/.
Introduction
has been, and continues to be, the subject of much debate among computer security experts.
Availability: A "requirement intended to assure that systems work promptly and service is not
denied to authorized users.
Confidentiality: A requirement that private or confidential information not be disclosed to
unauthorized individuals.
1.5 Legal Foundation for Federal Computer Security Programs
The executive principles discussed in the next chapter explain the need for computer security. In
addition, within the federal government, a number of laws and regulations mandate that agencies
protect their computers, the information they process, and related technology resources (e.g.,
telecommunications).^ The most important are listed below.
• The Computer Security Act of 1987 requires agencies to identify sensitive systems, conduct computer security training, and develop computer security plans.
• The Federal Information Resources Management Regulation (FIRMR) is the primary
regulation for the use, management, and acquisition of computer resources in the federal
government.
• 0MB Circular A-130 (specifically Appendix III) requires that federal agencies establish
security programs containing specified elements.
Note that many more specific requirements, many of which are agency specific, also exist.
Federal managers are responsible for familiarity and compliance with applicable legal
requirements. However, laws and regulations do not normally provide detailed instructions for
protecting computer-related assets. Instead, they specify requirements - such as restricting the
availability of personal data to authorized users. This handbook aids the reader in developing an
effective, overall security approach and in selecting cost-effective controls to meet such
requirements.
" Computers at Risk, p. 54.
' Although not Hsted, readers should be aware that laws also exist that may affect nongovernment organizations.
7
Chapter 6
COMPUTER SECURITY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
Computers and the information they process are critical to many organizations' ability to perform
their mission and business functions. It therefore makes sense that executives view computer
security as a management issue and seek to protect their organization's computer resources as
they would any other valuable asset. To do this effectively requires developing of a
comprehensive management approach.
This chapter presents an organizationwide
approach to computer security and discusses OMB Circular A-130, "Management of Federal
its important management function." Because Information Resources," requires that federal agencies
organizations differ vastly in size, complexity, establish computer security programs.
management styles, and culture, it is not mammammmm^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m
possible to describe one ideal computer
security program. However, this chapter does describe some of the features and issues common
to many federal organizations.
6.1 Structure of a Computer Security Program
Many computer security programs that are distributed throughout the organization have different
elements performing various functions. While this approach has benefits, the distribution of the
computer security function in many organizations is haphazard, usually based upon history (i.e., who was available in the organization to do what when the need arose). Ideally, the distribution
of computer security functions should result from a planned and integrated management
philosophy.
Managing computer security at multiple levels brings many benefits. Each level contributes to the
overall computer security program with different types of expertise, authority, and resources. In
general, higher-level officials (such as those at the headquarters or unit levels in the agency
described above) better understand the organization as a whole and have more authority. On the
other hand, lower-level officials (at the computer facility and applications levels) are more familiar
with the specific requirements, both technical and procedural, and problems of the systems and
This chapter is primarily directed at federal agencies, which are generally very large and complex organizations.
This chapter discusses programs which are suited to managing security in such environments. They may be wholly
inappropriate for smaller organizations or private sector firms.
" This chapter addresses the management of security programs, not the various activities such as risk analysis or
contingency planning that make up an effective security program.
45
//. Management Controls
computer security within an organization. In the federal government, the organization could
consist of a department, agency, or other major operating unit.
As with the management of all resources, central computer security management can be
performed in many practical and cost-effective ways. The importance of sound management
cannot be overemphasized. There is also a downside to centrally managed computer security
programs. Specifically, they present greater risk that errors in judgement will be more widely
propagated throughout the organization. As they strive to meet their objectives, managers need
to consider the full impact of available options when establishing their computer security
programs.
6.2.1 Benefits of Central Computer Security Programs
A central security program should provide two quite distinct types of benefits:
• Increased efficiency and economy of security throughout the organization, and
• the ability to provide centralized enforcement and oversight.
Both of these benefits are in keeping with the purpose of the Paperwork Reduction Act, as
implemented in 0MB Circular A- 1 30.
The Paperwork Reduction Act establishes a broad mandate for agencies to perform their
information management activities in an efficient, effective, and economical manner... .
Agencies shall assure an adequate level of security for all agency automated information
systems, whether maintained in-house or commercially.^^
6.2.2 Efficient, Economic Coordination of Information
A central computer security program helps to coordinate and manage effective use of security-
related resources throughout the organization. The most important of these resources are
normally information financial resources.
Sound and timely information is necessary for managers to accomplish their tasks effectively. However, most organizations have trouble collecting information from myriad sources and
effectively processing and distributing it within the organization. This section discusses some of
the sources and elficient uses of computer security information.
