?).

• Operational practices (Is the system operated according to stated procedures?).

• Overall security (Are there threats which the technical features and operational

practices do not address?).

• Remaining risks (Are they acceptable?).

A computer system should be accredited before the system becomes operational with periodic

reaccreditation after major system changes or when significant time has elapsed.^^ Even if a

system was not initially accredited, the accreditation process can be initiated at any time. Chapter

8 ftirther discusses accreditation.

9.1.1 Accreditation and Assurance

Assurance is an extremely important ~ but not the only ~ element in accreditation. As shown in

the diagram, assurance addresses whether the technical measures and procedures operate either

( 1 ) according to a set of security requirements and specifications or (2) according to general

quality principles. Accreditation also addresses whether the system's security requirements are

correct and well implemented and whether the level of quality is sufficiently high. These activities

are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.

0MB Circular A- 130 requires management security authorization of operation for federal systems.

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///. Operational Controls

10.3 Contractor Access Considerations

Many federal agencies as well as private organizations use contractors and consultants to assist

with computer processing. Contractors are often used for shorter periods of time than regular

employees. This factor may change the cost-effectiveness of conducting screening. The often

higher turnover among contractor personnel generates additional costs for security programs in

terms of user administration.

10.4 Public Access Considerations

Many federal agencies have begun to design, develop, and implement public access systems for

electronic dissemination of information to the public. Some systems provide electronic interaction

by allowing the public to send information to the government (e.g., electronic tax filing) as well as

to receive it. When systems are made available for access by the public (or a large or significant

subset thereof), additional security issues arise due to: (1) increased threats against public access

systems and (2) the difficulty of security administration.

While many computer systems have been

victims of hacker attacks, public access 0MB Circular A- 130, Appendix III "Security of

systems are well known and have published Federal Automated Information" and NIST CSL

phone numbers and network access IDs. In ^"^'^^'^ "Security Issues in Public Access Systems"

A 1 1 \A u- both recommend segregating information made addition, a successful attack could result in a •. , . Zv i j directly accessible to the public from official records. lot of publicity. For these reasons, public

access systems are subject to a greater threat f^ggggg/ggigggggggggggg^^

from hacker attacks on the confidentiality,

availability, and integrity of information processed by a system. In general, it is safe to say that when a system is made available for public access, the risk to the system increases - and often the

constraints on its use are tightened.

Besides increased risk of hackers, public access systems can be subject to insider malice. For

example, an unscrupulous user, such as a disgruntled employee, may try to introduce errors into

data files intended for distribution in order to embarrass or discredit the organization. Attacks on

public access systems could have a substantial impact on the organization's reputation and the

level of public confidence due to the high visibility of public access systems. Other security

problems may arise from unintentional actions by untrained users.

In systems without public access, there are procedures for enrolling users that often involve some

user training and frequently require the signing of forms acknowledging user responsibilities. In

addition, user profiles can be created and sophisticated audit mechanisms can be developed to

detect unusual activity by a user. In public access systems, users are often anonymous. This can

complicate system security administration.

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///. Operational Controls

training, as does the remainder of this chapter.

13.6 Implementation^^

An effective computer security awareness and training (CSAT) program requires proper planning,

implementation, maintenance, and periodic evaluation. The following seven steps constitute one

approach for developing a CSAT program.

Step 1 : Identify Program Scope, Goals, and Objectives.

Step 2: Identify Training Staff.

Step 3: Identify Target Audiences.

Step 4: Motivate Management and Employees.

Step 5: Administer the Program.

Step 6: Maintain the Program.

Step 7: Evaluate the Program.

13.6.1 Identify Program Scope, Goals, and

Objectives

The first step in developing a CSAT program

is to determine the program's scope, goals,

and objectives. The scope of the CSAT program should provide training to all types of

people who interact with computer systems. The scope of the program can be an entire

organization or a subunit. Since users need

training which relates directly to their use of

The Computer Security Act of 1987 requires federal

agencies to "provide for the mandatory periodic

training in computer security awareness and accepted

computer practices of all employees who are involved

with the management, use, or operation of each

federal computer system within or under the

supervision of that agency." The scope and goals of

federal computer security awareness and training

programs must implement this broad mandate.

(Other federal requirements for computer security

training are contained in 0MB Circular A- 130, Appendix lU, and 0PM regulations.)

Unfortunately, college and graduate security courses are not widely available. In addition, the courses may only

address general security.

This section is based on material prepared by the Department of Energy's Office of Information Management for its

unclassified security program.

'^This approach is presented to familiarize the reader with some of the important implementation issues. It is not the only

approach to implementing an awareness and training program.

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V. Example

attack was detected, COG immediately contacted the HGA's Incident Handling Team, and was

told that a bug fix had been distributed by the server vendor several months earlier. To its

embarrassment, COG discovered that it had already received the fix, which it then promptly

installed. It now believes that no subsequent attacks of the same nature have succeeded.

Although HGA has no evidence that it has been significantly harmed to date by attacks via

external networks, it believes that these attacks have great potential to inflict damage. HGA's management considers itself lucky that such attacks have not harmed HGA's reputation and the

confidence of the citizens its serves. It also believes the likelihood of such attacks via external

networks will increase in the future.