Within the federal government, many organizations such as the Office of Management and
OMB Circular A- 130, Section 5; Appendix III, Section 3.
48
//. Management Controls
Stable Resource Base. A well-established program will have a stable resource base in terms of
personnel, funds, and other support. Without a stable resource base, it is impossible to plan and
execute programs and projects effectively.
Existence of Policy. Policy provides the foundation for the central computer security program
and is the means for documenting and promulgating important decisions about computer security. A central computer security program should also publish standards, regulations, and guidelines
that implement and expand on policy. (See Chapter 5.)
Published Mission and Functions Statement. A published mission statement grounds the central
computer security program into the unique operating environment of the organization. The
statement clearly establishes the function of the computer security program and defines
responsibilities for both the computer security program and other related programs and entities.
Without such a statement, it is impossible to develop criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of
the program.
Long-Term Computer Security Strategy. A well-established program explores and develops long-
term strategies to incorporate computer security into the next generation of information
technology. Since the computer and telecommunications field moves rapidly, it is essential to plan
for future operating environments.
Compliance Program. A central computer security program needs to address compliance with
national policies and requirements, as well as organization-specific requirements. National
requirements include those prescribed under the Computer Security Act of 1987, OMB Circular A- 130, the FIRMR, and Federal Information Processing Standards.
Intraorganizational Liaison. Many offices
within an organization can affect computer
security. The Information Resources Management organization and physical
security office are two obvious examples. However, computer security often overlaps
with other offices, such as safety, reliability
and quality assurance, internal control, or the
Office of the Inspector General. An effective program should have established relationships
with these groups in order to integrate
computer security into the organization's
management. The relationships should encompass more than just the sharing of information; the offices should influence each other.
Liaison with External Groups. There are many sources of computer security information, such as
Example
Agency IRM offices engage in strategic and tactical
planning for both information and information
technology, in accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act and OMB Circular A-130. Security
should be an important component of these plans. The security needs of the agency should be reflected
in the information technology choices and the
information needs of the agency should be reflected in
the security program.
52
6. Computer Security Program Management
The most significant direct cost of a computer security program is personnel. In addition, many
programs make frequent and effective use of consultants and contractors. A program also needs
funds for training and for travel, oversight, information collection and dissemination, and meetings
with personnel at other levels of computer security management.
References
Federal Information Resources Management Regulations, especially 201-2. General Services
Administration. Washington, DC.
General Accounting Office. Automated Systems Security- Federal Agencies Should Strengthen
Safeguards Over Personal and Other Sensitive Data. GAO Report LCD 78-123. Washington,
DC. 1978.
General Services Administration. Information Resources Security: What Every Federal Manager
Should Know. Washington, DC.
Helsing, C, M. Swanson, and M. Todd. Executive Guide to the Protection of Information
Resources., Special Publication 500-169. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 1989.
Helsing, C, M. Swanson, and M. Todd. Management Guide for the Protection of Information
Resources. Special Publication 500-170. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 1989.
"Managing an Organization Wide Security Program." Computer Security Institute, San Francisco, CA. (course)
Office of Management and Budget. "Guidance for Preparation of Security Plans for Federal Computer Systems That Contain Sensitive Information." 0MB Bulletin 90-08. Washington, DC,
1990.
Office of Management and Budget. Management of Federal Information Resources. 0MB
Circular A- 130.
Owen, R., Jr. "Security Management: Using the Quality Approach." Proceedings of the 15th
National Computer Security Conference. Baltimore, MD: Vol. 2, 1992. pp. 584-592.
Spiegel, L. "Good LAN Security Requires Ajialysis of Corporate Data." Infoworld. 15(52), 1993.
p. 49.
57
8. Life Cycle Security
can be more expensive and less effective that security that is already integrated into the system. It
can also significantly degrade system performance. Of course, it is virtually impossible to
anticipate the whole array of problems that may arise during a system's lifetime. Therefore, it is
generally useful to update the computer security plan at least at the end of each phase in the life
cycle and after each re-accreditation. For many systems, it may be useful to update the plan more
often.
Life cycle management also helps document security-relevant decisions, in addition to helping
assure management that security is fully considered in all phases. This documentation benefits
system management officials as well as oversight and independent audit groups. System management personnel use documentation as a self-check and reminder of why decisions were made so that the impact of changes in the environment can be more easily assessed. Oversight
and independent audit groups use the documentation in their reviews to verify that system management has done an adequate job and to highlight areas where security may have been
overlooked. This includes examining whether the documentation accurately reflects how the
system is actually being operated.
Within the federal government, the Computer Security Act of 1987 and its implementing
instructions provide specific requirements for computer security plans. These plans are a form of
documentation that helps ensure that security is considered not only during system design and
development but also throughout the rest of the life cycle. Plans can also be used to be sure that
requirements of Appendix III to 0MB Circular A- 130, as well as other applicable requirements,
have been addressed.
8.3 Overview of the Computer System Life Cycle
There are many models for the computer system life cycle but most contain five basic phases, as
pictured in Figure 8.1.
• Initiation. During the initiation phase, the need for a system is expressed and the purpose of
the system is documented.
• Development/Acquisition. During this phase the system is designed, purchased,
programmed, developed, or otherwise constructed. This phase often consists of other
defined cycles, such as the system development cycle or the acquisition cycle.
• Implementation. After initial system testing, the system is installed or fielded.
• Operation/Maintenance. During this phase the system performs its work. The system is
almost always modified by the addition of hardware and software and by numerous other
events.
73
//. Management Controls
8.4.1.1 Conducting a Sensitivity
Assessment
A sensitivity assessment looks at the
sensitivity of both the information to be
processed and the system itself. The
assessment should consider legal implications,
organization policy (including federal and
agency policy if a federal system), and the
functional needs of the system. Sensitivity is
normally expressed in terms of integrity,
availability, and confidentiality. Such factors
as the importance of the system to the
organization's mission and the consequences of unauthorized modification, unauthorized
disclosure, or unavailability of the system or data need to be examined when assessing sensitivity. To address these types of issues, the people who use or own the system or information should
participate in the assessment.
A sensitivity assessment should answer the following questions:
• What information is handled by the system?
• What kind of potential damage could occur through error, unauthorized disclosure
or modification, or unavailability of data or the system?
• What laws or regulations affect security (e.g., the Privacy Act or the Fair Trade
Practices Act)?
• To what threats is the system or information particularly vulnerable?
• Are there significant environmental considerations (e.g., hazardous location of
system)?
• What are the security-relevant characteristics of the user community (e.g., level of
technical sophistication and training or security clearances)?
• What internal security standards, regulations, or guidelines apply to this system?
The sensitivity assessment starts an analysis of security that continues throughout the life cycle. The assessment helps determine if the project needs special security oversight, if further analysis is
The definition of sensitive is often misconstrued.
Sensitive is synonymous with important or valuable. Some data is sensitive because it must be kept
confidential. Much more data, however, is sensitive
because its integrity or availability must be assured. The Computer Security Act and 0MB Circular A-1 30
clearly state that information is sensitive if its
unauthorized disclosure, modification (i.e., loss of
integrity), or unavailability would harm the agency. In
general, the more important a system is to the mission
of the agency, the more sensitive it is.
76
//. Management Controls
management, operational, and technical issues under operational assurance. The reader should
keep in mind that the division is somewhat artificial and that there is substantial overlap.
9.1 Accreditation and Assurance
Accreditation is a management official's formal acceptance of the adequacy of a system's security.
The best way to view computer security accreditation is as a form of quality control. It forces
managers and technical staff to work together to find workable, cost-effective solutions given
security needs, technical constraints, operational constraints, and mission or business
requirements. The accreditation process obliges managers to make the critical decision regarding
the adequacy of security safeguards and, therefore, to recognize and perform their role in securing
their systems. In order for the decisions to be sound, they need to be based on reliable
information about the implementation of both technical and nontechnical safeguards. These
include:
• Technical features (Do they operate as intended?).
• Operational practices (Is the system operated according to stated procedures?).
• Overall security (Are there threats which the technical features and operational
practices do not address?).
• Remaining risks (Are they acceptable?).
A computer system should be accredited before the system becomes operational with periodic
reaccreditation after major system changes or when significant time has elapsed.^^ Even if a
system was not initially accredited, the accreditation process can be initiated at any time. Chapter
8 ftirther discusses accreditation.
9.1.1 Accreditation and Assurance
Assurance is an extremely important ~ but not the only ~ element in accreditation. As shown in
the diagram, assurance addresses whether the technical measures and procedures operate either
( 1 ) according to a set of security requirements and specifications or (2) according to general
quality principles. Accreditation also addresses whether the system's security requirements are
correct and well implemented and whether the level of quality is sufficiently high. These activities
are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.
0MB Circular A- 130 requires management security authorization of operation for federal systems.
90
///. Operational Controls
10.3 Contractor Access Considerations
Many federal agencies as well as private organizations use contractors and consultants to assist
with computer processing. Contractors are often used for shorter periods of time than regular
employees. This factor may change the cost-effectiveness of conducting screening. The often
higher turnover among contractor personnel generates additional costs for security programs in
terms of user administration.