20.3.6 Other Threats

HGA's systems also are exposed to several other threats that, for reasons of space, cannot be fully

enumerated here. Examples of threats and HGA's assessment of their probabilities and impacts

include those listed in Table 20. 1

20.4 Current Security Measures

HGA has numerous policies and procedures for protecting its assets against the above threats.

These are articulated in HGA's Computer Security Manual, which implements and synthesizes the

requirements of many federal directives, such as Appendix III to 0MB Circular A- 1 30, the Computer Security Act of 1987, and the Privacy Act. The manual also includes policies for

automated financial systems, such as those based on 0MB Circulars A- 123 and A- 127, as well as

the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act.

Several examples of those policies follow, as they apply generally to the use and administration of HGA's computer system and specifically to security issues related to time and attendance, payroll,

and continuity of operations.

20.4.1 General Use and Administration of HGA's Computer System

HGA's Computer Operations Group (COG) is responsible for controlling, administering, and

maintaining the computer resources owned and operated by HGA. These functions are depicted

in Figure 20. 1 enclosed in the large, dashed rectangle. Only individuals holding the job title

System Administrator are authorized to establish log-in IDs and passwords on multiuser HGA

systems (e.g., the LAN server). Only HGA's employees and contract personnel may use the

system, and only after receiving written authorization from the department supervisor (or, in the

case of contractors, the contracting officer) to whom these individuals report.

COG issues copies of all relevant security policies and procedures to new users. Before activating

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20. Assessing and Mitigating the Risks to a Hypothetical Computer System

archived and kept for three years. The server's access controls for the on-line files are

automatically set to read-only access by the time and attendance application at the time of

submission to the mainframe. The integrity of time and attendance data will be protected by

digital signatures as they are implemented.

The WAN's communications protocols also protect against loss of data during transmission from

the server to the mainframe (e.g., error checking). In addition, the mainframe payroll application

includes a program that is automatically run 24 hours before paychecks and pay stubs are printed.

This program produces a report identifying agencies from whom time and attendance data for the

current pay period were expected but not received. Payroll department staff are responsible for

reviewing the reports and immediately notifying agencies that need to submit or resubmit time and

attendance data. If time and attendance input or other related information is not available on a

timely basis, pay, leave, and other benefits are temporarily calculated based on information

estimated from prior pay periods.

20.4.3 Protection Against Interruption of Operations

HGA's policies regarding continuity of operations are derived from requirements stated in OMB

Circular A- 130. HGA requires various organizations within it to develop contingency plans, test them annually, and establish appropriate administrative and operational procedures for supporting

them. The plans must identify the facilities, equipment, suppUes, procedures, and personnel

needed to ensure reasonable continuity of operations under a broad range of adverse

circumstances.

COG Contingency Planning

COG is responsible for developing and maintaining a contingency plan that sets forth the

procedures and facilities to be used when physical plant failures, natural disasters, or major

equipment malfunctions occur sufficient to disrupt the normal use of HGA's PCs, LAN, server,

router, printers, and other associated equipment.

The plan prioritizes applications that rely on these resources, indicating those that should be

suspended if available automated fianctions or capacities are temporarily degraded. COG

personnel have identified system software and hardware components that are compatible with

those used by two nearby agencies. HGA has signed an agreement with those agencies, whereby

they have committed to reserving spare computational and storage capacities sufficient to support HGA's system-based operations for a few days during an emergency.

No communication devices or network interfaces may be connected to HGA's systems without

written approval of the COG Manager. The COG staff is responsible for installing all known

security-related software patches in a timely manner and for maintaining spare or redundant PCs,

servers, storage devices, and LAN interfaces to ensure that at least 100 people can simultaneously

253

Cross Reference and Index

I

individual accountability - see accountability

integrity statements

integrity verification

internal controls

intrusion detection

J, K

keys, cryptographic for authentication key escrow

see also Escrowed Encryption Standard key management (cryptography)

keystroke monitoring

L

labels

least privilege

liabilities

likelihood analysis

link encryption

M

maintenance accounts

malicious code

(virus, virus scanning, Trojan horse) monitoring

N, O

operational assurance 0MB Circular A- 130

95

100, 159-60, 227-30

98, 114

100, 168, 213

182

225-6

85, 114-5, 186, 199, 232 214

159, 202-3

107-8, 109, 112, 114, 179 95

62-3

233

161-2

27-8, 79, 95, 99, 133-5, 157, 166, 204, 213, 215,230

36, 67, 75, 79, 82, 86, 96, 99-101, 171, 182, 184,

185, 186, 205,213,214,215

82-3, 89, 96

7,48, 52, 73,76, 116, 149

password crackers

passwords, one-time

password-based access control

penetration testing

permission bits

plan, computer security

privacy

policy (general)

policy, issue- specific

99-100, 182

185-6, 189, 230

182, 199

98-9

200-1, 203

53, 71-3, 98, 127, 161

14, 28-9, 38, 78, 92, 196

12, 33-43,49, 51, 78, 144, 161

37-40, 78

274