10.4 Public Access Considerations
Many federal agencies have begun to design, develop, and implement public access systems for
electronic dissemination of information to the public. Some systems provide electronic interaction
by allowing the public to send information to the government (e.g., electronic tax filing) as well as
to receive it. When systems are made available for access by the public (or a large or significant
subset thereof), additional security issues arise due to: (1) increased threats against public access
systems and (2) the difficulty of security administration.
While many computer systems have been
victims of hacker attacks, public access 0MB Circular A- 130, Appendix III "Security of
systems are well known and have published Federal Automated Information" and NIST CSL
phone numbers and network access IDs. In ^"^'^^'^ "Security Issues in Public Access Systems"
A 1 1 \A u- both recommend segregating information made addition, a successful attack could result in a •. , . Zv i j directly accessible to the public from official records. lot of publicity. For these reasons, public
access systems are subject to a greater threat f^ggggg/ggigggggggggggg^^
from hacker attacks on the confidentiality,
availability, and integrity of information processed by a system. In general, it is safe to say that when a system is made available for public access, the risk to the system increases - and often the
constraints on its use are tightened.
Besides increased risk of hackers, public access systems can be subject to insider malice. For
example, an unscrupulous user, such as a disgruntled employee, may try to introduce errors into
data files intended for distribution in order to embarrass or discredit the organization. Attacks on
public access systems could have a substantial impact on the organization's reputation and the
level of public confidence due to the high visibility of public access systems. Other security
problems may arise from unintentional actions by untrained users.
In systems without public access, there are procedures for enrolling users that often involve some
user training and frequently require the signing of forms acknowledging user responsibilities. In
addition, user profiles can be created and sophisticated audit mechanisms can be developed to
detect unusual activity by a user. In public access systems, users are often anonymous. This can
complicate system security administration.
116
///. Operational Controls
training, as does the remainder of this chapter.
13.6 Implementation^^
An effective computer security awareness and training (CSAT) program requires proper planning,
implementation, maintenance, and periodic evaluation. The following seven steps constitute one
approach for developing a CSAT program.
Step 1 : Identify Program Scope, Goals, and Objectives.
Step 2: Identify Training Staff.
Step 3: Identify Target Audiences.
Step 4: Motivate Management and Employees.
Step 5: Administer the Program.
Step 6: Maintain the Program.
Step 7: Evaluate the Program.
13.6.1 Identify Program Scope, Goals, and
Objectives
The first step in developing a CSAT program
is to determine the program's scope, goals,
and objectives. The scope of the CSAT program should provide training to all types of
people who interact with computer systems. The scope of the program can be an entire
organization or a subunit. Since users need
training which relates directly to their use of
The Computer Security Act of 1987 requires federal
agencies to "provide for the mandatory periodic
training in computer security awareness and accepted
computer practices of all employees who are involved
with the management, use, or operation of each
federal computer system within or under the
supervision of that agency." The scope and goals of
federal computer security awareness and training
programs must implement this broad mandate.
(Other federal requirements for computer security
training are contained in 0MB Circular A- 130, Appendix lU, and 0PM regulations.)
Unfortunately, college and graduate security courses are not widely available. In addition, the courses may only
address general security.
This section is based on material prepared by the Department of Energy's Office of Information Management for its
unclassified security program.
'^This approach is presented to familiarize the reader with some of the important implementation issues. It is not the only
approach to implementing an awareness and training program.
148
V. Example
attack was detected, COG immediately contacted the HGA's Incident Handling Team, and was
told that a bug fix had been distributed by the server vendor several months earlier. To its
embarrassment, COG discovered that it had already received the fix, which it then promptly
installed. It now believes that no subsequent attacks of the same nature have succeeded.
Although HGA has no evidence that it has been significantly harmed to date by attacks via
external networks, it believes that these attacks have great potential to inflict damage. HGA's management considers itself lucky that such attacks have not harmed HGA's reputation and the
confidence of the citizens its serves. It also believes the likelihood of such attacks via external
networks will increase in the future.
20.3.6 Other Threats
HGA's systems also are exposed to several other threats that, for reasons of space, cannot be fully
enumerated here. Examples of threats and HGA's assessment of their probabilities and impacts
include those listed in Table 20. 1
20.4 Current Security Measures
HGA has numerous policies and procedures for protecting its assets against the above threats.
These are articulated in HGA's Computer Security Manual, which implements and synthesizes the
requirements of many federal directives, such as Appendix III to 0MB Circular A- 1 30, the Computer Security Act of 1987, and the Privacy Act. The manual also includes policies for
automated financial systems, such as those based on 0MB Circulars A- 123 and A- 127, as well as
the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act.
Several examples of those policies follow, as they apply generally to the use and administration of HGA's computer system and specifically to security issues related to time and attendance, payroll,
and continuity of operations.
20.4.1 General Use and Administration of HGA's Computer System
HGA's Computer Operations Group (COG) is responsible for controlling, administering, and
maintaining the computer resources owned and operated by HGA. These functions are depicted
in Figure 20. 1 enclosed in the large, dashed rectangle. Only individuals holding the job title
System Administrator are authorized to establish log-in IDs and passwords on multiuser HGA
systems (e.g., the LAN server). Only HGA's employees and contract personnel may use the
system, and only after receiving written authorization from the department supervisor (or, in the
case of contractors, the contracting officer) to whom these individuals report.
COG issues copies of all relevant security policies and procedures to new users. Before activating
248
20. Assessing and Mitigating the Risks to a Hypothetical Computer System
archived and kept for three years. The server's access controls for the on-line files are
automatically set to read-only access by the time and attendance application at the time of
submission to the mainframe. The integrity of time and attendance data will be protected by
digital signatures as they are implemented.
The WAN's communications protocols also protect against loss of data during transmission from
the server to the mainframe (e.g., error checking). In addition, the mainframe payroll application
includes a program that is automatically run 24 hours before paychecks and pay stubs are printed.
This program produces a report identifying agencies from whom time and attendance data for the
current pay period were expected but not received. Payroll department staff are responsible for
reviewing the reports and immediately notifying agencies that need to submit or resubmit time and
attendance data. If time and attendance input or other related information is not available on a
timely basis, pay, leave, and other benefits are temporarily calculated based on information
estimated from prior pay periods.
20.4.3 Protection Against Interruption of Operations
HGA's policies regarding continuity of operations are derived from requirements stated in OMB
Circular A- 130. HGA requires various organizations within it to develop contingency plans, test them annually, and establish appropriate administrative and operational procedures for supporting
them. The plans must identify the facilities, equipment, suppUes, procedures, and personnel
needed to ensure reasonable continuity of operations under a broad range of adverse
circumstances.
COG Contingency Planning
COG is responsible for developing and maintaining a contingency plan that sets forth the
procedures and facilities to be used when physical plant failures, natural disasters, or major
equipment malfunctions occur sufficient to disrupt the normal use of HGA's PCs, LAN, server,
router, printers, and other associated equipment.
The plan prioritizes applications that rely on these resources, indicating those that should be
suspended if available automated fianctions or capacities are temporarily degraded. COG
personnel have identified system software and hardware components that are compatible with
those used by two nearby agencies. HGA has signed an agreement with those agencies, whereby
they have committed to reserving spare computational and storage capacities sufficient to support HGA's system-based operations for a few days during an emergency.
No communication devices or network interfaces may be connected to HGA's systems without
written approval of the COG Manager. The COG staff is responsible for installing all known
security-related software patches in a timely manner and for maintaining spare or redundant PCs,
servers, storage devices, and LAN interfaces to ensure that at least 100 people can simultaneously
253
Cross Reference and Index
I
individual accountability - see accountability
integrity statements
integrity verification
internal controls
intrusion detection
J, K
keys, cryptographic for authentication key escrow
see also Escrowed Encryption Standard key management (cryptography)
keystroke monitoring
L
labels
least privilege
liabilities
likelihood analysis
link encryption
M
maintenance accounts
malicious code
(virus, virus scanning, Trojan horse) monitoring
N, O
operational assurance 0MB Circular A- 130
95
100, 159-60, 227-30
98, 114
100, 168, 213
182
225-6
85, 114-5, 186, 199, 232 214
159, 202-3
107-8, 109, 112, 114, 179 95
62-3
233
161-2
27-8, 79, 95, 99, 133-5, 157, 166, 204, 213, 215,230
36, 67, 75, 79, 82, 86, 96, 99-101, 171, 182, 184,
185, 186, 205,213,214,215
82-3, 89, 96
7,48, 52, 73,76, 116, 149
password crackers
passwords, one-time
password-based access control
penetration testing
permission bits
plan, computer security
privacy
policy (general)
policy, issue- specific
99-100, 182
185-6, 189, 230
182, 199
98-9
200-1, 203
53, 71-3, 98, 127, 161
14, 28-9, 38, 78, 92, 196
12, 33-43,49, 51, 78, 144, 161
37-40, 78
274